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The true diamond is a hard, diaphanous perfectly transparent stone, which doth 
sparkle forth its glorie much like the twinckling of a glorious starre. 
 T Nicols The History of Precious Stones 1652 
 
1. Synopsis 
 
Diamonds have played a dual role in society since their discovery. On the one hand, they 
have brought smiles to the faces of many exhibiting love, beauty, wealth and brilliance. On 
the other hand, they have been at the heart of many conflicts. This juxtaposition has different 
impacts in usage. For those whom diamonds were a positively and morally accepted benefit, 
it did not present problems. Where diamonds spurned conflicts, it caused harm to lives and 
territories. 
  
Human rights abuses became the cause of international conflicts. Humanitarian interventions 
appeared on the United Nations Security Council agenda. The United Nations had to address 
the human rights abuses and had to confront the escalation of human rights abuses. Human 
rights abuses reached significant proportions forcing the application of humanitarian 
intervention mechanisms. Control of the diamond trade industry was fast becoming an item 
on many international peace keeping agendas.  
 
International organisations such as the World Trade Organisation, the International Criminal 
Court, the African Union, the European Union, the World Diamond Council and the United 
Nations have all tried to influence the diamond trade and its consequential impact upon 
human rights. These organisations are regulated by law, making them a preferred mechanism 
for establishing accountability for human rights abuse, arising from the illegal trade in rough 
diamonds and the maintenance of peace and security. 
 
Pressed by the United Nations and, De Beers; NGOs; the Partnership Africa Canada and 
Global Witness; the World Diamond Council; and many States initiated a formalised 
voluntary international certification scheme for the export and import of diamonds. This 
xx 
 
international certification scheme for the trade of rough diamonds became known as the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 
 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has been hailed as a milestone in the diamond 
trade industry. Simultaneously, the Certification Scheme has been criticised for its inefficacy 
in regulating the legitimate trade of rough diamonds. Whether the Certification Scheme in its 
present form is suitable to address the crisis in the trade of rough diamonds is central to this 
study. Thus, the characterisation, monitoring, implementation and evolution of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme will be examined.  
  
xxi 
 
Key terms 
International law; international human rights law and diamonds; human rights abuses; 
conflict diamonds; implementation of the KPCS; monitoring of the KPCS; 
characterisation of the KPCS; soft law; international trade; Kimberley Process 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict diamonds or as they are more colloquially known as „blood diamonds,‟ have played 
a significant role in the international diamond trade environment. Illegally mined diamonds 
are sold throughout the world for two critical reasons. The first reason is that of acquisition 
for extrinsic value. The second reason is that conflict diamonds have been exchanged for 
arms and ammunition which, funded civil wars in countries such as Sierra Leone and 
Angola.
1
 Over time, it was discovered that Liberia, albeit in mostly industrial and modest 
quantities held a significant portion of the diamond trade.
2
 
 
The civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola prompted the United Nations to resolve that a 
„Certificate of Origin‟ should accompany the trade of all diamonds mined in Angola.3 As the 
problem of conflict diamonds escalated, the United Nations, civil society organisations, the 
World Diamond Council and many States agreed to enter into a voluntary mechanism that 
would serve as the basis for an international certification scheme for the trade of rough 
diamonds.  
 
Known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
4
 its thrust was to ensure that 
Participants to the Certification Scheme attach a Kimberley Certificate to every shipment of 
rough diamonds. Eliminating or curbing the illicit trade of rough diamonds is the first 
objective of the Certification Scheme. The second objective is to protect against human rights 
abuses that arise from the illegal trade of rough diamonds. The Certification Scheme is 
confined to certifying transactions for rough diamonds. Polished and processed diamonds, as 
well as synthetically produced diamonds like crystals fall outside the scope of application of 
the Certification Scheme. 
 
The Certification Scheme is not a treaty under international law. It is a voluntary mechanism 
without measures for compliance. The Certification Scheme began operation in 2003. In 
2006, the Working Group to the Kimberley Process embarked on its first review of the 
                                                 
1
 UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) UN Doc UN A/RES/55/56(2000). 
2
 http://www.globalwitness.org/library/civil-society-expresses-vote-no-confidence-conflict-diamond-scheme. 
Last visited 08 July 2011. 
3
 http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html. Last visited 08 July 2011. See also http://www. 
globalwitness.org /library/why-there-should-not-be-embargo-all-angolan-diamonds. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
4
 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme available on www.kimberleyprocesss.com; hereafter referred to 
as the „Certification Scheme‟. Attached as Annex A.  
3 
 
implementation and monitoring of the Certification Scheme.
5
 Although commended by the 
Kimberley Process, the Review brought to the attention of the international diamond industry 
its shortcomings and failings.  
 
The Certification Scheme as a „scheme‟ is not capable of achieving its two intended 
objectives; namely, to curb the illicit trade of rough diamonds and to better protect human 
rights. The inability to achieve these two objectives forms the basis of this study.
6
 The study 
hypothesises that should an international certification scheme for the trade of rough diamonds 
be sought, it must be elevated to the level of a legally binding mechanism such as a law 
making treaty mechanism. Therefore, the legal characterisation, implementation, monitoring 
and evolution of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme are central concerns of the 
study.  
 
The study is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the Certification Scheme 
document and how it came about. Furthermore, the Third Year Review in implementation 
and monitoring is also examined. An examination of the role of international organisations 
such as the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), the United Nations Security Council 
(UN SC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) follows. This concludes the first part of 
the study.  
 
The second part of the study considers the role of international law in the international 
community, focussing on the law relating to certain phenomena in the international 
community. These phenomena can create norms for compliance, even by actors that do not 
have a legal status in international law. The second part also deals with an analysis of the 
Certification Scheme in its present form, arising from the Third Year Review as it was 
reviewed in the first part of the study.  
                                                 
5
 Third Year Review available at www.kimberleyprocess.com. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
6
 On efficacy of the Certification Scheme see Wallis AC „Data mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for 
the United Nations‟ development of human rights norms for transnational corporations‟ (2005) 4/2 Nw Univ J 
Int’l for Hum Rts at 388-417 on monitoring, enforcement, redress and accountability issues; see also Holmes JD 
„The Kimberley Process: Evidence of change in international law‟(2006-2007) 3 Int’l L & Mgmnt Rev at 228-
232 213-232 on the Certification Scheme; see also Malamut SA „A band aid on a machete wound: Failures of 
the Kimberley Process and diamond caused bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ (2005-2006) 
29 Suffolk Transnat’l L Rev at 40-41 on the failings of the Certification Scheme 25-52; see also Smillie I „Loupe 
holes: Illicit diamonds in the Kimberley Process‟ (2008) Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness in 
general. 
 
4 
 
The second part of the study is aimed at demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Certification Scheme, which leads to the concluding chapter of the study. In this part, the 
Zimbabwean Marange situation is also addressed. The concluding chapter seeks to 
characterise the Certification Scheme in legal terms. The legal characterisation of the 
Certification Scheme is crucial in light of the international support and compliance it has 
received despite it not being a conventional international legal instrument.  
 
In this first chapter, the first section will look at the history of diamonds; the diamond trade 
and conflict-free diamonds. The second section will study blood diamonds, or conflict 
diamonds, and the role of the United Nations and the Certification Scheme which will lead to 
a conclusion. 
 
Following on this introductory first chapter, chapter two provides a general background to the 
diamond trade. Chapter two will proceed to discuss the background to the Certification 
Scheme itself. In addition, chapter two will provide a general background and a background 
to the formation of the Certification Scheme in order to understand how the Certification 
Scheme came about.  
 
Understanding the Certification Scheme‟s origins will enable a critical understanding as to 
how and why the illegal trade of rough diamonds was regulated by a Certification Scheme, 
which is a quasi legal, self-regulating and voluntary mechanism as opposed to a legally 
binding instrument. Examination of past developments leading to the Certification Scheme 
will allow the study to be clear with regard to future developments.  
 
Chapter three of the study discusses the Certification Scheme. The contents of the 
Certification Scheme are examined in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the 
contents. It is important to examine the contents of the Certification Scheme, as examination 
will allow the study to reveal its legal nature. 
 
In the main, the Certification Scheme may have a quasi legal basis in law. It is a voluntary, 
self regulatory initiative whose provisions may be adhered to by States and the diamond 
sector alike. The Certification Scheme operates on the basic premise that a Kimberley 
Process Certificate must accompany each shipment of rough diamonds from the point of 
origin to the point of destination. Participants to the Certification Scheme are expected to 
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fulfil particular „requirements‟ in order for the Certification Scheme to have application 
within their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, Participants are also expected to undertake 
several other measures, aimed toward the workability of the Certification Scheme. 
 
Chapter four discusses the Third Year Review
7
 with respect to implementation and 
monitoring of the Certification Scheme. The Certification Scheme makes provision for a 
review of the implementation and monitoring to be undertaken.
8
 Participants agreed to 
undertake a review of the operation of the Certification Scheme three years after the same 
came into existence. 
 
Other organisations such a Partnership Africa Canada have also undertaken reviews of the 
Certification Scheme.
9
 Chapter four does not focus on those reviews in the main. It will 
rather focus on the role of regional organisations in the implementation of the Certification 
Scheme. Chapter five will identify the shortcomings and the strong points of the Certification 
Scheme through an investigation of the implementation and monitoring by the Participants to 
the Certification Scheme. The areas of compliance and the areas of non compliance, linked to 
the Certification Scheme‟s specific provisions will also be highlighted. This will enable an 
understanding of how the Certification Scheme is being implemented and monitored to date.  
 
The identification of the shortcomings and strengths of the Certification Scheme in practice, 
outlined in chapter five, combined with the strengths and weakness of the provisions of the 
Certification Scheme, in chapter three, will give a more complete picture of the overall 
strengths and weaknesses of the Certification Scheme.  
 
According to the Third Year Review, the Certification Scheme is effective.
10
 In pronouncing 
on the Certification Scheme‟s efficacy, the Review recommended a number of actions to 
strengthen the Certification Scheme further. In particular, areas such as monitoring of 
implementation and strengthening internal controls in participating countries, as well as 
greater transparency in the gathering of statistical data came to the fore.  
                                                 
7
 Third Year Review submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group to the KP in November 2006 available at 
www.kimberleyprocess.com last visited 01 September 2011; see also Smillie I „Diamond and human security‟ 
(2008) Annual Review at 1-24 and Smillie I „Diamond and human security‟ (2009) Annual Review at 1-24. 
8
 Section VI(13) of the Certification Scheme. 
9
 Smillie supra, see also Left S „Corrupt countries named in new survey‟ Guardian (28 August 2002) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/28/sarahleft at 4. 
10
 Third Year Review at 1 in the Executive Summary and throughout the Third Year Review document. 
6 
 
This first three year Review focused on three major areas: firstly, the impact of the 
Certification Scheme on the international trade in rough diamonds, and the extent to which 
the Certification Scheme has been effective in preventing the flow of conflict diamonds into 
the legitimate trade; secondly, the technical provisions of the Certification Scheme and 
whether they are functioning as planned or require improvement; and thirdly, the operations 
of the Certification Scheme and its efficacy.  
 
Chapter five addresses the role of international organisations in the Certification Scheme. 
This chapter will turn the focus to the role of international organisations towards the efficacy 
of the Certification Scheme. International organisations have impacted upon the Certification 
Scheme since before its inception. Thus, chapter five examines the impact of international 
organisations such as the UN SC, the UN GA and the WTO in the first part. In the second 
part of the chapter five, the role of regional organisations such as the EC and the AU will be 
studied with regard to the strides they have made with the illegal trade of rough diamonds.  
 
Many organisations impact upon the workability of the Certification Scheme. However not 
all organisations will be examined in this study. The organisations, which have demonstrated 
the greatest impact resulting in the formation, recognition and workability of the Certification 
Scheme, will be examined. 
 
An examination of the role of international organisations will show the importance of 
international organisations to the Certification Scheme. Consequently, the important roles of 
these organisations will become clearer as the Certification Scheme appears to have 
embarked upon normative creation. It may be speculated that a treaty based mechanism may 
significantly improve the long term sustainability of regulating the illegal trade of rough 
diamonds; thus allowing the Certification Scheme‟s contents to give proper effect to its initial 
objectives. 
 
UN GA Resolution 55/56 established the initial mandate for the Kimberley Process in 
December 2000.
11
 Resolution 55/56 called for several structural measures to regulate the 
                                                 
11
 UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000). This Resolution created the mandate for the Kimberley Process which, has 
been regularly renewed by the UN GA through the following UN GA Resolutions: UN Doc A/56/263(2002), 
UN Doc A/57/302(2003), UN Doc A/58/290(2004), UN Doc A/59/144(2004), and UN Doc A/60/182(2005). 
The Certification Scheme has gained important recognition from the UN SC through the UN SC Resolution 
1459 UN Doc S/1459(2003). More recently the role of the Certification Scheme has been acknowledged in UN 
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trade of rough diamonds. It also explained the justification for the Certification Scheme, that 
is, to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds, which contributes to human rights crises.  
 
The UN SC Resolutions combined with the series of UN GA Resolutions represent an 
important accomplishment because they reflect widespread and continued international 
support for the Certification Scheme by the UN. Resolutions, according to the Review also 
confer an important measure of legitimacy upon the Certification Scheme in their 
acknowledgement of the efforts of Participants and Observers.
12
 
 
The illicit production and trade of diamonds have, in the main, fuelled conflicts in African 
countries, in particular, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Angola and Liberia.
13
 The escalation in 
conflicts, which were thought to be domestic conflicts and out of the purview of international 
organisations such as the UN and regional organisations such as the AU, became 
internationalised.
14
 
 
Consequently, conflicts that became intertwined with the trade in conflict diamonds appeared 
on international agendas. During the Millennium Session of the UN GA the agenda included 
„The role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts‟.15 The General Assembly strove to maintain a 
balance between conflict diamonds that „were a crucial factor in promoting brutal wars in 
parts of Africa‟ and legitimate diamonds that „contribute to the prosperity and development 
elsewhere on the continent‟.16 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
SC Resolutions 1521(2003) UN Doc S/1521(2003) on Liberia and 1643(2005) UN Doc S/1643(2005) on Côte 
d‟Ivoire. 
12
 Efrat A „Toward internationally regulated goods: Controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons‟ 
(2010) 64 International Organisation at 106 where a group of European NGOs launched a campaign against 
conflict diamonds called „Fatal Transactions‟ in the 1990s; see also Cooper N „Putting disarmament back in the 
frame‟ (2006) 32 Review of International Studies at 368 for a positive evaluation of the Certification Scheme. 
13
 Dates as far back as 1938, see Rosenthal Other Men’s Millions (1968) at 45-89; see also Billon PL „Thriving 
on war: The Angolan conflict and private business‟ (2001) Review of African Political Economy at 629-631; 
with regard to the DRC see Samset I „Conflict of interest or interests in conflict? Diamonds and wars in the 
DRC‟ (2002) Review of African Political Economy at 465-470 and 476-777; see Rosenthal (1968) that diamonds 
have been at the heart on conflict even during the Second World War Diamond industry in wartime (1943) 129-
43; see also in general Jacobson D The price of diamonds (1957) at 56-104. 
14
 See in general Mamdani M Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism 
(1996) at 56-75 and Ndegwa SN „Citizenship and ethnicity: An examination of two moments in Kenyan 
politics‟ (1997) 19 American political Science Review at 104-120. 
15
 Cooper N „Putting disarmament back in the frame‟ (2006) 32 Review of International Studies at 369; see also 
„A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict‟ in Global Witness (1998) 
16
 Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
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The UN recognised that international and regional organisations have a critical role to play in 
trade of conflict diamonds.
17
 The Certification Scheme acknowledged the role of 
international and regional organisations. Therefore, it is important within the context of this 
study to examine the role of international and regional organisations as their actions are 
crucial to the illicit trade of conflict diamonds and the consequent human rights crises. 
 
Chapter five will explain the roles of the UN SC, the UN GA, the WTO and finally that of 
regional organisations. Within regional organisations, the examples of the African and 
European Unions will be discussed. These organisations are examined against the 
background of the UN‟s role to ensure peace and security in the world.18 Chapter five is 
confined in its examination to the discussion on conflict diamonds and therefore is not 
intended to be a comprehensive examination of international organisations. Chapter five 
concludes the first part of the study.  
 
This first part concludes the salient aspects of the Certification Scheme itself. The second part 
proceeds to discuss the legal theoretical framework of accountability mechanism. Chapter six 
examines the phenomenon of norm creation in the international arena and discusses soft law. 
A selection of representative authors will be examined. This chapter intends to set the 
framework for new norm creation in the international arena.  
 
In the second part of the study, chapter seven proceeds to analyse the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Certification Scheme as highlighted by the Third Year Review. Finally, in 
this chapter the legal status of an international scheme for the certification of rough diamonds 
is discussed.  
 
The problems identified mainly in chapters three and four are juxtaposed against the findings 
of this study insofar as implementation and monitoring is concerned, to ensure a full and 
proper analysis. Chapter seven postulates that a law making treaty mechanism for the 
international certification scheme would have been the more appropriate mechanism as 
opposed to a „soft law‟ mechanism. Chapter eight will examine the diamond mining and 
                                                 
17
 UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/55/56(2000); see Shaw TM „Regional dimensions of conflict and peace 
building in contemporary Africa‟ (2003) 15 J Int Dev at 491-494.  
18
 Article 1 on Principles and Purposes of the UN Charter; see Brownlie I Principles of international law (1990) 
at 679-701. 
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production situation in the Marange region. The chapter will also examine the human rights 
situation in the region. The applicability of the Certification Scheme to the Marange region is 
very important; and must thus be examined. The Marange situation in Zimbabwe is addressed 
so as to examine the efficacy of the Certification Scheme in Participant countries 
experiencing illegal diamond mining. 
 
Chapter nine concludes the study. It contains a conclusion. The study concludes that for 
bolstered efficacy, with regard to the accountability and compliance, an international 
certification mechanism for the illegal trade of rough diamonds has to be couched in a law 
making normative mechanism. The legal characterisation of the Certification Scheme in 
international legal terms is discussed; and its consequent use in international law. 
  
10 
 
PART I 
CHAPTER 2 : BACKGROUND TO THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 
CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the background to the formation of the Certification Scheme. 
Furthermore, it explains how the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme came about.  
 
In this chapter, the first part will look at the history of diamonds; the diamond trade and 
conflict free diamonds. The second part will provide a brief overview of blood diamonds or 
conflict diamonds; the role of the UN and the Certification Scheme which will lead to a 
conclusion. 
 
Understanding the Certification Scheme‟s origins will enable a critical understanding as to 
how and why the illegal trade of rough diamonds has to date been regulated by a Certification 
Scheme, which is a quasi legal, self-regulating and voluntary mechanism as opposed to a 
legally binding mechanism. Examination of past developments leading to the Certification 
Scheme will allow the study to be clear with regard to future developments.  
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2. History of diamonds 
 
Diamonds were formed between 600 million and 3 billion years ago when pressure and heat 
caused carbon 1,931 km below the Earth‟s surface to crystallise.1 About a million years ago, 
erupting molten rock brought the diamonds closer to the earth‟s surface.2 The desire for 
diamonds is based on the idea that diamonds are precious and rare. While diamonds may be 
precious, they are not rare.
3
 Mines in Africa, Canada and other countries abound with the 
stones, which are for beneficiation and mostly not for sale.
4
 
 
As a commodity, the most attractive quality of diamonds is that they retain their purity.
5
 
Diamonds are the purest and toughest substance made by nature, formed when carbon is 
compressed into crystals under great heat and pressure deep within the earth‟s mantle.6 
Diamonds are measured in carats and judged by the four C‟s, namely colour, cut, carat weight 
and clarity.
7
 The extrinsic value of the diamond creates a desire for possession and 
ownership.
8
 
 
In Sierra Leone, until the issuing of digging licenses began in February 1956, diamond 
digging by Africans was illegal.
9
 From the mid 1950s, the „Diamond Rush‟ became 
international news. Approximately 30 000 diggers expanded their illegal activities in the 
                                                 
1
 Hoyt A How the African diamond trade works at www.blooddiamondaction.org. Last visited 08 July 2011; see 
also Keppel-Jones A South Africa: A short history (1975) at 77-87.  
2
 Hoyt supra at 77-79. 
3
 Diamonds are mined in more than 20 countries in the world and more than 100 countries are involved in the 
diamond industry. Yet only 4 companies control 76 percent of the world‟s rough diamonds: De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd, Alrosa Ltd, Rio Tinto and BHB Billiton. GAO 2002. 
4
 For an interesting position, see Allihgan Curtain up on South Africa  (1960) at 246-250; see also De Villiers M 
and Hirtle S Into Africa: A journey through the ancient empires (1997) at 139-142; see also in general Englebert 
P State legitimacy and development in Africa (2000) at 151-157.  
5
 Nadubere DW Africa’s First World War: Mineral wealth, conflicts and wars in the Great Lakes Region (1985) 
at 79-80; also see Greenhalgh P West African diamonds 1919-1983: An economic history (1985) at 12; see also 
Goredema C „Diamonds and other precious stones in armed conflicts and law enforcement co-operation in 
Southern Africa‟ (2002) May Institute for Security Studies ISS Paper 57.  
6
 Green T The world of diamonds (1981) at 1. 
7
 There are more than 16 000 categories of diamonds varying from industrial grade to gem quality; see also SA 
Department of Information Fact Paper 53 (1958) at 1-7; see also in general Hornsby AH South African diamond 
fields (1874) at 45-89. 
8
 From the 1850s when the British took possession of the Kohi-noor diamond from India and handed it over to 
the East India Company; see generally Ward F in Rubies and sapphires (2003) at 120-153.  
9
 Greenhalgh id at 152; of interest see also Haq K and U Kirdar (eds) Human development, adjustment and 
growth (1987) at 54-76 and Olson M The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social 
rigidities (1982) at 97-108; see further Gathii Slippages in public/private in resource wars (2010) at 21-36. 
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Kono district of Sierra Leone.
10
 Expansion continued southwards into the Bo and Kenama 
districts where licenses were not issued.
11
 
 
In South Africa, in contrast, diamond mining, production and sale are regulated by national 
legislation. The Department of Mineral Resources is responsible for overseeing and 
regulating these processes. In South Africa, more than 140 years have passed since the 
discovery of the Eureka diamond in 1867, which led to the birth of the modern diamond 
industry.
12
 South Africa‟s diamond industry has transformed over the years, accompanied by 
changes in legislation, specifically amendments to the Diamonds Act,
13
 and the Diamonds 
Export Levy Act.
14
 
 
The first diamonds found in South Africa were alluvial. By 1870, it was discovered that the 
blue, hard, igneous rock, later named kimberlite, is the primary source of diamonds. Later, in 
the early 20th century, diamonds were discovered on the seabed along the west coast of South 
Africa. Presently, South Africa remains a major diamond producer and diamonds are still 
mined from all three sources aforementioned. 
 
Internationally, as the diamond industry grew, so did the flow of conflict diamonds. South 
Africa played a leading role in the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a 
joint government, industry, and civil society initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds. 
 
South Africa‟s Diamonds Act15 led to the establishment of the South African Diamond Board 
in 1987 to regulate control over the possession, sale, purchase, processing and export of 
diamonds. However, this piece of legislation did not benefit cutters and polishers who make 
                                                 
10
 Greenhalgh ibid; see also in general Van der Laan HL The Sierre Leone diamonds: An economic study 
covering the years 1952-1961 (1965) 59-98; Keen D Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone (2005) at 175-213 
and general Hirsch JL „Sierre Leone Diamonds and the struggle for democracy‟ (2001) International Peace 
Academy Occasional Paper Series at 45-87. 
11
 Greenhalgh id at 154; see also Muller CF (ed) 500 Years: A history of South Africa (1986) at 187-205; of 
interest see Rosenthal Other Men’s Millions (1968) at 191; see for an interesting narrative account 189-197. 
These were the days in which the British traded one ox for one diamond with the local population, the very first 
diamond parcel left South Africa for London by means of a red flannel band, tied around the waist of a young 
man, with a series of pouches into which diamonds were placed. 
12
 South African Diamond Handbook and Operating Diamond Mines Directory (2010) (Directory D7/2010) 
available at http://www.dmr.gov.za/Mineral_Information/New/d7.pdf. Last visited 07 September 2011 at 6. 
13
 Diamonds Act No 56 of 1986. 
14
 Diamonds Export Levy Act No 15 of 2007. 
15
 Diamonds Act. 
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up the first stage of value addition in SA‟s diamond value chain. As a result, three pieces of 
legislation, namely the Diamonds Amendment Act,
16
 the Diamonds Second Amendment 
Act
17
 and the Precious Metals Act,
18
 were promulgated in 2007. 
 
The promulgation of these pieces of legislation broadened the legal mandate of the South 
African Diamond Board to also regulate precious metals. Subsequently, the South African 
Diamond Board was delisted as a public entity in March 2007 and replaced by the South 
African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator.
19
 The objectives of the South African 
Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator in terms of the Diamonds Act are to: 
 
 ensure that the diamond resources of the Republic are exploited and developed in 
the best interests of the people of South Africa; 
 promote equitable access to, and local beneficiation of, the Republic‟s diamonds; and 
 ensure compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 
 
The Regulator‟s functions with regard to diamonds include: 
 implementing, administering and controlling all matters relating to the purchase, 
sale, beneficiation, import and export of diamonds; and 
 establishing diamond exchange and export centres, which shall facilitate the 
buying, selling, export and import of diamonds and matters connected therewith. 
 
Whilst the former SA Diamond Board had an essentially regulatory role, the South African 
Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator has a promotional role as well. Through 
administering licenses and export approvals, the South African Diamond and Precious Metals 
Regulator will strive to ensure that local demand for diamonds and precious metals is catered 
for, and that there is growth in local beneficiation of diamonds and precious metals. 
 
The Diamonds Second Amendment Act prohibits: 
 Sale and purchase of unpolished diamonds; 
 Assistance by non-licensed persons; 
                                                 
16
 Diamonds Amendment Act No 29 of 2005. 
17
 Diamonds Second Amendment Act No 30 of 2005. 
18
 Precious Metals Act No 37 of 2005. 
19
 Established by section 3 of the Diamonds Act 1896 as amended in 2005. 
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 Processing of diamonds; 
 Erection and operation of machinery; and 
 Export of unpolished diamonds. 
 
Exceptions are licensed producers, manufacturers, dealers, beneficiators, researchers and 
holders of permits. The Minister of Mineral Resources has the power to exempt a producer 
from the requirement to offer rough diamonds intended for export for sale at the Diamond 
Exchange and Export Centre.
20
 This exemption also ensures that the Diamond Exchange and 
Export Centre is not overwhelmed with a high volume of low valued diamonds. 
 
The diamond trade has many facets in the chain commencing from mining and culminating in 
retail. Understanding the chain in the diamond trade is critical to the appreciation of 
vulnerabilities and points of illegal interventions as well as the appropriate choices for policy, 
legal and regulatory frameworks.  
  
                                                 
20
 S 48A of the Diamonds Act 1986 as amended. 
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3. The diamond trade 
 
The general principles of diamond trading must be considered. This will enable an 
understanding of how diamonds make their way from mines to the retail industry. The 
Certification Scheme regulates the various processes and role players in the diamond trade. 
Understanding the operation of diamond trading is essential to making an evaluation of the 
efficacy of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The diamond trade is characterised by its secrecy inasmuch as it is also conducted with a 
particular lack of business formalities.
21
 The diamond trade has many actors that may be 
characterised as follows:
22
 
 
 Miner – he mines diamonds  
 
 Shop owner – he establishes a licensed shop in the diamond mining area and 
supplies various miners in exchange of diamonds they produce  
 
 Diamond dealer – he buys from many shop owners and/or miners  
 
 Diamond buyer – he visits the diamond producing regions and buys from local 
diamond dealers 
 
 Diamond trader – he is established in the main diamond trading centres and 
buys from various diamond buyers, whom he often finances  
 
 Diamond cutter – he buys rough diamonds from diamond traders to cut them  
 
                                                 
21
 See in general Schram F „The legal aspects of the Kimberely Process‟ (2007) International Peace Information 
Services (2007) at 1-38.  
22
 Malamut „A band aid on a machete wound‟ (2005-2006) at 25-29 on chain of diamond mining; see also 
Kaplan M „Carats and sticks: Pursuing war and peace through the diamond trade‟ (2003) 35 NYUJ Int’l L & Pol 
at 570-575 on the pipeline of the diamond trade comprising of mostly miners, middlemen, rebel groups and 
foreign buyers; see also Ward F Diamonds (1998) at 30-31; see also www.blooddiamondaction.org; see also in 
general Miller R The mining and production of diamonds at CDM 1945-1983 (1985) at 140-149 and Harrison 
JL Law and economics (1995) at 132-156. 
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 Cut diamond wholesaler – he buys cut diamonds from diamond cutters and 
supplies local retailers or jewellery manufacturers  
 
 Jewellery maker/wholesaler – he makes or wholesales readymade jewellery  
 
 Cut diamond/jewellery retailer – he retails to clients and the market widely  
 
The factual course of a diamond transaction may include all, more or only some of the afore 
mentioned intermediaries. Names of intermediaries can change but the function is retained. 
Some intermediaries hold more than one function. Of importance, is that most diamond 
business participants in the chain know each other and often conduct business on the basis of 
personal trust and acquaintance.
23
 Thus, it is difficult for a newcomer to enter into the 
business.  
 
Newcomers to the aforementioned chain of intermediaries endeavour to contact miners 
directly or local diamond dealers. The fear underlying entrance of the newcomer into the 
circle of diamond business is that one does not know whether the newcomer is able to deliver 
as in accordance with the agreement entered into. The newcomer may be unscrupulous or 
underfunded. There are no substantive guarantees. Diamonds are liquid cash.
24
 This means 
that diamonds may be weighed and transformed into readily available cash in a significantly 
short period. The intermediaries in the chain of diamond trade will experience little difficulty 
brokering a deal if the conditions are favourable, even if the other contractor is a newcomer.  
 
  
                                                 
23
 See in general Lenzen G The history of the diamond production and the diamond trade (1970) at 56-78; Ward 
(1998) at 3-1; Herbert I The diamond diggers: South Africa 1866 to the 1970s (1972) at 56-58; see also Goreax 
L „Conflict diamonds‟ (2001) World Bank Africa Region Working Paper Series No 13 at 2-4. 
24
 Passas N and Jones K „Commodities and terrorist financing: Focus on diamonds‟ (2006) 12 European Journal 
on Criminal Policy and Research at 9-10; see Fishman JL „Is diamond smuggling forever? The Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme: The first step down the long road to solving the blood diamond trade problem‟ 
(2004-2005) 13 U Miami Bus LRev at 233-240 and 217-242 on smuggling in the DRC; see in general also 
Needham D The economics and politics of regulation: A behavioural approach (1998) at 45-97 and Dimock 
ME Business and government (1957) at 141-167. 
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4. Conflict-free diamonds 
 
Conflict-free diamonds are generally regarded as diamonds arising out of legitimate trade, 
from mining to retailing. The conflict-free diamond trade is legitimately regulated and 
sanctioned by an accountable government. The Certification Scheme does not define conflict-
free diamonds. However, it is submitted that a conflict-free diamond may be loosely defined 
as a diamond that does not arise from a situation of conflict. The definition will include the 
trajectory of the diamond from the point of production, which is mining, to the point of final 
retail.  
 
There are countries that rely on conflict-free diamond trade as an important part of their 
economies. In 1999, Botswana was considered the world‟s fastest growing economy.25 Three 
quarters of Botswana‟s export profits and 45 percent of the country‟s government revenue are 
generated by the diamond industry.
26
 Due to a legitimate diamond industry, Botswana has 
enjoyed a complete change from one of the world‟s poorest countries in 1966 to the world‟s 
most rapidly growing economy over the last 25 years.
27
 Botswana intends to establish 
beneficiation rights over the diamond production and its consequent trade.
28
 
 
Canada also boasts a growing and exemplary diamond industry, and many other countries 
around the world feature legitimate diamond mines.
29
 Conflict-free diamonds are dependent 
on the government and the mining corporations that are committed to operating within a 
legitimate diamond trading regime. When the government, mining corporations and the 
general population move away from operating within a legitimate diamond trading regime, 
the door is open for the illegal trade of diamonds; and diamonds produced by conflicts which 
came to be called conflict diamonds or blood diamonds. 
 
                                                 
25
 Official website http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/BOTSWANA 
EXTN/0,,contentMDK:21820856~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:322804,00.html. Last visited 08 July 
2011. 
26
 Official website http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/BOTSWANA 
EXTN/0,,contentMDK:21820856~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:322804,00.html.Last visited 08 
July 2011. 
27
 Ibid; see also Ward (1998) at 30-31 and 33-35 http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=4&aid=14&dir= 
2009/September/Wednesday23. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
28
 http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=4&aid=14&dir=2009/September/Wednesday23. Last visited 08 July 
2011. 
29
 Passas and Jones Commodities (2006) at 9-10. 
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Some critics of the existing state of the African diamond trade have a propensity to concur 
that excluding the diamond industry would have a negative effect on many innocent people in 
Africa that rely on diamond mines for their livelihood.
30
 Several post-war nations, such as 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, are free from the rule of illegal diamond mining organisations.
31
 In 
fact, in 2005 a peaceful Sierra Leone exported more than US $142 million worth of 
diamonds.
32
 However, areas of the Ivory Coast and the eastern portion of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo continue to suffer at the hands of unscrupulous diamond fortune seekers.
33
 
 
Conflict-free diamond trade is not regarded as a threat or risk to human rights and regional 
peace. Conflict diamonds are regarded as the source of these problems. However, the trade of 
conflict-free diamonds is inextricably linked to conflict diamonds due to the nature of the 
diamond trade. The role players in the conflict-free diamond trade have therefore recognised 
their responsibilities in curbing conflict diamond trading in the form of the Certification 
Scheme.  
  
                                                 
30
 Sparks A The mind of South Africa: The story of the rise and fall of apartheid (1997) at 62-63. 
31
The Prosecutor v Sessay Kallon and Gaboa SCSL-04-15-T and The Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu 
SCSL-2004-16-A. Cases decided before the Special Court for Sierra Leone after the war; see also Woody KE 
„Diamonds on the souls of her shoes: The Kimberley Process and the morality exceptions to WTO restrictions‟ 
(2006-2007) 22 Conn. J Int’l L at 335-336; see also Shaik-Peremanov N „The RUF case in the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone‟ (2009) 34 SAYIL at 174-177. 
32
 http://howstuffworks.com/framed.htm?parent=african-history/african-diamondtrade.htm&url=http://allafrica 
.com/stories/200612080608.html. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
33
 Third Year Review at 15-19; see Dietrich C „Hard currency: The criminalised diamond economy of the DRC 
and its neighbours‟ (2002) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamonds and human security project Occasional Paper 
No 4 at 4-15; see Gberie L „West Africa: Rocks in a hard place: The political economy of diamonds and 
regional destabilisation‟ (2003) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamonds and human security project Occasional 
Paper No. 9 at 2-6; see also 0061_DRC_review_visit_en[1].pdf on www.kimberleyprocess.com. Last visited 08 
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5. African blood diamonds 
 
Africa produces the most diamonds in the world market.
34
 The problem of conflict diamonds 
or blood diamonds is well documented.
35
 Rebel groups in Sierra Leone, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Angola and elsewhere took control of alluvial diamond mining areas 
in the 1990s, enabling them to engage in a protracted armed conflict.
36
 Conflict diamonds are 
also a product of the vast alluvial diamond areas in Africa where diamonds are mined by 
artisanal, small scale diggers.
37
 There are estimated to be 120,000 diggers in Sierra Leone, 
800,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo and many tens of thousands in Angola, 
Liberia, Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela.
38
 
 
Blood or conflict diamonds are diamonds which are mined in areas controlled by insurgent 
groups, or have been mined in areas characterised by conflict. The UN defines conflict 
diamonds as „rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, 
including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate governments‟.39 The Certification 
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35
 See Grant J, Taylor A and Taylor I „Global governance and conflict diamonds‟ (2004) 93 The Kimberley 
Process and the quest for clean gems and the round table Vol at 401 on how actors stimulate concern about the 
externalities of foreign trade. A notable example is the report of the NGO Global Witness, which raised 
awareness about the link between diamonds and civil wars and played an important role in the efforts to control 
the diamond trade see in general Global Witness „A rough trade‟ (1998) see: http:www.globalwitness.org/media 
_library_detail.php0900en/a_rough_trade. „Conflict diamonds: Possibilities for the identification, certification 
and control of diamonds‟ (2000) see: http:00www+globalwitness+org0media_library_detail+php0860 
en0conflict_diamonds; see also UN Resolutions UN GA UN Doc A/RES/55/56 (2000) and UN SC UN Doc 
S/RES/1459(2003). Last visited 08 July 2011; see further Gathii supra at 21-30. 
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 Holmes „The Kimberley Process‟ (2006-2007) at 215-217 on reasons for the war in Sierra Leone and the 
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diamond exporters of Brazil‟ (2006) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional 
Paper No 13; on Venezuela see Smillie I „The lost world: Diamond mining and smuggling in Venezuela‟ (2006) 
Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional Paper No 16 at 4-8; on Guyana see 
Smillie I „Triple jeopardy: Triplicate forms and triple borders: Controlling diamond exports from Guyana‟ 
(2006) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional Paper No 14 at 6-11; on 
Guinea see Gberie L „Destabilising Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor and the potential for wider human 
catastrophe‟ (2001) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional Paper No 1 at 4-
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Scheme defines conflict diamonds as „rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their 
allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments‟.40 
 
Blood diamonds or conflict diamonds have been at the heart of many conflicts throughout 
Africa, either directly or indirectly.
41
 One of the major reasons for the existence of blood 
diamonds is the inherent difficulty in tracing the origin of the diamond.
42
The easy portability 
of diamonds distinguishes diamonds from other valuable commodities such as copper and 
timber, which have also sparked conflicts.
43
 
 
Experts claim that the illegal sale of blood diamonds has produced billions of dollars to fund 
civil wars and other conflicts in various African nations, including Sierra Leone (where 
conflict ended in 2002), Angola, Liberia, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).
44
 It is argued that the people behind these civil wars and rebellions, oppose legitimate 
governments because of their desire to gain control over the countries‟ beneficial diamond 
industry.
45
 However, widespread insurgencies are also indicative of political, social and 
economic conflict causes that transcend opportunistic diamond trading interests. 
 
During the Sierra Leonean civil war, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was charged with 
killing and often mutilating people living and working in diamond villages so as to secure 
control over a number of diamond mines in that country.
46
 The RUF committed human rights 
atrocities systematically and widely throughout the territory of Sierra Leone which caused 
                                                 
40
 Section 1 of the Certification Scheme; see further Gathii (2010) at 21-36. Electronic copy available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357349. 
41
 Smillie I, Gberie L and Hazleton R „At the heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds and human security‟ 
(2000) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional Paper at 1-6.  
42
 Third Year Review at 35. 
43
 Schram „The legal aspects‟ (2007) at 7-12. 
44
 See in general Smillie I „Land grabbing and land reform: Diamonds, rubber and forests in the new Liberia‟ 
(2007) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional Paper No 17 at 4-9; see also 
Gberie L „War and peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, corruption and the Lebanese connection‟ (2002) 
Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond human security project Occasional Paper No 6 at 6-12 The diamond 
human security project Official website http://geography.howstuffworks.com/africa/geography-of-congo-
kinshasa.htm. Last visited 08 July 2011; see also Vaughn J Contemporary world issues: Conflict over natural 
resources A reference handbook (2007); see further Gathii supra at 21-36. 
45
 See in general Henkin L How nations behave (1986) at 304-339. 
46
 Peter PJ The Sierre Leonean tragedy: History and global dimensions (2006) at 202-35; see also RUF case The 
Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL-2004-16-A otherwise known as the ARFC case on the formation 
of „joint criminal enterprises‟; see also Shaik-Peremanov „RUF case‟ (2009) at 174-81. 
21 
 
many people to flee their homes in fear.
47
 Approximately 20,000 innocent civilians suffered 
mutilation, an estimated 75,000 lost their lives and 2 million people fled Sierra Leone.
48
 
According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, diamond-fuelled conflicts such as in Sierra 
Leone have in total displaced millions and resulted in the deaths of more than 4 million 
people.
49
 
 
Diamonds in conflict areas begin their „commercial life‟ in mines where theft, uncontrolled 
mining and informal management structures exist. Conflict diamonds make a brief 
appearance, after being transported, in cutting and polishing centres that will often manage to 
secure general tax and/or customs exemptions.
50
 From many cutting centres around the 
world, diamonds will re-enter irregular freight channels taking them to informal bourses 
where transactions are traditionally done in cash and sealed on the basis of long standing 
relationships.  
 
In conflict diamond trade circles, diamonds will, after having been traded on clandestine or 
informal bourses, again cross borders irregularly, finally arriving in informal and 
unstructured segments of diamond retail marketing that are often ill equipped to prevent and 
combat commercial fraud.
51
 Thus, the conflict diamond will pass through various unregulated 
and sometimes, illegal conduits before finding their way to the retailer and consumer.
52
 
 
Rough diamond caches are natural resources sought by rebel forces to finance arms purchases 
and their insurgency aspirations.
53
 Neighbouring and other countries serve as trading and 
transit grounds for illicit diamonds. Once diamonds are brought to market, their origin is 
difficult to trace and once polished, they can no longer be identified.
54
 
 
                                                 
47
 Goredema „Diamonds‟ (2002) at 149-79; see also Efrat „Toward internationally regulated goods‟ at 105; see 
also Official website http://www.hrw.org/en/node/84262/section/7. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
48
 See the RUF case and the ARFC case; see also Efrat „Toward Internationally regulated goods‟ (2010) at 105. 
49
 Official website http://www.hrw.org/en/node/84262/section/7. Last visited 08 July 2011; see further Gathii 
„Slippages in public/private in resource wars‟ at 21-36. 
50
 Passas and Jones „Commodities‟ (2006) at 3; Gathii ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Passas and Jones supra at 2-3. 
54
 Paes „Conflict diamonds‟ Hamburg African Studies (2005) at 309. 
22 
 
Especially in the 1990s, governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, diamond traders, and financial institutions, arms manufacturers, social and 
educational institutions and other civil society players were called upon to combine their 
efforts, demanding the strict enforcement of sanctions and encourage peace.
55
 Severe human 
right abuses in Sierra Leone and Angola heightened the international community's awareness 
for the need to sever sources of funding for the rebels in order to promote peace in those 
countries. 
 
During the period of conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, a 2000 UN SC Report established 
„that diamonds were illicitly traded to fund rebel groups, namely the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), both of 
which acted in contravention of the international community's objectives of restoring 
peace‟.56 
 
The ability to turn diamonds into money characterises them as something that has been 
termed „liquid cash‟. According to the UN SC Report aforementioned, this ability provided 
the impetus for groups to commit human rights atrocities when mining and controlling 
diamond mining areas. The same is applicable for human rights abuses arising out of wars 
and conflicts funded by diamonds. Thus, the concerns over civil strife and political dissension 
responsible for the degeneration of States have ramified into the degeneration of human 
rights. 
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6. Degeneration of human rights57 
 
The propensity of diamond fuelled conflicts to cause severe human rights violations brought 
the trade in conflict diamonds to the attention of the international community. The World 
Diamond Council, formed in 2000 to combat illegal diamond trading in Africa, maintains that 
diamonds benefit the world in many ways. For example, approximately 10 million people 
worldwide are supported by the diamond industry.
58
 In addition, revenue from the diamond 
industry is integral to the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa.
59
 In 2000, the World Bank stated 
that the struggle over diamonds and other mineral commodities are the main causes of civil 
wars globally.
60
 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a weak post-independence democracy in Sierra Leone became 
subverted.
61
 Economic decline and military rule followed. The rebellion that began in 1991 
was characterised from the outset by brutality. The Sierra Leonean rebel forces, the RUF, 
hacked off hands and feet with machetes and funded its war by exploiting slave labour in 
diamond fields.
62
 Over 75 000 lives were claimed between 1991 and 1999 and half a million 
Sierra Leoneans became refugees.
63
 Half of Sierra Leone‟s 4.5 million population people 
were displaced.
64
 
 
Rebel groups forced tens of thousands of people to work in diamond mines. The diamonds so 
mined made their way into the international diamond trade under dangerous conditions.
65
 For 
years, the RUF financed their insurgency war through the illicit trade of diamonds.
66
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The RUF actually controlled diamond mining areas.
67
 The RUF controlled the areas in which 
illegal diamond production occurred.
68
 Major gain for the RUF did not come from direct 
participation, though particular individuals might have done so on their own account, but 
from taxation and control over areas.
69
 
 
Rebel groups managed through military power to impose import and export duties, license 
fees, transportation surcharges and direct bribes for particular officers.
70
 In other words, the 
insurgents formed the quasi public infrastructure within which the diamond trade was run by 
experts and industry insiders. Human rights atrocities were an ongoing phenomenon. Civil 
society organisations, the UN and the diamond industry expressed particular concern over the 
abuses.
71
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7. The role of the United Nations’ (UN) interventions 
 
On 1 December 2000, the UN GA adopted, unanimously, a milestone Resolution 55/56 on 
the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict, to break the link between the illicit transaction of 
rough diamonds and armed conflict, as a contribution to prevention and settlement of 
conflicts.
72
 The UN GA recognised that conflict diamonds were a crucial factor in prolonging 
„brutal wars in parts of Africa, and accentuated that legitimate diamonds contribute to 
prosperity and development elsewhere on the continent‟. In Angola and Sierra Leone, conflict 
diamonds had for a long time funded the rebel groups, UNITA and the RUF, both of which 
were acting in contravention of the international community‟s objectives of restoring peace in 
the two countries.
73
 
 
Against this backdrop, the international diamond industry became concerned. It recognised 
an urgent need for regulating the diamond trade industry. A mechanism for the tracking and 
controlling of rough diamonds from the country of origin to the end user was needed. Even if 
the diamond parcel came from a country of provenance, the parcel‟s journey was crucial to 
ensuring the legitimate trade of rough diamonds. The UN officially denounced the use of 
rough diamonds for sales of arms. In the case of an adoption of international sanctions against 
Angola in 1998, the UN SC passed Resolution 1173.
74
 
 
Resolution 1173 demanded that a Certificate of Origin must accompany each shipment of 
rough diamonds sold. UN SC sanctions against Angola prohibited imports of any diamonds 
that did not meet the Certificate of Origin muster. Later similar sanctions were placed against 
Sierra Leone.
75
 Members of the G8 group of nations also called for an international 
certification regime, in recognition of the trade in conflict diamonds as being a major concern 
in conflict prevention. With pressure from NGOs and governments, in the main, the diamond 
industry gave its recognition in support of UN sanctions.
76
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The conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, fuelled by illicit diamond smuggling, had already 
led to action by the UN SC.
77
 Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sanctions 
were imposed against UNITA in Angola and the Sierra Leone rebels, including a prohibition 
on their main source of funding illicit diamonds.
78
 Diamond sanctions were also imposed 
against Liberia.
79
 
 
a. Angola 
 
Following UNITA‟s rejection of the results of the UN‟s monitored election in 1992, the UN 
SC, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter adopted Resolution 864 in 
September 1993.
80
 The sanctions imposed an arms embargo along with petroleum sanctions 
against UNITA.
81
 Further, it established a Sanctions Committee consisting of all the members 
of the Council to monitor and report on the implementation of the mandatory measures.
82
 
 
Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA refused to comply with its terms.
83
 In 
response to UNITA‟s refusal to disarm and implement the Lusaka Protocol, the UN SC 
adopted Resolution 1127 in 1997.
84
 The Resolution imposed mandatory travel sanctions on 
senior UNITA officials and their immediate family members. A year later, in 1998, the UN 
SC adopted Resolutions 1173 and 1778 prohibiting the direct or indirect import from Angola 
to their territory of all diamonds not controlled through the Certificate of Origin issued by the 
Government of Angola, as well as imposing financial sanctions on UNITA.
85
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By Resolution 1237 in 1999, the UN SC established an independent Panel of Experts to 
investigate violations of UN SC sanctions against UNITA.
86
 Following the publication of the 
Panel‟s report,87 the UN SC adopted Resolution 1295 in April 2000 creating a Monitoring 
Mechanism.
88
 Pursuant to Resolution 1295, the Panel‟s recommendations were taken up and 
a „Monitoring Mechanism‟ was established to „collect additional information and investigate 
any relevant leads regarding sanctions violations, with a view to enhancing the 
implementation of the measures imposed on UNITA‟.89 
 
On 20 February 2001, the UN SC held an open meeting to discuss the report of the 
Monitoring Mechanism, which had been submitted its report to the Committee on 20 
December 2000.
90
 The UN SC extended the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism for a 
period of three months.
91
 
 
b. Sierra Leone 
 
In July 1999, following over eight years of civil conflict, negotiations between the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF led to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement.
92
 
Under the Lome Peace Agreement, the parties agreed to the cessation of hostilities, 
disarmament of all combatants and the formation of a government of national unity. The 
United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) helped 
facilitate the negotiations.  
 
In October 1999, the UN SC passed Resolution 1270 establishing the United Nations Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to help create the conditions in which the parties could 
implement the Agreement.
93
 Subsequently, the number of personnel was increased and tasks 
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to be carried out by UNAMSIL adjusted by the UN SC in Resolutions 1289 and 1290 of 
February 2000 and of May 2000 respectively.
94
 
 
Following international concern about the role played by the illicit diamond trade in fuelling 
conflict in Sierra Leone, the UN SC adopted Resolution 1306 in July 2000 which imposed a 
ban on the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone not controlled by 
the government of Sierra Leone through a Certificate of Origin regime.
95
 An arms embargo 
and selective travel ban on nongovernmental forces was already in effect.
96
 
 
In 2000, Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee concerning Sierra Leone, presided over the first ever exploratory public hearing.
97
 
The hearing was attended by representatives of interested Member States, regional 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, the diamond industry and other relevant 
experts. The hearing exposed the link between the trade in illicit Sierra Leonean diamonds 
and trade in arms and related material.
98
 The ways and means for developing a sustainable 
and well regulated diamond industry in Sierra Leone were also discussed.  
 
As called for by UN SC Resolution 1306, the Secretary General, in August 2000, established 
a Panel of Experts. The mandate of the Panel was to collect information on possible 
violations of the arms embargo and the link between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and 
related material.
99
 Furthermore, the Panel had to consider the adequacy of air traffic control 
systems in the West African region for the purpose of detecting flights suspected of 
contravening the arms embargo.
100
 
 
In terms of UN SC Resolution 1306, the Panel had to report to the Security Council with 
observations and recommendations on ways of strengthening the arms and diamonds 
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embargoes no later than 31 October 2000. The Panel submitted its report to the Security 
Council on 19 December 2000.
101
 In January 2001 the UN SC discussed the findings. 
 
c. Liberia 
 
Following the findings presented in the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts‟ Report „that the illicit 
trade in diamonds from Sierra Leone could not be conducted without the permission and 
involvement of the Liberian government officials, and that the Government of Liberia was 
actively supporting the RUF at the highest levels,‟ the UN SC adopted Resolution 1343 in 
2001.
102
 
 
By UN SC Resolution 1343, a new Sanctions Committee of the Security Council was 
established. An arms embargo was imposed again.
103
 A Panel of Experts was mandated for a 
period of six months.
104
 In addition, UN SC Resolution 1343 indicated that if the 
„Government of Liberia did not meet the demands specified by the Security Council within 
two months, all States would be mandated to take the necessary measures to prevent the 
direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds 
originated in Liberia‟, and a selective travel ban would be imposed.105 
 
To date, UN SC interventions in the area of conflict diamonds have been confined to the 
imposition of sanctions. Absent from the scheme of interventions are the role of regional 
organisations, specifically the African Union. However, regional organisations have a most 
important role to play in the maintenance of peace and security with regard to the illegal trade 
of conflict diamonds. Thus the international community realising the lack of workability of 
efforts of the United Nations, and roused by the work of NGOs, without the support of the 
regional organisations, pushed forth the agenda for an international certification scheme for 
the import and export of rough and conflict diamonds. 
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d. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (The Certification Scheme) 
 
The road to Kimberley 
 
The issue of conflict diamonds gained momentum when Global Witness published its report 
in 1998. Government representatives and civil society organisations took the opportunity to 
deal with the crisis in Luanda and the MPLA, which the UN was attempting to address.
106
 In 
1999, the UN requested Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler to produce a report on the 
possibility of sanctions that could possibly be imposed in order to end the crisis. The 
involvement of the UN generated significant international attention. Another report produced 
by Human Rights Watch in 1999 confirmed that diamonds did play a role in financing 
UNITA‟s activities. De Beers then wrote to the UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, outlining 
its role in Angola stating that the company adhered to the sanctions imposed against UNITA 
diamonds.
107
 
 
Also, in October 1999, non-governmental organisations in Europe and North America formed 
the „Fatal Attractions‟ campaign. The campaign was intended for stricter practices in 
controlling the diamond trade and to prevent conflict diamonds from reaching the 
international market. De Beers announced in that year that it would stop buying Angolan 
diamonds. By the end of the same year, De Beers closed down all of its remaining outside 
buying operations and concentrated on sales from its own mines from contractual sources 
such as the Russian mining house, Alrosa.
108
  
 
In October 1999, De Beers announced that it would stop buying diamonds on the open 
market.
109
 It seems likely that the closing down of De Beers‟ buying offices in the DRC and 
Guinea which were targeting diamonds from artisanal diamonds from west and central Africa 
were a direct result of civil society initiatives.
110
 Having been the buyer of last resort for 
                                                 
106
 Paes „Conflict diamonds‟ (2005) at 314. 
107
 Bone „Conflict diamonds, the De Beers group and the Kimberley Process‟ at 130. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Paes supra at 315. 
110
 Ibid. 
31 
 
decades, De Beers had a diamond holding value of more than US$ 4billion.
111
 This enabled 
them to keep prices high arguably for the benefit of the industry.
112
 
 
In September 2000, US Congressman Tony Hall introduced the Consumer Access to a 
Responsible Accounting of Trade Act (CARAT). After a visit to Sierra Leone, Hall sought a 
legislative solution for diamonds entering the USA from Sierra Leone.
113
 The CARAT Act 
required certificates of origin for all diamonds imported. Politicians from diamond producing 
nations, most notably former South African President Nelson Mandela, spoke in favour of the 
diamond sector, stressing the harmful impact that a comprehensive diamond embargo would 
have on the economies of southern African countries.
114
 
 
In May 2000, following the joint initiative of South Africa and De Beers, a technical forum 
was convened in Kimberley bringing together for the first time, diamond producing countries, 
industry and civil society representatives, initiating a series of collective conferences known 
as the Kimberly Process. 
 
In response to international concern over the illegal trade of rough diamonds, in July 2000, 
the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturers 
Association issued a joint resolution in Antwerp, calling for control of diamonds as they were 
still bought and sold as rough diamond parcels.
115
 
 
Eventually, the prospect of an internationally accepted system for regulating the diamond 
industry trade seemed more of a reality when the international community commenced 
serious discussions in Kimberley South Africa in May 2000, to regulate tracking rough 
diamonds from their point of mining into the diamond trade market.
116
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 „The diamond cartel: The cartel isn‟t forever‟ in The Economist 15 July 2000. Available at www 
.economist.com/node/2921462 AUTHOR...  
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113
 Paes supra at 316. 
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115
 Holmes „The Kimberley Process‟ (2006-2007) at 218-20 and 213-232 on the Certification Scheme; see also 
official website http://www.wfdb.com/PDFs/Statutes/Resolutions&Recommendations.pdf at 11. Last visited 08 
July 2011. 
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 Official website http://www.delbwa.ec.europa.eu/publications/newsletters/.Last visited 08 July 2011. 
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The Kimberley Process began when Southern African diamond producing States met in 
Kimberley, South Africa, in May 2000, to discuss ways to bring to an end the trade in 
„conflict diamonds‟.117 Represented at the Kimberley Process were the following States: 
Angola; Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana; Brazil; Canada; Central African 
Republic; China; DRC; Côte d‟ Ivoire; Croatia; European Community; Ghana; Guinea; 
Guyana; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Korea; Lao; Lebanon‟ Lesotho; Liberia; Malaysia; 
Mauritius; Mexico; Namibia; New Zealand; Norway; Congo; Russia; Sierra Leone; 
Singapore; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Turkey; 
Ukraine; UAE; USA; Venezuela; Vietnam and Zimbabwe and western European nations 
represented by the EU Member States. 
 
Southern African diamond producing States such as Sierra Leone and transnational 
corporations such as De Beers sought to ensure that rough diamond purchases should stop 
funding conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola.
118
 
 
The discussion was based on the premise of formulating a mechanism that would govern and 
ensure the legitimate trade of rough diamonds. In this manner, it was averred that the conflict 
emanating from the illegal rough diamond trade would cease.  
 
The Kimberley Process was an inclusive, worldwide consultative
119
 process of governments, 
industry and civil society, to devise an effective response to the problem of conflict 
diamonds. The „Certificate of Origin‟ had become the mechanism that diamond producing 
States and transnational corporations implemented to address the problem of „conflict 
diamonds‟.  
 
The UN, as the custodian of international peace and security, recognised the need for 
accountability for human rights abuses and the subsequent humanitarian situations.
120
 
Recognition attracted the attention of the major role players in the diamond trade. Pressed by 
concerned parties, De Beers initiated a formalised voluntary international certification 
                                                 
117
 UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/RES 55/56(2000) Governments of South Africa, Namibia, Belgium, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Angola, Botswana, Canada and Switzerland hosted meetings of the 
Kimberley Process and UN SC Resolution UN Doc S/RES/1459 (2003). 
118
 UN SC Resolution UN Doc A/62/L.16. 
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 Official website www.kimberleyprocess.com/. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
120
 UN SC Resolution UN Doc S/RES/55/56(2000). 
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scheme for the export and import of diamonds, which became known as the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme.  
 
The NGO community responded to the Kimberley initiative by creating a coalition of more 
than 200 partners. Thus the diamond industry inclusive of seventy organisations from 
diamond bourses, diamond boards and diamond mining houses formed the World Diamond 
Council in July of 2000.
121
 In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 55/56 supporting the formation of an international certification scheme for trading 
in rough diamonds.
122
 
 
The legitimate global diamond industry needed protection from allegations of illegal diamond 
trading partners. As a global industry, diamond mining houses, traders and beneficiating 
industries established the World Diamond Council in 2000. In 2002 the World Diamond 
Council promoted the creation of the Certification Scheme to regulate diamond trading and 
keep blood diamonds from entering the legitimate diamond market.
123
 
 
The World Diamond Council is a coalition of diamond mining firms, trading companies and 
jewellery industry representatives created to engage on the issue of conflict diamonds, and to 
represent industry interests at Kimberley Process meetings. The objectives of the World 
Diamond Council are oversight functions pertinent to the development and implementation of 
a tracking system of rough diamonds for international trade.
124
 
 
Despite initial divergences, a final agreement was reached at Interlaken on 5 November 
2002.
125
 At the Interlaken Declaration of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for 
Rough Diamonds, ministers and other heads of delegations of Angola, Australia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Côte d‟ Ivoire, People‟s Republic of China, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic. Democratic Republic of Congo, the European Community, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
                                                 
121
 See www.worlddiamondcouncil.com. Last visited 01 September 2011; see also in general Koskoff DE The 
diamond world (1981) at 179-98. 
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 UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/RES/55/56(2000). 
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124
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2011. The Interlaken Declaration comprised of states and diamond industry representations that decided to give 
effect to UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 in 2000 for the formation of an international certification 
scheme for the trade of rough diamonds. 
34 
 
India, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, 
Norway, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Ukraine, United Arabs Emirates, United States of America and 
Zimbabwe declared their commitment to the Certification Scheme. They declared inter alia: 
 
 That they will adopt the Certification Scheme;  
 That their commitment to the launch of the Certification Scheme on 1 January 
2003; 
 That measures will be taken to implement the Certification Scheme consistent 
with international trade rules.
126
 
 
This negotiation and declaration between governments,
127
 the international diamond industry 
represented by the World Diamond Council and civil society organisations
128
 resulted in the 
establishment of the Certification Scheme. The Certification Scheme sets out the 
requirements for controlling rough diamond production and trade.
129
 
 
The Certification Scheme entered into force in 2003, when all Participant entities made firm 
intentions to implement its rules. The Participants declared their intention to adhere to trade 
under the rules established in the Certification Scheme as evidenced in the Interlaken 
Declaration.  
 
At the Interlaken Declaration, the Ministers of the representative states declared the 
following: 
 
„1.  We adopt the international certification scheme for rough diamonds developed by the 
Participants in the Kimberley Process and presented to us in the form of the document 
entitled: “Kimberley Process Certification Scheme”. 
2.  We remain committed to the simultaneous launch of the Certification Scheme beginning 
on 1 January 2003. Implementation will be based on our respective laws and internal 
                                                 
126
 See official website of the World Diamond Council at www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/. Last visited 08 July 
2011. The Interlaken Declaration comprised of states and diamond industry representations that decided to give 
effect to UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 in 2000 for the formation of an international certification 
scheme for the trade of rough diamonds. 
127
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systems of control meeting the standards established in the Document. For applicants that 
decide to join after this date, the Scheme takes effect for them following notification to 
the Chair pursuant to Section VI, paragraph 9. 
3.  We will ensure that the measures taken to implement the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme for rough diamonds will be consistent with international trade rules. 
4.  We note with appreciation the clear intention of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Japan, 
Malta, Thailand and Ukraine to become Participants of the Certification Scheme by the 
end of 2003. 
5.  We reaffirm our determination to monitor effectively the trade in rough diamonds in 
order to detect and to prevent trade in conflict diamonds. We consider the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme as an ongoing international process. 
6.  We thank the Government of South Africa for agreeing to Chair the Kimberley Process 
in the first year of its implementation. 
7.  We request our officials to review initial progress in implementation at the first formal 
meeting of the Participants of the Kimberley Process, to be held early in 2003.‟130 
 
The Certification Scheme is open to all countries and organisations, trading in diamonds, 
which are willing and able to implement its requirements.
131
 As of July 2011, the 
Certification Scheme has 49 members, representing 75 countries, with the European Union 
and its Member States counting as an individual Participant.
132
 Certification Scheme 
members account for approximately 99.8 percent of the global production of rough 
diamonds.
133
 The World Diamond Council represents both the international diamond 
industry, and civil society organisations.
134
  
 
The meetings that culminated in the finalisation of the Kimberley Process did not endure a 
formal or diplomatic status. Treaty documents were neither signed nor ratified.
135
 Participants 
to the Kimberley Process were NGOs and representatives of the diamond industry alike, 
which are entities without legislative authority.  
 
The Certification Scheme imposes extensive requirements on its members to enable them to 
certify shipments of rough diamonds as „conflict-free‟ and prevent conflict diamonds from 
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entering legitimate trade. In the terms of the Certification Scheme, Participants must meet 
„minimum requirements‟136 and must put in place „national legislation and institutions;‟ 
export, import and internal controls; and also commit to transparency and the exchange of 
statistical data regarding the trade of rough diamonds. 
 
The Certification Scheme is chaired through rotation by Participant countries. Thus far, South 
Africa, Canada, Russia, Botswana, the European Community have chaired the Certification 
Scheme, and India was the Chair in 2008.
137
 Namibia chaired the Kimberley Process in 
2010.
138
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the current Chair for 2011.  
 
Certification Scheme participating countries, the diamond industry and civil society observers 
assemble twice a year at intersessional and plenary meetings, as well as in working groups 
and committees that meet on a regular basis.
139
 Implementation should be monitored through 
review visits, by annual reports as well as by regular exchange and analysis of statistical 
data.
140
 
 
In its Preamble, the Certification Scheme posits the notion that the legitimate trade of conflict 
free diamonds underpins the realisation and protection of human rights.
141
 When human 
rights abuses reach a particular scale within a state, the state itself is placed in jeopardy, 
risking the invocation of international humanitarian interventions.
142
 
 
Once the Certification Scheme had come into existence, the UN SC in June 2004 sent a team 
of inspectors and experts to the DRC.
143
 The team reported and concluded that the DRC was 
exporting diamonds at a rate 100 times greater than its estimated production. Further, they 
concluded upon analysis that the DRC was exporting diamonds which were smuggled 
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illegally into the country in violation of the Certification Scheme. Consequently, the DRC 
was suspended from the Certification Scheme; which meant that its diamonds were 
prohibited from legitimate trade in the international markets.  
 
At the same time, presidential executive orders in the United States declared a national 
emergency to restrict the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone.
144
 This was followed 
by similar restrictions against Liberia. The United States Congress also reacted with the 
Clean Diamond Trade Act, which requires annual reviews of the standards, practices and 
procedures of any entity in the United States that issues Kimberley Process certificates for the 
export of rough diamonds.
145
 
 
Many non-governmental stakeholders such as Amnesty International and Global Witness 
embarked on lobby and information awareness campaigns regarding the illegal trade of rough 
diamonds when the diamond industry through the World Diamond Council failed to deliver 
on its promises.
146
 Human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Global Witness 
called on governments to regulate Kimberley Process countries, to ensure that the diamonds 
being imported and exported are completely conflict-free.
147
 
 
Nevertheless, some NGOs continue to fear a resurgence of diamond conflict. According to 
Amnesty International, the Certification Scheme simply left too many loupe holes through 
which diamonds can be smuggled.
148
 The international community reacted to the problem of 
blood diamonds entering legitimate diamond trade markets with a certification process. 
However, there are drawbacks in this process causing some commentators to say that it 
should have been reformed already in its infancy.
149
 
 
The UN continues to intervene despite the presence of the Certification Scheme. 
Interventions demonstrate the lack of capabilities for the implementation of the Certification 
Scheme. At the heart of this problem is the fact that the Certification Scheme lacks the force 
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of law. It is a voluntary mechanism with little consensus from those countries that are most 
affected by conflict and conflict diamonds. 
 
The Certification Scheme does not prevent rough diamonds from being smuggled from 
countries in a state of conflict to Participant countries and then passed off as legitimate 
diamonds for trade purposes.
150
 The UN and the United States government released reports as 
recently as 2006 stating that approximately US $23 million worth of Ivory Coast diamonds 
were smuggled into trade and distributed as legitimately mined diamonds.
151
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8. Conclusion 
 
The diamond trade, at first glance appears to be a simple transaction between diamond buyers 
and willing diamond sellers. The Kimberley meeting, in 2002, drew on the certification 
system the UN required of Angola in its Resolutions.  
 
The Security Council and the WTO too, strongly endorsed the Certification Scheme.
152
 These 
endorsements recognised the extraordinary humanitarian nature of this issue and the impact 
of conflicts fuelled by trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people 
in affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights violations that have been 
perpetrated in such conflicts.
153
 
 
The international community opted for a self-regulatory, voluntary Certification Scheme as 
opposed to a legally binding document, albeit the international concern over the illegal trade 
of rough diamonds and the human rights abuses. 
 
Having discussed the background to the Certification Scheme, it will be necessary to provide 
an overview and a discussion of the Certification Scheme‟s contents in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 : THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION 
SCHEME (THE ‘CERTIFICATION SCHEME’) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the content of the Certification Scheme will be discussed in detail. It is 
intended to provide an understanding of the contents of the Certification Scheme. There are 
difficulties with certain parts of the Certification Scheme. It is a voluntary, self-regulatory 
initiative, whose provisions may be complied with by States and the diamond sector.  
 
The Certification Scheme was formed in an effort to address two major objectives namely the 
curbing or elimination of the illegal trade of rough diamonds; and the resultant human rights 
crises.  
 
The Certification Scheme operates on the basic premise that each shipment of rough 
diamonds must be accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate from the point of origin 
to the point of destination. Participants to the Certification Scheme are expected to fulfil 
particular „requirements‟ in order for the Certification Scheme to have application within 
their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, Participants are also expected to undertake several 
other measures aimed toward the workability of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The chapter will begin with an overview of the Certification Scheme and then proceed to 
discuss the various parts of the Certification Scheme. The structure of this chapter will 
largely follow the structure of the Certification Scheme document. The last part of this study 
will examine critically the legal nature of the Certification Scheme and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Certification Scheme‟s provisions.  
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2. An overview of the Certification Scheme 
 
The Certification Scheme presently comprises 75 Participants. As mentioned above, the 
Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism. Participants voluntarily take part in the 
Certification Scheme. The Certification Scheme is not a treaty in its formation.  
 
Participants to the Certification Scheme may only engage in the legal trade of rough 
diamonds with other Participants who have also met the „minimum requirements of the 
Certification Scheme‟.1 International shipments of rough diamonds must be accompanied by 
a Kimberley Certificate guaranteeing that they are conflict-free.
2
 The Kimberley Certificate is 
the driving mechanism of the Certification Scheme.  
 
The Certification Scheme is housed and administered by the Kimberley Process which elects 
a Chair every year.
3
 The Chair presides and hosts the Kimberley Process during this period. 
The Certification Scheme has a website which provides information to the public regarding 
its activities. Working groups and committees are the hub of the Certification Scheme.
4
 
 
The UN SC and the UN GA, and many organisations such as the WTO support the 
Certification Scheme as has been observed.
5
 However, the Certification Scheme is not a UN 
document, nor is the Kimberley Process a UN agency.  
 
The Certification Scheme document comprises a preamble and six sections with three 
annexes which form part of the sections. Section I of the Certification Scheme provides for 
definitions. Section II of the Certification Scheme deals with the actual „Kimberley Process 
Certificate‟. A „Kimberley Process Certificate‟ must accompany each shipment6 of export of 
rough diamonds. Section III addresses the Participant‟s undertakings in respect of the 
international trade in rough diamonds. A „Kimberley Process Certificate‟ is defined by the 
                                                 
1
 Section II Annex I of the Certification Scheme. 
2
 Section II of the Certification Scheme; see also Gooch TM „Conflict diamonds or illicit diamonds: Should the 
difference matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?‟ (2008) 48 Natural Resources Journal 190-4. 
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 Section VI of the Certification Scheme. 
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6
 Section 1 of the Certification Scheme defines a „shipment‟ as one or more parcels that are physically imported 
or exported. 
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Certification Scheme as „a forgery resistant document with a particular format which 
identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in compliance with the requirements of the 
Certification Scheme‟.7 
 
In Section IV, the duties of Participants to the Certification Scheme outlined. Participants 
must undertake particular „internal control systems‟ for the export of rough diamonds.8 
Section V addresses the issues of cooperation and transparency between Participants to the 
Certification Scheme. Section VI of the Certification Scheme deals with administrative 
matters pertinent to the Kimberley Process. Section VI also contains three annexes, namely 
Annex I, Annex II and Annex III.  
  
                                                 
7
 Section 1 of the Certification Scheme defines a „shipment‟ as one or more parcels that are physically imported 
or exported. 
8
 „Conflict diamonds means rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at 
undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant UN SC Resolutions insofar as they remain in 
effect, or in other similar UN SC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and 
recognized in UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/55/56(2000), or in other similar UN GA Resolutions which may be 
adopted in future‟. Section 1 of the Certification Scheme. 
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3. Section II: The Kimberley Process Certificate 
 
Having shown the background and the overview of the Certification Scheme the author will 
now proceed to examine the Certificate which must accompany every shipment of rough 
diamonds from one Participant to another.
9
 Issuance of Certificates is at the heart of 
legitimising the trade in rough and or conflict diamonds.  
 
This is an example of the Kimberly Process Certificate which has been used in Liberia. The 
Kimberley Process Certificate has certain minimum requirements which must appear on it 
 
 
Figure 1 
A copy of the Kimberley Process Certificate used by the Republic of Liberia. Source: 
www.kimberelyprocess.com. Also, displayed is an „Import confirmation‟ document. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Section 1 of the Certification Scheme defines a „shipment‟ as one or more parcels that are physically imported 
or exported and Section II (a). 
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This is a specimen copy of the Kimberley Process Certificate which is used by the European 
Community Member States when importing and exporting rough diamonds. It must contain 
the importer‟s and exporter‟s details, the value of the rough diamonds in carats and the 
monetary value of in US Dollars. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Specimen Community Kimberley Process Certificate. Source: www.kimberleyprocess.com  
 
In the absence of a Certificate, shipments of rough diamonds may not take place.
10
 Therefore 
Participants are expected to comply fully with the requirements of drafting and issuing a 
Certificate in order to ensure the trade of their diamonds. Section II describes the duties of 
                                                 
10
 Section II of the Certification Scheme. 
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Participants with respect to the Certificate which must accompany each shipment of rough 
diamonds for export.
11
 
 
Each shipment must have a specifically numbered and government validated certificate that 
promises the shipment does not contain conflict diamonds.
12
 Each Participant should ensure 
that a Certificate accompanies every shipment of rough diamonds in keeping with the 
minimum standards
13
 and minimum requirements
14
 of the Certification Scheme. „Participant,‟ 
in terms of the Certification Scheme means a regional economic integration organisation or a 
State for which the Certification Scheme is effective.
15
 
 
Regional economic integration organisation means an organisation comprised of sovereign 
States that have transferred competence to that organisation in respect of matters governed by 
the Certification Scheme.
16
 The EC, as an entity, which has been granted competence for 
matters governed by the Certification Scheme is considered to fall within the ambit of this 
definition. As such, the EC has passed a Council Regulation for the implementation of the 
Certification Scheme.
17
 
 
The EC Council Regulation 2368 of 2002 allows for a margin of appreciation. Thus the 
individual states party to the EU may formulate country specific legislation which is in 
keeping with the overall thrust of the implementation of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The Certification Scheme grants Participants discretion to establish additional characteristics 
for their own certificates as long as Participants inform all other Participants of the features of 
the Certificate through the Chair for the purposes of validation.18 
                                                 
11
 Section II(a)of the Certification Scheme defines an export as follows: “„Export” is defined as the physical 
leaving/taking out of any part of the geographical territory of a Participant‟. 
12
 Section IV of the Certification Scheme. Section 1 of the Certification Scheme defines conflict diamonds as 
follows: „rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining 
legitimate governments, as described in relevant UN SC Resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other 
similar UN SC Resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognised in the UN 
GA Resolution UN Doc A/55/56(2000), or in any other similar UN GA Resolutions which may be adopted in 
future‟. 
13
 In accordance with Section IV of the Certification Scheme and Section 1(a) of the Certification Scheme. 
14
 As set out in Annex I of the Certification Scheme Section II(b) and Section IV of the Certification Scheme. 
15
 Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 EC Council Regulation No 2368 of 2002. 
18
 Sections 1(c) and (d) as set out in Annex 1 of the Certification Scheme. 
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Section II of the Certification Scheme sets out the duties of Participants
19
 with respect to the 
issue of the Certificate. Firstly, all international rough diamond
20
 shipments
21
 must be traded 
in tamperproof boxes and accompanied by a forgery-proof Certificate which states that the 
rough diamonds are conflict-free. Tamper proof boxes must necessarily be of such a quality 
that they are rendered incapable of manipulation by any unscrupulous parties. The nature and 
measure of a tamper proof box is not defined by the Certification Scheme. The construction 
of such boxes rests within the discretion of the Participants. 
 
Particular parcels should constitute a certain weight. Shipment parcels, it is submitted, which 
are prepared for export purposes, may be subjected to changes without prior consent of the 
Exporting Authority.
22
 Thus, the roles of the Exporting and Importing Authorities are crucial 
to ensuring that the correct carat weight parcels as declared are duly inspected.
23
 
 
Section II of the Certification Scheme, in the main, deals with the actual „Kimberley process 
Certificate‟. Each Participant should ensure that a Certificate will accompany each shipment 
or export of rough diamonds. The process for issuing such Certificates must meet the 
minimum standards of the Certification Scheme.
24
 These minimum standards are set out in 
Annex I.
25
 A Certificate is to contain a minimum of fourteen requirements. They are as 
follows:  
                                                 
19
 „Participant‟ means „a state or a regional economic integration organisation for which the Scheme is 
effective.‟ Section 1 of the Certification Scheme; see also Boeck FB „Domesticating diamonds and dollars: 
Identity, expenditure and sharing in Southwestern Zaire 1984-1997‟ (1998) 29 Development and change at 778-
810. 
20
 A „diamond‟ is defined as „a natural mineral consisting essentially of pure crystallised carbon in the isometric 
system, with a hardness on the Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a specific gravity of approximately 3.52 and a 
refractive index of 2.42.‟ Section I of the Certification Scheme. A diamond is accorded the minimal criteria 
necessary for trade. The Certification Scheme defines „rough diamonds‟ to mean „diamonds that are unworked 
or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31‟. Rough diamonds are diamonds which have been mined with a specific 
value. Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
21
 The term „shipment‟ means „one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported‟. Section 1 of the 
Certification Scheme. 
22
 An „exporting authority‟ is defined as „the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Participant from whose 
territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving, and which are authorised to validate the Kimberley Process 
Certificate‟. Section 1 of the Certification Scheme. 
23
 An „importing authority‟ means „the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Participant into whose 
territory a shipment of rough diamonds is imported to conduct all import formalities and particularly the 
verification of accompanying Kimberley Process Certificates‟. Section 1. Importing and exporting authorities 
are those entities appointed by the Participant State.  
24
 Section II (b) of the Certification Scheme. 
25
 Section VI (22) Annex I (A) of the Certification Scheme sets out the minimum standards which a Certificate 
should contain. 
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„1 Each Certificate should bear the title “Kimberley Process Certificate” and the following 
statement: “The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in accordance with 
the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds” 
(emphasis added). 
2 Country of origin for shipment of parcels of unmixed (ie from the same origin).‟26 
 
The Certification Scheme defines „country of origin‟ as „the country where a shipment of 
rough diamonds has been mined or extracted‟.27 Pursuant to the Certification Scheme „parcel 
means one or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not individualized‟.28 
 
„1 Certificates may be issued in any language, provided that an English translation is 
incorporated (emphasis added).‟ 
 
Difficulties arise with regard to the Certificate being translated into English. Not all countries 
are able to readily have Certificates translated into English. Time taken for translation may 
impede trade, which might encourage expeditious illegal trading. 
 
„1 Unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO 3166-1. 
2 The Certificate is to be “tamper and forgery resistant” (emphasis added).‟ 
 
The Certification Scheme does not provide guidelines as to how the Certificate is supposed to 
be „tamper and forgery resistant‟. Again, the Participants must address this matter in their 
own capacities. Discretion is permissible in direct correlation with the capabilities of 
Participants. 
 
„1 The Certificate is to contain a “date of issuance” (emphasis added). 
2 The Certificate is to contain a “date of expiry” (emphasis added). 
3 The Certificate is to contain the details of its “issuing authority” (emphasis added). 
4 The Certificate is to contain the “identification of exporter and importer” (emphasis 
added).‟ 
 
Problems may arise when the details of the exporter must be noted.  
 
„1 The Certificate is to contain the “carat weight/mass” of the rough diamonds intended for 
shipment (emphasis added). 
                                                 
26
 The Certification Scheme defines „Country of origin‟ means the country where a shipment of rough diamonds 
has been mined or extracted.  
27
 Section II (b) and Section I of the Certification Scheme.  
28
 Ibid. 
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2 The Certificate is to contain the monetary value of the rough diamonds in US dollars 
(emphasis added). 
3 The Certificate is to contain the number of parcels of rough diamonds in a shipment
29
 
(emphasis added). 
4 The Certificate is to contain a “Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and 
Coding System” (emphasis added). 
5 The Certificate is to be “validated” by exporting authority30 (emphasis added).‟  
 
The Certification Scheme defines an „exporting authority‟ as „the authority(ies) or body(ies) 
designated by a Participant from whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving, 
and which are authorised to validate the Kimberley Process Certificate‟. The Certification 
Scheme assumes that all countries, including diamond producing countries will have a legally 
sound export controlling infrastructure.  
 
In terms of Annex I(B), if a Certificate contains the above stated minimum requirements, 
optional elements may also be included.31 The inclusion of Optional Certificate Elements is at 
the discretion of the Participant.32 Firstly, Participants may at their discretion establish 
additional characteristics for their own Certificates, for example their form, additional data or 
security elements.33 Secondly, Participants may include the „quality characteristics‟ of the 
rough diamonds in the shipment of rough diamonds.34 
 
Finally, Participants may include a recommended import confirmation part that should 
contain the following elements: country of destination; identification of importer; 
carat/weight and value in US Dollars; a „Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and 
Coding System; date of receipt by the importing authority and „Authentication by Importing 
Authority‟.35 
 
                                                 
29
 The Certification Scheme in Section 1 defines a „parcel‟ to mean one or more diamonds that are packed 
together and that are not individualised. The Scheme defines a „parcel of mixed origin‟ as a parcel that contains 
rough diamonds from two or more countries of origin, mixed together. 
30
 The Certification Scheme in Section 1 defines „exporting authority‟ as „the authority(ies) or body(ies) 
designated by a Participant from whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving, and which are 
authorised to validate the Kimberley Process Certificate‟. 
31
 Section VI of the Certification Scheme. 
32
 Section VI Annex I (B) of the Certification Scheme. 
33
 Section II(c) of the Certification Scheme. 
34
 Section VI (22) Annex I(B) of the Certification Scheme. 
35
 Section VI (22) Annex I(B) of the Certification Scheme. 
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The Certification Scheme also makes provisions for a Participant to follow optional 
procedures when transporting shipments of rough diamonds.36 A Participant may pursuant to 
Annex I(C), transport rough diamonds in transparent security bags. Participants may also 
replicate the unique Certificate number on the container. Finally, a Participant should ensure 
that it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the Certification Scheme, of the 
features of its Certificate as specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation.37 Notification to 
the Chair of the Certification Scheme concludes the actual issuance of the Certificate.  
 
Problems exist with some definitions such as „Participants‟ and „rough diamonds‟. Drafting 
and issuing of Certificates have complexities in the 14 minimum requirements. Problems also 
exist with respect to the Importing and Exporting Authorities, which will be discussed later in 
the study.  
  
                                                 
36
 Section VI (22) Annex I(C) of the Certification Scheme. 
37
 Section II(d) of the Certification Scheme. 
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4. Section III: Undertakings in respect of the international trade in rough diamonds 
 
Having shown the background to the Certification Scheme and the overview of the 
Certification Scheme and the Certificate of the Certification Scheme, this part of the chapter 
will examine the undertakings of Participants in respect of international trade in rough 
diamonds. Pursuant to the Certification Scheme, Section III deals with undertakings of transit 
Participants. In other words, the undertakings of Participants through whose territory a 
shipment of rough diamonds pass en route to the final importing Participant is addressed in 
Section III.  
 
When entering into the international trade of rough diamonds, each Participant „should 
require that each shipment of rough diamonds exported to a Participant is accompanied by a 
duly validated Certificate‟ as discussed above.38 The recipient Participant, that is the 
Participant, who imports a shipment of rough diamonds, requires a duly validated Certificate 
from the exporting Participant.
39
 
 
The Certificate must meet the 14 minimum requirements as discussed above. The Certificate 
must accompany the shipment of rough diamonds.
40
 This means that the shipment will not be 
accepted into the country of import without the validated Certificate. By implication, it is 
noted that the Certificate and the shipment of rough diamonds must be physically together.  
 
The reason for the Certificate accompanying the shipment is to prevent instances of illegal 
activities. The recipient or the import Participant should ensure that confirmation of the 
receipt of the shipment is sent expeditiously to the relevant Exporting Authority.41 So the 
importer must ensure that upon receipt of the shipment of rough diamonds and the 
Certificate, a confirmation of receipt is sent as soon as is possible to the country of export.  
 
Here, the Certification Scheme intended that the shipment of rough diamond is not 
intercepted by any third party and that it arrives at the intended destination. Thus, to avoid 
any interception or illegal activities, the importing Participant must confirm that the shipment 
                                                 
38
 See Section III(a) of the Certification Scheme. A Certificate is valid if it complies with the minimum 
requirements set out in Section II read in conjunction with Section VI(22) Annex I(A). Section III(a). 
39
 Section III(a) of the Certification Scheme. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Section III(b) of the Certification Scheme. 
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indeed did arrive at its intended destination. This principle is also in keeping with 
requirements that may arise from the law of contract.42 
 
At minimum, the confirmation should refer to the Certificate number, the number of parcels, 
the carat weight and the details of the exporter.43 The importing Participant requires that the 
original Certificate be readily accessible for a period of no less than three years.44 Thus the 
country of import should have in place mechanisms to ensure storage and verification 
facilities for a period of three years. This may be problematic as not all Participants will be in 
a position to put into place adequate storage and verification facilities.  
 
Storage and verification facilities imply that the country of import puts theses mechanisms 
into place prior to becoming a Participant to the Certification Scheme. It may be that the 
drafters of the Certification Scheme had two possible intentions with this particular part of 
the Certification Scheme. Firstly, the drafters of the Certification Scheme intended that rough 
diamonds should be traceable. Secondly, the drafters of the Certification Scheme intended 
that the relationship between exporters and importers may be secured.  
 
Further, the importing Participant should ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is 
imported from or exported to a non-Participant.45 Section III of the Certification Scheme 
demands that the trade of rough diamonds be confined to Participants of the Certification 
Scheme. Only Participants may trade rough diamonds with each other.  
 
Parties and states who have not signed the Certification Scheme are prohibited from trading 
with Participants to the Certification Scheme. To date there are 75 Participants to the 
Certification Scheme, including the Member States of the EU. The Certification Scheme may 
encounter problems with regard to trading partners as there are between 192 to 196 States in 
the world today.46 Presently 192 states have signed the UN Charter.47 
                                                 
42
 Nagel CJ et al Commercial law (2006) at 45-7. 
43
 Section III(b) of the Certification Scheme. 
44
 Ibid. The Certification Scheme defines „import‟ to means the physical entering/bringing into any part of the 
geographical territory of a Participant. The Scheme defines and „importing authority‟ as the authority(ies) or 
body(ies) designated by a Participant into whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is imported to conduct 
all import formalities and particularly the verification of accompanying Kimberley Process Certificates.  
45
 Section III(c) of the Certification Scheme. 
46
 www.un.org; the number of states which are recognised by the UN differ due to the legal recognition of a 
state. The recognition is dependent on a given territory meeting particular requirements in international law. 
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Section III further states that „each Participant should when embarking on trading rough 
diamonds on the international level, recognise that Participants whose territory shipments 
pass through are not required to meet the requirement of producing a duly validated 
Certificate‟.48 According to the Certification Scheme „transit means the physical passage 
across the territory of a Participant or a non-Participant, with or without transshipment, 
warehousing or change in mode of transport, when such passage is only a portion of a 
complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-
Participant across whose territory a shipment passes‟.49 
 
Little difficulty arises when the shipment passes through the territory of a Participant to the 
Certification Scheme. However, concern arises when the shipment and Certificate pass 
through the territory of a non-Participant to the Certification Scheme. A shipment destined 
for international trade may have to pass through the country of a non-Participant state or 
region. Furthermore, the Certification Scheme‟s definition allows for the shipment to be 
warehoused, or to change the mode of transport from air to water or rail or road. Thirdly, the 
passage of the shipment may be on the territory of a non-Participant through any part of its 
journey en route to its final destination.  
 
Whether the shipment is safe and remains intact together with the Certificate arises from the 
goodwill or comity of the non-Participant state. Further, the transit non-Participant State is 
not required to comply with the minimum requirements for the issuance of the duly validated 
Certificate or with the Certification Scheme itself.50 
 
According to the Certification Scheme, the last two of requirements of a „duly validated 
Certificate and the number of parcels, carat weight, Certificate number and details of 
importer and exporter‟51 are waived provided that the import and export authorities of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
47
 Ibid. 
48
 The Certification Scheme in Section 1 defines „transit‟ as the physical passage across the territory of a 
Participant or a non Participant, with or without transhipment, warehousing or change in mode of transport, 
when such passage is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the 
Participant or non-Participant across whose territory a shipment passes.  
49
 Section III(c) of the Certification Scheme. 
50
 Section II(a) of the Certification Scheme provides as follows: „a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter 
referred to as the Certificate) accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds on export;‟ and Section II(b) of the 
Certification Scheme provides as follows: „its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of 
the Kimberley Process as set out in Section IV …‟ respectively. 
51
 Section III(a) and (b) of the Certification Scheme. 
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Participant through whose territory a shipment passes, together ensure that the shipment 
leaves its territory in an identical state as it entered its territory.52 
 
This means that the shipment must not be opened or tampered with.53 This too, may prove 
difficult to implement as the importing and exporting authorities may not be in a position to 
evade interception. Issues of bribery and corruption are inadequately addressed in this 
context. Hence difficulties exist with regard to the definition of „transit‟ and the transit of 
shipments of rough diamonds through territories of non-Participants to the Certification 
Scheme in particular.  
 
Having examined the background to the Certification Scheme and the overview of the 
Certification Scheme and the Certificate of the Certification Scheme, and the undertakings of 
Participants with regard to international trade, shipments of rough diamonds in transit in 
particular, this chapter proceeds to discuss the internal controls the Certification Scheme sets 
out for Participants.  
                                                 
52
 Section III(d) of the Certification Scheme. 
53
 Ibid. 
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Figure 3 
The Rough Diamond trading entity of Chinese Taipei has also met minimum requirements of 
the KPCS6/1/2011 
Source: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme at www.kimberleyprocess.com 
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Figure 4 
Source: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme at www.kimberelyprocess.com 
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The diagram shows the volume of diamonds produced vis-a-vis the value. By far, Botswana 
and the Russian Federation dominate the market production value in 2010. 
 
 
Figure 4: Global production of diamonds 2010 at www.kimberleyprocess.com 
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This diagram shows the volume of imports vis-a-vis the value of the imports. Although India 
dominates the rough diamond import market in terms of volume, the EC is the biggest 
importer of rough diamonds followed by India. 
 
Figure 5: Import of rough diamond parcels compliant with the Certification Scheme 
requirements for the year 2010 at www.kimbereleyprocess.com 
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This diagram shows the imports by volume vis-a-vis the value of rough diamonds exported. 
The EU remains the largest importer (as per previous diagram) and exporter of rough 
diamonds in the international trade of rough diamonds. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Import of rough diamond parcels compliant with the Certification Scheme 
requirements for the year 2011 at www.kimberelyprocess.com 
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This diagram for late 2010 demonstrates that the EC continues to be the main exporter of 
rough diamonds in the international diamond trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Export of rough diamond parcels compliant with the Certification Scheme 
requirements for the year 2010 at www.kimberleyprocess.com  
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This diagram shows that the EU also complies with the issuance of Kimberley Certificates. 
This is the case despite the fact that Botswana and the Russian Federation are the biggest 
diamond producers (please see earlier diagram).  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Kimberley Process Certificate counts for year 2010 at www.kimberleyprocess.com 
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The table encapsulates the diagrammatic representations of production, import and export of 
rough diamonds. It also shows the number of KP Certificates issued in compliance with the 
Certification Scheme. The actual values as recorded by the KP are also shown. It must be 
borne in mind that the production, import and export figures are those recorded by the KP 
Chairs and Working Groups. 
 
 
Table: Annual global summary for 2010. 
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5. Section IV: Internal controls (Undertakings by Participants) 
 
The Certification Scheme states that Participants have particular undertakings with regard to 
internal controls. Section IV of the Certification Scheme deals with these undertakings. 
Participants should undertake to establish particular internal control systems for the export of 
rough diamonds. Firstly, each Participant „should establish a system of internal controls 
designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds 
imported into and exported from its territory‟.54 
 
A few components must be in place in order to establish a „body‟ of a „system of internal 
controls‟. Intrinsic to the system of internal controls is that each Participant should designate 
an „Importing and an Exporting Authority‟.55 In furtherance of establishing a body of internal 
systems of control, Participants should ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported 
in tamper resistant containers.56 Fourthly, each Participant should as required, amend or enact 
appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme and to 
maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions.57 This will require passing 
national legislation as the Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism and not a legal 
mechanism.  
 
Pursuant to the Certification Scheme, each Participant should collect and maintain relevant 
official production, import and export data, and collate and exchange such data in accordance 
with the provisions of Section V.58 Again data collection entails the presence of technological 
facilities and information storage facilities for data collection and record keeping purposes.  
 
This may prove problematic for those Participants that lack technologically advanced 
administrative capabilities. Finally, each Participant when establishing a system of internal 
                                                 
54
 Section IV(a) of the Certification Scheme; see in general also Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton „At the heart of 
the matter‟ (2000). 
55
 Section IV(b) of the Certification Scheme. 
56
 Section IV(c) of the Certification Scheme. 
57
 Section IV(d) of the Certification Scheme. 
58
 Section IV(e) of the Certification Scheme; Smillie I „Killing Kimberley? Conflict diamonds and paper tigers‟ 
(2006) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamonds and human security project Occasional Paper Series No 15 at 4-
5.  
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controls, takes into account, where appropriate, the further options and recommendations for 
internal controls as elaborated in Annex II.59 
 
a. Annex II 
 
Annex II makes six different types of recommendations for a system of internal controls. In 
total twenty six recommendations are made to Participants. They are general 
recommendations; recommendations for control over diamond mines; recommendations for 
Participants with small scale diamond mining; recommendations for rough diamond buyers, 
sellers and exporters; recommendations for export processes; recommendations for import 
processes and recommendations on shipments to and from free trade zones. Within the 
Certification Scheme „free trade zones‟ is defined as „means a part of the territory of a 
Participant where any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and 
taxes are concerned, as being outside the customs territory‟.60 
 
Each of the six groups of recommendations will be dealt with in turn. 
 
i. General Recommendations 
 
The Certification Scheme makes eight „General Recommendations‟. Participants may elect to 
follow through with recommendations. The first General Recommendations make provision 
for Participants, at their discretion, to appoint an official to coordinate implementation of the 
Certification Scheme.61 In the implementation of the Certification Scheme, the Certification 
Scheme encourages information62 and data to be housed on a computer data base and the 
sending of electronic messages.63 
 
Participants are encouraged to transmit and receive electronic messages in order to support 
the Certification Scheme.64 Further Participants that produce diamonds are encouraged to 
                                                 
59
 Section IV(f) of the Certification Scheme. 
60
 Section I of the Certification Scheme.  
61
 General Recommendation 1 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
62
 As identified in Annex III of the Certification Scheme. 
63
 General Recommendations 2, 3 and 4 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
64
 General Recommendation 4 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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identify areas of rebel diamond mining activities.65 Participants are further encouraged to 
share this information with other Participants to the Certification Scheme.66 State Participants 
that have rebel groups suspected of mining diamonds within their territories should also make 
such information available to other Participants.67 Information should be updated on a regular 
basis.68 
 
If the purposes of the Certification Scheme are contravened by individuals or companies who 
have been convicted, Participants are encouraged to disclose the names of convicted and 
contravening individuals or companies.69 Disclosure should be made to all other Participants 
through the Chair.70 
 
Furthermore, Participants are encouraged to ensure that all cash purchases of rough diamonds 
follow the trajectory of a legally acceptable purchase and sale transaction.71 The transaction 
should include all the factors necessary for the conclusion of a legally valid sale, including 
but not limited to routing through official banking channels.72 All of the facets to the 
transaction should be supported by verifiable documentation.73 
 
In accordance with the Certification Scheme, Participants that produce diamonds should 
analyse their diamond production under the headings of „Characteristics of diamonds 
produced‟ and „Actual production‟.74 
 
The General Recommendations have been found to be commendable by the Kimberley 
Process. However, the workability of the General Recommendations may be problematic. For 
example, the collection and storage of data is not realistically a recommendation that 
countries afflicted by the worse levels of poverty and lacking in critical skills and technology 
                                                 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. 
69
 General Recommendation 6 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 General Recommendation 7 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 General Recommendation 8 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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may be able to implement in their national systems. Issues such as infrastructural constraints 
and lack of finances should be taken into account. 
 
ii. Recommendations for control over diamond mines 
 
The Certification Scheme also provides for „Recommendations for the Control over Diamond 
Mines‟ which is an aspect pivotal to tracing the course of a rough diamond. In so doing, the 
Certification Scheme encourages Participants to ensure that all diamond mines within their 
control are licensed.
75
 Permission for diamond mining will thus depend on the licence status 
of a given mine. If a diamond mine is not licensed, then it will be prohibited from mining 
diamonds.
76
 
 
„Security standards‟ was another issue which concerned the Certification Scheme drafters.77 
Provision is made for prospecting and mining companies to maintain effective security 
standards. Effective security standards are aimed at ensuring that conflict diamonds do not 
enter the legitimate rough diamond production sphere.
78
 
 
Control over diamond mines is intricate and demanding. Unless the Certification Scheme is 
able to provide standards for security procedures their implementation, as well as technical 
assistance to diamond producing countries, these Recommendations will remain problematic 
to implement.  
 
iii. Recommendations for Participants with small scale diamond 
mining 
 
Provision is made in the Kimberley Process for „Participants with small scale diamond 
mining‟ within their territories.79 Artisanal and informal diamond miners80 should hold 
                                                 
75
 General Recommendation 9 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
76
 Ibid; see studies on Sierra Leone, the DRC and Angola in Smillie I „Rich man, poor man. Development 
diamonds and poverty diamonds: The potential for change in the artisanal alluvial diamond fields of Africa‟ 
(2004) Partnership Africa Canada: Diamonds and human security project at 8-9.  
77
 General Recommendation 9 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Recommendations 11 and 12 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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licenses prior to embarking on mining initiatives.81 Only those artisanal and informal 
diamond miners who are licence bearers will be permitted to engage in diamond mining.82 
 
Therefore, artisanal and informal diamond miners who do not possess licences, by virtue of a 
Participant, declining an application for a diamond mining license, will be prohibited from 
mining. At minimum the licensing records should contain the name, address, nationality and 
or residence status and the area authorised for diamond mining purposes.
83
 
 
Indeed, the role of the artisanal or informal diamond miner is important and all too often 
detrimental to the diamond industry. More especially, it is frustrating attempts at curbing the 
illegal international trade in rough diamonds. However, most diamond producing countries 
experience difficulties in locating artisanal miners. In instances where they are located, there 
is little trust, which prevents co-operation by the miners or individual diggers. Here too, the 
Recommendations are problematic and implementation remains dependent on the attainment 
of certain development standards that are absent in many countries. 
 
iv. Recommendations for rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters 
 
„Recommendations for Rough Diamond Buyers, Sellers and Exporters‟ cover two important 
facets to the purchasing and sale of rough diamonds. Licensing and registering and 
information storage are central to these Recommendations.
84
 These Recommendations are 
exclusively intended for the purchase and sale of rough diamonds.  
 
In the first instance, all diamond buyers, sellers and exporters and their agents as well as 
courier companies involved in transporting rough diamonds should be registered and licensed 
by a Participant‟s relevant authorities.85 In this manner the diamond trade chain is secured. 
                                                                                                                                                        
80
 The Certification Scheme does not define „artisanal miners‟; see also see studies on Sierra Leone, the DRC 
and Angola in Smillie; see also General Recommendation 9 Annex II of the Certification Scheme; see studies on 
Sierra Leone, the DRC and Angola in Smillie „Rich man, poor man‟ (2004) at 8-9.  
81
 Recommendation 11 Annex II of the Certification Scheme; see also see studies on Sierra Leone, the DRC and 
Angola in Smillie „Rich man, poor man‟ (2004) at 8-10.  
82
 Recommendation 11 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
83
 Recommendation 12 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
84
 Recommendations 13, 14, 15 and 16 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
85
 Recommendation 13 Annex II of the Certification Scheme; on smuggling and Venezuela see Smillie „The lost 
world‟ (2006) at 7-9; see also Gberie „War and peace in Sierra Leone‟ (2002) at 10-11.  
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However, it is submitted that not all buyers, sellers or even exporters will be registered or 
licensed. Diamonds which leave a geographical region in a diplomatic case or the hand 
luggage of an air borne traveller or an informal trader crossing borders that for many 
hundreds of kilometres are open and unguarded, remain mostly undetected.  
 
In the second instance, all licensing records should contain at minimum, the name, address, 
and nationality and or residence status of the buyer, seller, exporter, agents and courier 
companies involved in transporting the rough diamonds.
86
 The Certification Scheme expects 
all rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters to be legally obliged to maintain records of 
their daily business for a period of five years.
87
 
 
Daily records should include buying, selling or exporting records listing names of buyers or 
selling clients, their license number and the amount and value of diamonds sold, exported or 
purchased.
88
 Daily records must be stored on a computer data base.
89
 Once more, the problem 
with regard to a frequent lack of technological capacities and lack of critical skills presents 
itself. 
 
Recommendations for buyers and sellers are detailed. Recommendations must however be 
realistic. The Recommendations made by the Certification Scheme present concerns over 
issuance of licences. Nor are all buyers and sellers willing to comply with legal requirements. 
Small scale buyers enter and exit the diamond industry at a fast pace. Thus, these 
Recommendations appear to be intended primarily for large scale buyers and sellers. This is a 
major concern which will be addressed in the final chapter of this study. 
 
v. Recommendations for export processes 
 
The Certification Scheme accommodates diamond export processes in its „Recommendations 
for Export Processes‟. When intending an export of a rough diamond shipment, the exporter 
should submit the same to the relevant Exporting Authority.
90
 Prior to validating a 
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 Recommendation 14 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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 Recommendation 15 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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 Recommendation 16 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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 Recommendation 17 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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Certificate, the Exporting Authority is encouraged to make particular requests to the 
exporter.
91
 Of note, the Exporting Authority may request an exporter to declare the status of 
the rough diamond shipment.
92
 In this manner, the exporter must declare that the rough 
shipment of diamonds for export purposes is indeed conflict-free.
93
 
 
When an exporter intends to export a rough shipment of diamonds after receipt of the 
Certificate, the diamonds should be sealed in a „tamper-proof container‟ together with the 
original Certificate or a duly authorised copy.
94
 If a copy of the Certificate is utilised, then the 
Certificate must be duly certified as a true copy of the original.
95
 
 
Intrinsic to the export process is the duty of the exporter. The Certification Scheme 
recommends that the relevant Exporting Authority should convey a meticulous electronic 
message, which must be recorded on a computer database,
96
 to the intended Importing 
Authority.
97
 Thus, the electronic message should contain information on the carat weight, 
value, country of origin or provenance, importer and the serial number of the Certificate.
98
 
 
Again, little cognisance has been granted to the technological gap between Participants as 
aforestated. Also, the clarity of questions which the Exporting Authority must pose to the 
exporter is uncertain. Thus, the workability of these Recommendations is debatable. 
 
vi. Recommendations for import processes 
 
As with the exporting processes, so too does the Kimberley Process contain 
recommendations for import processes. These recommendations are made under 
„Recommendations for Import Processes‟. When an importer intends to import a shipment of 
rough diamonds into his country of business, or residence, the Importing Authority of that 
                                                 
91
 Recommendation 18 Annex II; see also on Brazilian exporters, see Smillie „Fugitives and phantoms‟ (2006) at 
6-9; also see on Guyana see Smillie „Triple jeopardy‟ (2006) at 4-6.  
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 Recommendation 18 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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country should have been sent an electronic message either before or upon the arrival of the 
shipment.
99
 
 
Just as the exporter needs to furnish information to the Exporting Authority, so too should the 
importing authority be informed regarding particular granularities of the shipment. The 
details within the electronic message should contain details about the carat weight, value, 
country or origin or provenance, exporter and serial number of the Kimberley Process 
Certificate.
100
 Exchange of this information permits proper correlation between the Exporting 
and Importing Authorities. 
 
Upon arrival in the country of import, the Importing Authority should verify that the seals 
and the container have not been tampered with.
101
 Apart from inspection of the shipment, the 
Importing Authority should further verify that the details declared on the Certificate are 
indeed correct.
102
 After validation of the Certificate against the electronic message earlier 
received, the Importing Authority should proceed to open the container to inspect its 
contents.  
 
Inspection is undertaken so as to ensure that the details on the Certificate correspond with the 
contents of the container.
103
 All details of the imported rough diamond shipment should be 
recorded on a computer data base.
104
 In the instance of a request, or where it is applicable, the 
Importing Authority should send the „return slip‟ or „import confirmation coupon‟ to the 
Exporting Authority.
105
 The issue of technological capacity arises again. 
 
Export of rough diamond shipments is more often than not to countries which possess the 
technological and legal prowess to maintain and uphold the Recommendations aforestated.  
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vii. Recommendations on shipments to and from free trade zones 
 
Rough diamond shipments which are intended for import or export to and from free trade 
zones will be governed by the relevant import and export authorities of Participants. As such, 
the authorities designated by the Participants must undertake this process of trade. The 
Certification Scheme defines „free trade zones‟ as „... a part of the territory of the Participant 
where any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are 
concerned, as being outside the customs territory ...‟.106 
 
b. Principles of industry self-regulation 
 
The Certification Scheme is a voluntary process.
107
 Participants enter into the Certification 
Scheme with the understanding that the commitment is underpinned by moral and ethical 
norms and standards.
108
 The commitment is to ensure that conflict or blood diamonds do not 
enter the arena of trade domestically or internationally must be evidenced by Participants 
fulfilling the Certification Scheme‟s requirements. Blood diamonds should not be the subject 
of trade at any level. A voluntary system of self-regulation is spelt out in the Preamble of the 
Certification Scheme.  
 
The voluntary system is underpinned by a system of warranties.
109
 Warranties are enforced 
through the verification of the status of rough diamonds by independent auditors of individual 
companies and supported by internal penalties as set by the industry.
110
 „Internal penalties‟ 
are, however, not accorded a clear definition within the document of the Certification 
Scheme. Internal penalties will be imposed in the hope that such systems will help facilitate 
the „full traceability of rough diamonds by government authorities‟.111 
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In essence the system is a mechanism geared toward accountability and transparency in the 
shipment of rough diamonds. Penalties, to date have been confined to exclusion or 
suspension from participating in the Certification Scheme.
112
 
 
Having indicated some of the weaknesses and also the strengths of the Certificate of the 
Certification Scheme and the undertakings by Participants and the internal controls 
undertaken by Participants, this chapter will proceed to consider the co-operation and 
transparency undertakings by Participants in the Certification Scheme.  
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6. Section V: Co-operation and transparency (Annex III) 
 
Having discussed Sections I, III and IV of the Certification Scheme, Section V must be 
considered. It is necessary for the study to investigate the issues of co-operation and 
transparency. 
 
Section V of the Certification Scheme deals with co-operation and transparency between 
Participants to the Certification Scheme. Participants should co-operate with each other to 
ensure that shipments of rough diamonds are conflict-free. The Certification Scheme attempts 
to create co-operation between the Participants anticipating transparency.  
 
The hope is that effective checks and balances would result in the desired level of 
accountability. In so doing Participants must necessarily „comply‟ with the contents of the 
Certification Scheme. Participants should share with each other, through the Chair of the 
Kimberley Process, particular information.113 
 
Furthermore, Participants should provide information, which identifies their designated 
authorities or bodies responsible for implementing the provisions of the Certification 
Scheme.114 Each Participant should provide to other Participants, information, preferably in 
electronic format, on its relevant laws, regulations, rules, procedures and practices, and 
update that information as required.115 Information provided should include a synopsis in 
English of the essential content of this information.116 
 
It is submitted that the Certification Scheme, although not a treaty or agreement between 
Participants, in creating a system of peer review amongst Participants is nevertheless akin to 
a legally binding agreement. Conceptually, this is problematic for Participants. Of particular 
importance is the fact that the Certification Scheme makes provision for the reporting of other 
Participants whose domestic legislation is not in keeping with the „provisions‟ of the 
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Certification Scheme.117 The fact that the information pertaining to laws, regulations and 
procedures should be provided in English is detrimental to other non-English Participants. 
 
Participants should compile and make available to all other Participants statistical data in line 
with the principles set out in Annex III.118 Annex III deals with the matters of statistics and 
commercially sensitive information. The Certification Scheme recognises that reliable and 
comparable data on the production and the international trade in rough diamonds are an 
essential tool for the effective implementation of the Certification Scheme.119 
 
In particular the data is necessary for identifying any irregularities or anomalies which may 
indicate that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade.120 Therefore Participants are 
strongly encouraged to support the six principles identified by the Certification Scheme‟s 
Annex III, taking into account the need to protect commercially sensitive information.121 
 
Pursuant to the six Principles of Annex III, firstly Participants are encouraged to maintain 
records for activities of import and export undertaken within a period of two months.122 
Records of rough diamond exports and imports, including the number of Certificates issued 
must be made available to other Participants.123 Also, the information must be published in a 
standardised format based on quarterly aggregate statistics including the country of origin of 
rough diamond shipments; their provenance where possible; their carat weight and value 
under the relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) 
classifications.124 
 
In the event that a Participant is unable to publish these statistics it should notify the Chair 
immediately.125 Participants are also encouraged to collect and publish statistics taking into 
account the existing national practices regarding data collection.126 In addition, Participants 
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are encouraged to make statistics available to intergovernmental bodies or to any other 
appropriate mechanism identified by any other Participant.127 
 
Primarily two reasons underpin sharing of statistics. Firstly, the statistics relating to imports 
and exports of rough diamond shipments should be compiled and published on a quarterly 
basis.128 Secondly, statistics relating to the production of rough diamonds should be compiled 
and published on a semi-annual basis.129 
 
Statistics may also be made available by Participants to interested third parties for the 
purposes of analysis.130 Statistical information pertinent to the international trade in and 
production of rough diamonds which have been compiled and published may be considered 
for discussion at the Plenary Meetings. 131 The objective of the discussion is, ideally, to 
support the „effective implementation of the Certification Scheme‟.132 This concludes the 
Principles contained in Annex III.  
 
Participants are encouraged to share and exchange the required information on a regular 
basis. Other relevant information should include information on self-assessment so as to 
arrive at the best practice in given circumstances.133 Annex III also encourages Participants to 
consider, favourably, requests from other Participants for assistance to improve the 
functioning of the Certification Scheme within their territories.134 
 
Participants should inform another Participant through the Chair if it considers that the laws, 
regulations, rules, procedures or practices of that other Participant do not ensure the absence 
of conflict diamonds in the exports of that other Participant.135 
 
Sixthly, Participants should cooperate with other Participants to attempt to resolve problems 
which may arise from unintentional circumstances and, which could lead to non-fulfilment of 
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the minimum requirements for the issuance or acceptance of the Certificates.136 Participants 
should inform all other Participants of the essence of the problems encountered and of 
desirable solutions.137 Finally, Participants should encourage, through their relevant 
authorities, closer co-operation between law enforcement agencies and between customs 
agencies of Participants.138 
 
These Principles are guidelines, which Participants elect to abide by. In the instance that a 
Participant elects not to abide by Annex III‟s Principles, problems may arise in relation to 
other Participants. Participants have come to regard the Certification Scheme as a so-called 
„binding‟ instrument despite its voluntary nature.  
 
It must be noted that Recommendations, like the Certification Scheme itself, do not have the 
force of law. Recommendations may or may not be adopted by the Participants. In the 
absence of adoption, there is no legal sanction. However, it seems that if Participants adopt 
the Recommendations will assist Participants significantly; as this will enable uniformity of 
rules within the diamond trading industry. 
 
The Certification Scheme assumes that all Participants have in place suitable technical 
structures and personnel with specialised expertise and knowledge. It is doubtful that this is 
the case with all Participants. Having examined co-operation and transparency, this study 
must necessarily investigate administrative matters pertaining to the Certification Scheme.  
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7. Section VI: Administrative matters to the Certification Scheme 
 
This part of the chapter will explain the „requirements‟ of the Certification Scheme and will 
highlight the weaknesses and strengths of the administrative matters of the Certification 
Scheme. The administrative matters of the Certification Scheme show where the Certification 
Scheme is actually „housed‟. Unlike most international instruments, the instrument of the 
Certification Scheme is not located in any specific place. Instead, it is „hosted‟ by different 
State Participants each year.  
 
Section VI addresses administrative matters within the purview of the Certification Scheme. 
The section deals with meetings, administrative support, participation, Participant measures, 
compliance and dispute prevention, modifications and review mechanisms. Essentially, 
housekeeping matters are given due attention in Section VI. Each will be addressed in turn.  
 
a. Meetings 
 
Participants and Observers should meet in Plenary annually or as Participants may deem 
necessary, in order to discuss the effectiveness of the Certification Scheme.139 The 
Certification Scheme defines „observers‟ as „a representative of civil society, the diamond 
industry, international organisations and non-participating governments are invited to take 
part in Plenary meetings‟.140 
 
The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings.141 The 
host country must therefore make the necessary arrangements for visas, accommodation and 
such related issues pertinent to travel. At the end of each Plenary meeting, a Chair would be 
elected to preside over all Plenary meetings. Ad hoc working groups and other subsidiary 
bodies, which might be formed, may also be decided.142 Participants should reach decisions 
by consensus. In the event that consensus proves to be impossible, the Chair is to conduct 
consultations with the Participants.143 Holding meetings to discuss the efficacy of the 
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Certification Scheme is important as this will aid the development of Certification Scheme 
initiatives 
 
The efficacy of the Certification Scheme may focus on different regions and or countries. 
Participants should adopt Rules of Procedure for such meetings at the first Plenary meeting.144 
At best, these rules of procedure should be in pre-emptive in response to the prevailing 
conditions of application of the Certification Scheme.  
 
Meetings should be held in the country where the Chair is located, unless a Participant or an 
international organisation offers to host a meeting and this offer has been accepted.145 
Decisions should be reached through consensus. This is problematic with 75 Participants to 
the Certification Scheme. 
 
b. Administrative support 
 
For the effective administration of the Certification Scheme, administrative support is 
essential. The modalities and functions of that support should be discussed at the first Plenary 
meeting, following endorsement by the UN General Assembly.146 Support may differ from 
year to year depending on the Chair or host country of the Certification Scheme. 
Administrative support may include a variety of functions, amongst others, the following 
functions:147 
 
„(a)  to serve as a channel of communication, information sharing and consultation between 
the Participants with regard to matters provided for in this Document;
148
 
(b)  to maintain and make available for the use of all Participants a collection of those laws, 
regulations, rules, procedures, practices and statistics notified pursuant to Section V;
149
 
(c)  to prepare documents and provide administrative support for Plenary and working group 
meetings;
150
 and 
(d)  to undertake such additional responsibilities as the Plenary meetings, or any working 
group delegated by Plenary meetings, may instruct.‟151 
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As may be seen, administrative support is very important to the operation of the Certification 
Scheme as it impacts upon its workability. The Administration of the Certification Scheme 
enables communication, sharing of information, preparation of documents and many other 
responsibilities. This means that the administration must be efficient so as to ensure the 
proper and optimal functioning of the Certification Scheme. Whether all country Chairs will 
be able to provide a proper administration is doubtful, considering the vast income and 
developmental disparities between the Participant States.
152
  
 
c. Participation 
 
Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all 
Applicants willing and able to fulfil the requirements of that Certification Scheme.153 Any 
applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme should signify its interest by 
notifying the Chair through diplomatic channels.154 This notification should include the 
information set forth in paragraph (a) of Section V and be circulated to all Participants within 
one month.155 Participants intending to invite representatives of civil society, the diamond 
industry, non-participating governments and international organisations to participate in 
Plenary meetings as Observers must also comply with this requirement.156 
 
The only requirement for participating in the Certification Scheme is that interested parties 
should notify the Chair through diplomatic channels. Usually legally binding and policy 
agreements are communicated through diplomatic channels.157 The Certification Scheme, in 
making such a request, at this juncture seems akin to a legally binding mechanism as opposed 
to a voluntary measure.  
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d. Participant measures 
 
Participants are to prepare, and make available to other Participants, in advance of annual 
Plenary meetings of the Kimberley Process, information as stipulated in paragraph (a) of 
Section V outlining how the requirements of the Certification Scheme are being implemented 
within their respective jurisdictions.158 The agenda of annual Plenary meetings is to include 
an item where information as stipulated in paragraph (a) of Section V is reviewed and 
Participants can provide further details of their respective systems at the request of the 
Plenary.159 
 
Where further clarification is needed, Participants at Plenary meetings, upon recommendation 
by the Chair, can identify and decide on additional verification measures to be undertaken.160 
Such measures are to be implemented in accordance with applicable national and 
international law.161 These could include, but need not be limited to measures such as:162 
 
„A  requesting additional information and clarification from Participants;163 and 
B  review missions by other Participants or their representatives where there are credible 
indications of significant non-compliance with the Certification Scheme.‟164 
 
Participants should conduct review missions in an analytical, expert and impartial manner 
with the consent of the Participant concerned.165 The size, composition, terms of reference 
and time-frame of these missions should be based on the circumstances and be established by 
the Chair with the consent of the Participant concerned and in consultation with all 
Participants.166 
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A report on the results of compliance verification measures should be forwarded to the Chair 
and to the Participant concerned within three weeks of completion of the mission.167 Any 
comments from that Participant as well as the report are to be posted on the restricted access 
section of an official Certification Scheme website no later than three weeks after the 
submission of the report to the Participant concerned.168 Participants and Observers should 
make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issue and the discussions 
relating to any compliance matter.169 
 
Indeed, it is disconcerting that the Certification Scheme requests information from 
Participants, which involve such advanced technological, analytical and other skills. Not all 
Participants, especially the major diamond producing countries of Africa will be in a position 
to meet this request.  
 
e. Compliance and dispute prevention in the Certification Scheme 
 
In the event that an issue regarding compliance by a Participant or any other issue regarding 
the implementation of the Certification Scheme arises, any concerned Participant may inform 
the Chair, who is to inform all Participants without delay about the said concern and enter 
into dialogue on how to address the concern.170 The Certification Scheme advocates 
constructive dialogue. Participants and Observers should make every effort to observe strict 
confidentiality regarding the issue and the discussions relating to any compliance matter.171 
 
The compliance and dispute prevention of the Certification Scheme falls within the 
responsibility of a rotating Chair. This is problematic. The rotating Chair is housed within the 
country itself. Administrative matters, differing legal regimes and usual business practices 
arising from cultural norms are some of the issues which may prove difficult for the rotating 
Chair to address. 
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f. Modifications to the Certification Scheme 
 
The Certification Scheme document may be modified by consensus of the Participants.172 
Modifications may be proposed by any Participant.173 Proposals for modifications should be 
sent in writing to the Chair, at least ninety days before the next Plenary meeting, unless 
otherwise agreed.174 The Chair should circulate any proposed modification expeditiously to 
all Participants and Observers and place it on the agenda of the next annual Plenary 
meeting.175 
 
g. Review mechanism 
 
Participants intend that the Certification Scheme should be subject to periodic review, to 
allow Participants to conduct a thorough analysis of all elements contained in the scheme.176 
The review should also include consideration of the continuing requirement for such a 
scheme, in view of the perception of the Participants, and of international organisations, in 
particular the UN, of the continued threat posed at that time by conflict diamonds.177 
 
The first review should take place no later than three years after the effective starting date of 
the Certification Scheme.178The review meeting should normally coincide with the annual 
Plenary meeting, unless otherwise agreed.179The Third Year Review was undertaken in 2006 
and was published in 2007. 
 
The Certification Scheme was established at the Ministerial Meeting on the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds in Interlaken on 5 November 2002.180 
Since then a review was commissioned annually. Reviews are of crucial importance as they 
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are indicators of the efficacy of the Certification Scheme‟s contents and the Participants‟ 
commitments.  
 
h. Finance 
 
The Kimberley Process does not have a funding mechanism in order to sustain its activities. 
Review missions and the work of the WGS have been funded by civil society organisations 
such as Partnership Africa Canada. Sometimes, states have contributed to the Kimberly 
Process for ad hoc activities. However, there is no permanent budget to which Participants 
contribute. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Having shown the background to the Certification Scheme, the overview of the Certification 
Scheme, the Certificate of the Certification Scheme, the undertakings by Participants, co-
operation and transparency with regard to Certification Scheme and administrative matters to 
the Certification Scheme, it is necessary to highlight some of the major difficulties of the 
Certification Scheme‟s contents. 
 
The Kimberley Certificate is the driving mechanism of the Certification Scheme. The UN SC 
and the UN GA, and other organisations such as the WTO support the Certification Scheme 
as has been aforementioned. However, the Certification Scheme is not a UN document which 
could claim the formal force of law like most UN documents seeking to address specific 
situations. 
 
There are significant problems with the wording of the Certification Scheme. Words such as 
„should‟ and phrases like „… is to …‟ are problematic when dealing with a Certification 
Scheme of such importance. The problems of the Certification Scheme may be addressed in 
three categories: the legality of the Certification Scheme; the technological efficiency of 
Participants as well as definitions of the Certification Scheme. At this point the problems will 
be summarised for further interrogation in the chapter six. 
 
The Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism with no apparent force of law. However 
the contents of the Certification Scheme in some salient instances, as will be mentioned 
below, represent the format of legal documents. Specifically, the Certification Scheme 
appears to aspire to that of a treaty formation. It is nevertheless a voluntary and self-
regulatory initiative whose provisions are strongly encouraged to be complied with by the 
UN and other international organisations, and in the case of the EC, obliged to do so by states 
passing enabling legislation in the diamond sector. 
 
The Certification Scheme was formed in an effort to address two major objectives, namely 
the curbing of the illegal trade of rough diamonds and thereby the elimination of one of the 
main contributing factors to severe human rights abuses. The extent to which a voluntary 
scheme in general, and more specifically the Certification Scheme, can achieve such 
objectives is one of the central objectives in this study.  
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However, the ability of the Certification Scheme to achieve its objectives cannot be 
determined only through an analysis of the contents of the Certification Scheme. The 
practical implementation and monitoring of the Certification Scheme must also be 
investigated. So too, must the role of international organisations and the role of international 
law be examined.  
 
The Certification Scheme operates on the basic premise that each shipment of rough 
diamonds must be accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate from the point of origin 
to the point of destination. Participants to the Certification Scheme are expected to fulfil 
particular „requirements‟ in order for the Certification Scheme to have application within 
their respective jurisdictions. 
 
The Certification Scheme comprises 49 Participants. Of these, 49 are actually Participants as 
the EU acts as single Participant to the Certification Scheme. Many Participants have agreed 
to implement the requirements of the Certification Scheme into their domestic systems. 
Notably, these Participants are the EU countries. Most Participants have not yet fully 
implemented the Certification Scheme due to various technological difficulties and problems 
which exist with the definitions aspect of the Certification Scheme. 
 
a. Section I: Definitions 
 
Problems exist with some definitions such as „Transshipment‟.  
 
To start with, the definition of „Transshipment‟ is indicative of many difficulties. Firstly a 
shipment destined for international trade may pass through the country of a non-Participant 
State or region. Secondly, the Certification Scheme‟s definition allows for the shipment to be 
warehoused, or to change the mode of transport from air to water. Thirdly, the passage of the 
shipment may be on the territory of a non-Participant through any part of its journey en route 
to its final destination. Participants should ensure that the shipment leaves its territory in an 
identical state as it entered its territory. This too, is problematic as the importing and 
exporting authorities may not be in a position to evade interception.  
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Therefore, the definition, as it is presently couched does not present difficulties in form and 
language. However, the problems may arise during the actual physical transhipment of 
parcels of rough diamonds.  
 
b. Technological efficiency and capacity with respect to expectations of the 
Certification Scheme 
 
Difficulties arise with regard to the Certificate being translated into English. Not all countries 
are able to readily have Certificates translated into English. Further, the Certification Scheme 
does not provide guidelines as to how the Certificate is supposed to be „tamper and forgery 
resistant‟. The Participants must address this matter in their own capacities. Problems arise 
when the details of the exporter must be noted. These details are not readily and easily 
available in most diamond producing nations. 
 
Drafting and issuing of Certificates have complexities contained in the fourteen minimum 
requirements. Problems also exist with respect to the Importing and Exporting Authorities. 
The next part of this chapter will address undertakings of Participants in respect of 
international trade in rough diamonds. 
 
c. Section III: undertakings of Participants in respect of international trade 
of diamonds 
 
At minimum, the confirmation should refer to the Certificate number, the number of parcels, 
the carat weight and the details of the exporter. The importing Participant requires that the 
original Certificate be readily accessible for a period of no less than three years. Section III 
(b) of the Certification Scheme defines „import‟ to mean the physical entering/bringing into 
any part of the geographical territory of a Participant.  
 
Thus the countries of import and export should have in place mechanisms to ensure storage 
and verification facilities for a period of three years. This may be problematic as not all 
Participants will be in a position to put into place and maintain storage and verification 
facilities. Not all buyers and sellers are on record with the official coordinating offices 
responsible for the implementation of the Certification Scheme. Moreover, the lack of 
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technological capacities as aforementioned is another obstacle, as not all Participants are in a 
position to store data electronically.  
 
d. Section IV 
 
It must be borne in mind that the General Recommendations are commendable indeed. 
However, the workability of the General Recommendations in practical terms may become 
problematic. For example, the collection and storage of data is not realistically a 
recommendation that countries afflicted by poverty and backward technology may be able to 
implement readily in their national systems. Infrastructural constraints, lack of finances and 
other factors must be considered; and the Certification Scheme should have considered the 
need for technological capacities and the provision of technical assistance. 
 
Indeed, the role of the artisanal or informal diamond miner is important to the diamond 
industry, most especially in curbing the illegal international trade in rough diamonds. 
However, most diamond producing countries experience difficulties in locating artisanal 
miners. In instances where they are located, there is little trust which prevents co-operation.  
 
e. Collection of data and storage 
 
The problems so far indicated may undermine the efficacy of the Certification Scheme. The 
Certification Scheme, in mandating Participants to collect, share and make available 
information and statistics through electronic and written documented systems demands that 
Participants have structures in place which will enable collection and analysis of statistics.  
 
The Certification Scheme assumes that all Participants have in place these structures that 
require personnel to have specialised expertise and knowledge. It is doubtful that this is the 
case with all Participants. 
 
 
 
87 
 
f. Section V 
 
Of particular importance is the fact that the Certification Scheme makes provision for the 
reporting of other Participants whose domestic legislation is not in keeping with the 
„provisions‟ of the Certification Scheme. The fact that the information pertaining to laws, 
regulations and procedures should be provided in English is detrimental to other non-English 
Participants.  
 
g. Section VI 
 
Administrative support is important to the operation of the Certification Scheme as it impacts 
upon its workability.181 This means that the administration must be efficient so as to ensure 
the proper and optimal functioning of the Certification Scheme. Whether all country Chairs 
will be equally able to provide a proper administration is debatable.  
 
Compliance and dispute prevention of the Certification Scheme falls within the responsibility 
of a rotating Chair. This is problematic, as it only provides for an embryonic dispute 
prevention and dispute resolution process. 
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9. Concluding remarks 
 
Matters pertaining to the Certificate are intrinsically difficult. The same is applicable to 
internal controls, co-operation and transparency and the administrative matters relating to the 
Certification Scheme.  
 
Although EC countries have experienced seemingly negligible practical difficulties in 
implementing the contents of the Certification Scheme, this is not the case with regard to 
smaller and less developed countries, especially in Africa.  
 
Due to the non-legal nature of the Certification Scheme, it is difficult to make use of the term 
„provisions‟ as this term is normally confined to legal documents and treaties. The 
Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism, which means that Participants to the 
Certification Scheme are not legally obliged to follow through with the contents of the 
Certification Scheme. As will be seen later in this study, non-compliance with the contents of 
the Certification Scheme has attendant consequences. Therefore the Certification Scheme 
operates akin to a treaty or a contract mechanism.  
 
At the time of drafting of the Certification Scheme, the international community wished to 
have an international certification scheme in place, whose notion was taken from the UN 
SC‟s sanctions against Sierra Leone, the DRC and Angola. The Certification Scheme could 
possibly have been reduced to a legally binding document. Rather, and for obvious reasons of 
expediency, the Certification Scheme drafters opted for a voluntary non-legally binding 
mechanism. 
 
In the main the Certification Scheme‟s efforts are commendable. The drafters of the 
Certification Scheme appear to have been pre-emptive in their construction of the contents. 
However, there remains a significant doubt regarding the realistic implementation of the 
Certification Scheme in light of differing Participants.  
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No two countries are alike in their commitment to the Certification Scheme. African 
countries remain amongst the largest diamond producing nations globally.
182
 Countries such 
as Sierra Leone and Liberia are in the wake of recovery from conflicts. This means that such 
states are not sufficiently equipped to meet the deliverables of the Certification Scheme. 
Countries such as the DRC and Cote d‟Ivoire have made this problem public at the 
Kimberley meetings. 
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CHAPTER 4 : IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING IN THE 
KPCS: HIGHLIGHTING THE 2007 ANNUAL REVIEW 
OF THE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
1. Introduction 
 
The study will proceed, in this chapter, to provide an introduction to the Certification 
Scheme‟s implementation and monitoring in accordance with the Annual Review 2006 
published in 2007.
1
 
 
The Certification Scheme makes provision for review of the implementation and monitoring 
to be undertaken.
2
 Participants agreed to undertake a review of the operation of the 
Certification Scheme three years after the same came into existence. Other organisations such 
as a Partnership Africa Canada, have also undertaken reviews of the Certification Scheme.
3
 
This chapter does not focus on those reviews in the main. They have been consulted for this 
study. As such they will be utilised throughout for the purposes of completion.  
 
According to the findings of the 2006 Third Year Review,
4
 the Certification Scheme is 
effective.
5
 In recognising the Certification Scheme‟s efficacy, the Review recommended a 
number of actions to further strengthen the Certification Scheme. In particular, areas such as 
monitoring of implementation and strengthening internal controls in participating countries, 
as well as greater transparency in the gathering of statistical data came to the fore.  
 
A significant body of information regarding the implementation of the technical requirements 
of the Certification Scheme is available.
6
 The information indicates that the minimum 
requirements of the Certification Scheme have been implemented in Participant countries at 
the level of legislation or other acts and regulations.
7
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 Smillie I „Diamond and human security‟ (2008) Annual Review and Smillie I „Diamond and human security‟ 
(2009) Annual Review. 
4
 The Review was submitted by the ad hoc working Group in November 2006. 
5
 Third Year Review at 1 with regard to all aspects of the Certification Scheme. 
6
 31 review visits, two review missions and three expert missions carried out by the KP since the inception of 
the Certification Scheme, as of July 2006, as well as the annual reports submitted by Participants on their 
implementation of the Certification Scheme in 2003, 2004 and 2005, and Participants‟ responses to the Review 
Questionnaire. On the Kimberley Process website at www.kimberleyprocess.com. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
7
 Third Year Review at 5, 12 and 34-35. 
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This first Third Year Review focused on three major areas: firstly, the impact of the 
Certification Scheme on the international trade in rough diamonds, and the extent to which 
the Certification Scheme has been effective in preventing the flow of conflict diamonds into 
the legitimate trade; secondly, the technical provisions of the Certification Scheme and 
whether they are functioning as planned or require improvement; and thirdly, the operations 
of the Certification Scheme and its efficacy.  
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2. Background to the Third Year Review 
 
The mandate for the Review arose from the Certification Scheme document.
8
 Review is 
intended to allow Participants to conduct a thorough analysis of all elements contained in the 
Certification Scheme document. A „Review Working Group‟ undertook the review.9 
Following consultations, the composition of the Working Group consisted of the following 
members: Australia, China, European Community, India, Israel, Russian Federation, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, United States, World Diamond Council, and Partnership Africa Canada 
and Global Witness.
10
 
 
Terms of reference for the Working Group arose from „The Moscow Plenary‟.11 Acting upon 
its mandate, the ad hoc Working Group reviewed the efficacy of implementing different 
elements contained in the Certification Scheme, the impact of the Certification Scheme and 
the efficacy of its organisation and working methods.
12
 The Review includes 
recommendations and implications of the suggested course of action in comparison to 
benefits of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The Moscow Plenary outlined in detail the criteria for the Review under the following major 
headings: Impact, Technical Provisions of the Certification Scheme, and Organisation and 
Working Methods.
13
 These detailed criteria formed the basis for the questionnaire, which was 
distributed to all Participants, Observers and interested international organisations.
14
 
                                                 
8
 Section VI, Paragraph 20 of the Certification Scheme, which provides for a review of the Scheme after three 
years. „Participants intend that the Certification Scheme should be subject to periodic review. The review should 
also include consideration of the continuing requirement for such a Scheme, in view of the perception of the 
Participants, and of international organisations, particular the United Nations, of the continued threat posed at 
that time by conflict diamonds … .‟ 
9
 At the Gatineau Plenary in 2004, Canada was selected to chair an ad hoc Working Group, to include also the 
Kimberley Process Chair and Vice Chair, as well as the Chairs of the Kimberley Process Working Groups and 
Committees, and a representative group of Participants with equitable geographic balance as well as industry 
and civil society representation. 
10
 Third Year Review at 9. 
11
 Moscow Plenary at Final Communique Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting Moscow, the Russian Federation, 
15-17 November 2005. Available on Kimberley Process website. Doc 0016_Moscow_2005_final_communique-
_en[1].pdf. Last visited 01 September 2011. 
12
 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Questionnaire to the Participants available on www. 
kimberleyprocess.com. Last visited 01 September 2011. 
13
 Moscow Plenary at Final Communique Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting Moscow, the Russian Federation, 
15-17 November 2005. Available on Kimberley Process website. Doc 0016_Moscow_2005_final_communique-
_en[1].pdf. Last visited 01 September 2011. 
14
 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Questionnaire to the Participants available on www. 
kimberleyprocess.com. Last visited 01 September 2011. 
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a. Sources of information 
 
The Chair of the ad hoc Working Group was instructed by the rotating Chair to separately 
seek input from all Participants, Observers and interested international organisations from the 
Kimberley Process Working Groups and Committees.
15
 Information was also drawn from 
other Kimberley Process documents, submissions related to the Kimberley Process and the 
diamond industry from other interested parties and interviews with representatives of NGOs, 
governments and industry.
16
It must be borne in mind that the Review was pursuant to a 
questionnaire issued by the Working Group to all Participants. This questionnaire was sent to 
all Kimberley Process Participants, Observers, and other interested parties; including the 
United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
b. Time frame 
 
The ad hoc Working Group was instructed to prepare a report and recommendations on the 
review of the Certification Scheme, in consultation with Kimberley Process Participants and 
Observers which was presented in 2006, following the detailed work-plan set out by the 
Moscow Plenary. 
 
Having considered the context within which the Review ensued, the organisation of the 
Certification Scheme can now be examined. Thus the chapter is organised in six parts: 
organisation and working of the Certification Scheme; infringements and responses; technical 
provisions and difficulties experienced with implementation and monitoring; operational 
issues with implementation and monitoring; and the Peer Review Monitoring Mechanism 
(PRMM); statistical issues of the Certification Scheme and; finally internal controls.  
  
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
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3. Organisation and working of the Certification Scheme 
 
This is a diagrammatic representation of the organisation and working of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme. 
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a. Structures and operational methods 
 
Implementation of the Certification Scheme requirements is carried out by its Participants 
under national law pursuant to the requirements of the Certification Scheme.
17
 The duties of 
the Chair, and the working bodies of the Kimberley Process, have been allocated by 
consensual decisions of Plenary to Participants and Observers volunteering for such roles.
18
 
 
Under structures and operational methods, the following will be discussed as matters for 
implementation: national laws; the Chair of the Certification Scheme; the KP Working 
Groups; a global inclusive partnership; and Participation Committees; compliance issues and 
statistical non-compliance. These are the factors which the Review took into account. 
 
b. National laws 
 
Firstly, Participant countries are expected to implement the provisions of the Certification 
Scheme into their respective jurisdictions. Secondly, Participant countries are expected to 
ensure that they adhere to the contents of the Certification Scheme in their relations with 
other Participants. Non-state Participants must ensure that the content of the Certification 
Scheme is included in their regulations and policies.
19
 
 
c. The Chair of the Kimberley Process 
 
The position of Chair of the Certification Scheme is essential to its operation. The Chair 
(which rotates each year among Certification Scheme Participant countries) oversees the 
various operations of the Certification Scheme.
20
 The Chair‟s duties are extensive and may be 
expanded as requested. Duties range from hosting, organising, and preparing the agenda for 
                                                 
17
 Section IV of the Certification Scheme. 
18
 Third Year Review at 61. 
19
 To date State Participants are: Angola, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, 
Central African Republic, People‟s Republic of China, Côte d‟ Ivoire, Croatia, European Community, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Lao, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of the Congo, Russian 
Federation, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, 
Ukraine, UAE, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. 
20
 Third Year Review at 62. 
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the annual Intercessional and Plenary meetings; to communicating regularly with 
Participants, Observers, Chairs of the Working Groups, prospective Participants, and others 
on Certification Scheme matters; to retaining and circulating Certification Scheme documents 
and addenda.
21
  
 
d. The KP Working Groups 
 
In general, the 2007 Review states that the Working Groups have enjoyed effective working 
relations among themselves, with successive Chairs and between Working Groups. The four 
main Kimberley Process Working Groups are: Working Group on Statistics, Working Group 
of Diamond Experts, Working Group on Monitoring, and the Participation Committee. In 
terms of the Review, it can be difficult for those who are not Working Group members to be 
aware of all the activities of the Working Groups. Chairs should be reminded of the need to 
place minutes of teleconferences and meetings on the Certification Scheme‟s website.22 
 
All decisions of the Certification Scheme are taken by Plenary. They are not taken by the 
Working Groups. Thus, the Review suggested that compilation of Certification Scheme 
decisions should be aimed at making it easier to follow recommendations and requirements 
as not all Participants are represented on all the Working Groups.
23
 Physical meetings are 
held twice per year. For example the Intercessional and Plenary meetings, electronic 
communications, and teleconferences have served the Working Groups and Committees well 
in terms of their respective mandates.
24
 
 
However, some Participants were found to have failed to provide updated contact information 
following administrative, legislative, and/or personnel changes within their government 
agencies.
25
 Omissions hinder effective communication, which is addressed by the Review in 
its Recommendation.
26
 Some members of the various Working Groups have noted that time 
zone differences had made some teleconferences difficult to plan and execute. This is a valid 
concern, the Review noted, which is difficult to remedy.  
                                                 
21
 Third Year Review at 63. 
22
 Third Year Review at 64. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Third Year Review at 65. 
25
 Third Year Review at 65. 
26
 Third Year Review in Recommendation No 10. 
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e. A global, inclusive membership 
 
The Certification Scheme has remained open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all 
countries and regional economic integration organisations willing and able to fulfill its 
requirements. Membership at the time of the Review stood at 74 Participants, the 25 EU 
Member States being represented by the EU as one Participant. These comprise the vast 
majority of all States interested in the trade in rough diamonds, including small and larger 
alluvial producers, industrial producers and trading and polishing and cutting centres, the 
diamond trade is represented by the World Diamond Council and civil society by Global 
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada.
27
 
 
f. Participation Committee 
 
The Participation Committee was established in 2003.
28
 It is responsible for assessing 
whether or not a Participant is in compliance with the minimum standards of the Certification 
Scheme. As such, it is the body that decides who can join the Certification Scheme, and who 
should be expelled for non-compliance. Its Terms of Reference detail its importance to the 
Certification Scheme.
29
 They were revised at the Gatineau Plenary of 2004, and again at the 
Moscow Plenary of 2005. 
 
Application for membership to the Certification Scheme falls within the purview of the 
Participation Committee. The Terms of Reference of the Participation Committee require that 
it considers applications for membership in an expeditious manner (within 30 days), and this 
has generally been followed.
30
 During that time, the Committee should set out clearly the 
basis on which further inquiry is to be made, such as through expert missions or provision of 
additional information or studies.
31
 
  
                                                 
27
 A variety of international organisations participate on an ad hoc basis. 
28
 The Participation Committee includes both civil society and industry Observers, and is required by its Terms 
of Reference to have appropriate geographical balance and the necessary expertise. It is chaired for a one year 
term by the former KP Chair. Its membership includes the Vice Chair of the KP.  
29
 Third Year Review at 66. 
30
 Third Year Review at 66. 
31
 Ibid. 
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The Review stated that applications for membership to the Certification Scheme should be 
judged not only on paper credentials but also on the reports of expert missions sent 
specifically to assess an applicant‟s capacity to implement the Certification Scheme‟s 
minimum requirements, where appropriate. Applicants should be made aware of the 
developments in Certification Scheme rules and practices since the original Certification 
Scheme document.
32
 
 
g. Compliance issues 
 
Compliance means that Participants adhere to the minimum standards of the Certification 
Scheme.
33
 The Participation Committee, in accordance with its Terms of Reference, must 
consider any relevant information submitted to it by the Working Group on Monitoring 
regarding compliance by a Participant.
34
 It then determines whether, in its view, the 
Participant in question remains able and willing to meet the minimum requirements of the 
Certification Scheme.
35
 
 
If the Participation Committee finds that the Participant no longer meets the minimum 
requirements, it must notify the Chair in writing of the reasons for its conclusion; and may 
include a set of recommendations. In order to assist the Participation Committee further in its 
assessment of an applicant‟s ability to meet the Certification Scheme‟s compliance standards, 
the Review suggested that the Participation Committee should draw up a list of questions on 
the objectives of the applicant in joining the Certification Scheme, as well as listing the tasks 
required and mandatory documents and data to be submitted.  
 
h. Statistical non-compliance 
 
The collection and analysis of statistics is an important tool in the Certification Scheme‟s 
efforts to uncover sources and flows of conflict diamonds and illicit diamonds.
36
 Although 
                                                 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Third Year Review at 67. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 The Certification Scheme‟s minimum standards are defined in Sections II, III, IV, and V, and Annexes I, II, 
and III. 
36
 Third Year Review at 67. 
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progress on the issue of statistical non-compliance has been made since 2003, several 
Participants continue to submit their statistical reports after due dates.
37
 As a result, the 
Participation Committee developed specific guidelines together with the Working Group on 
Statistics to deal with the issue of statistical non-reporting.
38
 Procedures agreed to at the 
Moscow Plenary have improved the timeliness of statistical reporting according to the 
Review. 
 
i. Dispute resolution and compliance issues 
 
According to the Certification Scheme document, disputes are to be communicated to the 
Chair, „who is to inform all Participants without delay about the said concern and enter into 
dialogue on how to address it‟.39 The Chair also informs relevant observers about the dispute 
or concern, and Participants and observers are expected to treat the matter with strict 
confidentiality.
40
 
 
The Chair is responsible for mediating disputes, whether procedural or substantive in nature. 
By general consensus, mediation is perceived to have strengthened the Certification Scheme 
by showing it has „teeth‟.41 To date, all other disputes have been handled informally by the 
Chair or by Working Groups within the terms of their mandate. Exclusion from the 
Certification Scheme, as suggested by the Review, should only be considered in the most 
serious cases of non-compliance, where the maintenance of a Participant inside the 
Certification Scheme would seriously jeopardise the integrity of the Certification Scheme.
42
 
 
j. Transparency 
 
The Kimberley Process strives to be transparent.
43
 However, it is concerned with balancing 
transparency and necessary confidentiality, as in the case, for example, of security 
                                                 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Section IV at para 16 of the Certification Scheme document. 
40
 Third Year Review at 70. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Third Year Review at 70. 
43
 Section V of the Certification Scheme. 
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requirements when dealing with politically sensitive and or commercially valuable 
information relating to the trade in rough diamonds, or information that is sub judice.
44
 In its 
outreach to the public, the Certification Scheme‟s principal communication tool is its general 
website. 
 
k. Websites 
 
The Certification Scheme has two websites: the Rough Diamonds Statistics website
45
 and the 
general website. The Rough Diamond Statistics website
46
 is an internal tool for the collection 
of statistics and other related information relating to the trade in rough diamonds, which is 
operated, maintained and paid for by the Chair of the Working Group on Statistics.
47
 
According to the Review, statistical and related information could be published on the 
Statistics website in an area to be accessed by the public, or made available through a link to 
the general website.
48
 
 
With regard to the website, the responsibility to operate and maintain rests with the Chair.
49
 
The site has both a „members only‟ section and a public section. The public section includes 
information on the background of the Certification Scheme, its structure, and selected 
documents. Critics claim,
50
 correctly, that it does not include all the key Certification Scheme 
documents, such as national legislation relating to the Certification Scheme, or annual reports 
or, the full peer review reports, only summaries of those reports; that documents are not 
posted consistently or in a timely fashion; and that there is no obvious point of contact listed 
to request further information.
51
 The Review suggested that the Certification Scheme should 
make available on the public site all documents concerning the Certification Scheme that do 
not have confidentiality implications.
52
 
 
                                                 
44
 Third Year Review at 71. 
45
 Not available for public access at www.kimberelyprocess.com. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Third Year Review at 71. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Section VI(15) of the Certification Scheme. 
50
 NGOs Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness undertook studies to the contrary which will not be 
canvassed in this study. 
51
 Third Year Review at 72. 
52
 Partnership for Africa Canada and Global Witness „Implementing the KP 5 years on‟ (2005) at 3-9. 
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To date, this suggestion has not been fully implemented. Minimum information is made 
available for public access.  
 
l. The role of observers 
 
i. The diamond industry’s self-regulation 
 
In October 2002, the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA) and the 
World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB) created a voluntary system of self 
regulation, which required its members to sign a System of Warranties and a Code of 
Conduct.
53
 The System of Warranties is supposed to guarantee the provenance of diamonds 
and certify that the diamonds sold are conflict-free.  
 
While the System of Warranties and its Code of Conduct are voluntary, they require the 
expulsion of members who violated the system, and publication of their names.
54
 They also 
require members to work with governments to publicise various pieces of information in 
support of the Certification Scheme and to „assist and provide technical support regarding 
government regulations and trade resolutions restricting the trade in conflict diamonds to all 
legitimate parties in need of such information or expertise‟.55 
 
ii. Civil society  
 
Since the origin of the process at Kimberley in 2000, civil society representatives have played 
an essential role in motivating the Certification Scheme, in negotiating its establishment, and 
in its operation.
56
 As active Observers of the process, NGOs such as Partnership Africa 
Canada and Global Witness continue to keep the issue of conflict diamonds in the public 
domain. They continue to champion other diamond-related activities such as the Diamond 
Development Initiative (DDI), which De Beers founded.
57
 
                                                 
53
 Third Year Review at 75. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Third Year Review at 75; see also on advantages and disadvantages of regulation. Mistelis LA „Regulatory 
aspects: Globalisation; harmonisation, legal transplants and law reform: Some fundamental observations‟ (2000) 
34/3 Int’l L at 1059-60. 
56
 Third Year Review at 75. 
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The Review recommended that the Certification Scheme should cooperate with 
representatives of civil society, including at local levels, to promote effective Certification 
Scheme implementation, especially in those countries that have weak systems, limited 
capacity and or have been affected by conflict diamonds.
58
 
 
iii. Links with international organisations 
 
The Certification Scheme‟s involvement with international organisations dates back to the 
UN GA Resolution 55/56 of December 2000, when the UN GA endorsed the Kimberley 
Process and urged the implementation of its Certification Scheme as soon as possible.  
 
Since then, links with international organisations have been maintained, as shown by the 
participation in this Review by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and by UN 
Missions serving in the DRC (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Côte d‟Ivoire (UNOCI) 
and Liberia (UNMIL).
59
 The World Bank and IMF have attended KP Plenary meetings.  
 
The Certification Scheme‟s Chairs have worked with the UN Security Council Sanctions 
Committee on Liberia and Côte d‟Ivoire.60 Increasingly, Participants are calling for a closer 
working relationship with international organisations, which have activities that are relevant 
to diamond production and trade.
61
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Third Year Review at 4 and 13. 
60
 Third Year Review at 75. 
61
 International organisations include the United Nations Development Programme, international financial 
institutions like the World Bank and other multilateral development banks, and the UN Secretariat; see also in 
general Hopkins K „Assessing the world‟s response to Apartheid: An historical account of international law and 
its part in the South African transformation‟ (2002) 10 Univ of Miami Int and Comparative Law LR at 65.  
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m. Impact of the Certification Scheme 
 
i. Curbing production and trade in conflict diamonds 
 
According to the Review, it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of the Certification 
Scheme in curbing the illicit production and trade of diamonds in countries affected by 
conflict diamonds, as well as on the international diamond trade.
62
 
 
Given the difficulties posed by attempts to regulate an international trade of such complexity, 
added to the problems posed by artisanal mining, porous borders, lack of infrastructure and 
the nature of the illicit trade itself, as it exists today the Certification Scheme cannot 
completely control the entire trade.
63
 According to the Review, there is near unanimous 
agreement on the effectiveness of the Certification Scheme in responding to its UN 
mandate.
64
The majority of Participant countries agreed that they were making significant 
progress in meeting the requirements of the Certification Scheme. The DRC and the RoC 
expressed concerns over technological and logistical infrastructure within their respective 
national systems. 
 
Côte d‟Ivoire also disagreed, stating that the Certification Scheme „has not effectively 
responded to the mandate given by the relevant UN GA resolution to combat the threat of 
conflict diamonds. It stated that despite the implementation of the Certification Scheme, 
Ivorian diamonds have been sold to the international market without any sanctions for those 
involved in that trade‟.65 In 2005 the Certification Scheme began monitoring the illicit 
production of diamonds in the north of the country.  
 
The UN Panel of Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire subsequently confirmed the production and trade 
of conflict diamonds from Côte d‟Ivoire.66 The Certification Scheme adopted a nine point 
resolution in November 2005, with detailed provisions.
67
 The Chair reported to the 
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 Third Year Review at 75-80. 
63
 Third Year Review at 17. 
64
 Ibid; see also Goldman HB „Between a RoC and a hard place: The Republic of the Congo‟s illicit trade in 
diamonds and efforts to break the cycle of corruption‟ (2008-2009) 30 U Pa J Int’l L at 362-3. 
65
 Côte d‟Ivoire: Submission for the 2006 Review of the Certification Scheme (March 2006) at 2. 
66
 Third Year Review at 18. 
67
 Ibid. 
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Intercessional in June 2006 on progress implementing these requirements.
68
 Unfortunately, 
these actions have not stopped Ivorian diamonds from reaching the international diamond 
market without a certificate of origin.  
 
ii. The case of Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Rebels control two of Côte d‟Ivoire‟s main diamond-mining areas, Bobi- Seguela and 
Tortiya, which are estimated to produce 200,000 carats per year.
69
 From the beginning of the 
Certification Scheme, Côte d‟Ivoire has suspended the issuance of Certificates and prohibited 
the export of rough diamonds from its territory through the issuance of Ministerial decree no 
0070/mme/dm of 19 November 2002, following the hostilities of 18 September 2002. At the 
same time, Liberian conflict diamonds continued to seep into the international market, at a 
rate of between 100,000 and 400,000 carats per year.
70
 
The expert mission in March 2005 found that, while potential production could be in the 
range of 100,000 to 400,000 carats per year, only a small proportion of mining sites were 
being worked.
71
 Specifically, the mission report noted that „during 2004, UN sanctions and 
Liberian Government actions appear to have reduced visible artisanal mining activity that had 
held the potential to circumvent sanctions from 16 to three mining operations‟.72 Whereas the 
Certification Scheme could not prove that diamonds are produced in Liberia, it did state that 
Liberia was a conduit state for diamond smuggling. The situation is Cote d‟Ivoire is a one 
where the territory is also being used for conduit diamond smuggling. Also, it is a diamond 
producing state. 
 
Like in Liberia, the Certification Scheme took a number of steps to objectively analyse the 
situation in Côte d‟Ivoire. In April 2005, the Review states that the past Chair went to Côte 
d‟Ivoire as special envoy of then Chair, Russia. This resulted in a report from the Chair to the 
                                                 
68
 Ibid; On the lack of efficacy of the Certification Scheme, see Fluet ER „Conflict diamonds: US responsibility 
and response‟ (2004-2005) 7 San Diego Int’l LJ at 111-13 and103-24. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 On the assumption that Liberian production can be valued at somewhere around US$100/ct, this would be 
equivalent to ongoing annual production of somewhere in the region of 140,000 cts. Kimberley Process 
Working Group on Monitoring: Submission for the 2006 Review of the KPCS (February 2006) at 2. 
71
 The UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, in its report of November 2005, estimated current Liberian production to 
be in the region of about US$1.2 million per month. 
72
 Third Year Review at 18. 
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UN SC that alerted the international community to the issue. Subsequently, the UN SC 
nominated a diamond expert to the Panel of Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire.73 
 
Investigations conducted by the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire suggested that there 
are a number of exit routes for Ivorian diamonds in both the north and south of the country, 
and smuggling routes operating through countries outside the Certification Scheme.
74
 Other 
routes may have involved Ivorian production being laundered through Participants in breach 
of the Certification Scheme‟s rules.75 The Chair gave an interim report on implementation of 
the resolution in the June 2006 Gaborone Intercessional.
76
 
 
Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire in April 2006 were tasked to assess the extent of conflict diamond 
production in the northern part of the country under rebel Forces Nouvelles control.
77
 All 
Participants in the region (Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) agreed to record the quality 
characteristics of their exports in accordance the Certification Scheme, an optional measure 
with a view to identifying occasions where Côte d‟Ivoire diamonds could be brought into the 
legitimate rough diamond trade.
78
 
 
The Gaborone Resolution aforementioned also requires Participants to report to the Chair any 
incoming shipments of rough diamonds which they suspect of containing diamonds of Côte 
d‟Ivoire origin. Further, the Gaborone Resolution provided that Participants must institute 
appropriate action against any of their nationals or companies found to be involved in the 
production of diamonds in Côte d‟Ivoire or in the trade in such diamonds.79 Representative 
organisations of the international diamond industry were requested the full cooperation of all 
                                                 
73
 On the lack of efficacy of the Certification Scheme, see Fluet „Conflict diamonds‟ (2004-2005) at 111-3. 
74
 Third Year Review at 18. 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 At paras 1 and 4 of the Moscow Resolution, and at para 12 of UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/UN/SCR 1643 
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the Kimberley Process Plenary meeting, Moscow, 15-17 November 2005, on the subject of illicit diamond 
production in Côte d‟Ivoire‟. 
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 At paras 1 and 4 of the Moscow Resolution, and para 12 of UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/UN/SCR 1643 
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the Kimberley Process Plenary meeting, Moscow, 15-17 November 2005, on the subject of illicit diamond 
production in Côte d‟Ivoire‟ at17-25. 
78
 Third Year Review at 17-20. 
79
 Third Year Review at 20. 
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sections of the international diamond industry in ensuring that rough diamonds produced in 
Côte d‟Ivoire cannot be introduced into the legitimate trade.80 
 
Despite greater international awareness of the problem of conflict diamonds created by the 
Kimberley Process, the trade in conflict diamonds has not yet been totally eradicated.
81
 In 
terms of the Review, the Côte d‟Ivoire situation demonstrates the need for vigilance on the 
part of all Participants and Observers concerning the threat of conflict diamonds.
82
 Whilst 
accurate statistics on the current production and trading of conflict diamonds, in terms of the 
Review, are very difficult to determine, all available data suggest that the major proportion of 
the international trade in rough diamonds is carried out within the Certification Scheme.
83
 
 
While the peer review mechanism does not by itself yield a detailed quantitative assessment 
of the percentage of the trade covered by the Certification Scheme, the reports of review 
visits do show general developments. The review visits carried out to date to the DRC, Sierra 
Leone and Angola together with the statistical reports and responses to the questionnaires 
from these Participants, point to substantial increases in the proportion of diamonds exported 
through official channels as a result of Certification Scheme implementation, alongside other 
factors such as overall stabilisation of the countries in question and the implementation of 
peace agreements.
84
 
 
In addition to review visits, the KP WGM carried out ad hoc monitoring activities on Liberia 
and Côte d‟ Ivoire.85 These two countries were subjected to UN embargos on their diamond 
exports.
86
 The Review Report specified „during 2004, UN sanctions and Liberian 
Government actions appear to have reduced visible artisanal mining activity that had held the 
potential to circumvent sanctions, from 16 to 3 mining operations‟.87 The UN Panel of 
Experts on Liberia, in its report of November 2005, estimated Liberian production to be in 
                                                 
80
 Ibid. 
81
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 Third Year Review at 18-20. 
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the region of about US$1.2 million per month.
88
 It is likely that at least a significant 
proportion of this production is reaching world markets by various routes.
89
 
 
In summary, ten key problem areas may be identified with the organisation of the 
Certification Scheme with regard to implementation and monitoring. Firstly, the Working 
Group assumes a working knowledge of the Participants as regards the Certification Scheme. 
Under structures and operational methods, the following will be discussed as matters for 
implementation: national laws; the Chair of the Certification Scheme; the KP Working 
Groups; a global inclusive partnership; and Participation Committees; compliance issues and 
statistical non compliance. These are the factors which the Review took into account. The 
organisation of the Certification Scheme for implementation and monitoring presents 
problems.  
 
Firstly, the Review assumes that Participants have implemented the Certification Scheme into 
their respective jurisdictions. Secondly, Participant countries are expected to ensure that they 
adhere to the contents of the Certification Scheme in their relations with other Participants. 
Non- state Participants must ensure that the content of the Certification Scheme are included 
in their regulations and policies. With regards to the Chair, the Certification Scheme assumes 
that Chairs undertake to fulfil all their duties imposed by the Kimberley Process.  
 
Thirdly, pertinent to the four Working Groups, not all Participants are aware of the activities 
of all working Groups. The four main Kimberley Process Working Groups are: Working 
Group on Statistics, Working Group of Diamond Experts, Working Group on Monitoring, 
and the Participation Committee. In terms of the Review, it can be difficult for those who are 
not Working Group members to be aware of all the activities of the Working Groups. Some 
Participants have failed to timeously submit data to the WG which hampers their work. Some 
members of the various Working Groups have noted that time-zone differences have made 
some teleconferences difficult to plan and execute. 
 
Fourthly, the Participation Committee is responsible for assessing whether or not a 
Participant is in compliance with the minimum standards of the Certification Scheme. As 
such, it is the body that decides who can join the Certification Scheme, and who should be 
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expelled for non-compliance. Its Terms of Reference detail its importance to the Certification 
Scheme. They were revised at the Gatineau Plenary of 2004, and again at the Moscow 
Plenary of 2005. 
 
Fifthly, compliance means that Participants adhere to the minimum standards of the 
Certification Scheme. Sixthly, the Participation Committee, in accordance with its Terms of 
Reference, must consider any relevant information submitted to it by the Working Group on 
Monitoring regarding compliance by a Participant. It then determines whether, in its view, the 
Participant in question remains able and willing to meet the minimum requirements of the 
Certification Scheme.
90
 
 
Seventhly, the issue of dispute resolution and compliance is dealt with by the Chair. This is 
problematic due to the rotation of the Chair. Moreover the Chair is a Participant to the 
Certification Scheme. The next issue of transparency affects the efficacy of the Certification 
Scheme. In the same vein is the matter of websites which was also not sufficiently addressed 
in the Review. 
 
Tenthly, the role of observers comprises three aspects: the diamond industry self-regulation; 
civil society and links with international organisations. All three aspects presented problems 
in the Review.  
 
Finally, with respect to the true impact of the Certification Scheme, in curbing the production 
and trade in conflict diamonds, Côte d‟Ivoire made its important submissions, already 
referred to. The submissions by Côte d‟Ivoire reflected the lack of practical workability of the 
Certification Scheme. 
 
Against the background of the organisation of the Certification Scheme, and its 
implementation and monitoring, it is now necessary to investigate the „infringements‟ of the 
Certification Scheme and the responses by the Kimberley Process. 
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4. Infringements and responses 
 
This chapter will proceed to discuss the Review‟s findings in regard to infringements of the 
Certification Scheme and the responses rendered with regard to the same. 
 
Understanding the infringements will enable the study to determine the weaknesses and 
strengths of the Certification Scheme in practice. The efficacy of the Certification Scheme 
may also be measured in terms of the number of reported cases of infringement in relation to 
the number of cases that are pursued through the judicial channels of respective 
Participants.
91
 This, according to the Review, provides evidence that the Certification Scheme 
is being enforced in Participant countries.  
 
With respect to the Review Questionnaires, nearly half of the Participants reported no cases 
of Certification Scheme infringement.
92
 Among the Participants that did report instances of 
infringement on their questionnaires, the number of cases ranged most commonly from one to 
five. For example, the Review stated that since the implementation of national legislation in 
January 2003, Canada recorded five cases of infringement, resulting in one conviction, two 
forfeitures, and two cases still under investigation.
93
 
 
Three Participants reported more than five cases of infringement on their questionnaires: 
Australia recorded eight, Sierra Leone recorded 16, and the EC recorded 26.
94
 In each 
country, the cases were investigated in conjunction with customs officials and in accordance 
with national legislative provisions and judicial procedures.
95
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The responses of Participants to instances of infringements varied from case to case. The vast 
majority of cases led to the seizure of the parcel or shipment of rough diamonds in question.
96
 
Some parcels of rough diamonds were returned to the exporting country while others were 
forwarded to the intended recipient pending receipt of proper documentation.
97
 
 
Several cases led to the imposition of fines and the commencement of criminal proceedings 
following police investigations and other judicial instruments.
98
 Reporting seizures and cases 
of infringements is not mandatory for Participants, although the Review recommended their 
inclusion in the Annual Reports. The Working Group on Review suggested that detailed 
information on infringements would be useful to the authorities of Participants both at home 
and abroad in efforts to identify the actors involved, the origin of the diamond shipments, and 
the routes taken as part of the overall effort to increase the efficacy of the Certification 
Scheme.
99
 
 
According to the Review, illegal diamond mining and trading has become a less viable option 
for rebel groups than in the past.
100
 The Review Working Group recommended that high 
priority should be given to the nine points contained in the KP resolution on Côte d‟Ivoire.101 
 
The DRC, in its response to the Review Questionnaire, stated that it was „totally satisfied‟ 
with the creation of the Certification Scheme and pointed to export statistics as one proof of 
the success of the Certification Scheme in combating the illicit production and trade in 
diamonds in countries previously affected by conflict diamonds.
102
 When the KP excluded 
the RoC from exporting legally to any major diamond-trading centre, exclusion appears to 
have contributed to a dramatic increase in legal exports from the DRC, since illegal routes 
were no longer available.
103
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In the case of Sierra Leone, the KP review visit found that that the certification system had 
facilitated greater control over the diamond industry and reduced smuggling through the 
monitoring and control of diamond exports.
104
 The review visit estimated that the official 
system captured up to 80 percent of production.
105
 
 
In Angola, the KP has also seen a dramatic increase in legal exports of diamonds.
106
 In its 
response to the Review Questionnaire, Angola stated that it considered the Certification 
Scheme „efficient‟. Further, Angola stated that the end of local conflict and the 
implementation of the Certification Scheme have enabled it to significantly increase its 
control of its diamond production and trade, thereby increasing state fiscal revenue and 
discouraging the activities of rebel groups.
107
 
 
The Review suggested that the Certification Scheme should closely monitor the situation in 
the DRC, Sierra Leone, Angola and Liberia. A variety of natural resources, including 
diamonds, fuel conflicts.
108
 While the Certification Scheme makes illicit rough diamonds less 
attractive as a means of financial support for rebel groups, it is not, of course, an absolute 
deterrent.
109
 The DRC was encouraged, through the Chair, to invite a second KP review visit 
and the Expert Panels, which would allow the Certification Scheme to closely monitor the 
local situation.
110
 
 
Although the conflict diamond trade was significantly reduced through the implementation of 
the Certification Scheme in Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC, it must be borne in mind that 
the reports arise from the Certification Scheme itself. The Review was based on country 
reports and the Review visits undertaken by the KP. This may have tainted an objective 
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assessment as other reports by civil society organisations and NGOs continually 
demonstrated that some of the factual assessments made by the KP were in fact contestable. 
After having briefly indicated past infringements of the Certification Scheme the KP‟s 
responses, it will be necessary for to consider the technical provisions of the Certification 
Scheme and difficulties arising there from. 
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5. Technical provisions and difficulties experienced 
 
Having considered the contents of the Certification Scheme and its implementation and 
monitoring; and the Review process as well as the organisation of the Certification Scheme; 
and the infringements and responses to such infringements, it is now necessary to consider 
technical difficulties experienced by Certification Scheme in implementation and monitoring, 
as identified by the Review Panel. 
 
Understanding problems with implementation as regards technical provisions will provide 
greater understanding of the Certification Scheme in implementation and monitoring. 
According to the findings of the Review Panel, the technical provisions are generally 
workable and effective in contributing to the aims of the Certification Scheme. This may be 
attributed to collaboration between the different stakeholders and consultations with other 
regulators during the negotiations that led to the Certification Scheme.
111
 Nevertheless, and 
again in terms of the Review, it is evident from the responses to the Certification Scheme‟s 
Review Questionnaire that several technical provisions and operating procedures still pose 
problems and challenges to implementation. 
 
In order to address implementation difficulties and to suggest improvements to existing 
working methods and administrative procedures, the Working Group of Diamond Experts 
(WGDE)
112
 was created in 2003. The WGDE also provides diamond expert opinion and 
technical assistance to all participating countries and KP Working Groups in order to be able 
to fully implement the Certification Scheme or to improve the data collection and reporting 
capabilities of the importing or exporting national authorities.
113
  
 
The establishment of a series of technical guidelines to address technical problems by the 
WGDE was well received by Participants. At first, the WGDE was concerned about instances 
in which the legitimate trade in rough diamonds was hindered. Subsequently, the attention 
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shifted to more complicated matters such, as Harmonized System (HS) classification 
difficulties and value discrepancies.
114
 
 
Partial solutions were obtained by suggesting changes to the Explanatory Notes of the HS 
Classification. These changes were adopted by the World Customs Organization (WCO) HS 
Committee in May 2004.
115
 Some issues remain for the WGDE‟s attention. Classification 
difficulties between rough and polished diamonds are being investigated. An important part 
of the work of the WGDE has centred on the „Harmonization of Valuation Methodologies‟.116 
 
The work on this topic is ongoing and will, ideally, result in a hierarchical order of valuation 
methods, the identification of what constitutes an „unacceptable value discrepancy‟, and 
remedial procedures to be followed in case of such an occurrence. An issue that has remained 
in WGDE‟s agenda is the issue of samples and scientific shipments, for which no workable 
solutions have been proposed to date.  
 
With regard to samples in particular, significant preparatory work has already taken place. 
One „best practice‟ has been identified regarding the shipment of diamondiferous core and 
bulk samples to specialised laboratories.
117
 Still to be addressed is the current impossibility of 
sending extracted rough diamonds to countries from which they have been derived, but that 
are not yet Participants of the Certification Scheme.
118
 There is also the difficulty that 
scientific samples of rough diamonds cannot be exchanged with research institutes located in 
non-Participant countries.  
 
The Moscow Plenary introduced the WGDE‟s role in engaging in a discussion with 
transnational companies such as banks, insurance and especially international courier 
companies, in order to investigate potential loopholes that may exist on this transnational 
level and consequently to suggest remedies.
119
 
 
                                                 
114
 Third Year Review at 26. 
115
 Third Year Review at 27. 
116
 Ibid. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 Ibid. 
119
 Third Year Review at 27. 
115 
 
a. Diversity in national laws and practice 
 
Pursuant to its mandate, implementation of the Certification Scheme relies on national laws, 
procedures and personnel of Participants.
120
 A consequence of this individualised approach is 
the absence of harmonisation in implementation, as Participants have interpreted the 
Certification Scheme‟s document in different ways. However, it is not certain that an 
international, harmonised approach would have yielded fewer discrepancies when translated 
into national law.  
 
An example of this variance in national legislation is demonstrated by the translation of the 
minimum requirement that a valid and validated Certificate must accompany every rough 
diamond shipment. Some Participants have concluded that this requirement is met when the 
KP Certificate is packed inside the sealed tamper resistant container.
121
 Other Participants 
have concluded that no verification of the legitimacy of the shipment is possible while in 
transit, and consequently some attach the Certificate outside the container while others add it 
to the commercial documents accompanying the shipment.
122
 
 
Another consequence of differences under national legislation is that there may be a 
legislative gap between the moment when the rough diamond shipment leaves the exporting 
Participant and when it arrives at its destination, depending on the scope of jurisdiction under 
the two legislative systems concerned.
123
 
 
b. Definitions 
 
The definitions listed in Section 1 of the Certification Scheme document sometimes conflict 
with definitions used by other authorities, notably customs.
124
 This is particularly true of the 
terms import, export, transit and country of origin. In the judgment of the Chair of the 
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WGDE, this conflict „may weaken the implementation of the Certification Scheme or even 
jeopardise the legitimate rough diamond trade‟.125 
 
i. Transit 
 
The Certification Scheme considers transit as the physical passing of a shipment of rough 
diamonds through the geographical territory of a Participant on its way from the exporter to 
an importer. The definition that most customs services apply is slightly different. When an 
importer refuses to accept a shipment before customs clearance, customs will simply return 
the shipment to the sender and will consider this a transit shipment. 
 
However, when a shipment contains rough diamonds, this may be considered by some 
Participants to be problematic, as the returned shipment is not accompanied by a new KP 
Certificate.
126
 Some Participants interpret import literally, as stated in Certification Scheme‟s 
definitions, as the physical entry into the geographical territory of a Participant.
127
 This 
interpretation requires that when the goods are returned, they should be covered as an export 
by a new Certificate, issued by the Participant that is returning the goods.
128
 
 
There has been little progress made in clarifying these definitions.
129
 
 
ii. Country of origin 
 
The use of the term „country of origin‟, but with a different meaning to the same term defined 
by WTO/WCO/Customs, has caused confusion.
130
 To correct this problem, the WGDE issued 
Technical Guidelines 7, 12 and 15 to address different consequences of the issue. Technical 
Guideline 15 recommends that Certificates use „country of origin (mining)‟.131 
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iii. Import/Export 
 
There is no definition of „exporter‟ or „importer‟ in the Certification Scheme, but Technical 
Guideline 11 does state that the Exporter listed on the Certificate should have an address in 
the geographical territory of the Participant that issues the KP Certificate.
132
 Also, an address 
in the geographical territory of the importing Participant should be provided on the 
Certificate.
133
 
 
There is a risk of further confusion caused by missing definitions. Terms required on the 
Certificate are „importer, exporter, number of parcels and deviations’. The latter occurs when 
shipments of rough diamonds accompanied by a Certificate end up in a different Participant 
than the one mentioned as importer on the Certificate. None of these terms are defined in 
Section 1 of the Certification Scheme.
134
 
 
iv. Value 
 
From the inception of the Certification Scheme, the issue of value disagreements has been, 
and continues to be, one of the most difficult problems on which the WGDE has had to 
advise.
135
 It was repeatedly raised by Participants in responses to the Review Questionnaire, 
who pointed out that valuation methodologies have not been standardised.
136
 
 
Technical Guideline 6 states that „the value in US$ on the Certificate remains a vital 
parameter for the successful implementation of the Certification Scheme and therefore 
reiterates that the mention of the value in US$ on the Certificate is a minimum requirement of 
the Certification Scheme‟.137 Accordingly, the Review found that the WGDE was seized of 
the outstanding technical problem and decided to engage in discussions on „Harmonization of 
Methodologies‟.  
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v. Classification (Harmonized System codes) 
 
The apparent lack of consistency within the Certification Scheme to classify rough diamonds 
using the Harmonized System (HS) codes has been problematic for some Participants.
138
 This 
may be a consequence of the Certification Scheme being enacted through respective national 
legislations with the reliance on the KP authorities‟ interpretation of the HS System.139 For 
almost all Participants, the agency responsible for commodity classification issues is 
Customs, which bases its classification on the HS System (WCO/WTO).
140
 
 
In cases where classification is at issue, any resulting action such as detaining shipments has 
implications for the relevant authorities and industry.
141
 In the judgment of the Chair of the 
WGDE, „the value and classification disagreements have become increasingly problematic 
and are hampering trade‟.142 Despite the issuance of Technical Guideline 5 and despite 
amending the explanatory notes of the HS Classification 7102 in May 2004, problems still 
remain. The WGDE is of the opinion that the way forward lies in collecting and making 
available a photographic library that documents and visualises the distinction between the 
different HS codes following the amended Explanatory Notes.
143
 
 
vi. The Kimberley Process Certificate 
 
The Certification Scheme‟s document sets out the requirements for Certificates, which must 
conform to the minimum standards.
144
 Technical Guidelines 4, 8 and 9 provide additional 
requirements and an Administrative Decision requires a maximum validity of 60 days. The 
Participation Committee is responsible for assessing the conformity of Certificates of 
applicants with these requirements.
145
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There are many variations in type, style and duration of validity of Certificates, particularly in 
the area of security features. The Certificates of some Participants show minimal security 
features, whereas other Participants have invested in having a secure, tamper resistant 
document with sets of security features.
146
 Variations have often led to confusion among 
authorities attempting to authenticate Certificates. They have also led to delays when 
additional information was sought, and in some cases have led to the seizure of shipments 
when Certificates differed from the specimens which were on file.
147
 
 
vii. Technical Guideline 10 
 
Although it is not required, Participants are encouraged to break down shipments with more 
than one HS code by carat weight/US$ value per HS code classification. Those with artisanal 
alluvial productions should be encouraged to list the quality characteristics of the rough 
diamonds in the shipment on the reverse of their Certificates, as it makes identification of the 
shipment more certain, and permits a more rigorous analysis of data.
148
 
 
viii. Errors in filing in KP Certificates 
 
There are some recurrent errors in filling in Certificates. According to Technical Guideline 
10, Participants should not impose undue burdens on other Participants, which can arise if 
Participants return shipments unnecessarily, raising the question of who should pay the 
resulting costs.
149
 In terms of the Review, shipments should not be blocked because there is 
no advance notification (or other optional features on the KP Certificate are absent).
150
 Only 
Certificates that do not comply with the Certification Scheme‟s requirements should be 
rejected. 
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ix. Mandatory import confirmation 
 
According to the Review, import confirmation is mandatory. What is optional is the manner 
in which it is confirmed. Accordingly Annex I, paragraph B suggests that the Certificate 
might include a section that could be detached and returned to the exporter to confirm the 
import. The alternative or additional method is by e-mail.
151
 
 
Reports from review visits make it clear that import confirmation is taking place more and 
more systematically.
152
 The information required on the import confirmation is the KP 
Certificate number; the name of the Participant confirming the import, and the date should be 
systematised.
153
Accordingly, it was recommended that the Working Group on Monitoring 
should monitor compliance with this requirement, and if noncompliance continues, the matter 
will be referred to the Participation Committee.
154
 
 
x. Who should confirm? 
 
Most Participants delegate this responsibility to their KP Authority or sometimes customs. 
Review visits have discovered that detachable import confirmation parts of issued 
Certificates are returned sometimes bearing only the stamp and signature of private diamond 
companies.
155
 According to the Review, confirmation notice requires an endorsement by an 
importing authority of a Participant to legalise or authenticate the confirmation.  
 
xi. Advance notice of shipment 
 
Annex II, Recommendation 21 of the Certification Scheme suggests that an advance notice of 
shipment be sent. For security reasons this notice should be encrypted, as outlined in 
Technical Guideline 10.
156
 However, if import confirmation becomes a routine practice, as 
required, there is less reason for advance notification.
157
 Another approach to mandatory 
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confirmation of imports is to investigate the feasibility of having an interactive website or 
database into which all Participants would enter details of exports, and confirm details of 
imports.
158
 
 
xii. Distinction between rough diamonds and powder: Technical 
Guideline 13 
 
No consensus could be reached (within the WGDE) in discriminating between „stones‟ 
belonging to HS Classification Codes 7102.10-7102.21 or 7102.31, and „dust and powder of 
diamonds‟ belonging to HS Classification Code 7105.10.159 The WGDE adopted Technical 
Guideline 13 limiting the scope of the Certification Scheme to rough diamonds of a one 
millimetre circumference.
160
 
 
Unfortunately this „solution‟ did not yield the results that were expected.161 The adoption of 
Technical Guideline 13 did not resolve the issue of distinguishing between rough diamonds 
and powder. There has been a repeated and widespread call for a consolidation of all 
technical guidelines and technical advice in one easily accessible place.
162
 The Review 
recommended that a consolidated technical guidance annex be created to form part of the 
Compilation of Kimberley Process Documents.
163
 
 
There remain, thus, significant difficulties with technical operations of the Certification 
Scheme‟s provisions despite the investigations by the Working Groups and the passage of 
Technical Guidelines. They are highlighted in turn. 
 
c. Diversity in national laws and practice 
 
The Certification Scheme assumed at the outset that laws and practices will be uniform with 
respect to implementation. Still, there are difficulties because Participants differ in the 
national laws and practices through vagaries of interpretation. Moreover the Certification 
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Scheme is not a legally binding instrument which is able to make particular demands upon 
Participants. 
 
i. Definitions 
 
Confusion around certain important definitions such as „transit,‟ import,‟ and „export‟ hamper 
the operation of the Certification Scheme. This confusion is of concern to the operation of the 
Certification Scheme. 
 
ii. Value attached to diamond parcels 
 
Participants are not clear on the values to be attached to shipments of rough diamonds. Some 
make use of the US$ system as set out by the Certification Scheme and others experience 
difficulties with the valuations. Thus the issue of values remains a problem for 
implementation.  
 
iii. Classification 
 
Despite the issuance of Technical Guideline 5, Participants continue to experience difficulties 
with classification of rough diamonds for shipment purposes. Thus, trade is hampered. 
 
iv. The Certificate 
 
Not all Participants comply with the issuance of a duly validated Certificate with minimum 
requirements as set out by the Certification Scheme‟s document. Errors in filling out 
Certificates persist. The Certificate is the driving force of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The Third Year Review found that instances of violation in the case of Côte d‟ Ivoire. 
Partnership for Africa Canada and Global Witness have also found violations of mandatory 
information in Certificates in the cases of the DRC, Venezuela and Angola.
164
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v. Mandatory import confirmation 
 
Mandatory import information is not always readily available or accurate. This, too, is a 
minimum requirement of the Certification Scheme‟s document with respect to issuance of 
Certificates. When information is not accurately presented, then the efficacy of the 
Certification Scheme is undermined.  
 
vi. Distinction between rough diamonds and powder: Technical 
Guideline 13 
 
Participants are encountering difficulties with distinguishing between rough diamonds and 
powder. Technical Guideline 13 assists very little in this regard for various reasons as not all 
the information is properly collated and distributed for usage by all Participants. 
 
After having highlighted the technical difficulties experienced in implementation and 
monitoring of the Certification Scheme‟s contents, it is necessary to examine the operational 
issues as have been experienced by the Certification Scheme. 
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6. Operational issues 
 
Understanding problems associated with implementation and monitoring of operational 
issues will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the Certification Scheme in practice and 
thus enable the study to better appraise the Certification Scheme in its present form. Review 
visits have provided important information as to the efficacy of Participants‟ systems in 
place.  
 
An assessment of internal controls has been a central concern of all review visits to date. 
Review visit reports highlight both that the kind of controls required vary greatly between 
Participants (for example between producers, traders and polishers), and that different 
mechanisms are being applied by different Participants.
165
 Observations in review visit 
reports relate more generally to the implementation of other Certification Scheme 
requirements. The Review did not make this information available. 
 
a. Lack of import procedures 
 
Some diamond producing Participants with very limited imports of rough diamonds have 
been found not to have proper procedures in place for processing imports of rough 
diamonds.
166
 The Review stated that it is essential that all Participants have both proper 
import and export procedures in place, regardless of the volume of imports and exports they 
deal with.
167
 
 
b. Illegal shipments 
 
A small number of Participants, on identifying irregular or illegal shipments at import, 
systematically return these to the sender or country of origin, rather than seizing the 
diamonds.
168
According to the Review, Participants should ensure that it is a minimum 
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requirement of the Certification Scheme to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for 
transgression.
169
 
 
c. Inadequate annual reporting on internal controls 
 
Some Participants that have not yet received review visits fail to provide adequate 
information in their annual reports on the internal controls in place to prevent conflict 
diamonds from entering the pipeline. The WGM requested additional details in the process of 
its analysis of annual reports as they are another important tool to enable the KP to assess the 
adequacy of their internal controls.
170
 
 
d. Conflict diamond affected countries 
 
In conflict diamond affected countries such as Sierra Leone, the DRC and Angola substantial 
challenges remain with regard to implementation of the Certification Scheme‟s minimum 
requirements, including organisation of diamond export certification, organisation of internal 
control systems, gathering of corresponding statistical data, as well as the traceability of 
rough diamond production from mine to export.
171
 
 
Weak monitoring of border flows of rough diamonds remains a problem in terms of the 
Review. Capacity constraints on the part of customs and law enforcement, tax incentives for 
smuggling, and the physical length and porosity of borders remain substantial challenges for 
curbing smuggling.
172
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e. Ease of operation of the Certification Scheme 
 
Most Participants, according to the Review, responded that they consider the Certification 
Scheme to be simple and workable. Some Participants believe that difficulties do not lie in 
the complexity of the procedures but in the lack of capacity of governments, particularly at 
the provincial level, to implement them.
173
 This is especially true when the remit of the 
government does not cover the entire country.
174
 Participants note that some definitions of 
terms used in the KP differ from those used in other contexts, such as customs agreements.  
 
f. Need for better communication 
 
After investigation, it appears that many of the cases are caused by difficulties in 
communicating with the respondent‟s KP contact point.175 This can occur where there are 
linguistic differences, where there is limited internet access, where an official moves on 
without notifying the KP of their successor, where government departments are reorganised, 
or for other day-to-day reasons.  
 
The Review stated that it is essential to maintain an up-to-date register of KP focal contacts, 
as well as alternates which should continue to be available on the KP website and could also 
be circulated annually with the compilation of Kimberley Process documents. Participants 
should inform the KP Chair promptly of any change in contacts.
176
 
 
The Review identified problematic areas even though efforts have been made to address the 
problems. The following have been highlighted for discussion in the concluding chapter of 
this study. 
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g. Lack of import procedures 
 
There are no consistent procedures for import in accordance with the Certification Scheme. 
The Certification Scheme does not provide for import procedures. This is of concern for the 
implementation and the consequent monitoring of the Certification Scheme‟s workability. 
 
i. Illegal shipments 
 
Participants reported illegal shipments despite the operation of the Certification Scheme‟s 
contents within their respective jurisdictions. Trade is impeded in this manner. 
 
ii. Inadequate annual reporting on internal controls 
 
Some Participants were unable to report on internal controls as the KP had not yet undertaken 
review visits. The Working Group did not have sufficient capacity for review visits. 
 
iii. Conflict diamond affected countries 
 
Conflict diamond affected countries are unable to implement the Certification Scheme due to 
the absence of infrastructures. This is a basis of acute concern. 
 
iv. Ease of operation of the Certification Scheme 
 
Most Participants agreed that the Certification Scheme is simple and workable. Yet 
Participants continue to experience difficulties with implementing the Certification Scheme. 
 
v. Need for better communication 
 
All Participants agreed that there was a need for better communication between Participants 
on the one hand, and the between Participants and the KP on the other hand. 
 
Having flagged the shortcomings in operational issues, it is necessary to examine the Peer 
Review Monitoring Mechanism of the Certification Scheme in implementation and 
monitoring, before a final discussion is undertaken in the concluding chapter. 
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7.  The Peer Review Monitoring Mechanism (PRMM) 
 
Understanding the PRMM in implementation and monitoring will bring to the fore the 
shortcomings and strengths of the KP. The workability of the Certification Scheme may be 
demonstrated with specific regard to implementation and monitoring in keeping with the 
objectives of the Certification Scheme. In terms of the Review, there is agreement among 
Participants and Observers that the PRMM has been a success, although civil society is 
concerned that it is not sufficiently penetrating, and that a timely follow-up is often 
lacking.
177
 
 
Between January 2004 and September 2006, review visits had been carried out to 32 
Participants.
178
 In addition, two non-Participants namely, Liberia and Lebanon prior to their 
joining the Certification Scheme, received special expert missions. Furthermore, two review 
missions had been carried out to the Central African Republic and to the Republic of 
Congo.
179
 A further nine Participants
180
 have invited review visits and one Participant, 
Guinea, has invited a follow-up review visit. Forty two out of 45 Participants (or 93 percent) 
have thus received or invited review visits, or review missions.
181
 One Participant has not 
been counted in this list, Côte d‟Ivoire, which has been the subject of specific and ongoing 
monitoring measures since 2004. 
 
The Chair of the WGM confirms that these Participants have been approached and are all 
considering inviting a review visit.
182
 All previously conflict diamond affected countries have 
received review visits, and almost all countries reporting diamond production or trade have 
had review visits according to the Review.
183
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a. Expanding the mandate of the PRMM 
 
According to the Review, it may be useful for the peer review system to examine patterns of 
rough diamond trade in or through Participants and non-Participants, where this has a direct 
bearing on the ability of Participants to implement the provisions of the Certification 
Scheme.
184
 Thus, in terms of the Review, in specific circumstances, it may be useful to 
mandate review visits or, where applicants are concerned, in conjunction with the approval of 
the Participation Committee, ad hoc expert missions explicitly to integrate a regional 
dimension into review visit activities.
185
 
 
Effectiveness was demonstrated in two ways. Firstly, by considering whether the system had 
detected the main implementation problems as and where they arose. Secondly, by 
considering whether the PRMM contributed to bringing about tangible improvements with 
regard to problems identified.
186
 Review visits were able to establish a complete overview of 
the practices of individual Participants.  
 
Accordingly, the Review recommended that the report for each review visit will state that the 
team has reviewed internal controls for effective compliance with all Certification Scheme 
minimum standards, as set out in the Certification Scheme documents, recognising some 
procedures may be security sensitive.
187
 Review teams should continue to identify Participant 
country needs for technical assistance and training in order to help Participants implement 
effective internal controls.
188
 
 
b. Compliance 
 
The ADPR stipulates that review visits should carry out their work in an „analytical, expert 
and impartial manner‟.189 In order to further strengthen these safeguards, the criteria in the 
Administrative Decision on Peer Review should be expanded to include a provision that 
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experts are required to be impartial and highly professional and should further require 
members to disclose any potential conflict of interest.
190
 
 
c. Follow up to review visits 
 
The ADPR contains limited provisions for follow up to a review visit‟s findings but makes 
provision for sending a follow up review visit where this is deemed „necessary and 
appropriate‟.191 The provisions of the ADPR are limited to address compliance.192 The WGM 
has therefore considered additional mechanisms for ensuring adequate follow-up.  
 
The Review suggested that Participants identified by review teams as needing technical 
assistance or training should communicate their needs to international donors and the 
coordinator of technical assistance.
193
 Donor countries were encouraged to provide technical 
assistance and training to meet the needs of Participants to implement effective internal 
controls, as identified by review teams.
194
 
 
The Review stated that the requirement to submit an annual report should be maintained, as 
should the requirement to provide feedback in the report on follow-up to review visits.
195
 The 
recommendations listed above under „Follow-up to review visits‟ should be integrated into 
the Administrative Decision on Peer Review according to the Review. 
 
d. Transparency of review visits 
 
Full reports of review visits are placed on the restricted „Participants Only‟ section of the KP 
website, as set out in the ADPR. It may be useful, the Review recommended, to actively draw 
the attention of Participants and Observers to the reports of visits once they have been agreed 
upon.  
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This could be done by the Chair circulating a message to all Participants and Observers, 
informing them whenever a report has been completed, with a link to the full report on the 
website.
196
 The Review recommended that the Chair circulates a message to all Participants 
and Observers informing them whenever a report has been completed, with a link to the full 
report on the website.
197
 
 
e. Access of review visit reports by parties outside the KP 
 
Summaries of review visit reports are supposed to be publicly available and are supposed to 
be placed on the public section of the KP website. Consideration has been given to making 
the full reports public. Some Participants
198
 believe the confidentiality of review visit reports 
has been crucial in ensuring full cooperation with review visit teams and transparency on the 
part of Participants under review.  
 
Others
199
 argue that review visit reports should be made publicly available, and that this 
would bolster the effectiveness of review visits and the overall credibility of the Certification 
Scheme. The Review stated that two possible steps would address some of the concerns about 
transparency while also taking into account that full publication might be detrimental to the 
willingness of Participants to share information.
200
 
 
Firstly, detailed summaries of review visit reports, following a standard template developed 
by the Working Group on Monitoring, should be placed on the KP‟s public website. 
Secondly, review visit reports should be made available more consistently to other 
international organisations with an interest in diamond sector governance.
201
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f. The future of the APRMM 
 
In addition to providing a comprehensive overview of the overall state of implementation of 
the Certification Scheme, the APRMM has enabled the KP to detect and address some major 
compliance issues; to work with Participants to remedy a range of practical implementation 
issues; and to highlight areas where capacity-building assistance is required.
202
 
 
The Review recommended that the system of peer review and review visits, with its main 
components as established in 2003, should be maintained, recognising that the resource 
concerns of some Participants and Observers will need to be addressed.
203
 Relevant 
provisions in Section II of the Administrative Decision on Peer Review should be amended, 
specifying that in further review visits, attention should be focused on follow-up to issues 
identified in the first visit. In case of repeated review visits, the visits should be flexible and 
remain focused on substantial implementation issues.
204
 The recommendations listed in this 
assessment of the peer review monitoring system should be incorporated into a revised 
Administrative Decision on Peer Review.
205
 
 
i. Expanding the mandate of the PRMM 
 
Having discerned that the PRMM is successful, the Review found that experts should be 
appointed to undertake the Reviews. Not all Participants implemented the Certification 
Scheme‟s contents.206 To date, experts have not been permanently appointed, but only on an 
ad hoc basis. It is important for experts to undertake review missions consistently as 
Participants, at times, experience difficulties in implementing the contents of the Certification 
Scheme into practical measures. 
 
 
                                                 
202
 Third Year Review at 46; see on the lack of efficacy of the Certification Scheme, see Fluet „Conflict 
diamonds‟ (2004-2005) at 111-3; see also Grant et al „Global governance‟ (2004) at 375-85 on how actors 
stimulate concern about the externalities of foreign trade. 
203
 Third Year Review at 47. 
204
 Third Year Review at 46. 
205
 Ibid. 
206
 Like Zimbabwe. 
133 
 
ii. Compliance 
 
Not all Participants were compliant with the contents of the Certification Scheme. There is a 
need to bolster capacity for implementation. 
 
iii. Follow up to review visits 
 
Follow up review visits were made to some Participants. In terms of the Review, the review 
visits were successful.  
 
iv. Transparency of review visits 
 
Review Reports are not made public. They are made available to other Participants in the 
restricted part of the KP‟s website. This cannot be commended as it severely compromises 
transparency and accountability.  
 
v. Access of review visit reports by parties outside the KP 
 
Only Participants may access the Review Reports. Parties outside the KP have no access to 
the Review Reports, which is problematic in light of accountability and transparency. 
 
Having highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the PRMM with respect to how the 
Certification Scheme is implemented and monitored, it will be necessary investigate the 
statistical issues of the Certification Scheme. 
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8. Statistical issues of the Certification Scheme 
 
Having explained the workings of the PRMM, the chapter will proceed to discuss the 
statistical issues of the Certification Scheme.  
 
Understanding the statistical issues of the Certification Scheme will allow the study to gain a 
better understanding of the Certification Scheme in terms of its workability from an empirical 
basis. Annex III of the Certification Scheme‟s document outlines the need for statistical 
information with the statement „that reliable and comparable data on the production and the 
international trade in rough diamonds are an essential tool for the effective implementation of 
the Certification Scheme, and particularly for identifying any irregularities or anomalies 
which could indicate that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade‟.207 The 
complexity and difficulties involved in creating and managing a Certification Scheme‟s 
statistical database were enormous and underestimated at the outset.
208
 
 
a. The WGS 
 
The WGS offers Participants various options that may be used to submit their requisite 
statistical information, including online entry into the database into the KP‟s Rough Diamond 
Statistics website.
209
 Firstly, Participants can review and edit their reported data online. They 
can view the verified data submitted by all Participants. Processes are in place for providing 
assistance to Participants, and to address any concerns brought forward by Participants.
210
 
 
Secondly, multi-purpose tabulations of the statistical information gathered are regularly 
returned to Participants and are available on the KP Rough Diamond Statistics website.
211
 
Tabulations, updated regularly, are also being provided annually to the Working Group on 
Monitoring to be integrated with each Participant‟s annual report. Thirdly, the website has 
matured into an effective tool in the collection and dissemination of statistics. Fourthly, 
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statistical reviews and analyses are prepared by the WGS on an ongoing basis for all review 
visits.
212
 
 
Fifthly, the Working Group compiles an annual report to Plenary describing its progress and 
current issues.
213
 As well, the WGS has brought forward a succession of administrative 
decisions, the latest as adopted by Plenary, recommending the use of trade statistics derived 
from the KP Certificates as the standard for submission of these data to the Certification 
Scheme. Sixthly, effective relations with the Certification Scheme‟s Chair, the Secretariat to 
the Chair, and other Working Groups and Committees have been established. Finally, to test 
the analysis methodology, a comprehensive analysis of the statistical data for 2004 was 
completed and an analysis of data for 2005 was underway.  
 
b. Challenges 
 
The WGS carried out one analysis of 2004 data on a pilot basis and, building on this, carried 
out a fuller analysis of 2005 data.
214
 The inability of the WGS to complete a comprehensive 
analysis of the statistical database until recently in 2006 has been a cause for concern among 
Participants.
215
 Participants believe that the statistical analysis should focus on situations 
where a clear risk of conflict diamonds exists and where there is a clear unwillingness or 
inability to comply with minimum standards, including referring the situation to the 
Participation Committee.
216
 
 
c. Country specific statistical analyses 
 
The WGS prepares country specific, statistical analyses for review visits, which provide 
review teams with vital information before and during the visits.
217
 Participants agree that 
these reports are a very useful tool for the purposes of the review visits. However, at times, 
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the specific country analysis has been completed too late for useful discussion by the review 
team and Participant. It is important that the WGS be involved in preparing for review visits, 
particularly where statistical issues are known to exist and follow-up is required.  
 
The timeliness of these reports depends, to some extent, on sufficient notice being provided 
of upcoming review visits. The Review recommended that the WGS continue to prepare 
Participant-specific analyses for review visits.
218
A number of WGS members are on the 
roster of experts for review visits and have participated in review visits, and not only when 
there are known statistical issues. Members of the WGS, according to the Review, should 
participate in review visits, particularly when there are known issues with the statistics of the 
Participant to be reviewed.
219
 
 
d. Timely submission of statistics 
 
At times, Participants have failed to submit timely and complete data to the Certification 
Scheme, despite the system of notifications and reminders now in place. To address this 
issue, the WGS and the Participation Committee have established a documented process that 
clearly outlines the procedure and associated timelines used to remind Participants of their 
responsibility to submit statistical information.
220
 Participants recommended that the names 
of Participants who fail to meet Certification Scheme‟s requirements for submission of 
statistics over two consecutive reporting periods be posted on the public website.
221
 
 
e. Data quality and accuracy 
 
The quality and accuracy of information provided by Participants on their data submitted and 
their use of trade data based on KP Certificates must constantly be monitored and, where 
necessary, questioned and verified.
222
 In an effort to improve accuracy, within one week after 
the due date, the WGS publishes preliminary comprehensive tables for all Participants. The 
Review recommended that each table should be updated and posted on the website. 
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f. Valuation parameter 
 
The statistics on value of production, which are required by Technical Guideline 6, should 
continue to be reported.
223
 They provide an important indicator of the quality of the diamonds 
being traded, as well as transactional levels and of orders of magnitude of the sales of rough 
diamonds. 
 
i. Technical assistance 
 
The KP Rough Diamond Statistics website was developed to allow direct input of 
Certification Scheme statistics directly onto the website.
224
 The site also allows Participants 
to confirm the data submitted, to correct their data when warranted, to view verified data for 
all Participants, and to view statistical tabulations for all Participants from 2003 onward.
225
 
Accordingly, it is now possible for all Participants to view and use Certification Scheme‟s 
statistics, both in raw and aggregated form.  
 
ii. Transparency and publication 
 
The Moscow Plenary in 2001 directed the WGS to study various options for the publication 
of statistics. Work is progressing on this issue and, building on discussions at the 2006 
Intersessional is ongoing. Resolution of this issue will depend on balancing the need for 
transparency with the requirement to respect the commercially sensitive nature of certain data 
collected. Meanwhile, the WGS in its report recommends that, once steps necessary to protect 
commercially sensitive data are introduced, all data proven to be of a satisfactory quality be 
published. 
 
iii. Website 
 
It seems attractive to investigate the feasibility of developing an internet portal website 
database for the communication and interchange of transaction information and or KP 
Certificate information between Participants. However, at this point it appears impossible to 
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deal satisfactorily with several major concerns, including: the current limited capability, 
technical infrastructure and capacity of some Participants; the requirement to have updated, 
compatible computer software and technical expertise to use and maintain such a website; the 
very sensitive issues of security for commercial data; and, the thorny question of financial 
and human resources to create, maintain and fund such a website.
226
 If such a website is 
created, the WGS would recommend that it not be placed under its aegis but be independently 
funded.
227
  
 
iv. Resources 
 
The financial and human resources required to run a Working Group of the importance of the 
WGS are considerable and have exceeded expectations. Some Participants argue that thought 
should be given to creating a permanent body or bodies outside of the Certification Scheme 
to manage functions such as the maintenance of the website and the analysis of statistics. The 
WGS should study and clarify the issue of maintenance of the KP Rough Diamond Statistics 
website.
228
 
 
Strengths and mostly weaknesses, or concerns were revealed by the Third Year Review. 
Firstly, the WGS has made significant headway into the collection and submission of 
statistics. Secondly, Participants opine that the statistical analysis should focus on situations 
where there is a risk of conflict diamonds and where there is unwillingness or inability to 
comply with minimum standards, including referring the situation to the Participation 
Committee.  
 
Thirdly, timely reports must be submitted by the WGS so as to enable complete and full 
contextual discussions. Fourthly, concern was expressed over the quality and accuracy of data 
collated. Fifthly, Participants were of the view that the data must be made available for 
verification purposes by themselves. 
 
As previously stated, the issues highlighted throughout will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter of this study. Having highlighted how the Certification Scheme addresses statistical 
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issues with respect to implementation and monitoring, it will be necessary to examine the 
implementation and monitoring with respect to the internal controls of the Certification 
Scheme.  
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9. Internal controls 
 
Having explained the conclusion of the Third Year Review, pertinent to the Certification 
Scheme, this chapter will proceed to discuss the internal controls of the Certification Scheme. 
Understanding the internal controls of the Certification Scheme will provide for a better 
understanding of the Certification Scheme and its practicability.  
 
While the main Certification Scheme‟s document requires Participants to „establish a system 
of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments 
of rough diamonds imported into and exported from its territory‟,229 and includes certain 
recommendations in its Annex II, there is little detail in the document on standards of 
effective internal controls. The Moscow Declaration of 2001 has made considerable progress 
on standard setting for alluvial and artisanal diamond producers. Internal controls have been 
improved.  
  
There is consensus among Participants and observers that implementation on the ground is a 
major challenge for the Certification Scheme. The Review states that there is no doubt that 
internal controls are at the very heart of the Certification Scheme. Assessment of internal 
controls established by Participants, in line with the requirements of the Certification 
Scheme, has been a concern of all review visits carried out to date. This has been mainly 
attributable to the lack of financial resources and personnel to under such review visits.  
 
The reports of these visits thus yield a significant amount of information regarding the 
effectiveness or lack of internal controls. The reasons for weak or non-existent controls 
include lack of capacity, technical shortcomings and poor governance. Some governments 
such as Zimbabwe and Venezuela lack the political will.
230
 
 
Most borders of Participant countries are porous, and there is little regional cooperation to 
stop illicit, cross-border trading.
231
 At the heart of the matter is how to develop appropriate, 
workable standards in greater detail than is currently found in the Certification Scheme 
document, and how best to ensure their effective implementation by Participants.  
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In order to ensure the efficacy of the Certification Scheme and its long term sustainability, 
Participants should adopt an approach which is cohesive and indicative not only of an internal 
commitment with respect to national controls. They should in addition become robust by 
addressing concerns which arise from other Participant countries. If Participants were to 
become vocal and assist other Participant countries that „breach‟ the Certification Scheme, it 
may strengthen internal controls and allow for room for improvement. Internal controls 
should be closely monitored through a possible peer review mechanism which would enable 
sanctions as well.  
 
a. Artisanal and alluvial producers 
 
Peer review visits have highlighted that the nature and extent of internal controls in artisanal 
and alluvial producing Participants remains a major challenge for the KP as a whole. Poor or 
badly enforced internal controls are most evident in countries where alluvial diamonds are 
produced by artisanal miners outside the formal sector.
232
 Countries vulnerable to conflict 
diamonds in the first place are often the least able to adopt and enforce strong control 
measures.
233
 
 
For Participants with artisanal-alluvial production, the report included recommendations on 
ensuring traceability of production from mine to export; regulating artisanal diamond mining 
and the trade in artisanal-alluvial diamonds; tackling illicit cross-border trade; and 
encouraging artisanal miners to move into the formal economy.
234
 In parallel with the Review 
of the Certification Scheme, an additional list of internal control standards for all Participants 
will be prepared complementary to the recommendations contained in Annex II to the basic 
Certification Scheme document.
235
 
  
Implementation of the measures set out in it should be promoted as part of the peer review 
system. Review visits should be mandated in a revised Administrative Decision on Peer 
Review to assess specifically whether Participants have effective measures in place, on the 
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basis of the measures set out in such an additional list of internal controls.
236
 Applicants for 
participation in the Certification Scheme should be invited to take into account, while 
designing their internal control measures, both the mandatory and the optional Certification 
Scheme requirements indicated in Annex II and in the additional list of internal controls.
237
 
 
The reports of the Sub-Group on Alluvial Production and the Moscow Declaration on 
Alluvial Production have proved the Sub-Group‟s usefulness as a forum for the exchange of 
information and best practices among artisanal alluvial producers.
238
 It should be strongly 
encouraged to play an active role in promoting implementation of the recommendations of its 
report. Members of the Sub-Group on Alluvial Production should be strongly encouraged to 
play an active role in promoting and monitoring the implementation of the recommendations 
of the Declaration.
239
A fully fledged Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production 
should be established.  
 
b. Industry self-regulation 
 
In general Participants call for the peer monitoring system to incorporate as an integral part of 
its review an evaluation of how a Participant government is monitoring and verifying 
industry compliance.
240
 The Review reported that the EC has an extensive system of industry 
self-regulation in place, based on industry self-regulating bodies that have been recognised by 
the EC authorities.
241
The EC has sought to meet this objective through EC directives and 
resolutions.
242
 
 
Participant governments retain responsibility for implementation of industry self-regulation 
within their territories. Participants are moving increasingly to ensure that industry self-
regulation is implemented by government, where appropriate and consistent with national 
law.
243
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c. Controls on trading, cutting and polishing 
 
When the Certification Scheme was initiated, the primary emphasis was on the international 
trade in conflict diamonds. The WGM should identify any loopholes in the implementation of 
the Certification Scheme in trading, cutting and polishing centres, and make 
recommendations to address them as needed, in accordance with its mandate.
244
 
 
d. Standards and guidance for implementation of effective controls 
 
In the original Certification Scheme document, Section IV Internal Controls, clause (f), 
Participants seeking guidance on additional internal controls are referred to Annex II of the 
same document, where „further options and recommendations for internal controls‟ are 
elaborated.
245
 A number of Participants were of the opinion that the recommendations set out 
in Annex II, which were compiled in 2002, no longer reflect current best practices, as regards 
internal controls and could be added to.
246
 
 
In terms of the Review, every effort should be made by the KP to ensure that such an 
additional list of internal control measures is progressively implemented by Participants. To 
this end, further review visits could be tasked specifically with assessing whether a given 
Participant is implementing key measures identified in the additional list of internal 
controls.
247
 
 
Having discussed internal controls within the ambit of the Review, particular findings merit 
discussion. Although the work of the WG and the sub-WG are acknowledged by the Review, 
much work remains outstanding with respect to the internal controls contained in the 
Certification Scheme‟s document. Firstly, it is debatable whether self-regulation may be 
undertaken in isolation. Participants need support and contact with other Participants. 
 
Secondly, implementation and monitoring with respect to trading, cutting and polishing 
centres must be addressed for the purposes of beneficiation. Thirdly, concern over the 
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internal controls, as contained in the Certification Scheme document, must be addressed for 
as long as Participants lack confidence therein. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
An investigation into the implementation and monitoring of the Certification Scheme 
highlights a number of strengths and weaknesses. For the purpose of this study seven 
problem areas can be identified:  
 
1. Organisation and working of the Certification Scheme in implementation and 
monitoring; 
2. Infringements of the Certification Scheme; 
3. Technical issues; 
4. Operational issues; 
5. PRRM; 
6. Statistical issues; and 
7. Internal controls. 
 
a. Organisation and working of the Certification Scheme in implementation 
and monitoring 
 
Nine key problem areas can be identified with the organisation of the Certification Scheme 
with regard to implementation and monitoring.  
 
There are various problems with the organisation of the Certification Scheme with regard to 
implementation and monitoring. The Working Group assumes a working knowledge of the 
Participants as regards the Certification Scheme. Under structures and operational methods, 
the following will be discussed as matters for implementation: national laws; the Chair of the 
Certification Scheme; the KP Working Groups; a global inclusive partnership; and 
Participation Committees; compliance issues and statistical non-compliance. 
 
These are the factors which the Review took into account. The organisation of the 
Certification Scheme for implementation and monitoring presents ten key problems. First, the 
Review assumes that Participants have implemented the Certification Scheme into their 
respective jurisdictions. Second, Participant countries are expected to ensure that they adhere 
to the content of the Certification Scheme in their relations with other Participants.  
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Third, pertinent to the four Working Groups, not all Participants are aware of the activities of 
all the Working Groups.  
 
Fourth, the Participation Committee is responsible for assessing whether or not a Participant 
is in compliance with the minimum standards of the Certification Scheme.  
 
Fifth, compliance means that Participants adhere to the minimum standards of the 
Certification Scheme.  
 
Sixth, the Participation Committee, in accordance with its Terms of Reference, must consider 
any relevant information submitted to it by the Working Group on Monitoring regarding 
compliance by a Participant.  
Seventh, the issue of dispute resolution and compliance is dealt with by the Chair. This is 
problematic due to the rotation of the Chair and the lack of actual procedural provisions on 
dispute resolution.  
 
Eighth, the role of observers comprises three aspects: the diamond industry is self regulation; 
the role of civil society and links with international organisations. All three aspects presented 
problems in the Review.  
 
Finally, with respect to the impact of the Certification Scheme, curbing the production and 
trade in conflict diamonds, Côte d‟ Ivoire made very important submissions. Submissions 
reflected the lack of workability of the Certification Scheme which is another problematic.  
 
b. Infringements of the Certification Scheme 
 
Although the situations of conflict diamond trade have significantly been reduced through the 
implementation of the Certification Scheme in Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC, it must be 
borne in mind that these reports arise from the Certification Scheme itself. The Review has 
been based on country reports and the Review visits of the KP. This may taint a proper 
scientific determination as other reports by civil society organisations for example, 
demonstrate contestable facts. Partnership Africa Canada undertook independent reviews in 
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2008, 2009 and 2010.
248
 These reviews were not measured against the independent 
Participant reviews which were undertaken by the Kimberley Process. Moreover, reviews 
undertaken by the Kimberley Process were made public only in summary form.
249
 Details of 
the infringements were not made public. 
 
No infringements were made public by the Review. 
 
c. Technical issues 
 
There remain significant difficulties with technical operations of the Certification Scheme‟s 
provisions despite the investigations by the Working Groups and the passage of Technical 
Guidelines. They are highlighted in turn. 
 
i. Diversity in national laws and practice 
 
The Certification Scheme assumed at the outset that laws and practices will be uniform with 
respect to implementation. Still, there are difficulties because Participants differ in the 
national laws and practices through vagaries of interpretation. In this instance, the national 
systems of certain Participants did not enable proper implementation of the Certification 
Scheme. The case of Côte d‟ Ivoire is a prime example which demonstrates the lack of 
capabilities and technologies to implement the Certification Scheme.
250
 Côte d‟ Ivoire sought 
the assistance of the Kimberley Process with respect to capacity and also clarity on 
definitions and standards expected of the Certification Scheme.
251
 Côte d‟ Ivoire‟s situation 
has not improved. 
 
ii. Lack of clarity of technical issues 
 
Confusion around certain important definitions such as „transit‟, „import‟, and „export‟ 
persist. Issues around the value of shipments, classification of rough diamonds, the minimum 
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requirements which must be included in the Certificate, mandatory import information also 
persist. 
 
All the aforementioned hamper the efficacy of the Certification Scheme due to its lack of 
clarity. Despite the issuance of Technical Guidelines 5 and 13, Participants complain of lack 
of capability which arises, in the main, from a lack of clarity of understanding the contents of 
the Certification Scheme. 
 
d. Operational issues 
 
i. Lack of import procedures 
 
There are no consistent procedures for import in accordance with the Certification Scheme, as 
the Certification Scheme does not provide for import procedures. This is of concern for 
implementation and the consequent monitoring of the Certification Scheme‟s workability. 
 
ii. Illegal shipments 
 
Participants reported illegal shipments despite the operation of the Certification Scheme‟s 
contents within their respective jurisdictions. Trade is impeded in this manner. 
 
iii. Inadequate annual reporting on internal controls 
 
Participants were unable to report on internal controls as the KP had not yet undertaken 
review visits. The Working Group did not have sufficient capacity for review visits. 
 
iv. Conflict diamond affected countries 
 
Conflict diamond affected countries are unable to implement the Certification Scheme due to 
the absence of infrastructures. This is a basis of acute concern. 
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v. Ease of operation of the Certification Scheme 
 
Most Participants agreed that the Certification Scheme is simple and workable. Yet 
Participants continue to experience difficulties with implementing the Certification Scheme. 
 
vi. Need for better communication 
 
All Participants agreed that there was a need for better communication between Participants 
on the one hand, and the between Participants and the KP on the other hand. 
 
e. PRRM 
 
i. Expanding the mandate of the PRMM 
 
Having determined that the PRMM is successful, the Review found that experts should be 
appointed to undertake the Reviews. Not all Participants implemented the Certification 
Scheme‟s contents. Reviews are funded, in the main, by civil society organisations 
Partnership Africa Canada, Global Witness, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch.
252
 They form the core of the team which undertakes review visits to Participant 
countries. Unfortunately, the details and specific contents of the review missions and or visits 
are not made available to the public. 
 
ii. Compliance 
 
According to the review missions, not all Participants were compliant with the contents of the 
Certification Scheme. The intrinsic content of the review missions are not made public. Most 
of the information gathered is held in confidence by the Kimberley Process. At best, it may 
be safe to speculate that there is a need to bolster capacity for implementation. 
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iii. Follow-up to review visits 
 
Follow up review visits were made to some Participants. In terms of the Review, the review 
visits were successful.  
 
iv. Transparency of review visits 
 
Review Reports are not made public. They are made available to other Participants in the 
restricted part of the KP‟s website. This may present some concerns as proper scrutiny is not 
possible. In the absence of transparency and accountability, the review missions, it is 
submitted will contribute little to improved implementation and compliance. 
 
f. Statistical issues 
 
Firstly, the WGS has made significant headway into the collection and submission of 
statistics. Secondly, Participants opine that the statistical analysis should focus on situations 
where there is considered a clear risk of conflict diamonds and where there is clear 
unwillingness or inability to comply with minimum standards, including referring the 
situation to the Participation Committee. 
 
Third, timely reports must be submitted by the WGS so as to enable complete and full 
contextual discussions. Fourth, concern was expressed over the quality and accuracy of data 
collated.  
 
Finally, Participants were of the view that the data must be made available for verification 
purposes by themselves. 
 
g. Internal controls 
 
Although the work of the WG and the sub-WG are acknowledged by the Review, much work 
remains outstanding with respect to the internal controls contained in the Certification 
Scheme‟s document. Firstly, it is doubtful that self-regulation may be undertaken in isolation. 
Participants need support and contact with other Participants. 
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Secondly, implementation and monitoring with respect to trading, cutting and polishing 
centres must be addressed for the purposes of beneficiation and otherwise. Thirdly, concern 
over the internal controls, as contained in the Certification Scheme document, should be 
addressed as Participants lack confidence therein. 
 
In conclusion, various shortcomings arise from implementation and monitoring of the 
Certification Scheme. The problems highlighted may be categorised as both substantive and 
procedural. Some difficulties highlighted go to the heart of the efficacy of the Certification 
Scheme, such as the lack of clarity of definitions; internal controls and infringements of the 
Certification Scheme. Other difficulties in implementation and monitoring appear to be 
peripheral and more easily addressed, for example, the matter of the control and access to the 
KP websites. It is clear, however, that almost every facet of the Certification Scheme has 
encountered difficulties with implementation and monitoring.  
 
This chapter discussed the context for Review of implementation and monitoring; the 
organisation of the Certification Scheme; the infringements and responses of the Certification 
Scheme; the technical difficulties experienced by the Certification Scheme; how the 
Certification Scheme deals with the PRMM; and the statistical issues of the Certification 
Scheme and the manner in which the implementation and monitoring has experienced 
internal controls.  
 
The weaknesses and strengths in each of the above categories have been highlighted. An 
analysis of these weaknesses and strengths will be placed in the context of the strengths and 
weaknesses arriving out of the provisions of the Certification Scheme, set out in chapter two 
and in the context of international law making addressed in chapter six of this study.  
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CHAPTER 5 : THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
IN THE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This fifth chapter will focus on the role of international organisations in recognition of the 
Certification Scheme as an instrument of international law. The chapter will therefore 
proceed to discuss the different types of recognition accorded by different international 
organisations to the Certification Scheme. International organisations have influenced the 
Certification Scheme before its official inception. This chapter examines the impact of the 
UN SC, the UN GA and the WTO in its first part.  
 
The second part of this chapter will examine two regional organisations, namely the EC and 
the AU. Notably, the EC‟s role will be studied with regard to the strides it has made in the 
combat against the illegal trade of rough diamonds. In other words, the recognition accorded 
to the Certification Scheme by the EC will be examined. Of note is the EC‟s promulgation of 
Council Regulation 2368 of 2002, which will be discussed.  
 
An examination of the role of international organisations will show their importance to the 
success of the Certification Scheme in the international legal environment. Consequently, the 
important roles of these organisations will become clearer in relation to the formation of 
international instruments, which subsequently acquire legal force in practical application.  
 
The UN GA Resolution established the initial mandate for the KP in December 2000.
253
 The 
Resolution called for several structural measures to regulate the trade of rough diamonds. It 
also explained the justification of the Certification Scheme, that is, to prevent the trade in 
conflict diamonds that leads to human rights crises. The Certification Scheme defines conflict 
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diamonds as „rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict 
aimed at undermining legitimate governments‟.254 
 
This is the most important shortcoming of the Certification Scheme. The Certification 
Scheme was drafted to address the issue of diamond pillaging rebel movements attempting to 
overthrow legitimate governments. It does not however, address the situation of governments 
producing blood diamonds under circumstances that constitute human rights abuses. This 
issue will be dealt with in chapter seven of this thesis.  
 
Returning to the role of international organisations, the UN SC Resolutions combined with 
the series of UN GA Resolutions represent an important accomplishment because they reflect 
widespread and continued international support for the Certification Scheme by the UN. 
Resolutions, according to the Third Year Review, are discussed in chapter four. They also 
confer an important measure of legitimacy upon the Certification Scheme in their 
acknowledgement of the efforts of Participants and Observers. 
 
The illicit production and trade of diamonds have fuelled conflicts in Sierra Leone, the DRC, 
Angola, and Liberia.
255
 What were once thought to be domestic conflicts, and thus out of the 
purview of international organisations in particular the UN and the AU, have now become 
internationalised conflicts.
256
 
 
The internal conflicts in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Liberia appeared on international 
agendas because of the intensity of human rights violations observed. During the Millennium 
Session of the UNGA the agenda included „The role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts‟. The 
General Assembly strived to maintain a balance between conflict diamonds that „were a 
crucial factor in promoting brutal wars in parts of Africa‟ and legitimate diamonds that 
„contribute to the prosperity and development elsewhere on the continent‟.257 
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The UN recognised that international and regional organisations have a critical role to play in 
the trade of conflict diamonds.
258
 The Certification Scheme acknowledged the role of 
international and regional organisations in its Preamble.
259
 Therefore, it is important within 
the context of this study to examine the role of international and regional organisations as 
their actions are crucial to the illicit trade of conflict diamonds and the consequent human 
rights crises. 
 
Since its inception, the Certification Scheme enjoyed the support of the UN, both the UNGA 
and the UNSC. Support has been evidenced in their Resolutions. Every year, the KP Chair is 
requested to report to the UNGA on its work. Each year since 2000, the UNGA has adopted a 
Resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict, demonstrating its support for the 
Certification Scheme by consensus.
260
 The UNSC also endorsed the Certification Scheme and 
has worked with the Certification Scheme, most recently in the cases of Liberian and Côte d‟ 
Ivoirian diamond trade.
261
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2. The role of the UN SC and conflict diamonds (Resolutions): The Certification 
Scheme 
 
In January 2003, the UN SC passed Resolution 1459 noting the linkage between the illicit 
trade of rough diamonds and the fuelling of armed conflicts in certain regions of the world, 
which were affecting international peace and security.
262
 It also highlighted the importance of 
conflict prevention arising from the illicit trade of rough diamonds, which is the very purpose 
of the Certification Scheme.
263
 
 
The Resolution made three points. Firstly, the UN SC expressed its „strong support‟ for the 
Certification Scheme as well as the ongoing process to refine and implement the Certification 
Scheme as a valuable contribution against trafficking in conflict diamonds.
264
 Secondly, the 
UN SC welcomed the voluntary system of industry self-regulation, as described in the 
Interlaken Declaration.
265
 Finally, the Resolution stressed that the widest possible 
participation in the Certification Scheme is essential and urged all Member States of the UN 
to actively participate in the Certification Scheme.
266
 
 
In the same year, on 15 December 2003, the UN SC passed another Resolution, which took 
note of the reports of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia.
267
 The UN SC expressed concern at 
the findings of the Panel of Experts that the measures imposed by its 2001 Resolution, 
continued to be breached.
268
The Security Council called upon all states in the region, 
particularly the National Transitional Government of Liberia, to work together to build 
regional peace, through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
International Contact Group on Liberia, the Mano River Union and the Rabat Process.
269
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Furthermore, the Resolution identified the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources such as diamonds and the illicit trade of resources. The Resolution also recognised 
the proliferation and trafficking of illegal arms as a major source of fuelling and exacerbating 
conflicts in West Africa, particularly in Liberia. Conflicts continued to pose a threat to 
international peace and security in West Africa, in particular to the peace process in 
Liberia.
270
 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council imposed an arms trade 
embargo against Liberia.
271
 The Resolution made two „demands‟.272 Firstly, the Resolution 
demanded that all States in West Africa take action to prevent armed individuals and groups 
from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries. Secondly, 
the Resolution demanded that countries refrain from any action that might contribute to 
further destabilisation of the situation in the sub region.  
 
In addition, the Resolution decided that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent 
the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such 
diamonds originated in Liberia.
273
 The Resolution also called upon the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia to urgently establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime, for 
trade of Liberian rough diamonds. This, the Resolution stated should be transparent and 
internationally verifiable with a view to joining the Kimberley Process.
274
 
 
A year later, the UN SC passed another Resolution, which noted the reports of the UN Panel 
of Experts on Liberia.
275
 Again, the Security Council recognised the linkage between the 
illegal exploitation of diamonds and the illicit trade in diamonds, and the proliferation and 
trafficking of arms as one of the sources of fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in West 
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Africa, particularly in Liberia.
276
 The measures imposed under the Resolution were designed 
to prevent illegal exploitation from fuelling a resurgence of the conflict in Liberia.
277
 
 
The Security Council stated that the situation in Liberia continued to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
the Security Council renewed the previous Resolution 1521 of 2003 for a further six 
months.
278
 The Security Council also decided to re-establish the Panel of Experts.
279
 
 
Another year passed when the state of Côte d‟Ivoire appeared on the Security Council‟s 
agenda. In December 2005, the Security Council passed a Resolution expressing its concern 
at the persistence of the crisis in Côte d‟Ivoire and of obstacles to the peace and national 
reconciliation process by all parties.
280
 It reiterated its firm condemnation of all violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, including the use of child soldiers, in Côte 
d‟Ivoire.  
 
The Security Council noted the final communiqué of the KP Plenary Meeting held in 
Moscow in November 2005. Furthermore, it noted the Resolution adopted by the 
Certification Scheme‟s Participants at that meeting „setting out concrete measures to prevent 
the introduction of diamonds from Côte d‟Ivoire into the legitimate diamond trade, and 
recognising the linkage between the illegal exploitation of diamonds, illicit trade in 
diamonds, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms and the recruitment and use of 
mercenaries as one of the sources of fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in West Africa‟.281 
 
The Security Council noted the report of the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire282 and 
determined that the situation in Côte d‟Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace 
and security in the region. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, the Security 
Council renewed the provisions of Resolution 1572 until December 2006.
283
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Further, the Security Council decided that all states were obliged to take necessary measures 
to prevent the import of all rough diamonds from Côte d‟Ivoire.284 The Resolution noted 
pleasure at the agreement by Participants to the Certification Scheme. The Resolution also 
called upon the states in the region, which were not Participants in the Certification Scheme, 
to intensify their efforts to join the same in order to increase the effectiveness of monitoring 
the import of diamonds from Côte d‟Ivoire.285 
 
As the Resolution referred to above shows that, many strides have been made by the UN SC 
to support the objectives of the Certification Scheme. The UN SC has also enjoyed the 
support of Participants in its Resolutions. Indeed, the UN SC has been vociferous in making 
the role of the illicit trade of conflict diamonds an international agenda item. Through its 
Resolutions, the UN SC has made known its concern for the illicit trade in rough diamonds. 
At the outset in 2003, the UN SC made itself clear on the pursuance of an international 
certification scheme for the trade in rough diamonds, which lead to human rights abuses and 
sustain conflicts. 
 
The UN SC has through its Resolutions demonstrated support for the elimination of the 
illegal trade of rough diamonds, which cause human rights violations. Because Resolutions of 
the UN SC are legally binding, the UN SC has significant power in making particular 
determinations, toward the maintenance of international peace and security.  
 
The right to veto of the permanent members of the Security Council is embodied in Article 27 
of the UN Charter.
286
 Chapter V of the UN Charter provides for the vital role of the Security 
                                                 
284
 Part 6 of UN SC Resolution 1643(2005) UN Doc S/RES/1643 (2005). 
285
 Ibid. 
286
 Article 27 of the UN Charter reads as follows:  
 
„Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Security Council on the 
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven (nine) members. Decisions of the 
Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven (nine) members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members, provided that, in decisions under Chapter 
VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting’(added 
emphasis) 
 
This must be done with due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution (added 
emphasis) of Members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other 
purposes of the UN; and also to equitable geographical distribution. See further Article 23(1) of the UN Charter. 
159 
 
Council in the UN system. Resolutions passed by the UN SC are legally binding. Since 1998, 
the UN has engaged in Resolutions regarding the illicit trade in conflict diamonds.
287
 
 
Subject to proportionality and the requisite consensus of the veto members, the UN SC may 
impose sanctions to enforce its resolutions that deal with the maintenance and international 
peace and security.
288
 Sanctions have their basis in international law.
289
 Sanctions are 
intended to persuade heads of state to amend their military, economic, or human rights 
policies, to end wars, civil conflicts or other crises that threaten international peace and 
security.
290
 
 
Sanctions are a significant means to deter actions, which threaten international peace and 
security.
291
 
 
Contained within the power of the UN SC, is the ability to call upon Member States of the 
UN to support Resolutions. Also, the UN SC has the power to enforce Resolutions. 
Consequently the UN SC Resolutions on the illegal trade of rough diamonds have an 
internationally legally binding effect on Member States and organisations. 
 
Having discussed the role of the UN SC, this chapter will examine the Resolutions of the UN 
GA.  
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3. The role of the UN GA on conflict diamonds: The Certification Scheme 
 
Having reviewed the Resolutions of the UN SC, the chapter will proceed to examine the role 
of the UN General Assembly (UN GA) in the illegal trade of rough diamonds, which 
culminated in the formation of the Certification Scheme.  
 
In terms of the UN Charter, the function of the UN GA is confined to making 
recommendations.
292
 Issues appearing on the UN GA agenda may secure the attention of the 
UN SC upon referral by the UN GA.
293
 
 
Brownlie discusses law making by organisations. In particular, he opines that resolutions of 
the UN GA may be termed „prescriptive resolutions‟.294 He acknowledges that resolutions in 
themselves are not legally binding. Yet they may „prescribe principles of international law 
and be, or purport to be, merely declaratory‟. When UNGA Resolutions emanate from or 
have a direct bearing upon a subject within the UN Charter, they may be regarded as an 
„authoritative interpretation of the Charter‟.295 
 
New issues have a greater possibility of success when UNGA Resolutions may be relied upon 
as a source of international law. Resolutions of the UN GA in such instances provide „a 
means of corralling and defining the quickly growing practice of States, while remaining 
hortatory in form‟.296 Generally, these issues have been of considerable importance.  
 
It is important to examine the role of the UN GA in the Certification Scheme so that the study 
may be able to assess the future role of the UN GA, to be followed by an examination of the 
role the WTO to the Certification Scheme. 
 
 
                                                 
292
 Articles 10-18 of the UN Charter. 
293
 Brownlie (1990) at 14; see also UN Experts Meeting on „Natural resources and conflict in Africa: 
Transforming a peace liability into a peace asset‟ 17-19 June Part VIII. 
294
 Brownlie supra at 699. 
295
 Ibid. Here Brownlie gives the examples of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in Resolutions of the UN GA.  
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 Brownlie (1990) at 14; see also UN Experts Meeting on „Natural resources and conflict in Africa: 
Transforming a peace liability into a peace asset‟ 17-19 June Part VIII. 
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a. UN GA Resolution 55/56 
 
General Assembly Resolution 55/56 in 2000 expressed concern over „the problem of conflict 
diamonds fuelling conflicts in a number of countries and the devastating impact of these 
conflicts on peace, safety and security for people in affected countries‟.297 The Resolution 
also recognised that the legitimate trade in diamonds makes a critical contribution to 
economic development in many countries worldwide.  
 
Further, the Resolution stated that conflict diamonds are of serious international concern. The 
UN GA recommended that measures to address the problem should involve all concerned 
parties, including producing, processing, exporting and importing countries, as well as the 
diamond industry. The Resolution also emphasised that measures should be effective and 
pragmatic, consistent with international law and should not hinder the development of the 
diamond industry.
298
 
 
The UN GA supported an initiative to launch an inclusive consultation process of 
governments, industry and civil society. Consultation found fruition in the Kimberley 
Process,
299
 expressing appreciation to African countries for their initiatives.
300
 The General 
Assembly called upon all states to implement Security Council measures targeting the link 
between the trade in conflict diamonds and the supply to rebel movements of weapons, fuel 
or other prohibited material.
301
 
 
The Resolution urged all states to support efforts of the diamond producing, processing, 
exporting and importing countries and the diamond industry, to find ways to break the link 
between conflict diamonds and armed conflict. The Resolution also encouraged improved 
international cooperation on law enforcement.
302
 In expressing the need to consider devising 
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 UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/56 (2000). 
298
 Recalling all the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council, including its Resolutions UN Doc S/RES/1173 
(1998), UN Doc S/RES/1295(2000), UN Doc S/RES/1306 (2000) and UN Doc S/RES/1304 (2000). 
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 The ministerial statement was issued at the conclusion of the meeting on diamonds held in Pretoria on 21 
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London Intergovernmental Meeting on Conflict Diamonds, held on 25 and 26 October 2000. 
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 Part 1 of UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/56. 
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 Part 2 of UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) supra. 
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measures to address the problem of conflict diamonds, the Resolution stated that the 
following elements should be included:
303
 
 
(a)  The creation and implementation of a simple and workable international 
Certification Scheme for rough diamonds;  
(b)  basing the scheme primarily on national Certification Schemes;  
(c)  the need for national practices to meet internationally agreed minimum standards; 
(d)  the aim of securing the widest possible participation;  
(e)  the need for diamond processing, exporting and importing States to act in concert;  
(f)  the need for appropriate arrangements to help to ensure compliance, acting with 
respect for the sovereignty of States; and 
(g)  the need for transparency. 
 
These elements became the backbone of the Certification Scheme as it is in existence. 
 
b. UN GA Resolution 56/263 
 
In 2002, the UN GA adopted another Resolution. Whilst reiterating and commending the 
work of the Kimberley Process, the Resolution encouraged the resolution of outstanding 
measures to be taken to implement the international Certification Scheme for rough diamonds 
consistent with international law governing international trade.
304
 Also the UN GA 
encouraged finalisation and implementation of the international Certification Scheme, 
recognising the urgency of the situation from a humanitarian and security standpoint.
305
 
 
Further, it drew attention to essential tools for the successful implementation of the proposed 
international Certification Scheme, for the collation and dissemination of relevant statistical 
data on the production of and international trade in rough diamonds.
306
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 Part 3 of UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) supra. 
304
 Part 5 of Resolution UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) UN Doc A/RES/56/263(2000); These statements were 
reiterated in the General Assembly Resolutions UN Doc A/RES/58/290 (2004) and UN doc A/RES/58/L.59 
(2004) 
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 Part 6 of UN GA Resolution 56/263(2004) UN Doc A/RES/56/263(2004). 
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 Part 7 of UN GA Resolution 56/263(2004) supra. 
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c. UN GA Resolution 57/302 
 
UNGA Resolution 57/302 restated the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict, and the need to 
break the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict, as a much 
needed contribution to the prevention and settlement of conflicts. In addition to reiterating the 
contents of the preceding Resolution, this Resolution also recognised the following: the 
impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace; safety and security 
of people in affected countries; and the systematic and gross human rights violations, which 
were perpetrated in such conflicts.
307
 
 
Therefore, urgent action to curb the trade in conflict diamonds was considered imperative. 
The introduction of the Certification Scheme should, according to the Resolution, 
substantially reduce the opportunity for conflict diamonds to play a role in fuelling armed 
conflict. The Certification Scheme should also help to protect legitimate trade and ensure the 
effective implementation of the relevant resolutions on trade in conflict diamonds. Voluntary 
self-regulation initiatives for the diamond industry announced by the World Diamond 
Council were acknowledged in that a system of such voluntary self-regulation will contribute, 
as described in the Interlaken Declaration.
308
 
 
Resolutions of the UN GA are of a recommendation making nature. Unlike the Resolutions 
of the UN SC, they are not legally binding. However, the strength of the UN GA Resolutions 
rests in their ability to gather mobility for action toward the agenda of the UN SC. Once the 
attention of the UN SC is gained, UN GA Resolutions may be turned into action by the UN 
SC. In this manner, the significance of the UN GA is improved. The efficacy of the UN GA 
is further bolstered through its wide Member State representation. 
 
Resolution 55/56 is synonymous with the Certification Scheme. The Resolution set down the 
fundamental elements of the Certification Scheme. These elements formed the basic structure 
of the Certification Scheme. The Resolution was strong on the points of the need for the 
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 UN GA Resolution 57/302 UN Doc A/RES/57/302(2004). 
308
 UN GA Resolution 57/489(2002) UN Doc A/57/489, Annex 2 (2002) on the Kimberley Process Scheme for 
Rough Diamonds. The General Assembly in UN GA Resolution 59/144(2005) UN Doc A/59/144(2005) restated 
its commitment to the Kimberley Process and the work of the diamond industry most especially the World 
Diamond Council. In another Resolution UN Doc A/RES/60/182(2006); UN Doc A/RES/61/28(2007); UN Doc 
A/RES/62/L.16(2007) and UN GA Resolution A/RES/63/l.52 (as orally amended) of 5 December 2008, the 
General Assembly noted with satisfaction the progress of the Kimberley Process. 
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compilation and dissemination of statistics relating to blood diamonds to all Member States. 
At the time, the opinion that prevailed in the UN GA was that the introduction of an 
international certification scheme would substantially reduce the illegal trade in rough and 
conflict diamonds.  
 
The Resolution also recognised the role of international organisations, recognised the human 
rights violations and conflicts generated by the illicit trade in rough and conflict diamonds, 
the impact of trade on regional stability and the maintenance of peace and security. All these 
factors were a sum total of the pertinent aspects for international concern arising from the 
illegal trade in rough and conflict diamonds. 
 
Having examined the UN SC and the UN GA Resolutions, the role of the WTO in the 
Certification Scheme can be considered. 
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4. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
The contribution of the WTO in the setting up and implementation of the Certification 
Scheme is evidenced by a WTO a policy document.
309
 The document is indicative of the 
WTO‟s recognition of the Certification Scheme in the diamond trade. 
 
The WTO is an organisation focused on liberalising trade. It is a forum for governments to 
negotiate trade agreements.310 It is a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a 
system, which has created rules for trade.311 Lowering trade barriers is one of the most 
obvious means of encouraging trade.  
 
Where countries have encountered trade barriers and wished them lowered, WTO 
negotiations have helped to liberalise trade.
312
 However, the WTO is not only about 
liberalising trade. In some circumstances, its rules support maintaining trade barriers.
313
 At 
the heart of the WTO are its agreements, negotiated and signed by the majority of the world‟s 
trading nations. These documents provide the legal framework for international commerce. 
Diamond trade has also been regulated within the policies of the WTO.  
 
The system‟s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible because this is 
important for economic development and economic wellbeing.
314
 It also means ensuring that 
individuals, companies and governments know what the global trade rules are; which affords 
transparency.
315
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state actors‟ (2009) 11 Oregon Rev Int’l L at 71; see in general: Williams A „The post colony as trope: 
Searching for a lost continent in a borderless world‟ (2000) 31/2 Research in African Literature at 56-9; see also 
Cochrane WW and Bell CS The economics of consumption (1956) at 87-93; see also Burk M Consumption 
economics: A multidisciplinary approach (1968) at 78-97; see also Hoekman BM and Olarreaga M € Global 
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In recent years, this danger of flouting rules has become increasingly evident with the 
emergence of the WTO‟s totalising economic agenda.316 Most rough diamonds are mined in 
Africa. The components for an international Certification Scheme for rough diamonds are 
contained in the Certification Scheme‟s document.  
 
a. The Kimberley Process: WTO Conformity317 
 
The key provision with regard to the question of WTO conformity is contained in Section 
III:
318
 
 
‘Each Participant should: …  
(c)  ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non-
Participant; …‟ (emphasis added). 
 
The Section requires Participants to the Certification Scheme to prohibit trade in rough 
diamonds with trade partners that are not participating to the Certification Scheme. One 
justification for the trade restriction is to attain broad participation in the Certification 
Scheme and to prevent non Participants from mixing conflict free diamonds with conflict 
diamonds.
319
 
 
Since the Certification Scheme encourages Participants to adopt trade measures at a national 
level, if necessary, the question of WTO conformity will arise at the level of national 
                                                                                                                                                        
trade and poor nations: The poverty impacts and policy implications of liberalization (2007) at 93-107; see also 
Gwartney JD and Wagner RE Public choice and constitutional economics (1988) at 56-98; see Robinson NA 
Strategies toward sustainable development: Implementing Agenda 21 (2004) at 123-89. 
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(2003) Asper Bus Int’l and Trade L Rev at 215. 
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implementation.
320
 In this context, the WTO considered measures to implement the 
Certification Scheme as well as to enforce it through trade restrictions such as an import or 
export ban.  
 
The Certification Scheme developed in the Kimberley Process is enshrined in a political 
document providing guidance to Participants on how to implement the Certification Scheme 
at national level.
321
As a political document, the Certification Scheme contains no legally 
binding obligations. Therefore, according to the WTO, the Certification Scheme does not 
constitute a trade measure in WTO terms and will not be under scrutiny of the WTO.
322
 
 
Any national legislation of WTO members, relevant to the WTO Agreements, is subject to 
the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
323
 Therefore, national laws or regulations amended or 
enacted to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme may be subject to legal review by 
the WTO dispute settlement institutions.
324
 Thus, national laws or regulations have to be 
drafted in conformity with relevant WTO obligations. 
 
b. Rules of treaty interpretation 
 
The WTO‟s Policy Paper refers to rules of treaty interpretation in examining national 
implementation of the Certification Scheme.
325
 Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding directs members to clarify WTO provisions „in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law‟.326 It is generally recognised that the 
fundamental rules set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the 
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status of customary international law.
327
 According to Article 31, the, „text, context and 
object and purpose of the treaty form the foundation for interpretation of same‟.  
 
In addition, any subsequent agreement between the parties and subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty shall be taken into account; thereby giving effect to the notion of 
abrogation.
328
 According to Article 32 (Supplementary means of interpretation) recourse may 
also be made to the „preparatory work and the circumstances of its conclusion‟. In the 
Shrimp/Turtle case,
329
 the Appellate Body also relied on international conventions
330
 and 
political declarations, outside of the WTO context, to interpret provisions of Article XX.2. 
 
c. Articles I, XI and XIII GATT 94 
 
The most significant obligations in GATT 1994 affected by an import and export ban on 
rough diamonds are the „most favoured nation treatment‟ obligation of Article I; the ban on 
prohibitions and quantitative restrictions of Article XI; and the obligation of non 
discrimination in the administration of quantitative restrictions of Article XIII.
331
 Article 
XIII: 1 establishes the more specific obligation of non-discrimination with regard to the 
application of prohibitions and quantitative restrictions. It is, therefore, according to the WTO 
considered to be the lex specialis taking priority of Article I in a particular case.
332
 
 
Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading 
partners. To grant a state a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their 
products) and this must be reciprocated for all other WTO members, is one such example. 
This principle is known as most-favoured-nation treatment. It is so important that it is the first 
article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governs trade in 
goods. MFN is also a priority in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), although in 
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each agreement the principle is handled slightly differently. Together, those three agreements 
cover all three main areas of trade handled by the WTO. Some exceptions are allowed.  
Article XI: 1 applies to exports as well as imports underpinning the basic GATT philosophy 
in respect of trade restrictions. As a matter of principle, such restrictions have to be in the 
form of „duties, taxes or other charges‟. Article XI bans other forms of import and export 
restraints, mentioning in particular prohibitions and quantitative restrictions.
333
 
 
An import and export ban on rough diamonds with regard to WTO members not participating 
in the Certification Scheme could, therefore, constitute a trade restriction prohibited by this 
provision. There are a number of specific exceptions listed in Article XI. According to the 
WTO, a closer examination of the wording and intention demonstrates that they have no 
application in the trade of rough diamonds. 
 
d. Article XXI GATT 94: Security exceptions 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the rules of trade between nations at a the 
international level. There are a number of ways of looking at the WTO in that it is an 
organization for liberalizing trade. It is also a forum for governments to negotiate trade 
agreements and a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of trade rules. 
Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments attempt to resolve disputes.  
The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of 
negotiations. The bulk of the WTO‟s current work comes from the 1986-94 negotiations 
called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, under the „Doha 
Development Agenda‟ launched in 2001. 
At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by most of the world‟s trading 
nations. These documents provide the legal ground-rules for international commerce. They 
are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep their trade policies within agreed 
limits. Although negotiated and signed by governments, the goal is to help producers of 
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goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business, while allowing 
governments to meet social and environmental objectives. 
The system‟s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible because this is 
important for economic development and well-being. That partly means removing obstacles. 
It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade 
rules are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden 
changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be “transparent” and predictable. 
This is a third important side to the WTO‟s work. Trade relations often involve conflicting 
interests. Agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the WTO system, often 
need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle these differences is through some 
neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute 
settlement process written into the WTO agreements. 
 
Articles XX and XXI provide as follows: 
 
„Article XX 
 
General Exceptions 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures: 
 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver; 
 
(d)  necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the 
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, 
the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive 
practices; 
 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
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(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; 
 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; 
 
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity 
agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and 
not disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved;* 
 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential 
quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the 
domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental 
stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports 
of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from the 
provisions of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination; 
 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; 
Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting 
parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products, and 
that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the 
Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have 
ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this sub-
paragraph not later than 30 June 1960. 
 
Article XXI 
 
Security Exceptions 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or 
 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests 
 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;  
 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.‟ 
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The wording of Article XXI, the so called security exception, is broader than Article XX. In 
contrast to Article XX, there is no introductory clause limiting the scope of these exceptions. 
Article XXI is considered to be among the most sensitive of GATT and broad enough to be 
subject to abuse. It is held that, in some cases, it could be difficult to draw a clear line 
between national security and political purposes.
334
 
 
In the case of a trade ban on rough diamonds, considerations can be limited to Paragraphs (b) 
and (c) of Article XXI. These provisions apply to imports as well as exports since the term 
„action’ includes all kinds of trade measures. Article XXI (b) contains a general exception for 
certain measures taken by a member „which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests‟. 
 
The language bestows the right of determining the necessity for the protection of security 
interests to individual governments. However, it is limited to „essential security interests‟.335 
Therefore, trade measures may not be used for political purposes that have a tangential 
relationship to national security. The applicability of this provision could be the subject of 
differing interpretations.  
 
Thus far, this exception has rarely been invoked and governments have shown restraint in 
using it.
336
 The provision is limited to three specific situations. In the context of a trade ban 
on rough diamonds, a closer examination must be had to Paragraphs (ii) and (iii).
337
 
Paragraph (ii) covers any action relating to the traffic of goods carried on „directly or 
indirectly for supplying a military establishment‟.338 
 
Thus, all goods, which could contribute to war, may potentially fall within the exception of 
Article XXI (b). Accordingly, if the WTO is of the view that rebel movements use conflict 
diamonds to finance their military activities, then the wording of this paragraph may be 
considered applicable to the Certification Scheme.
339
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Paragraph (iii) covers action „taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations‟. Therefore, the main question is whether the problem of conflict diamonds could be 
considered in an emergency situation in international relations. If the answer is in the 
affirmative, then the WTO may conclude that this paragraph is applicable to the Certification 
Scheme. 
 
The exception in Article XXI(c) covers actions in pursuance of the obligations „under the UN 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security‟.340 The necessity for taking 
action is, therefore, based on a multilateral decision and not on a decision of an individual 
government as in Article XXI (b).
341
 
 
With regard to the wording of this provision, it is not clear whether it applies only to UN SC 
actions or also other measures such as recommendations of the UN GA. Imposition of 
economic and military sanctions according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is within the 
competence of the Security Council.
342
 
 
However, the General Assembly can make recommendations on „the general principles of co-
operation in the maintenance of international peace and security‟.343 Therefore, the key issue 
is whether only UN SC actions or recommendations of the UN GA can lead to obligations 
within the meaning of Article XXI(c).  
 
Participant Countries threatened by an insurgency, which is funded by the sale of diamonds 
outside the auspices of the Certification Scheme, may choose to rely on the invocation of 
Article XXI. Ultimately, the WTO will casuistically assess the applicability of Article XXI. 
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e. Article XX GATT 94: General exceptions 
 
The question whether Article XX applies to a trade ban on conflict diamonds is of subsidiary 
importance, to be reverted to in a situation where the applicability of Article XXI is denied.
344
 
Firstly, the security exceptions of Article XXI are more specific and fit better the objectives 
of possible restrictions on the trade with conflict diamonds.
345
 Article XX applies to imports 
as well as to exports since the term „measures‟ includes all kinds of trade measures.346 
 
Secondly, the scope of Article XX is limited by the introductory clause, which prohibits; 
amongst others, any „disguised restriction on international trade‟.347 Thirdly, and according to 
numerous precedents, the Appellate Body noted that Article XX permits only a limited and 
conditional exception to the GATT obligations, which must be interpreted narrowly.
348
 
 
Upon examining the specific situations listed in Article XX it seems that, in particular, 
paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) might cover the case of a trade ban on rough diamonds. In 
accordance with the approach of WTO Panels, it must first be examined whether a measure 
falls within the scope of one of these paragraphs.
349
 
 
f. Article VIII GATT 94 and Agreement on import licensing procedures 
 
According to Article VIII.1(c) GATT, the formalities and documentation requirements for 
imports and exports should be kept to a minimum in order to facilitate trade. However, it is 
recognised that members may, for various reasons, require importers or exporters to obtain 
licenses.  
 
The Certification Scheme requires Participants to obtain Certificates. This implies obtaining 
licenses to trade in rough diamonds. Licensing systems may be applied, for example, to 
administer quantitative restrictions or to implement the Certification Scheme. Nothing in the 
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345
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Certification Scheme requires the adoption of measures prima facie inconsistent with Article 
VIII GATT 1994 or the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
 
The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures lays down rules for adopting and 
implementing national procedures for issuing import licenses. It divides licensing systems 
into two categories, namely automatic and non-automatic, and sets down general rules 
applicable to both systems as well as specific rules for each system.  
 
The rules require national licensing authorities to ensure, for example, that licensing 
procedures: 
 
a. are implemented in a transparent and predictable manner (Preamble); 
b. are neutral in application and administered in a fair and equitable manner (Art 
1.3); 
c. are not more burdensome than absolutely necessary to administer the measure 
(Art 3.2); and 
d. protect importers and foreign suppliers from unnecessary delays (e.g. time limits 
in Art 2.2(a) (iii) and Art 3.5(f))  
 
The Agreement also obliges members to notify the WTO when they introduce new licensing 
procedures, or change existing procedures, and contains a list of elements that should be 
included in the notification.
350
 Finally, the Agreement states that with regard to security 
exceptions, the provisions of Article XXI GATT apply.
351
 
 
Conditions of the Certification Scheme are not inconsistent, prima facie with the 
requirements of Article VIII (1) (c). It must, however, be borne in mind that should 
Participants embark upon implementing legislation broadening the ambit of the Certification 
Scheme, caution will exercised in light of their WTO membership.  
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g. Request for a waiver under Article IX of the WTO Agreement 
 
According to Article IX of the WTO Agreement, in exceptional circumstances WTO 
members may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by the WTO Agreements, 
if certain requirements are fulfilled.
352
 In the context of the Certification Scheme, a waiver 
could be sought for trade measures that are inconsistent with WTO obligations.  
A waiver may be sought following a determination that the measures would not be justified 
by the general exceptions. However, a waiver could also be seen as an instrument to provide 
legal certainty by ensuring the WTO compatibility of trade measures from their inception.
353
 
 
The request for a waiver is without prejudice to the question of WTO conformity. For 
example, in the 1990 Panel Report on the United States – Restrictions on the Importation of 
Sugar 26, the Panel concluded that a waiver does not alter the legal nature of a measure. The 
Panel stated that a party having obtained a waiver for a particular measure is not barred from 
arguing in a dispute settlement procedure that the measure would be consistent with the 
GATT even in the absence of the waiver.
354
 
 
In case a waiver is requested, a few practical questions will have to be taken into account. 
Firstly, a request can be made by each Participant or collectively.
355
 However, it must be 
noted that the Certification Scheme, as such, does not constitute a trade measure in WTO 
terms. Only concrete trade measures adopted at national level to implement the Certification 
Scheme could be subject to a waiver.
356
 
 
Secondly, a waiver can be requested at various stages of the implementation of the 
Certification Scheme. A waiver may be requested before the entry into force of trade 
measures. Alternatively, a waiver may be requested during the first step of a dispute 
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settlement procedure; or as a last resort, in case a trade measure has been found to be a 
violation of WTO rules and disciplines.
357
 Election of one of these options is within the 
discretion of Participants. 
 
h. The General Council: Request for waiver in the Certification Scheme 
 
The General Council of the WTO conducted the function of the Ministerial Conference 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO 
(the WTO Agreement).
358
 A request was made by Member States to the WTO in 2002 and 
again in 2006 for the extension on the waiver for the trade in rough diamonds.
359
 
 
The General Council referred to its previous decision, which granted Members a waiver from 
obligations.
360
 It took note of the request of the Members listed in the Annex for an extension 
of the Existing Waiver with respect to their domestic measures to regulate the international 
trade in rough diamonds consistent with the Certification Scheme.
361
 
 
The General Council made clear that its decision
362
 did not prejudge the consistency of 
domestic measures taken consistent with the Certification Scheme with provisions of the 
WTO Agreement, including any relevant WTO exceptions, and that the Existing Waiver was 
to expire. Thus, the Council granted and extended the Waiver for reasons of legal certainty.  
 
The waiver was granted in recognition that „the trade in conflict diamonds remains a matter 
of serious international concern and has been directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, 
                                                 
357
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the activities of rebel movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate 
governments, and the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms 
and light weapons‟.363 
 
Further it recognised the „extraordinary humanitarian nature of this issue and the devastating 
impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security 
of people in affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights violations that have 
been perpetrated in such conflicts‟.364 Members gave the assurance for implementing the 
Certification Scheme through national legislation. 
 
If the Certification Scheme is to create a certain sense of efficacy, the role of the WTO must 
be seriously considered. Member States must ensure that implementation of the Certification 
Scheme‟s contents at national level is in conformity with the WTO principles.365 Of 
importance also is that trade import and export rules as well as procedures must be revised, so 
that legitimate trade of diamonds legally mined takes place within an economic context 
compliant with peace and security which arises from the protection of human rights. 
 
Much debate ensued amongst Participants before the adoption of the Interlaken 
Declaration.
366
 Two main concerns gave rise to the debate. Firstly, Participants were 
concerned about whether the Certification Scheme might be regarded as restricting trade 
under the regulations of the trade agreements administered by the World Trade Organization. 
Secondly, Participants expressed concern around GATT. 
 
During the negotiations of the Certification Scheme, it was considered necessary to create a 
special working group on WTO compliance issues.
367
 In paragraph 3 of the Interlaken 
Declaration, the Participants declare, „We will ensure that the measures taken to implement 
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the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds will be consistent with 
international trade rules‟.368 
 
Consequently, the request for a waiver seemed a fitting gesture to the fulfillment of the 
Interlaken promise.
369
 Although it is highly unlikely that the exceptions of GATT articles XX 
and XXI would not be applicable to the case of a multilateral certification system, set out to 
resolve transboundary disputes, some WTO Members nevertheless wanted to have absolute 
certainty on WTO compliance once the Certification Scheme was in place.
370
 
 
The extra assurance was ultimately reached through the waiver.
371
 The waiver nonetheless 
leaves open the possibility for a WTO Member to bring before the WTO General Council 
potential future concerns related to „any benefit accruing...under the GATT 1994‟ that is 
„impaired unduly‟, as well as concerns regarding a Member‟s potential claim that the 
Certification Scheme measures are being „applied inconsistently‟.372 
 
Certainly the WTO has deemed appropriate their role in the implementation of the 
Certification Scheme at a national level. This means that the WTO involvement and 
compliance for WTO Member States is inevitable. Diamond trading has naturally elevated 
the world economy. This, then must be subject to regulation in order to afford a fair measure 
of control. As such, the WTO has made its position clear. The role of international 
organisations, as has been evidenced by the WTO policy document, is crucial to the operation 
and future sustainability for an international certification scheme for the trade of rough 
diamonds. 
 
The inclusion of the Certification Scheme on the agenda of the WTO evidences the 
importance of the Certification Scheme and the work undertaken to date which demanded the 
attention of the WTO. This impact of the policy document demonstrates the importance of 
the Certification Scheme. Examination of the role of the WTO in the operation of the 
Certification Scheme concludes the first part of this chapter.  
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This chapter will proceed to its second part to discuss the role of regional organisations, 
namely the AU and the EC, in the Certification Scheme.  
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5. The role of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and 
security 
 
Having provided an introduction to the importance of international organisations to the 
Certification Scheme and specifically; the roles of the UN SC and the UN GA and the WTO, 
this chapter will proceed to explore the role of regional organisations.  
 
It is anticipated that this will reveal the importance of regional organisations for the long term 
sustainability and optimal efficacy of an international certification scheme within which 
diamond trading may ensue. The AU and the EC will be examined. To date the EC has 
„implemented‟ the Certification Scheme into its region. To this end, it may be stated that the 
EC gave full recognition to the Certification Scheme as if it were a legally binding treaty.  
 
According to the UN Charter, Member States may form regional alliances to maintain peace 
and security provided these activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
UN.373 The Charter gives full recognition to regional organisations insofar as arrangements 
are made for the maintenance of peace and security whilst the general principle of 
subordination of regional arrangements and agencies to the Purposes and Principles of the 
Charter is asserted.374 Maintenance of international peace and security is contingent on 
regional and domestic peace and security.375 
 
a. The African Union (AU) and the African region 
 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union established the African Union.
376
 There are a 
number of mechanisms that address peace and security in Africa.
377
 One of the objectives of 
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the AU is to promote and protect human and peoples‟ rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.378 
 
One of the most important mechanisms of the AU is the creation of the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC).
379
 The primary objective of the PSC is the promotion of peace, security and 
stability in Africa.
380
 
 
The PSC is supported by five main organs: the AU Commission; the Continental Early 
Warning System, the Peace Fund, the Panel of the Wise and the African Standby Force which 
includes the Military Staff Committee.
381
 
 
The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council came into force in 
December 2003. The coming into force of the Protocol paved the way for the selection of 
members in March 2004. The Protocol was launched in May 2004. The PSC comprises 
fifteen Member States.
382
 Ten of the fifteen Member States serve a two year term while five 
members serve a three year term.
383
  
 
Unlike the UN SC, the AU‟s PSC does not have permanent member States. Nor does any 
member enjoy the right to veto. Decision making of the PSC is through consensus. In the 
absence of attaining consensus, a vote of a simple majority will inform the decision. The PSC 
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may convene at three different levels, namely Heads of States level, the Ministerial level and 
or the Permanent Representatives level. 
 
Regional organisations on the African continent, such as SADC, have not been seized with 
the issue of conflict diamonds. As such, the matter of the Certification Scheme has not 
received attention from African regional organisations. 
 
It is submitted that regional bodies should incorporate the initiatives such as the international 
certification scheme for trading in rough diamonds onto its agenda.
384
 To date other regional 
organisations such as the European Community have issued directives for the inclusion of the 
Certification Scheme‟s content into policies and legislation so as to ensure that the mandate 
of the Certification Scheme is met. This aspect will be discussed below.  
 
In contrast, the AU has not issued directives or policies with respect to the implementation of 
the Certification Scheme. Thus, the sound of a singular voice with regards to the trade of 
conflict diamonds has not resonated in the African region. Certain African countries have 
incorporated the contents of the Certification Scheme into their domestic legal systems. The 
limited incorporation of the Certification Scheme may only be had as an indirect application 
under the rubric of human rights violations through the possible invocation of international 
legal principles.  
 
b. The European Union (EU) 
 
The EU is the regional organisation for the European states. It currently comprises 27 
States.
385
For most international trade matters, including the matter of trading of rough 
diamonds, the EC is considered as one entity without internal state borders. The EC operates 
as a single market and customs and economic union. All trade of commodities must in the 
first instance comply with the regulations set down by the European Council.
386
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A singular set of EU rules govern the trade of rough diamonds for all 27 Member States at the 
external borders of a single economic market.
387
 The EU is a single Participant to the 
Certification Scheme. The EC formulated and passed a Council Regulation implementing the 
Certification Scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds.
388
 
 
In article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that in order 
for the EU to exercise competencies, the institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions.
389
 Furthermore it states that a regulation shall have 
general application and shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
390
 
 
The European Council can delegate legislative authority to the Commission and, depending 
on the area and the appropriate legislative procedure, both institutions can make laws.
391
 The 
legal effect of regulations is that they are in some sense equivalent to „Acts of Parliament‟, in 
that what they say is law and does not need to be mediated into national law by means of 
implementing measures.
392
 
 
Thus, when a regulation comes into force, it overrides all national laws pertinent to the 
subject matter and subsequent legislation must be consistent with the regulation issued. 
Whilst Member States are prohibited from making irrelevant the direct effect of regulations, 
it is common practice to pass legislation dealing with consequential matters arising from the 
coming into force of a regulation.
393
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Regulation 2368 of 2002 created a Community system of certification and import and export 
controls for rough diamonds for the purposes of implementing the Certification Scheme.
394
 
Thus, all EU Member States must conform to the uniform set of rules set by the EC Council 
Regulation in order to engage the trade of rough diamonds.
395
 
 
Rules were formulated in response to the Certification Scheme in order to recognise, „… the 
sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council against rebel movements in Sierra 
Leone and Angola against the Liberian government, prohibiting under certain conditions 
imports of rough diamonds from Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone have not been able to stop 
the flow of conflict diamonds into the legitimate trade or to bring conflicts to a halt‟.396 
 
In June 2001, the Goteborg European Council (GEC) endorsed a programme for the 
prevention of violent conflicts. The programme provided that Member States and the 
Commission will deal with the illicit trade in high value commodities, including ways of 
breaking the link between rough diamonds and violent conflicts and supporting the 
Kimberley Process.
397
 
 
The EU found that regulations dealing with the import of rough diamonds into the Union 
from Sierra Leone, which prohibited trade under certain conditions, were insufficient.
398
 
Recognising the need to complement the then existing measures with effective controls over 
the international trade of rough diamonds which were financing the wars in diamond 
producing African countries and the undermining of legitimate governments, the EU sought 
to formulate a system for the certification of rough diamonds.
399
 
Effective control of the rough diamond trade, the EU envisaged, will help maintain 
international peace and security; and will protect the revenue from the export of rough 
diamonds.
400
 The Regulation in very large part emulates the contents of the Certification 
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Scheme. Thus, these provisions will not be duplicated in this chapter save the contents, which 
differ from the contents of the Certification Scheme. The contents of the Certification 
Scheme document have been discussed in chapter two of this study.  
The EU distinguishes between a „regulation‟ and a „directive‟. The principle of „indirect 
effect‟ of European Community Law was brought out in the hallmark of the Ratti case in the 
European Court of Justice.
401
 The principle compels national courts to interpret „so far as 
possible‟ national legislation in accordance with the aims of a directive. In the EU, a 
„directive‟ is a legislative order that requires implementation in every Member State by the 
national government.
402
 
Whilst the Member State has the freedom to draft individual implementing legislation, the 
law must comply with the objective of the original directives. Therefore, implementation of a 
directive may assume different forms in different member states. In contrast, a „regulation,‟ is 
a single law for all Members States of the EU. It is directly applicable in Member States; 
meaning a regulation does not require implementing legislation. Measures necessary for the 
implementation of the Regulation need not be adopted by Member States in accordance with 
procedures laid down by Council Decision.
403
 However, in order to give effect to the 
regulation, mechanisms must be instituted so that the meaning of the regulation is not 
watered down. 
The Regulation states that its provisions should not be applicable to rough diamonds 
transiting the Community in the course of export to another Participant.
404
 Implied in this 
provision is that the EC has complied with import regulations and that all Member States will 
serve as a transit country.  
 
Chapter II deals with the import regime, which governs the EC. Chapter III of the EC 
Regulation deals with the export regime, which governs the EC Member States. Chapter IV 
deals with industry self regulation. Chapter VII addresses transit of rough diamonds. Chapter 
VI deals with general provisions. 
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c. Chapter II of the Council Regulation No 2368/2002: Import of rough 
diamonds into the EU 
 
Chapter II of the Council Regulation deals with the import of rough diamonds into the EC. In 
order to facilitate uniform application of the EC customs and tariffs legislation by the 
customs services of each Member state, the EC created the Integrated Tariff of the 
Community (TARIC, Tarif Integre de la Communaute) and a Combined Nomenclature (CN) 
in 1987.
405
 
 
TARIC is an electronic system that indicates all customs duties or commercial policy 
measures applicable to any given product.
406
 The use of TARIC is obligatory in customs 
declarations in trade with third world countries.
407
 In importing rough diamonds, importers or 
economic operators may freely opt for a point of entry at an external border of the EC. 
 
If rough diamonds are registered at any EU customs authority for import into the Community, 
TARIC automatically flags the existence of a trade restriction by means of an electronic 
warning system. The warning system refers to Council Regulation, which specifies the 
applicable rules for the import of rough diamonds into the EC in keeping with the 
Certification Scheme.
408
 
 
Every import of rough diamond shipments must be verified by a Community Authority.
409
 A 
Community authority is a competent authority designated by a Member State and agreed by 
the Commission to fulfil certain tasks in connection with the implementation of the 
Certification Scheme.
410
 Specifically, the task of the Community Authority is verification of 
incoming shipments for conformity with the Certification Scheme‟s rules and issuance of 
Kimberley Process Certificates for export shipments.
411
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Import of rough diamonds into the Community shall be prohibited unless three conditions 
have been fulfilled. Firstly, pursuant to article 3(a) of the Regulation and Section II of the 
Certification Scheme, the rough diamond shipment must be accompanied by a certificate 
validated by the competent authority of a Participant.
412
 Secondly, the rough diamond 
shipment must be contained in tamper resistant containers, and the seals applied at export by 
the Participant must not be broken.
413
 Thirdly, the Certificate must identify clearly the 
consignment to which it refers.
414
 
 
If there is a Community authority
415
 in either the Member State where the rough diamonds 
are intended for import or the Member State for which the rough diamonds are destined, then 
the containers and certificates should be submitted for verification. Submission to either the 
Member State or importing destination Member State should be undertaken at the earliest 
opportunity.
416
 
 
The procedure to be followed if there is no Community authority in either the Member State 
where the rough diamonds are intended for import or the destined Member State, allows the 
importer to elect which Community authority submission of the shipment certificate will be 
made to, for verification purposes.
417
 
 
The customs authorities at the point of entry into the Community territory will register the 
shipment of rough diamonds for the external transit procedure. The procedure allows for the 
movement of goods from one point to another within the customs territory of the Community, 
without being subject to import duties.
418
 
 
Registration for this procedure allows for the transfer of rough diamonds to a Community 
authority for verification. Community authorities verify if the contents of a container matches 
the particulars on the corresponding certificates. After verification by a Community authority, 
the goods are submitted to the relevant national customs authorities for regular customs 
                                                 
412
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procedures.
419
 Therefore, it is important that importers and exporters alike familiarise 
themselves with the Community authority, which they wish to utilise in the first instance. 
 
d. Chapter III of the Council Regulation No 2368/2002: Export of rough 
diamonds from the EC/ EU 
 
In order to obtain a Community certificate for exporting rough diamonds outside of the EC, 
the exporter must submit an export declaration and or an invoice to a Community 
authority.
420
 The exporter must provide conclusive documentary evidence that the rough 
diamonds to be exported were legally imported into the Community.
421
 This may include the 
provision of invoices from the original import certificates and any others flowing from the 
same transaction. 
 
In terms of Article 13 of the Council Regulation, the Community authority may accept as 
conclusive, evidence of lawful import into the Community a signed declaration by the 
exporter to that effect.
422
 Such a declaration shall contain at least the information to be given 
in an invoice under Article 17. The invoice requirements are that each sale of rough diamonds 
is accompanied by an invoice containing: the said signed guarantee unequivocally identifying 
the seller and the buyer and their registered offices; containing the VAT identification 
number of the seller, where applicable; the quantity of weight and qualification of the goods 
sold; the value of the transaction and the date of delivery.
423
 
 
Before issuing a Community Certificate, the Community authority may decide to physically 
inspect the contents of the consignment in order to verify that the conditions laid down in the 
Regulation have indeed been met.
424
 Within the validity period of the Certificate, Participants 
are able to elect when and where customs formalities and the actual export from the 
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Community are to take place.
425
 Verification of the actual export of the shipment is 
undertaken by control of import receipts from the receiving Participant.
426
 
 
Community authorities in Prague, London and Idar-Oberstein systematically send advance 
notices of shipments by email containing information on the carat weight, value, country of 
origin or provenance, exporter, importer and the serial number of the Certificate to the 
importing authorities of participants.
427
 All details of rough diamonds shipments are recorded 
on a computerised database and reported to the Commission as the KP authority on a monthly 
basis.
428
 
 
In the instance of resolutions of discrepancies with respect to import confirmation, Technical 
Guideline 14 states that exporting participants and requested to exchange with importing 
participants on a bilateral basis quarterly lists of Certificate numbers accompanying rough 
diamond shipments.
429
 Importing participants are requested to verify and flag any missing 
numbers and other discrepancies to the exporting participant and the Chair.
430
 
 
Article 14 makes provision for procedures to be adopted in instances of irregular 
shipments.
431
 Pursuant to Article 14 of the Regulation, a Community authority may detain a 
shipment if the provisions of Articles 11, 12 and 13 have not been fulfilled.
432
 A shipment 
can therefore not be released or sent back to the country of provenance unless all Regulation 
conditions are met.  
 
If a Community authority finds that failure to fulfil the requisite conditions of Articles 11, 12 
and 13, is not made knowingly or intentionally or is the result of an action by another 
authority in exercising its proper duties, the Community authority may release the shipment 
and proceed with the issuance of a valid Certificate.
433
 The issuance of a Certificate will be 
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made available after the exporter has undertaken the necessary remedial measures in that the 
exporter ensures that the provisions of Articles 11, 12 and 13 have been met.  
 
The EU explicitly endorses the principle of industry self-regulation as laid down in Section 
IV of the Certification Scheme document in its legislation implementing the Certification 
Scheme in the Community. Chapter IV („Industry Self-Regulation‟) of Council Regulation 
sets out requirements for the establishment of a system of warranties and industry self-
regulation by organisations representing traders in rough diamonds should be guided and 
provides for a „fast track‟ procedure for organisations applying a system of warranties and 
industry self-regulation.
434
 
 
It is important to clarify that the EC does not understand by the term „industry self-
regulation‟ the delegation of governmental responsibilities to industry bodies.435 Rather it 
means the granting of a privilege („fast track‟ issuance of the Certificate) to companies 
subject to considerable responsibilities, as members of industry bodies.
436
 
 
In order to be listed in Annex V of Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002n, an organisation 
representing traders in rough diamonds has to provide conclusive evidence to the 
Commission that it has adopted rules and regulations obliging the organisation and its 
members to respect specific principles and procedures set out in Article 17 of the Regulation.  
 
In particular, the rules and regulations of such organisations must oblige members: to sell 
only diamonds purchased from legitimate sources in compliance with the Certification 
Scheme; to guarantee that, on the basis of their personal knowledge and/or written warranties 
provided by the suppliers of rough diamonds, the rough diamonds sold are not conflict 
diamonds; not to buy rough diamonds from suspect or unknown sources of supply and/or 
rough diamonds originating in non-participants in the Certification Scheme; not to knowingly 
buy, sell or assist others in buying or selling conflict diamonds; and to create and maintain for 
at least three years records of invoices received from suppliers and issued to customers, and 
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instruct an independent auditor to certify that these records have been created and maintained 
accurately.  
 
The rules and regulations adopted by the organisation must foresee disciplinary measures, in 
particular the obligation for the organisation to expel any member found, after a due process 
inquiry by the organisation itself, to have seriously violated the principles laid down in 
Article 17 of the Regulation.  
 
Community Authorities communicate relevant developments and information on the 
Kimberley Process to the Bourses, inter alia: 
 
 Updates to Participants list; 
 New EC Regulations; 
 New technical guidelines, best practices, administrative decisions; 
 Chair‟s notices; and 
 Practical guidelines for import and export procedures. 
  
In turn, Bourses should pass on this information to their members. In accordance with Article 
13 of Council Regulation, Members of a listed organisation can obtain a Community 
certificate on the basis of a signed declaration by that Member that the rough diamonds to be 
exported were lawfully imported.
437
 
 
In accordance with Article 17(5) of the Council Regulation, the Community authorities in 
Antwerp and London provide the European Commission with annual reports on their 
assessment of the functioning of the system of warranties and industry self-regulation on an 
annual basis.
438
 In a small number of cases, members of bourses have failed to submit the 
                                                 
437
 By its Regulations No 762/2003 of 30 April 2003 and No 1214/2003 of 7July 2003, the Commission granted 
listing in Annex V to: Antwerpsche Diamantkring CV, Beurs voor Diamanthandel CV, Diamantclub van 
Antwerpen CV,Vrije Diamanthandel NV (all based in Antwerp) and, the London Diamond Bourse and Club 
upon their application and following verification that each of the bourses has adopted rules and regulations, in 
particular a binding Code of Conduct, that ensure compliance by the bourses and their members with the 
requirements laid down in the Regulation. On 7 September 2004, the Belgian Minister of Economy and the 
Presidents of the four Antwerp Bourses signed a Protocol on the modalities for the implementation of the 
provisions on industry self-regulation in Belgium. The Protocol provides a framework for the Belgian 
Community Authority with regard to the monitoring of the functioning and implementation of Article 17. 
438
 Article 17(5) of EC Council Regulation EC No 2368/2002. 
193 
 
required attestations by independent auditors and have been subjected to disciplinary 
hearings.
439
 
 
The Community Authorities have carried out, or intend to carry out, random spot-checks of 
company audits.
440
 This involves: examining the invoices of the companies, and checking for 
the presence of the warranty on the invoices; checking the presence of Kimberley Process 
certificates in respect of imports and exports of rough diamonds; checking data on the annual 
stock declarations against information on the Certification Scheme‟s database held by the 
Community Authority.
441
 
 
The examination of the role played by regional organisations shows that only the EU is 
contributing actively toward ensuring that the Certification Scheme is given effect to at the 
regional and sub-regional levels, that is, at Member States levels within the region. To this 
end, a regional organisation such as the African Union has a much more limited scope of 
intervention, in particular due to lack of harmonisation of national laws on the African 
continent. This problem might be overcome in the instance of a legally binding mechanism. 
What would be required is a set of rules that could apply independently of the political will 
and capacity at the national levels, so as to ensure that an international certification scheme 
for rough or conflict diamond trading could be enforced in Africa as effectively as in Europe.  
 
In the global diamond mining production arena African states dominate.
442
 European and 
American states are the largest importers of rough diamonds out of African countries, where 
producers domiciled or funded in Europe and in the US dominate the mining sectors.
443
 It 
would only make sense that the largest importers of rough diamonds and the largest 
producers would find equally effective mechanisms in place both for the import as well as for 
the export of rough diamonds, if the Certification Scheme is to truly succeed in Africa.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Having shown the relevance of the work of international organisations to the Certification 
Scheme, the study will provide a preliminary conclusion in this chapter. 
 
a. The UN SC 
 
The Security Council has the power to make decisions, which are binding upon Member 
States. The UN is vested with the authority to create international law and ensure compliance, 
contrary to any public private or industry based association, such as the World Diamond 
Council. 
 
The UN SC has been vociferous in making the risks attached to the illicit trade of conflict 
diamonds an international agenda item. Through its Resolutions, the UNSC has acted out of 
its concern for the illicit trade in rough diamonds.  
 
b. The UN GA 
 
Resolution 55/56 of the UN GA is synonymous with the Certification Scheme. The 
Resolution set down the fundamental elements of the Certification Scheme. These elements 
formed the basic structure of the Certification Scheme.
444
 The Resolutions were strong on the 
points of statistical compilation and their dissemination to all Member States. The UN GA 
was of the opinion that the introduction of an international certification scheme, in particular 
the KPCS, would substantially reduce the illegal trade in rough and conflict diamonds.  
 
c. The WTO and then regional organisations 
 
The policy document shows the critical view the WTO accords the Certification Scheme. The 
WTO has demonstrated its commitment to the Certification Scheme. Rough diamond trading 
is no longer an issue of domestic concern. Rather, it is an issue of international concern. The 
WTO testifies to this concern by means of its policy. The most important consequence 
expressed by the WTO is that trade and import and export rules as well as their procedures 
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can and must be revised so that the legitimate trade of diamonds legally mined is safeguarded 
and takes place within an economic context compliant with peace and security imperatives, 
arising from the protection of human rights.
445
 
 
d. The AU 
 
Regrettably, the AU to date has not been able to specifically address the illegal trade of rough 
diamonds. In part, alternative arguments might be developed from an extrapolating 
interpretation of the peace and security mechanisms. The AU should incorporate the 
initiatives and contents of the Certification Scheme for trading in rough diamonds onto their 
agendas for regional and domestic application.  
 
e. The EU 
 
Unlike the AU, the EU has lent significant support to the Certification Scheme. In a most 
comprehensive way, the EU has emulated the contents of the Certification Scheme with 
innovation.
446
 The EC has passed Regulation 2368 having the force of law.  
  
                                                 
445
 Zagel „WTO and human rights‟ (2005) at 30-35. 
446
 On competitive market theory, see Perry A „Multinational enterprises, international economic organisations 
and convergences of legal systems: Non state actors and international law‟ in Mattei U Comparative law and 
economics (2000) vol 2 at 23-39; see also Joerges „The law in the process‟(2002) at 11-25. 
196 
 
7. Summary 
 
International organisations are essential for the implementation of the Certification Scheme, 
which they influence in various ways. Most importantly, they provide the impetus for 
inclusion into national schemes of implementation. However, the question of compliance and 
mechanisms continues.  
 
Implementation and compliance are essential for the workability and the long term 
sustainability of the Certification Scheme in view of the initially envisaged objectives: of 
curbing or eliminating entirely the illegal trade of rough diamonds which leads to severe 
human rights crises.  
 
The next chapter will address international law making and non-law making instruments with 
the intention of answering the question of this study: namely to identify and evaluate the legal 
nature of the Certification Scheme. In other words: through the infinite varieties of theories 
presented in international law, which most aptly characterises the Certification Scheme? 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 6 : THE CERTIFICATION SCHEME AS A 
MANIFESTATION OF SOFT LAW (EVOLUTION AND 
CHARACTERISATION OF THE CERTIFICATION 
SCHEME) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the time of adoption, the Certification Scheme was accepted as a voluntary mechanism 
which was intended to curb the illicit trade of conflict diamonds that lead to human rights 
abuses. It remains a voluntary instrument in international law.  
 
Thus the purpose of this chapter is to determine the framework of the Certification Scheme 
and to examine the principles of public international law that may characterise the 
Certification Scheme. 
 
a. Sources of international law 
 
Traditionally the sources of international law have been divided into two categories, namely 
binding and non-binding sources.
447
 International law becomes binding upon states due to the 
fact that states become party to legally binding instruments in the first instance through 
acceptance and ratification.
448
 This is explicit. In the second instance international law may 
become binding implicitly.
449
 
 
An implicit acceptance of international legal norms may occur as a result of recognition by a 
number of states of rules that can claim legal force.
450
 This means that particular principles of 
international law can be considered legally binding upon all states.
451
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Explicit legally binding instruments are usually clear. States consent to be bound by virtue of 
their expression to carry out certain legal duties arising from an international agreement or 
treaty.
452
 Non-legally binding instruments may give rise to binding obligations because the 
contents of such agreements become in whole or part, with the passage of time or with 
sufficient pace recognised by states. Non-legally binding instruments may assume the form of 
declarations, recommendations by the UNGA, covenants and conventions.
453
 The body of 
non-legally binding instruments is what has come to be termed „soft law‟.454 
 
i. Background to the sources of international law 
 
Sources of international law have long been recorded. It may be stated that the first source of 
international law was the practice by states of a particular type or kind of conduct.
455
 With the 
passage of time, post-World War I, the Statute of the International Court of Justice which is 
the primary dispute resolution body for the United Nations Charter came into being with the 
formation of the predecessor to the United Nations, namely the League of Nations.
456
 
 
ii. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
 
Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice Statute provides as follows: 
 
„Article 38 
1  The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are admitted to it, shall apply: 
a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b)  International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.
457
 
2  This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono, if the parties agree thereto.‟ 
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Article 38 does not present a hierarchy of sources of international law. It makes reference to a 
combination of informal and formal sources of law such as treaties and opinions respectively. 
Strictly speaking, the provisions of Article 38(1) are only legally binding on the International 
Court of Justice. In practice, many courts and tribunals throughout the world apply the 
provisions of Article 38(1) when determining a matter concerning the sources of international 
law. 
 
iii. International treaties 
 
Treaties are international instruments which determine legal relations between parties.
458
 The 
International Law Commission defines a „treaty‟ as: 
 
„any international agreement in written form, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation (treaty, convention, 
protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed 
minute, memorandum of agreement, modus Vivendi or any other appellation), concluded 
between two or more States or other subjects of international law and governed by international 
law.‟459 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
460
 defines a treaty as „an international 
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever 
its particular designation‟.461 A treaty need not be reduced to writing.462 At first glance it 
would appear that the Vienna Convention confines treaty making to state parties.
463
 
However, on closer examination of Article 3, the Vienna Convention provides that the fact 
that the Convention is limited shall not affect the legal force of agreements between states 
and other subjects of international law, or between such other subjects of international law or 
between such other subjects.
464
 This means entities which exist in the public international 
legal domain, apart from states, are recognised by the Vienna Convention. 
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Parties to treaties may be states and international organisations.
465
 Two types of treaties exist 
in public international law, namely bilateral and multilateral treaties.
466
 Bilateral treaties are 
entered into by two parties in the international arena whilst multilateral treaties are entered 
into by more than two parties. An example of the former is an extradition agreement.
467
 An 
example of the latter would be the United Nations Charter.
468
 Multilateral treaties create legal 
obligations between all the parties as all parties to the treaty have rights and duties vis-a-vis 
one another.  
 
b. International law governing treaties 
 
International legal principles govern treaties and their subsequent operation. Legal 
obligations arise from treaties insofar as they are regarded as a source of international law.
469
 
Parties to the treaties must fulfil treaty obligations as demanded by the most fundamental 
principles of law and international law of pacta sunt servanda. International law makes 
provision for parties to treaties; the formation of treaties; the interpretation of treaties and 
amendment of treaties.  
 
i. Parties to treaties 
 
State and international organisations are subjects of public international law. They enjoy 
international legal personality. States are the primary subjects of public international law.
470
 
According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention, an entity qualifies as a State when it has the 
elements of a territory; a population; a government in control over such territory and 
population and independence or sovereignty.
471
 
 
An international organisation is an organisation made up of states or other international 
organisations which derives its powers from a founding document drawn up by the (state or 
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international organisations) parties.
472
 Like states, international organisations are subjects of 
public international law. Public international law developed to regulate relationships between 
states, rather than individuals. The capacity of an international organisation to make treaties 
depends on the constitution of the organisation concerned.
473
 
 
International legal personality includes the ability to act independently on the international 
plane; to acquire rights and duties; to conclude agreements; and to enforce rights and 
agreements in international tribunals against other public international legal subjects.
474
 
States and international organisations remain the principal subjects of public international 
law.
475
 
 
Generally treaties are regarded as a source of international law.
476
 Recognition is given to the 
different types of treaties in existence in public international legal arena. Some treaties are 
merely declaratory of existing legal rules as opposed to those which are legally binding in 
that they are law making treaties.
477
 
 
Where a large majority of states accept a rule created by treaties, then that new rule may 
become part of the general international law. Here, it is opined that it is the custom which the 
treaty embodies which creates the law rather than the treaty itself.  
 
A prime example is the case of the French nuclear testing in the Pacific Basin from 1966 to 
1972. Australia and New Zealand applied to the International Court of Justice for an 
injunction pursuant to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The injunction was intended to 
prevent France from further testing until such time as the Court determined on the issue of 
legality under the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
478
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France was not a signatory to the treaty, nor had France accepted the treaty. The Court 
granted the applicants interim relief which France did not heed. France continued testing. Six 
months later the Court examined the case on its merits. The Court avoided the substantive 
issues which involved making a determination on the legality of nuclear tests. Instead, the 
Court relied on official statements by France that it did not intend to conduct further tests.  
 
States which do not ratify or acquiesce to treaties are strictly speaking not bound by the 
provisions of the treaty in question.
479
 Nevertheless, a state may become bound from the time 
at which it accepted the rules contained in the treaty. The legally binding nature of treaty 
provisions or the contents of international instruments may be determined upon attainment of 
the status of international customary law.
480
 
 
This aspect of law making and non-law making treaties is crucial to the formation of 
international customary law.
481
 Whether or not treaty rules are rules of international law or 
confined to parties which agreed to the rules, is in the main dependent upon whether the rules 
have the potential to bind non-parties to the treaty.
482
 
 
According to Brierly, „consent cannot of itself create an obligation; it can only do so within a 
system of law which declares that consent duly given, as in a treaty or in a contract, shall be 
binding on the party consenting‟.483 Brierly‟s opinion begs the question: if consent alone is 
insufficient, then what indeed gives treaties in international law its legally binding force? 
 
One response lies in the notion of pacta sund servanda.
484
 This term means that a contract 
entered into between parties is binding upon the parties. If a party to the contract breaches a 
term of the contract, then the aggrieved party may bring a legal action against the offending 
party on the basis of law. Law making treaties concluded between states are intended to 
create legally binding obligations. Treaties are a specialised type of contract. Unlike ordinary 
contracts, which ensue between one or more parties involving natural persons, treaties are 
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contracts concluded at the highest levels possible; namely between juristic personalities in the 
form of States and international organisations.
485
 
 
Be that as it may, the same contractual principles applicable in the ordinary law of contract 
may be applicable to the law of treaties.
486
 In the instance of a breach by any contractant, that 
party may be held liable on the basis of a breach in international law. Treaties are usually 
binding upon state parties that agree to be bound by the contents of the treaty.
487
 With the 
passage of time, law making treaties may become legally binding
488
 upon non-state parties to 
the treaty.
489
 The liability of non-state parties is attributed to the provisions of the treaty 
becoming widely applicable as a source of law.  
 
It is the creation of new legally binding norms which are problematic.
490
 When new norms 
are created within the parameters of law, then there is no problem. However, when new 
norms come about as a result of conduct which does not rise to the level of international 
customary law, then problems arise in its application. One must either accept that new legal 
norms are created through treaties in the first instance. Or, in the second instance, one may 
accept that new legal norms are created through the acceptance of same by non-parties to the 
treaty in question. The latter appears to be simpler and more easily accepted in international 
law in order for a treaty‟s rules to become legally binding on non-parties.  
 
As has been explained, the ability to bind the newly created legal rules or norms arise from 
wide acceptance by state parties. This is attributed to the fact that States have the ability to 
enter into legally binding treaties.  
 
It may be then said that law making treaties create legally binding obligations by virtue of the 
inherent ability of states to bind themselves to obligations. However, the issue of states that 
are not party to the treaty may still be bound by the provisions of the treaty remains 
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outstanding. Often this is due to the international community‟s need for change, coupled with 
other impacting factors such as economics, international pressure and political will.
491
 
 
These conditions in the international community provide a potent impetus for new norm 
creation. In this manner, new legal rules are created and accepted by the international 
community which seemingly appears to be read into, as a source of international law. 
 
ii. International customary law 
 
Unlike national legal systems supported by a framework of a constitution which enables 
functioning within a prescribed manner establishing legitimacy, international law is deprived 
of any such framework.
492
 For its legitimacy, international law relies upon a „general 
recognition among States of a certain practice as obligatory‟.493 States create laws for 
themselves.  
 
Article 38(1) refers to international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.
494
 This part refers to custom with its two components of usus and opinio iuris. These are 
the two elements which must be satisfied for international customary legal principles to 
become recognised. This is encapsulated in the second subsection. In the instance of a 
majority of states accepting the legally binding rules created by the treaty either by the 
process of ratification or acquiescence, the new legal rule may potentially become part of the 
generally accepted rules of international law.  
 
Thus, the newly accepted rule of international law may be relied upon for future legal 
determinations in the international legal domain. A legal rule may become part of the 
international body of law even if a few states agree with the rule and practice it.
495
 
 
                                                 
491
 Thurer at paras 2-4. 
492
 Arajavi N „From state centricism to where? The formation of international (customary) law and non state 
actors‟ on state practice and opinio iuris (2010) at 3-14. 
493
 Brierly (1938) at 61. 
494
 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ.  
495
 Brownlie (1990) at 7; see also UK v Albania (1949) ICJ 4 Report (Corfu Channel case). For an interesting 
read, see Wright Q „The Corfu Channel Case‟ (1949) 43/3 The American Journal of International Law at 491-4. 
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When legally binding treaties become part of the body of customary law through 
acquiescence or ratification, such treaty law will become legally binding on all states.
496
 This 
is due to the fact that the new legal rules created by a particular treaty will have obtained 
international recognition generally. 
 
The test as to whether treaty rules are rules of international law or legal rules that bind the 
parties to the treaty, is determined mainly by whether the new legal rule binds all other 
parties, apart from those parties to the legally binding treaty.
497
 Two instances present 
themselves: opinio iuris and usus in the broader ambit of custom.
498
 
 
In evaluating whether or not a rule has been created by practice, the International Court of 
Justice has sought evidence of a general practice. „General practice‟ requires a distinction 
between those states which acquiesce to a particular practice and those states or parties which 
are silent.
499
 With regard to the duration of time within which a general practice must have 
been in existence, no particular duration is required provided that the repetition and the 
generality of the practice can be proven.
500
 
 
In the establishment of custom, overt acts of positive assertion count for more than abstract 
claims.
501
 „State practice‟ is deemed to be in place when states manifest their intentions to 
accept a particular code of conduct such as a declaration, or joint actions by states, documents 
submitted or statements made, or resolutions of the UN organs or treaties.
502
 Non-
governmental organisations and other non-state actors may also establish state practice in the 
same manner as states do. That is to say that non state actors or non-governmental 
                                                 
496
 UK v Albania (1949) ICJ 4 Report (Corfu Channel case). 
497
 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ICJ Reports (1969) wherein the ICJ held that the Article 6 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention was not declaratory as it was not binding on West Germany as West Germany did 
not ratify the Convention at p251. 
498
 Brownlie (1990) at 8; see also Holmes „The Kimberley Process‟ (2006-2007) at 228-229 on evidence on 
international „evidence for international customary law.‟ 
499
 See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (1951) ICJ Reports 116. In this case Britain challenged the Norwegian 
territorial waters limit. The ICJ found in favour of Norway on the basis of the geographical outline and 
economic dependence on fishing. The Court went further to discuss the issue of the length of time which 
transpired during which Britain failed to contest the matter. The Court was of the opinion that where vital 
interests which could not have failed to have to come to the attention of the affected state were indeed affected, 
then abstention from counteraction could safely be regarded as acquiescence. 
500
 Brownlie supra at 6; see also Holmes „The Kimberley Process‟ (2006-2007) at 228-229 on evidence on 
international „evidence for international customary law‟. 
501
 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (1951) Principles of public international law‟ (1990) ICJ Reports 116 at 197. 
502
 Treves Customary international law (2011) at para 43-52. 
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organisations manifest their intention to be bound by particular rules of conduct which may 
become accepted as „state practice‟. 
 
iii. General principles of law 
 
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to the „general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations‟. Most authorities agree that treaty law and 
custom are sources of international law. However, there is no agreement on the content of 
Article 38(1)(c).  
 
When examining Article 38(1))(c) it is important to distinguish between general principles of 
law and general principles of international law. The former makes reference to domestic law 
as is applicable within states. The latter makes reference to those principles which have for so 
long and so generally been accepted that they can no longer be directly attributed to any 
particular system of law but are instead peculiar to the needs of international law.
503
 
 
The phrase „General principles of law recognized by civilized nations‟ does not make 
reference to a comparative study of domestic legal systems in an attempt to ascertain 
commonly established features. The International Court of Justice relies upon a coincidence 
of opinion from its judges who have in any case been elected as representatives „of the main 
forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world‟.504 
 
iv. Judicial decisions and text writings 
 
Article 38(1)(d) provides that another source of law are general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations.
505
 Finally Article 38(1) provides for judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law.
506
 
 
                                                 
503
 Thurer „Norms in the twilight‟ (2011) at para 11. 
504
 Article 9 of the Statute of the ICJ; example of pacta sund servanda in the law of contracts. 
505
 Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
506
 Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
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Judicial decisions are not confined to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. 
Rather judicial decisions are inclusive of decisions of other international tribunals, national 
courts and tribunals in general. According to Brownlie, several judgments and advisory 
opinions have had a decisive influence on international law, still he advocates more caution 
in handling decisions.
507
 
 
The importance of judicial decisions, prima facie, lies in their value as a means of indicating 
the successful recognition and application of rules of law. The substantive value of the 
decisions rests more upon the authority of the Court and the reasoning applied than on their 
actual binding forces. Although Article 59 provides that the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case, the rule of precedent is 
firmly adhered to in matters of procedure.
508
 
 
Article 38(1)(d) also refers to the „teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations‟. As a „source‟ the writings of publicists only constitute evidence of the law 
although some writers and organisations of substantial repute do have a shaping influence. 
  
                                                 
507
 Brownlie (1990) at 21. 
508
 Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
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2. UN Resolutions- a possible new source of international law? 
a. Introduction 
 
The UN is the primary international body whose foremost objective is to maintain 
international peace and security.
509
 The background to the creation of the UN is provided in 
the Preamble to the UN Charter.  
 
Article 1 of the UN Charter lists the objectives and principles of the UN. Article 1 provides, 
inter alia, as follows: 
  
„… To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace … in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law …‟ 
 
International peace and security has many components to its maintenance and long term 
sustainability. According to Article I the UN must undertake measures in order to meet its 
intended objectives.  
 
b. ‘effective and collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to peace’ 
 
Conflicts within states arise from various sources.
510
 Conflicts that are fought within the 
borders of a single sovereign state are characterised as being within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the state concerned.
511
 Thus the state itself must attempt resolution of conflicts. 
Competence for conflict resolution arises from the „sovereignty of state‟ doctrine.512 The 
doctrine hinders UN involvement under the Charter.
513
 The singular qualification to 
intervention by the UN is permissible if the UN SC deems a threat to international peace and 
security.
514
 
                                                 
509
 Principles and Purposes of the UN Charter in terms of Article 1. 
510
 Clapham A „Human rights obligations of non state actors in conflict situations‟ (2006) 98/863 International 
Review of the Red Cross at 495-508 on rebel groups, unrecognised insurgent groups, armed opposition groups or 
parties to an internal conflict.  
511
 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
512
 Ibid; see also Brownlie (1990) at 78-79. 
513
 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
514
 Articles 39-54 of the UN Charter. 
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A threat may exist within the state or have the potential for cross-border conflict. Cross-
border conflict or interstate conflict is already deemed to be a conflict of an international 
nature;
515
 or it may have the potential of becoming a conflict of an international nature 
thereby necessitating UN involvement under Article 1 of the Charter. In this manner, the UN 
is authorised to embark upon action pursuant to its objectives.
516
 
 
Diamond trading has contributed significantly to intra-state and interstate conflicts in Sierra 
Leone; Angola, the DRC and Liberia.
517
 The international community responded 
approximately 20 years after the conflicts commenced.
518
 In fulfilling its duty to maintain 
international peace and security through collective means, the UN SC passed Resolutions to 
address the conflicts. Human rights abuses in Sierra Leone and Liberia gave way to 
humanitarian crises. The UN stepped in as the custodian of human rights.
519
 The UNSC and 
UNGA Resolutions sought to address the prevailing situations through security and trade 
embargos, which had minimal effect.
520
 
 
The principles of justice and international law are crucial when embarking on initiatives to 
bring about peace and security.
521
 The Security Council is at the heart of the UN in 
maintaining peace and security.
522
 Security Council intervention is meant to be in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law.
523
 The Security Council is held to act in 
good faith in an attempt to curb any conflict from spilling across borders.  
 
                                                 
515
 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War; see also Article 1 of the UN Charter. 
516
 Articles 1 and 39-54 of the UN Charter. 
517
 With regard to the DRC see Samset „Conflict of interest‟ (2002) at 465-470, 476-7 and 463-480; on Liberia 
see in general Smillie „Land grabbing‟ (2007) at 2-9; on Sierra Leone see Gberie „War and peace in Sierra 
Leone‟ (2002) at 2-8; see also Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton „At the heart of the matter‟ (2000) at 8-11. 
518
 Wars in the Great Lakes Region and West Africa have persisted over two decades; on Guinea see Gberie 
„Destabilising Guinea‟ (2001) at 8-9; see also UN Experts Meeting on „Natural resources and conflict in Africa: 
Transforming a peace liability into a peace asset‟ 17-19 June Part IV.  
519
 Wallis „Data mining‟ (2005) in general on monitoring, enforcement, redress and accountability issues; see 
also Hazleton R „Diamonds are forever or for good: The economic impact of diamonds on Southern Africa‟ 
(2003) Partnership Africa Canada: The diamonds human security project  Occasional Paper No 3 at 4-8. 
520
 Wars still persisted; diamonds were traded illegally on the market; see Africa Research Bulletin 
„Commodities‟ 17640 Nov-Dec (2007) for Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC on diamonds and their rate of 
production; see Shaw „Regional dimensions‟ (2003) at 489 on „external actors‟ including transnational mining 
corporations and their roles and at 492-493.  
521
 Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
522
 Articles 39-55 of the UN Charter. 
523
 Articles 1 and 41-42 of the UN Charter. 
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The fear underlying conflict spillage is regional instability and conflict, which can engage 
other states on a global level.
524
 The ineffectiveness of the security and trade embargoes on 
the DRC and Liberia caused the UN SC to address the matter in a number of Resolutions as 
has been discussed in chapter four of this study. An important Resolution culminated in 
respect of Sierra Leone, with the formation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone which was 
established to address atrocities committed during the period of conflict.
525
 
 
Illicit diamond production and trade have factually given rise to human rights abuse, 
predominantly in Africa.
526
 The human rights situation has remarkably improved in Sierra 
Leone.
527
 However it persists in other African countries where diamond production and trade 
do not meet the requirements of the legal diamond trade.
528
 In so doing, systemic abuses are 
sustained. In accordance with the principles of justice, the UN SC and the UN GA passed 
several Resolutions in an attempt to address the problem of conflict diamonds which result in 
human rights abuses.  
 
The initial mandate for the KP was established by UN GA Resolution in December 2000.
529
 
The Resolution called for several structural measures to regulate the trade of rough diamonds. 
It also spelt out the justification of the Certification Scheme, that is, to prevent the trade in 
                                                 
524
 Shaw supra at 489. 
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 UN Doc S/RES/1315 (2000); see also Article 1 of the Statute. 
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 Bosl A and Diescho J Human rights in Africa: Legal perspectives in their protection and promotion (2009) at 
112-116. 
528
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of states and indirect obligations; at 46-50 on the duty to protect – obligations on states to regulate private actors 
pursuant to provisions in human rights treaties; at 51 on when is a state responsible for abuses by private actors; 
at 55-77 direct obligations, that is, duties on companies; on international law is not only for states; at 58 on 
applying international standards directly to companies and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; at 62 
„elementary considerations of humanity‟ and international criminal law.  
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 UN GA Resolution UN Doc A/RES/55/56 (2000) created the mandate for the Kimberley Process has been 
regularly renewed basis by the UN through the following UN GA Resolutions: UN Doc A/RES/56/263(2002), 
UN Doc A/RES/57/302(2003), UN Doc A/RES/58/290(2004), UN Doc A/RES/59/144(2004), and UN Doc 
A/RES/60/182(2005). The Certification Scheme has gained important recognition from the UN SC through UN 
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conflict diamonds that leads to human rights crises. The Certification Scheme defines conflict 
diamonds as „rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict 
aimed at undermining legitimate governments‟.530 
 
UN SC Resolutions combined with the series of UN GA Resolutions represent an important 
accomplishment because they reflect widespread and continued international support for the 
Certification Scheme by the UN.
531
 Resolutions, according to the Review also confer an 
important measure of legitimacy upon the Certification Scheme in their acknowledgement of 
the efforts of Participants and Observers.
532
 
 
The illicit production and trade of diamonds, in particular in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Angola 
and Liberia, have significantly fuelled conflicts in Africa.
533
 Domestic conflicts, once thought 
to be out of the purview of international organisations and regional organisations, such as the 
UN and AU, have become internationalised.
534
 
 
Conflicts in these countries appeared on international agendas. During the Millennium 
Session of the UN GA the agenda included „The role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts‟. The 
UN GA strove to maintain a balance between conflict diamonds that „were a crucial factor in 
promoting brutal wars in parts of Africa‟ and legitimate diamonds that „contribute to the 
prosperity and development elsewhere on the continent‟.535 
 
The UN recognised that international and regional organisations have a critical role to play in 
trade of conflict diamonds.
536
 The Certification Scheme acknowledged the role of 
international and regional organisations.
537
 It is important therefore, within the context of this 
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 Thurer „Norms in the twilight‟(2011) at paras 11-14. 
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 Wellens „Fragmentation of international law‟ (2004) at 3-4; see also Article 56 of the UN Charter; see also 
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study, to examine the role of international and regional organisations. The actions of these 
organisations are crucial to the illicit trade of conflict diamonds and the consequent human 
rights crises that have their basis in international law. 
 
Since its inception, the Certification Scheme has enjoyed the support of the UN, both the UN 
GA and the UN SC. Support has been evidenced in their Resolutions. Every year, the KP 
Chair is requested to report to the UN GA on its work. Each year since 2000, the UN GA has 
adopted a Resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict, demonstrating its support 
for the Certification Scheme by consensus.
538
 The UN SC also endorsed the Certification 
Scheme and has worked with the Certification Scheme, most recently in the cases of Liberian 
and Côte d‟ Ivoirian diamond trade.539 
 
c. Resolutions of the UN GA 
 
The General Assembly consists of all the member States of the United Nations. Pursuant to 
the United Nations Charter, the UN GA is authorised to discuss any question of matters 
except as provided in Article 12, to make recommendations on any such questions or matters. 
Resolutions of the UN GA are not legally binding on member states.
540
 
 
According to Brownlie when resolutions concern general norms of international law, „then 
acceptance by a majority vote constitutes evidence of the opinions of governments in the 
widest forum for the expression of such opinions‟.541 Resolutions of this kind when couched 
as general principles provide a basis for the progressive development of the law and the 
speedy consolidation of customary rules, Brownlie further opines.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Diamond Council and many other organisations; see also Shaw „Regional dimensions (2003) at 491-494 and 
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538
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A/RES/60/182(2005). The Certification Scheme has gained important recognition from the UN SC through 
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 Brownlie (1990) at 696; also see Thurer „Norms in the twilight‟(2011) at paras 11-15. 
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Thurer supra at para 14; see also judgment in the case of Nicaragua v United States (Merits) ICJ Reports 
(1986) 98-10 4 paras 187-195 and pp 107-108, paras 203-205. 
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In some instances a resolution may have direct legal effect as an authoritative interpretation 
and application of the principles of the UN Charter.
542
 Ultimately, every UN GA resolution 
must be individually assessed with regard to the context within which it came into being with 
especial reference to other evidence of the opinions of States on the specific matter. 
 
d. Resolutions of the UN SC 
 
The UN SC comprises representatives of fifteen member States of the United Nations. There 
are five permanent members and ten elected member States. Pursuant to Article 24(1) of the 
United Nations Charter, the UN SC holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Therefore members of the United Nations have agreed to 
„accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter‟.543 
 
The UN SC is empowered to adopt legally binding resolutions on matters relating to 
international peace and security.
544
 The UN SC also has the power to make 
recommendations. In order to determine whether a particular resolution of the UN SC is 
intended as a recommendation or a legally binding resolution, it is necessary to have recourse 
to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.
545
 UN SC resolutions made pursuant to Chapter 
VI of the Charter are generally accepted as not being legally binding.
546
 
 
Resolutions pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the UN SC have the competence to 
pass legally binding actions. Article 39 provides that „the Security Council shall determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security‟.  
 
                                                 
542
 Brownlie (1990) at 15 wherein he cites the example of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination adopted 20 Nov 1963 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
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Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter enable the UN to embark upon enforcement action against 
an offending state. Action may include „complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations‟.547 The UN may also embark upon „such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security‟.548 
Both enforcement measures have been embarked upon by the UN SC. 
 
e. Conclusion 
 
It has been shown that Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is the 
accepted definition of the recognised sources of international law. However, the use of 
recommendations and declarations for example, demonstrates that it could not have been the 
intention of the drafters of Article 38 to limit the development of the sources of international 
law. It is submitted that albeit the fact that Article 38 is accepted as the foundational 
provision for sources of law, it is acknowledged that it is not an exhaustive list.  
 
International bodies such as the UN SC and the UN GA have also contributed to the body of 
international law through their respective roles.
549
 Whilst they may not have direct law 
making powers, resolutions of the UN GA and the UN SC play an important role in the 
continuous development of the body of international law.
550
 Whether resolutions of the UN 
GA and the UN SC may be regarded as a source of law, still remains debatable.  
 
In appraising the Certification Scheme in legal terms, it is essential to identify the source of 
the Certification Scheme‟s legal effect. Through identification of sources of norms of 
international law it becomes possible to make a determination of the legal impact of the 
Certification Scheme. Therefore it is pertinent that the myriad of factors which point in this 
direction are examined. These factors include the subject matter of the Certification Scheme, 
the contents, the circumstances of its adoption, the intention of the drafters, the process of 
adoption, implementation of the Certification, the role and practice of Participants, and the 
conduct of Participants. 
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3. What type of international agreement? 
 
The question of whether the Certification Scheme may be classified as a Memorandum of 
Understanding in international law is an important one. This is because the Certification 
Scheme is a voluntary instrument without a legally binding force. However, States have 
incorporated its requirements, so-called, into domestic legislation. 
 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has a less formal character. MoUs usually set out 
working arrangements within the framework of an international agreement. Schram argues 
that there are different opinions on the requirements for constituting a legally binding treaty 
or a non-legally binding MoU.
551
 According to Schram, multilateral MoUs are mostly 
qualified as being „soft law‟552 and, because a MoU is generally not regarded as legally 
binding, the question arises as to what kind of rights and obligations are generated for the 
signatories. 
 
Schram opines that it remains unclear as to what extent the lapse of time, the intention of the 
parties to be legally bound, the principle of good faith,
553
 and the doctrine of estoppel, 
constitute a legally binding treaty or can grant legal effects to what are purportedly non-
legally binding agreements.
554
 Generally, the intention of the parties to be legally bound is 
viewed as being conclusive.  
 
Despite Brierly‟s philosophical contestation of the element of the legal fiction pertinent to the 
lack of a mental aspect attributable to a state, the facts which have appeared in the EU most 
especially on a factually practical level have more than counterbalanced this. Any agreement 
which is concluded with a meeting of the „minds,‟ or, otherwise stated, are ad idem, acting 
without reservation, is by definition a legally binding agreement.  
 
Participants embarked upon the formation of the Certification Scheme intending to be bound 
by the contents. Empirically this may be demonstrated by the „duties‟ accorded to 
Participants, the „duties‟ of importers, the „duties‟ of exporters and various other 
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553
 VC Article 31(1). 
554
 Klabbers J  „The concept of treaty in international law‟ (1996) 22 Kluwer law international at 111-112. 
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manifestations reflecting the intention to be bound. 
555
 Having pointed to these crucial 
elements, the Certification Scheme does not reflect the makings of a MoU. 
 
Other commentators
556
 argue that a politically or morally binding agreement cannot exist 
unless it is expressly legally binding, regardless of the parties‟ intention. Political agreements 
rely upon the good faith of Parties.
557
 Further the general principle of „consent to be bound‟ is 
a crucial element of international law.
558
 This means that if there usually are no legal 
consequences following the failure to implement a MoU, it does not mean that the matter is 
not lawful, or that a State is free, politically or morally, to disregard it.
559
 
 
Participants to the Certification Scheme have never formally stated their „consent to be 
bound,‟560 which normally implies that an agreement is not legally binding in the 
conventional sense. It is most likely that the parties had not intended to create a scheme 
containing rules and obligations of too rigid a nature. In all likelihood, it is for that reason 
they opted for the more flexible „political agreement‟.561 
 
Certainly, these options allowed for political swiftness, which is sometimes necessary as 
setting up an international agreement between many countries and international 
organisations. The Certification Scheme was probably seen as a „dynamic effort and a 
framework for the future that seeks to reconcile competing priorities, rather than assessing it 
against a set of accountability measures‟ according to Schram.562 
 
However, the Certification Scheme that includes parties that are neither states nor 
international organisations, is not a treaty. Logically, some feared that without a legally 
binding treaty, complete with a monitoring and enforcement mechanism, „the KPCS would 
be no more binding than a nod and a handshake‟.563 It is therefore surprising that this political 
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 Schram at 11. 
563
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agreement has nonetheless attained a certain force of law, with countries abiding by it and 
changing their behaviour to avoid violating its commands.
564
 
 
Even if a commitment is not legally binding, it may still have the force of „political 
commitment‟.565 Governments may develop expectations of political commitments, invoke 
them in public debate to marshal support, and even impose sanctions for their violations. 
However, the distinction between political and legally binding commitments may become 
blurred in particular cases.
566
 Non-legal commitments are generally viewed as politically or 
morally binding instruments which are intended to be carried out in good faith. Good faith, 
according to Carter and Trimble, is an accepted general principle in international law.
567
  
 
Good faith does not draw distinction within the legal and political paradigms.
568
 Essentially, 
in the legal sense the notion of „good faith‟ does not differ from one situation to another. 
Thus, particular parties to a non-legally binding instrument may rely upon other parties to 
meet their obligations. The focal difficulty with reliance upon good faith arises when the 
„other party‟ does not „perform‟ under the so called „obligations‟. Other parties to the 
instrument may not label the lack of action on the former as being „illegal‟. However, the 
former state or party may rely upon the approval or consensus reached by all other states or 
parties to the instrument. Thus, compliance may be demanded in this instance. Non-binding 
undertakings are able to attract a possible „beach‟ when relying upon „good faith‟. 
 
Inasmuch as „good faith‟ is evident from States incorporating the contents of the Certification 
Scheme into domestic legislation, the Certification Scheme may not be classified as an MoU. 
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4. Exploring ‘Soft law’ 
a. Introduction 
 
Having established that the Certification Scheme may not be classified as a MoU, its 
characterisation in international law remains an open question. Thus, it may be prudent to 
examine the possibility of the Certification Scheme falling into the ambit of a „soft law‟ 
instrument. 
 
Law is a system of rules created with the objective to bind and determine the conduct of legal 
subjects, where possible under the threat of enforcement.
569
 Often rules created are 
enforceable by institutions.  
 
Difficult instances arise when parties in the international legal arena agree to rules of conduct 
without wishing to be strictly bound.
570
 Voluntary mechanisms such as declarations may 
acquire the force of law over time. Less conventional means of establishing norms may arise 
through the voluntary conduct of States and organisations within the international arena.
571
 
States and organisations may elect to modify their behaviour outside of treaties and 
custom.
572
 
 
The interdependence of states and organisations evidences the need for adaptation of existing 
norms. The adapted norms require a constant renegotiation that usually takes place within 
various organs of international law. The renegotiation arises from a steady evolution of the 
conduct by actors within the international community. Hence, a new normative phenomenon 
is created. This new normative phenomenon may be termed as „soft law‟.  
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Certain provisions of treaties are hortatory. They call for co-operation by states to achieve 
certain purposes. As Judge Dillard wrote in his separate opinion in the Appeal Relating to the 
Jurisdiction of the ICA O Council (India v Pakistan): 
 
„... (M)ultilateral treaties establishing functioning institutions frequently contain articles that 
represent ideals and aspirations which, being hortatory, are not considered to be legally binding 
except by those who seek to apply them to the other fellow.‟573 
 
Baxter states further that the intent is to avoid clashes of interests between State parties and or 
international organisations. These may not be „treaties‟ in the technical sense, but they do 
form part of the agreed machinery by which governments avoid or soften clashes of 
interest.
574
 
 
In view of the controversy surrounding „soft law,‟ as new legal rules established by states and 
organisations, it is important to understand the nature of „soft law‟. The phenomenon of „soft 
law‟ has been the subject of much discussion. Here, an analysis of a representative selection 
of literature on „soft law‟ will be discussed. The aim is to understand the nature and function 
of „soft law‟ with a view to understand the legal nature of the Certification Scheme. 
 
i. Thurer’s features of ‘soft law’ 
 
According to Thurer, it is not easy to define soft law in a precise sense. It does not represent a 
legal concept with a clearly determinable scope and content.
575
 He states that „to put it 
abstractly, soft law as a phenomenon in international relations covers all those social rules 
generated by States or other subjects of international law which are not legally binding but 
which are nevertheless of special legal relevance‟.576 
 
He identifies four aspects which are seemingly intrinsic to the current scope of soft law. 
Firstly, he states that soft law generally expresses common expectations concerning the 
conduct of international relations, as is often shaped, or arises within, the framework of 
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international organisations.
577
 The second aspect that Thurer identifies is that soft law is 
created by subjects of international law.
578
 This, he states is in contrast to commercial 
customs and rules such as codes of conduct set up by private organisations or companies.  
 
In the third instance, Thurer observes the aspect that soft law rules have not or have not in 
entirety passed through all the stages of the procedures prescribed for international law 
making.
579
 They do not stem from a formal source of law. Therefore they lack a legally 
binding force. Fourthly, Thurer states that soft law, despite the legally „noncommittal 
quality,‟ it is characterised by a certain proximity to the law with a capacity to produce 
certain legal effects.
580
 
 
ii. Dupuy 
 
Dupuy identifies „soft law‟ as a tool which „developing states‟ utilise to recreate international 
law.
581
 He describes the traditional view of custom as „the multiplication of facts that leads to 
a growth in juridical consciousness in an existential process in which existence precedes 
essence, termed after the fact as law.
582
 He explains that „the anonymity resulting from the 
passage of time masks three customs disguised as rules of general interest‟.583 
 
He goes on further to discuss counter custom by stating that „… classical custom grows from 
tacit agreement, revisionist custom develops from the common will of the States involved 
which adopt a unilateral approach in attempting to place the inchoate custom in opposition to 
the rest of the international community‟.584 The voluntary element prevails over the historical 
factor.
585
 According to Dupuy then, it may occur that law precedes fact. 
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According to Dupuy, the process by which customary law is challenged is carried out in a 
particular manner. In the instance of the UN GA, the first step is to create a declaration which 
is introduced to the international community by the UN system in an attempt to gain 
recognition. In this manner, some of the norms contained in the UN GA resolutions are relied 
upon. Such a declaration has two functions. First, it can complete the development of an 
undeveloped custom. Second, the declaration may provide the „psychological pivot‟ in 
justifying later practice which conforms to the „declaration‟ itself.586 
 
For Dupuy the „declaration‟ is not entirely without legal effect. Once the so called „counter 
custom‟ has been established and accepted by a certain number of states, the „counter 
custom‟ may be used against other States in that the latter may be bound by what the former 
has created. The fact that a minority number of states disagree or decide not to be the part of 
the process of the „counter custom‟ becomes irrelevant, as the views of the minority are not 
taken cognisance of.
587
 This is so because a resolution is passed through consensus. In this 
way, „counter custom‟ becomes custom accepted by the international community, according 
to Dupuy. 
 
In the other situation, a „declaration‟ or parts thereof may not yet have attained the 
recognition of the representative or so called States that matter in the international 
community. The „declaration‟ of the parts thereof thus remains in a state of transition. This, 
Dupuy states is a matter of programmatory and not declaratory law.
588
 At this point Dupuy 
makes use of the notion of „soft law‟ which he regards as the „transitional stage of 
development of norms where their content is vague and their scope imprecise‟.589 
 
Dupuy states that the role of programmatory or „soft law‟ is to create awareness.590 In 
attributing the creation of „soft law‟ to Third World countries, he states that „when passed by 
the Third World countries, they are advanced in opposition to the principle of positive law 
which they contradict…the new or future norms are submitted as legitimate on the basis of 
                                                 
586
 Dupuy supra at 251. 
587
 See also Hollis „Why state consent still matters‟ (2005) at 1 on state consent. 
588
 Dupuy supra at 252. 
589
 Ibid. 
590
 Dupuy „Declaratory law‟ (1977) at 254. 
222 
 
democratic and egalitarian imperatives which nobody would dream of contesting as the 
General Assembly or UNCTAD‟.591 
 
For a „declaration‟ to pass from progammatory to customary law, three elements need to be 
satisfied, according to Dupuy. Firstly, the conditions governing the vote which adopted the 
text in question; secondly, the precision in detail and drafting and thirdly, the effective 
application of the contents of the declaration.
592
 Dupuy stresses that none of the three 
elements aforementioned are of importance. For example, a resolution that does not secure 
the support of many of the important states may still have the effect of changing and 
acceptance of new values and norms. In the same vein, resolutions that are clear on objectives 
and principles also create the way for more concrete rules to be adopted between states on the 
international plane. 
 
Resolutions may already have the effect of the force of law where states have relied upon 
them to justify actions at the national level. In this way, states may justify actions when they 
have „acted in conformity‟ with the contents of a resolution.593 Here the third element, that is, 
the element of effective application of the contents of the „declaration‟ does not lose value in 
the case of a lack of sanctions from other states or the international community or even within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the applying state itself. Dupuy further states that the fact that the 
state has elected to make the contents of the declaration or the resolution part of its domestic 
system strengthens its arguments against opposing states in the creation of new custom or 
norms.  
 
Ultimately, for Dupuy „soft law‟ is an instrument of „revolutionary custom‟ justified by the 
unfortunate situations experienced by Third World countries arising from the era of 
colonisation.
594
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iii. Schreuer 
 
According to Schreuer, formulating recommendations of general standards of international 
conduct is a common feature of modern international organisations.
595
 International 
organisations such as the UN, within the UN GA meetings agree upon sets of general 
principles which are either declaratory or recommendation making in nature which ultimately 
set the tone for conduct in international business relations.  
 
Recommendations do not have the same force and effect as treaties have, most especially law 
making treaties which create immediately binding legal obligations. Consequently, treaty 
implementation supports the view that treaties – both law making and non-law making 
treaties-have a significant influence in international decision making processes.
596
 In other 
words, the role of treaty practice and implementation impacts on the conduct of international 
organisations and parties. 
 
International relations have transformed significantly with respect to the new norm creation 
in that declarations, recommendations and memoranda of understandings have played a 
significant role in international relations. That is to say, these so called programmatory norm 
creation have steadily gained momentum for future usage. Thus, Schreuer advances the 
argument that attempts to insinuate the „soft law‟ aspects of the body of international law 
within the parameters of the traditional sources of international law have in the main been 
unsuccessful. 
 
The changing face of international relations as was previously governed through the 
traditional sources have in recent decades opened its doors to new norm creation as Schreuer 
argues.
597
 Schreuer also recognises that the „new realities of organised international 
cooperation and communication‟ would be ignored if the traditional sources of international 
law were strictly examined.  
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Schreuer goes on to argue that all the legitimate factors which affect authority of a specific 
decision must be appropriately examined in order to avoid a strict construction of traditional 
sources of international law.
598
 It should also be recognised that this approach takes 
cognisance of the values based theory of interpretation which demands a recourse to the 
circumstances within which an event occurs as opposed to a strict and literal adherence to the 
letter of the law. 
 
Consequently examination may be had of the subject matter of the recommendation; the 
degree and quality of consensus underlying it; the actual language of the text and attendant 
statements; the will of a significant minority; citation of later resolutions, the institution of 
follow up procedures to encourage implementation; the moral authority of the adopting 
organ, and most importantly the actual conduct of the recommendation‟s addressees.599 
Schreur, therefore, adopts a more liberal and holistic approach to „possible occurrences‟ of 
„soft law‟ or „instances of transition‟. Of use to the „soft law‟ paradigm is the inclusive aspect 
of Schreuer‟s approach in that he insists upon taking into account all the relevant factors that 
would lead to a classification of the possible occurrence. 
 
With regard to the legal consequences of the recommendations of international organs, 
Schreuer states that by virtue of their non-legally binding nature, recommendations do not 
require absolute conformity with the letter of its construction. This means that there is 
sufficient room for manoeuvering within the spirit, object and purport of the 
recommendations.
600
 In other words, instances of deviation from the recommendation must 
not be so significant so as to render the recommendation meaningless. Instead, the practical 
application of the recommendation should be accompanied by the notion of good faith.  
 
After all, a recommendation is not based on the strict legal obligations. Rather the 
implementation of recommendations is based on moral or political or other commitments. 
The obligation of good faith requires a Member States to refrain from acts calculated to 
frustrate the objects of the programmatory instrument.
601
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Good faith does not draw distinction within the legal and political paradigms. Essentially in 
the legal sense the notion of „good faith‟ does not differ from one situation to another.602 
Thus, particular parties to a non-legally binding instrument may rely upon other parties to 
meet their obligations.  
 
The focal difficulty with reliance upon good faith arises when the „other party‟ does not 
„perform‟ under the so called „obligations‟. Other parties to the instrument may not label the 
lack of action on the former as being „illegal‟. However, the former State or party may rely 
upon the approval or consensus reached by all other States or parties to the instrument. Thus 
compliance may be demanded in this instance. Non-binding undertakings would therefore be 
in a position to rely upon „good faith‟. 
 
For Schreuer, there is at minimal a duty on the part of international organisations to consider 
recommendations in good faith. Caution must be exercised when approaching the notion of 
good faith as it implies a legal concept has come into existence. This, in turn, implies that 
non-legal instruments may be granted a legal status.
603
 
 
Within the international community, law making is not confined to a central constitutional 
authority. Instead law making and its development is a task assumed by Member States and 
international organisations. As aforementioned, Schreuer states that recommendations do not 
carry the force of law. Inasmuch as this may be true within the realms of traditional sources 
of law, it does not detract from the ability of recommendations to dictate conformity of state 
behaviour in practice and provide and an expectation to the recommendation. Therefore, 
irrespective of the legal force of recommendations, they set down the rules for conduct by 
Member States and international organisations.
604
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iv. Bothe 
 
In order for society to function with reasonable harmony, legal rules predict behaviour, which 
makes it easier for society to function.
605
 Rules vary from society to society depending on 
their individual needs and contexts.
606
 When known and made available, rules create an 
environment for predictable behaviour. In this manner, rules organise society into conduct 
which is acceptable.  
 
Bothe states that it is with respect to the precise nature of specifically various rules that the 
controversy arises.
607
 Legal obligations arising from a normal contractual relationship are 
predictable because the parties to the contract are aware and agree to the terms of the 
contract. The terms of the contract are the so called legal norms which arise from the 
contract.  
 
Within the international arena, different methods of formulating expectations exist. Some 
international agreements provide for consent and thus the legal norms are the terms of the 
agreement. In the case where agreements have no basis in consent to be bound as a matter of 
law, Bothe regards this use of non-legal or policy considerations as a legitimate technique to 
regulate state behaviour.
608
 
 
Bothe points out that then when states comply with a non-legal obligation; he rejects reliance 
upon the principle of „good faith‟. He argues that in such an instance it is a legal concept 
which must be confined to legal obligations.
609
 Therefore he accepts that reliance upon 
concepts of authority and promise are valid sources of an obligation which are outside the 
scope of law.
610
 
 
For Bothe, the distinction between hard law and „soft law‟ is dependent upon the will and 
desire of states. With respect to hard law, the matter is not difficult as state behaviour is 
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regulated through consensus to be bound. With respect to soft law, the intention of the state 
parties will dictate compliance or non-compliance with norms which have been created. In 
this way, state parties seem to regulate their own behaviour.  
 
v. Weil 
 
Inasmuch as „soft law‟ may be used a positive mechanism in developing the body of legal 
norms, Weil disagrees. Weil cautions against the formation of new legal norms in the absence 
of consensus by state parties to be bound. He does so citing the dangers associated with the 
misconstruction of legal norms in the absence of consensus. 
 
Weil states that public international law „is the aggregate of the legal norms governing 
international relations‟.611 Public international law serves two purposes. Its first purpose is to 
facilitate the peaceful orderly co-existence of states.
612
 The second purpose of public 
international law is to provide for the common interests of states.
613
 
 
Furthermore, he states that the aggregate of legal norms dictate what its subjects must do. 
These norms, he terms „prescriptive norms‟. The aggregate of legal norms also dictate what 
its subjects must not do and may not do. These norms are known as prohibitive and 
permissive norms, respectively. Together, all three types of norms constitute the source of 
legal rights and obligations. 
 
According to Weil, the quality of international legal norms becomes compromised through 
the degraded quality of the constituent elements. Poor quality legal norms will not be able to 
fulfil the two purposes of public international law. Weil is of the opinion that „soft law‟ is 
inherently weak due to its „lack of rigour‟ in making the distinction between that which is 
norm creating and that which does not create norms. In light of the aforementioned, the 
threshold for what is norm creating and what is non-norm creating is unclear. For Weil, this is 
precisely what fails in making the cross or the transition from non-legal to legal norms.
614
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Thus Weil has two primary concerns. Firstly, he is concerned about the lack of clarity as to 
the normative force of international actions. The lack of clarity impedes the dual function of 
public international law. His second concern is that the slippery slope argument which when 
elucidated undercuts the traditional notion that states make law.
615
 
 
Resolutions of UN GA are considered by Weil as a stage in the development of the body of 
soft law. However he rejects the idea that they are a source of new legal norms. He states that 
to accept UN GA resolutions as a source of new legal norms is to undermine „the specific 
nature of the legal phenomenon‟.616 
 
Although „soft law‟ is considered by some to acquire the status of jus cogens, Weil rejects 
this idea too.
617
 He does so on the grounds that some states or a few States will create legally 
binding rules for all states.
618
 Thus, states that object to the formation of new legal norms, 
will nonetheless be bound by them. Further, he states that the creation of new binding legal 
norms flies in the face of the sovereignty of states doctrine.
619
 
 
vi. Boyle 
 
Boyle observes that the subtlety of the processes by which contemporary international law 
can be created is no longer adequately captured by reference to the orthodox categories of 
custom and treaty.
620
 He supports his observation by stating that „the role of soft law as an 
element in international law-making is now widely appreciated, and its influence throughout 
international law is evident‟.621 Within that law-making course of action, the relationships 
between treaty and custom or between „soft law‟ and custom become well understood.  
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For Boyle, „soft law‟ has a wide range of possible meanings,622 but three are of direct 
relevance for him, namely: „soft law‟ is not binding; „soft law‟ consists of norms and 
principles and not rules; and finally the notion that „soft law‟ is non-binding law.623 
 
With regards to the notion that „soft law is not binding,‟ Boyle means that when used in this 
sense „soft law‟ can be contrasted with hard law, which is binding. Treaties are by definition 
always hard law because they are always binding. In this category of „soft law‟ the legal form 
is decisive he states.
624
 If the form is that of a treaty it cannot be soft law. If the form is that of 
a non-binding agreement, such as the Helsinki Accords for example,
625
 it will not be a treaty 
for precisely that reason and the result is a „soft‟ agreement.  
 
The question whether an agreement is a binding treaty is not necessarily easy to answer, as 
Boyle observed in the Qatar-Bahrain Maritime Delimitation Case.
626
 Moreover, he opines 
that an agreement involving states may be binding even if it is not a treaty. Thus the 
distinction between hard and soft agreements is not synonymous with the distinction between 
treaties and non-treaties.
627
 When „soft law‟ begins to interact with binding treaties its non-
binding character may be lost or altered.
628
 
 
The second notion, according to Boyle regards „soft law‟ as consisting of general norms or 
principles, not rules. An alternative view of soft law, Boyle explains, „focuses on the contrast 
between “rules”, involving clear and reasonably specific commitments which are in this sense 
hard law, and “norms” or “principles”, which, being more open textured or general in the 
content and wording can thus be seen as soft‟.629 
 
                                                 
622
 See generally Baxter „In her infinite variety‟ (1980) at 549; Chinkin CM „The challenge of soft law: 
development and change in international law‟ (1989)  ICLQ at 850; Dupuy „Soft law‟ (1991) at 420; Sztucki J 
„Reflections on international soft law‟ (1992) de Leg at 365; Elias and Lim „General principles of law, soft law 
and the identification of international law‟ (1997) 28 Neths Ybk IL at 3. 
623
 Boyle supra at 901. 
624
 Id at 901. 
625
 See Schachter O „The twilight existence of non-binding international agreements‟ (1997) 71 Am Jrnal Int’l L 
at 296. 
626
 (1994) ICJ Rep 112. 
627
 Bothe „Legal and non legal norms‟ (1980) at 67-70. 
628
 Boyle (1999) supra at 901. 
629
 Boyle supra at 902. 
230 
 
From this perspective treaties may be either hard or soft, or both. Consequently, for Boyle, it 
is the contents of treaties that are decisive in determining whether they are hard or soft.
630
 
The enquiry as to whether something is reduced to treaty form or not is irrelevant. 
 
The third notion is that of „soft law as non-binding law‟.631 Reliance on soft law, as part of 
the law-making process, takes a number of different forms including declarations of inter-
governmental conferences, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
632
 
The legal effect of different „soft law‟ instruments is not necessarily the same. Rather, it is 
distinguishing features of „soft law‟ instruments which are important.  
 
For example, „soft law‟ agreements are carefully negotiated and often carefully drafted 
statements. These are its two distinguishing features.
633
 In some cases, these distinguishing 
features are intended to have some normative significance despite their non-binding, non-
treaty form.
634
 At minimal, there is an „element of good faith commitment, and in many 
cases, a desire to influence State practice and an element of lawmaking intention and 
progressive development‟.635 In this respect, Boyle states they may be both an alternative to 
and a part of the process of multilateral treaty making, in particular law-making treaties.
636
 
 
He cites four main reasons why „soft law‟ instruments may represent an attractive alternative 
to law making by treaty. Firstly, it may be easier to reach agreement when the form is non-
binding.
637
 Boyle explains that the use of „soft law‟ instruments enables States to agree to 
more detailed and precise provisions because their legal commitment and the consequences 
of any non-compliance are more limited.
638
 
 
Secondly, he states that it may be easier for some States to adhere to non-binding 
instruments. In so doing states can avoid the domestic treaty ratification process and escape 
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democratic accountability for the domestic treaty ratification process.
639
 States may also 
escape democratic accountability for the policy to which they have agreed.  
 
Boyle‟s third reason is that „soft law‟ instruments will normally be easier to amend or replace 
than treaties, particularly when all that is required is the adoption of a new resolution by an 
international institution.
640
 Finally, „soft law‟ instruments may provide immediate evidence of 
international support and consensus than a treaty whose impact is heavily qualified by 
reservations and the need to wait for ratification and entry into force.
641
 
 
The argument for using a treaty rather than a „soft law‟ instrument is stronger in the case of 
new law-making, such as the renegotiation of the law of the sea or the elaboration of human 
rights law. Although in several cases institutions with wide powers were also being 
simultaneously established and a treaty was thus desirable in any event.  
 
According to Boyle, for the creation of new law, non-binding instruments may still be useful 
if they can help generate widespread and consistent State practice and/or provide evidence of 
opinio juris in support of a customary rule.
642
 Here he relies upon the examples
643
 of UN 
General Assembly resolutions and inter-governmental declarations having this effect in the 
Nicaragua Case,
644
 the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,
645
 and the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Dam Case.
646
 
 
This suggests that the non-binding form of an instrument is of relatively limited relevance in 
the context of customary international law-making.
647
 Treaties do not generate or codify 
customary law because of their binding form but because they either influence state practice 
and provide evidence of opinion juris for new or emerging rules, or because they are good 
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evidence of what the existing law is.
648
 In many cases this is no different from the potential 
effect of non-binding „soft law‟ instruments.  
 
Treaties and „soft law‟ instruments may be utilised as vehicles for focusing consensus on 
rules and principles, and for mobilising a consistent, general response on the part of states.
649
 
Depending upon what is involved, treaties may be more effective than „soft law‟ instruments 
for this purpose. Thus treaties indicate a stronger commitment to the principles in question 
and to that extent carry greater weight than a „soft law‟ instrument, but the assumption that 
they are necessarily more authoritative is misplaced, according to Boyle.
650
 It may occur that 
a treaty will not achieve the same level of participation and acceptance for a significant 
period whereas a „soft law‟ agreement may secure acceptance with relatively more ease.  
 
According to Boyle, other „soft law‟ instruments are used as mechanisms for authoritative 
interpretation or amplification of the terms of a treaty as part of a multilateral treaty making 
process.
651
 He relies upon the occasional role of General Assembly resolutions in regard to 
articles of the UN Charter, such as those dealing with decolonisation, or the use of force.
652
 
Of importance, he states that the same task is performed more frequently by resolutions, 
recommendations and decisions of other international organisations, and by the conferences 
of parties to treaties.
653
 
 
Boyle opines „… another important related role for „soft law‟ instruments is to provide the 
detailed rules and technical standards required for implementation of some treaties.
654
 
Environmental “soft law” is quite often important for this reason, setting standards of best 
practice or due diligence to be achieved by the parties in implementing their obligations.
655
 
These “ecostandards” are essential in giving hard content to the overly general and open-
textured terms of framework environmental treaties.‟656 
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The advantages of regulating environmental risks in this manner are that the detailed rules 
can easily be changed or strengthened as scientific understanding develops, or as political 
priorities change.
657
 Such standards may be adopted in binding form, using easily amended 
annexes to provide flexibility, depending on the needs of the parties.  
 
Boyle agrees with the point made many years ago by the late Judge Baxter that some treaties 
are soft in the sense that they impose no real obligations on the parties.
658
 Though formally 
binding, the vagueness, indeterminacy, or generality of their provisions may deprive them of 
the character of „hard law‟ in any meaningful sense. According to Boyle, this remains true.659 
He uses the example of the Framework Convention on Climate Change to demonstrate the 
point. Adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992, this treaty does impose some commitments on 
the parties, but its core articles, dealing with policies and measures to tackle greenhouse gas 
emissions, are so cautiously and obscurely worded and so weak that it is uncertain whether 
any real obligations are created.
660
 
 
Such treaty provisions are almost impossible to breach and in that narrow sense, Boyle 
advances that Baxter is justified in terming them „soft law‟.661 „Soft‟ undertakings which are 
very weak represent more of a political compromise than a legal one. They are not normative 
and cannot be described as creating „rules‟. This point was recognised by the International 
Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case wherein it stated that one of the conditions to 
be met before a treaty could be regarded as law-making is that it should be drafted in a 
manner which may be „potentially normative‟ in character.662 
 
More significantly, a treaty may be potentially normative, but still „soft‟ in character, because 
it articulates „principles‟ rather than „rules‟.663 Such a treaty may lay down parameters which 
influence a court‟s decisions,664 or the manner in which an international institution exercises 
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its discretionary powers.
665
 Treaties of this nature may lack the legal muster attached to hard 
law of a „rule‟ or an „obligation‟, but they are certainly not legally irrelevant. As such they 
constitute a very important form of law. 
 
Hard law and „soft law‟ have „enforcement mechanisms‟. Hard enforcement has many 
remedies arising from legal obligations. Boyle opines that the contrasting model of „soft 
enforcement‟, or „dispute avoidance‟, is one in which problems are referred to non-binding 
conciliation before an independent third party, or to some form of non-compliance procedure 
involving other parties to the treaty.
666
 
 
In both situations there is an attempt to find an agreed solution, rather than to engage in 
adversarial litigation, or claims for reparation.
667
 Soft enforcement characteristically evades 
issues of responsibility for breach, and relies on a combination of inducements, or the 
possibility of termination or suspension of treaty rights to secure compliance.
668
 
 
For Boyle an example of a soft enforcement is best exemplified by the non-compliance 
procedure adopted by parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the Ozone Convention.
669
 The 
procedure, adopted in 1990 and revised in 1992, may be invoked by any party to the Protocol, 
or by the Protocol Secretariat, or by the party itself, wherever there are thought to be 
problems regarding compliance.
670
 
 
The matter is then referred for investigation to an Implementation Committee consisting of 
10 parties elected on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The main task of the 
Implementation Committee is to consider the submissions, information and observations 
made to it with a view to securing an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect 
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for the provisions of the Protocol.
671
 The Implementation Committee can seek whatever 
information it needs through the Secretariat.  
 
For this purpose it may also visit the territory of the party under investigation if invited to do 
so. A report is then made to the full Meeting of the Parties, which decides what steps to call 
for in order to bring about full compliance.
672
 Steps may include the provision of appropriate 
financial, technical, or training assistance in order to help the party to comply. If these 
measures are insufficient, cautions may be issued, or, as a last resort, rights and privileges 
under the treaty can be suspended in accordance with the law of treaties.
673
 The non-
compliance procedure has been invoked on several occasions by parties to the Montreal 
Protocol.  
 
The effect has been to secure compliance, albeit at the cost of some delay in 
implementation.
674
 Boyle argues that this new process represents a further move away from 
formal, binding, third party dispute settlement in favour of procedures that facilitate 
compliance but cannot compel it.
675
 Like the Montreal Protocol procedure it tries to resolve 
problems, differences, or disputes, through political rather than judicial processes, relying on 
negotiation and persuasion, rather than formal findings of breach of treaty or responsibility.
676
 
 
„Soft enforcement‟ of this type is not confined to environmental agreements. According to 
some, it has been criticised for undermining the binding character of the treaties concerned 
and setting them apart from „normal‟ treaties.  
 
It creates another category of „soft‟ treaty.677 Why do states employ these techniques of soft 
enforcement for certain treaties? Boyle advances several reasons. Firstly, he states that like 
non-binding instruments, it facilitates agreement on rules or commitments which are hard in 
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content.
678
 These rules or commitments do have the binding force of a treaty, with all that 
implies in terms of a sense of obligation. Yet the consequences of non-compliance are not as 
severe or potentially troublesome as they would be if there was compulsory binding 
adjudication in every case of dispute or alleged non-compliance.
679
 
 
This may be important where compliance may not be equally easy for all states, or where the 
capacities of states differ. It allows some leeway for parties in difficulty, while the emphasis 
on co-operation is consistent with broader notions of solidarity which underlie many modern 
environmental agreements.  
 
Secondly, soft enforcement is more suited to a regulatory approach that emphasises 
prevention of problems rather than reparation after the event.
680
 Boyle‟s third reason is that 
non-compliance affects all parties to the treaty equally. There is considerable merit in 
designing a process for securing compliance, which is multilateral in character and which 
allows all parties, as well as NGOs, to participate, and which ensures that all interests are 
adequately represented.
681
 
 
Boyle goes further to say that although it is possible to accommodate a multiplicity of parties 
and NGOs in judicial proceedings, it is not easy to do so, and an adversarial procedure is not 
well suited to the resolution of the kind of non-compliance problems likely to arise under 
global environmental treaties.
682
 Finally he states that soft enforcement typically facilitates 
more readily than judicial processes the necessary input of scientific and technical expertise 
required to deal with issues of compliance under agreements of a particular kind.
683
 
 
b. Conclusion 
 
Soft law is evidently a multifaceted notion, whose relationship to treaties is both subtle and 
diverse. Soft law agreements present alternatives to treaties in certain circumstances. In other 
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instances, „soft law‟ agreements complement treaties.684 They also provide different ways of 
understanding the legal effect of different kinds of treaties.  
 
Even Weil admits that whether a rule is hard or soft does not affect its normative character. A 
rule of treaty or customary law may be vague or soft but it does not cease to be a legal 
norm.
685
 
 
According to Boyle, those who continue to maintain that „soft law‟ is simply not law are 
grossly incorrect due to the rate of „compliance‟ and „adherence‟ to „soft law‟ agreements. As 
Baxter wrote, those who see a treaty as having greater legal effect than „soft law‟ have 
perhaps not examined the „infinite variety‟ of treaties.  
 
Soft law in its various forms is certainly subject to abuse. The same abuse is true for most 
legal forms. Boyle surmises that „soft law‟ has generally been more useful to the process of 
international law-making than it has been objectionable. Succinctly he writes, „it is simply 
another tool in the professional lawyer's armoury‟.686 
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5. Conclusion: Soft law as law 
 
Soft law encompasses a variety of instruments under the level of compelling treaty law, the 
exact scope and nature of which can only be determined on a casuistic basis. Soft law is 
communicated in the form of an ideology, an ideal, or a set of rules or procedures. The 
principal function of „soft law‟ is to facilitate concrete state action in response to declarations, 
declarations of policy, intent or common principles without incurring legal obligations.
687
 
These instruments rely on the willingness of parties to implement them for their effect.  
 
Non-legally binding instruments, within the realm of soft law, have shown states entering 
into legal obligations within accepted parameters. The Certification Scheme is a voluntary 
non-legally binding international instrument, which has been accepted by many states. 
Therefore, the Certification Scheme may be viewed as one such agreement.  
 
A study of existing international law demonstrates the existence of normative phenomena 
which states conform to. The normative phenomena are new and dynamic. Therefore they are 
not capable of being categorised according to the traditional sources of law per se, namely 
that of treaties or custom. All the same, the normative phenomena cannot easily be ruled out 
of the realm of law. Their legal effect is diffused, yet in particularly limited instances it is 
clear. 
 
As Baxter points out when he states that the totality of these „arrangements,‟ these 
undertakings, constitute another form of „soft law,‟ complied with in fact but not under the 
coercion of the principle of pacta sunt servanda or any other rules of customary international 
law.
688
 
 
States demonstrate their volition to become part of the international community through their 
behaviour. In some cases, States modify their behaviour to suit their particular contexts, such 
as modifying relevant existing legislation within their domestic contexts to reflect the views 
of the international community. In other instances, states become part of the international 
community through subscription to new normative behaviour. The conduct in both cases is 
                                                 
687
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undertaken outside the parameters of treaty law or international customary law. It is in this 
specialty of conduct that the normative phenomenon of „soft law‟ occurs. 
 
Regardless of the legal force of „soft law‟, states may agree to abide by the new normative 
phenomena and as a result of such practices eventually feel compelled to continue to abide. 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising to note that the conduct of states adheres to resolutions of 
the UN GA or the codes of MNCs for example. Resolutions of the UN GA, codes of conduct 
of MNCs, codes of good practice and such have a common feature. These instruments 
possess the ability to articulate objectives and principles that state conduct manifests. In this 
manner, states are able to better formulate or concretise new rules of behaviour (new norms) 
which agreeable states subsequently adopt. 
 
New norms do not easily become established norms. Whilst some argue that new norms arise 
from the consent of state parties, others argue the holistic, contextual impact of new norms 
must be carefully examined in order to determine their effect. States are not grappling with 
law itself in the „soft law‟ domain. Instead, States are confronted with non-legally binding 
norms. Non-legally binding norms may or may not culminate in fulfilment of expectations of 
and by state parties. Fulfilment of expectations is largely dependent on the prevailing political 
and social contexts. 
 
States make law for themselves which regulates their conduct in different circumstances. In 
the same manner, States make „soft law‟ for themselves. As its name implies, „soft law‟ is 
„law‟ insofar as it constitutes an agreement between the parties in the first instance. In the 
second instance, it is „soft‟ insofar as an integral part of that agreement is that the state parties 
agree not to be bound by legal obligations, and to retain a comfortable margin of flexibility. 
 
Parties can be said to be bound by the basic principle of contracts. According to Schachter, 
the fact that an agreement is non-legally binding does not imply that the agreement is not 
binding.
689
 Rather, it means that the agreement is binding insofar as states consider 
themselves to be bound without any recourse for breach because there can be no breach. As a 
further inducement to comply with a voluntary instrument, acts which are performed pursuant 
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to the agreement are valid and cannot, according to the principles of contract law, be 
rescinded.  
 
Adherence to the principle of good faith may also encourage compliance with soft law. 
However, good faith alone cannot provide a binding force. More likely, the binding force 
may arise from non-legal relations such as the authority of states, mutual benefit and good 
international relations. Compliance by state parties to „soft law‟ instruments may rise to the 
level of international customary law thereby creating new norms.  
 
However, the evolution of „soft law‟ into international customary law through compliance by 
MNCs is not possible owing to their lack of full legal personality. Thus, a more detailed 
examination of the Certification Scheme as implemented by member states themselves will 
permit a determination of the type of authority vested in the Certification Scheme. This will 
also allow a determination on the classification of the Certification Scheme. 
 
Having examined the Certification Scheme in detail in chapter three; and the Third Year 
Review with respect to implementation and monitoring in chapter four; and the role of 
international and regional organisations in this chapter, it is appropriate to address two of the 
central concerns of this study, namely implementation and monitoring. Thus, the next chapter 
deals with the highlights of the shortcomings and failings of the Certification Scheme. 
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CHAPTER 7 : SHORTCOMINGS AND FAILINGS OF THE 
CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
1. Introduction 
 
Difficulties with the Certification Scheme‟s contents; and its implementation and monitoring 
have been highlighted in chapters three and four of the study. Problems identified in chapter 
three arose from the Certificate which must accompany rough diamond shipments, with 
regard to the undertakings by Participants, co-operation and transparency and administrative 
matters to the Certification Scheme. At this point it is necessary to discuss some of the major 
difficulties of the Certification Scheme‟s contents. 
 
The Certification Scheme was formed in an effort to address two major objectives: the 
curbing or elimination of the illegal trade of rough diamonds, which provoke human rights 
crises. The Certification Scheme operates on the basic premise that a KP Certificate must 
accompany each shipment of rough diamonds from the point of origin to the point of 
destination. The Certification Scheme presently comprises 75 Participants. The Certification 
Scheme is a voluntary mechanism.  
 
Participants to the Certification Scheme may only engage in the legal trade of rough 
diamonds with other Participants who have also met the „minimum requirements of the 
Scheme‟.690 International shipments of rough diamonds must also be accompanied by a KP 
Certificate guaranteeing that they are conflict-free.
691
 The KP Certificate is the driving 
mechanism of the Certification Scheme. However, the Certification Scheme per se does not 
have the force of law. There is no central body which controls the workings of the 
Certification Scheme. Working groups and committees are the hub of the Scheme.
692
 
 
For ease of reference, the composition of the Certification Scheme document is repeated. The 
Certification Scheme document comprises a Preamble and six sections with three annexes, 
which form part of the sections. Section I of the Certification Scheme provides for 
definitions. Section II of the Scheme deals with the actual „Kimberley process Certificate‟. A 
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„Kimberley Process Certificate‟ must accompany each shipment693 of export of rough 
diamonds.  
The problems with the Certification Scheme have therefore been divided into two categories 
„capacity‟ and „accountability‟. These categories have been identified to draw together the 
problems with the Certification Scheme in a thematic manner. The categories of „capacity‟ 
and „accountability‟ allow for the problems with the Certification Scheme to be correlated 
with the advantages offered by an international instrument which has or acquires the force of 
law.  
The categories of capacity and accountability are by no means definitive or all encompassing. 
There is also a degree of overlap and fluidity between the concepts. However, the categories 
have been used in this study for the purposes of conceptual analysis and are sufficient for this 
purpose.  
It may be stated that problems with the Certification Scheme discussed under capacity are 
problems, which broadly speaking can to a lesser or greater degree be remedied by 
formulating an international instrument having the force of law. Such an instrument is able to 
afford measures couched in legally binding obligations between parties. 
The problems identified in the formation, implementation and monitoring of the Certification 
Scheme may be classified into two groups, namely that of capacity and accountability. 
Accountability arises due to a lack of mechanisms, which may ensure compliance with the 
contents of the Certification Scheme. In this manner, accountability may be seen to comprise 
two forms, namely legal and moral accountability. Here, the focus is upon legal 
accountability. 
 
a. Section II: The KP Certificate694 
 
The KP Certificate must meet the 14 minimum requirements as discussed in chapter three of 
the study. The Certificate is the driving force of the Certification Scheme. 
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Problem 
According to the Review, not all Participants comply with the issuance of a duly validated KP 
Certificate with minimum requirements as set out by the Certification Scheme’s document. 
Errors in filling out KP Certificates persist.  
 
A KP Certificate must accompany every shipment of rough diamonds from one Participant to 
another.
695
 Each shipment must have a specifically numbered and government validated KP 
Certificate that promises the shipment does not contain conflict diamonds.
696
 
 
Since the issuance of KP Certificates is at the heart of legitimising the trade in rough and or 
conflict diamonds, the KP Certificate must be complied with by all exporting and importing 
Participants. In order to ensure compliance with the fourteen minimum requirements of the 
KP Certificate, the Certification Scheme demands that governments must have in place 
measures and the necessary infrastructure, which will enable the issuance of the KP 
compliant Certificate. This particular „requirement‟ of the Certification Scheme assumes that 
all Participants shall have the necessary infrastructure to ensure the issuance of KP 
Certificates.  
 
The capacities of differing state Participants who are the primary exporters of diamonds is not 
taken into account. Each participating government to the Certification Scheme ideally must 
have the ability to ensure that all fourteen minimum requirements are met. Each Participant 
should ensure that a KP Certificate accompanies every shipment of rough diamonds in 
keeping with the minimum standards697 and minimum requirements698 of the Certification 
Scheme. Drafting and issuing of KP Certificates have complexities in most of the 14 
minimum requirements. The issue of fraud is also a central concern for the Certification 
Scheme.
699
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Mandatory import information is not always readily available or accurate.
700
 This, too, is a 
minimum requirement of the Certification Scheme‟s document with respect to issuance of KP 
Certificates. When information is not accurately presented, then the efficacy of the 
Certification Scheme is undermined. The efficacy of the Certification Scheme is also 
undermined when Participants do not adhere to the contents of the Certification Scheme.
701
 
 
Problem: Minimum requirement 1 (KP Certificate) 
Each KP Certificate should bear the title ‘Kimberley Process Certificate’ and the following 
statement: ‘The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in accordance with the 
provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds’.  
 
The requirement for Certificates to accompany each shipment as such does not guarantee that 
shipments not accompanied by a KP Certificate will no longer occur. The issue of rebel 
movements controlling and mining rough diamonds is addressed by the Certification Scheme. 
However, the issue of governments causing human rights abuses through mining and 
production of rough diamonds is not addressed. Indeed, this is of serious concern. As such, it 
is addressed in the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
KP Certificates must accompany every shipment of rough diamonds. It is difficult to ensure 
that each and every shipment of diamonds is accompanied by a KP Certificate due to the 
nature of the commodity. Smuggling and criminal activities associated with diamond import 
and exports have been reported by credible sources. Zimbabwean diamonds having their 
origin in Angola have made their way to South Africa for export purposes. Diamonds are 
portable. Consequently they are easily transferred from one party to another. This is a 
significant shortcoming of the Certification Scheme. 
 
However the Certification Scheme and De Beers maintain that 99.8 percent of diamonds are 
conflict-free.
702
 This averment does not take cognisance of diamonds which do not reach the 
mainstream market. In other words, diamonds entering the markets through informal trade 
mechanisms and will not be captured by data bases.
703
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All products mined will not necessarily follow the correct channels of entering the market. 
Simultaneously, it is conceded that diamonds may nonetheless slip the long arm of 
controlling law. But this amount will be almost negligible in comparison to that which 
ordinarily would have been lost to the informal trade sector. South African dealers reported 
large volumes of smuggling during 2006 and 2007, and Zimbabwe‟s Central Bank Governor, 
Gideon Gono has said many times that huge volumes of government revenue are being lost to 
diamond smugglers.
704
 
 
According to the PAC and Global Witness, in 2008, if there has been smuggling to 
neighbouring countries, it is not clearly evident in the statistics they submit to the Kimberley 
Process.
705
 Further, it was stated that at first glance, a tenfold spike in Tanzanian exports in 
2006 looked suspicious, but it could not be explained by increased production in 
Zimbabwe.
706
According to the PAC and Global Witness, the Marange rush in Zimbabwe 
began in mid 2006, and the Tanzanian spike was spread evenly across all four quarters of the 
year. Tanzanian exports dropped significantly in 2007 and during 2008 were back to 2005 
levels.
707
 There was little record of KP certificates. Simultaneously, Canada was commended 
for its system of KP certificates.
708
 
 
Thus Participants should have in place mechanisms which the Certification Scheme at large 
provides, in terms of all the requirements in general. The statement implies that an exporting 
Participant State has the necessary infrastructural capacities such as implementation of the 
Certification Scheme‟s document into national legislation.709 
 
Problem Minimum requirement 5 (KP Certificate) 
The Certificate is to be ‘tamper and forgery resistant. 
 
The Certification Scheme does not provide guidelines as to how the KP Certificate is 
supposed to be „tamper and forgery resistant‟. Participants must address this matter in their 
respective capacities. Different standards within Participant countries may result in a wide 
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range of different implementation standards. This also undermines the efficacy of the 
Working Groups to the Kimberley Process. Many Participants lack the capacity to undertake 
such assurances.
710
 
 
The Certification Scheme does not adequately address this problem. An international law 
instrument may be able to address this problem; as it may be able to establish a permanent 
secretariat and office headquarters which will issue certificates that are tamper and forgery 
resistant. In this manner, capacity may be fostered and accountability may be established. 
 
Changing technologies may in all likelihood intercept an original Kimberly Process 
Certificate. However, this constraint will be under control if the secretariat was a permanent 
body established pursuant to a law making treaty. Furthermore, a permanent secretariat will 
be in favourable position for the issuance of dates of entry and expiry of certificates. 
 
The possibility of strengthening the existing roaming secretariat is not viable as this would 
require funding which must come from the Participant country holding the seat of the Chair. 
In the alternative, a trust fund may be established which would make it possible for the 
collection and utilisation of funds for the Participant country holding the seat of the Chair. 
 
Problem 
Recommendations for rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters to be legally obliged to 
maintain records of their daily business for a period of five years.
711
 
 
The Recommendations made by the Certification Scheme present concerns to buyers and 
sellers for obtaining licenses. Nor are all buyers and sellers willing to comply with legal 
requirements. Small scale buyers enter and exit the diamond industry at a fast pace. Thus, 
these Recommendations appear to be intended for large scale buyers and sellers. These 
Recommendations may very well escape the hands of small scale buyers and sellers. 
 
Daily records should include buying, selling or exporting records listing names of buyers or 
selling clients, their license number and the amount and value of diamonds sold, exported or 
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purchased.
712
 Daily records must be stored on a computer data base.
713
 Once more the 
problem with regard to technological capacities presents itself. The PAC and Global Witness 
in 2002 commended the US government for its implementation of technological systems in 
place which comply with the Certification Scheme.
714
 
 
There are major problems in getting Participants to submit required statistics on time 
according to the PAC.
715
 A significant number of Participants are consistently late in 
reporting data and are therefore in non-compliance with the statistical reporting requirements. 
In 2005, Tanzania did not submit any statistical data. Ten other countries: Bulgaria, Central 
African Republic, China, Guinea, Ghana, Guyana, Laos, Lesotho, Malaysia and Venezuela 
had outstanding, limited or incomplete data.
716
 There were no consequences for Participants 
that are non-compliant with statistical submissions even though this meant that they failed to 
meet the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process.
717
 
 
Problem  
Intrinsic to the export process is the duty of the exporter. The Scheme recommends that the 
relevant Exporting Authority should convey a meticulous electronic message, which must be 
recorded on a computer database,
718
 to the intended Importing Authority.
719
 Thus, the 
electronic message should contain information on the carat weight, value, country of origin 
or provenance, importer and the serial number of the Certificate.
720
 
 
Cognisance must be had to the technological gap as previously stated in this chapter. Also, 
the clarity of questions which the Exporting Authority must pose to the exporter is uncertain. 
Thus the workability of these Recommendations is debatable. Again, not all Participants 
possess the necessary technological infrastructure to ensure that they meet the impositions of 
this Recommendation.
721
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b. Section VI: Administrative matters to the Certification Scheme 
 
Problem 
The administrative matters of the Scheme show where the Scheme is actually ‘housed’ like 
most international instruments. The instrument of the Scheme though is not located in any 
specific place. Instead it is ‘hosted’ by different state Participants each year.  
 
Section VI addresses administrative matters within the purview of the Certification Scheme. 
The section deals with meetings, administrative support, participation, Participant measures, 
compliance and dispute prevention, modifications and review mechanisms. Essentially 
housekeeping matters are given due attention in Section VI.  
 
At best, these rules of procedure should be pre-emptive in response to the prevailing 
conditions of application of the Scheme. There is no single head office for the Certification 
Scheme and its management. The matter of a „roaming‟ Secretariat is once more 
problematic.
722
 
 
The presence of a permanent head office with occupancy for the Chair, irrespective of the 
country may be achieved through an instrument which has the force of law. Such an 
instrument will thus alleviate the concerns regarding capacity with especial regard to 
dissemination of information and communication.
723
 The PAC Global Witness Coalition 
suggested that an evaluation exercise be undertaken.
724
 
 
c. Synopsis of problems relating to ‘capacity’ 
 
The investigation into the problems with the Certification Scheme indicates that there is a 
lack of capacity with regards to the Certification Scheme brought about by the absence of a 
central office and the non-legal nature of the Certification Scheme. The implementation of a 
legal instrument could alleviate these problems as a legal instrument is able to alleviate and in 
some instances resolve the capacity issue which the study has identified.  
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 PAC Annual Review (2009) at 1-2. 
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 PAC „Implementing KP‟ (2005) at 6-7. 
724
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d. Accountability 
 
Accountability in this context refers to the ability of Participants or parties to the Certification 
Scheme to meet obligations as contained in the Certification Scheme document. Thus, a 
Participant must be held to account for a failure to comply with an obligation or a violation of 
an obligation. In this instance, a legal instrument is best suited to ameliorate difficulties 
encountered by the present Certification Scheme.725 
 
i. Section I: Definitions 
 
Problem 
According to the Review, there is confusion around certain important definitions. 
 
Certainly unclear definitions can seriously impede the operation of the Certification Scheme. 
Definitional uncertainty is of concern to the operation and long term sustainability of the 
Scheme. The Review found that Participants experienced problems with the terms „value‟ 
and „classification‟. 
 
a. Value 
 
Participants are not clear as to the values which must be attached to shipments of rough 
diamonds. Some make use of the US dollar system as set out by the Certification Scheme and 
others experience difficulties with the valuations of rough diamond shipments. Thus the 
issues of values remain a problem for implementation.  
 
Unfortunately, and as this information is held by the WGDE and not made available for 
public inspection, the actual details and seriousness of this problem remain cloudy. 
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 Curtain D and Nollkaemper A „Conceptualizing accountability in international and European law‟ (2006) 36 
Neth Ybk IL at 9-14. 
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b. Classification 
 
Despite the issuance of Technical Guideline 5, Participants continue to experience difficulties 
with classification of rough diamonds for shipment purposes. Thus, trade is hampered.  
 
Problems exist with some definitions such as „Participants‟ and „rough diamonds‟. Problems 
also exist with respect to the Importing and Exporting Authorities. Unfortunately, this 
information is held by the WGDE. It is not made available for public inspection. 
 
c. Participant 
 
„Participant,‟ in terms of the Certification Scheme means a regional economic integration 
organisation or a State for which the Certification Scheme is effective.
726
 
 
According to the Certification Scheme, „regional economic integration organisation‟ means 
an organisation comprised of sovereign States that have transferred competence to that 
organisation in respect of matters governed by the Certification Scheme.
727
 The EU, as an 
entity which has been granted competence for matters governed by the Scheme is considered 
to fall within the ambit of this definition.  
 
Consequently the EU passed its Council Regulation for the implementation of the 
Certification Scheme. The Council made allowance for individual states party to the EU to 
formulate country specific legislation in keeping with the overall thrust of the implementation 
of the Certification Scheme. Each State retained a small measure of discretion to formulate its 
legislation, also known as margin of appreciation. 
 
d. Distinction between rough diamonds and powder 
 
Technical Guideline 13 addresses the distinction between rough diamonds and powder. 
Technical Guidelines are only made available to Participants on a confidential basis. They are 
not made available to the public, thus frustrating transparency. Participants also encounter 
                                                 
726
 Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
727
 Ibid. 
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difficulties due to a lack of information. It has been averred that although Technical 
Guideline 13 addresses this issue, it is not sufficiently clear for Participants.  
 
Participants are encountering difficulties with distinguishing between rough diamonds and 
powder. Technical Guideline 13 assists very little in this regard for various reasons as not all 
the information is properly collated and distributed for usage by all Participants. 
Unfortunately, this information is held by the WGDE. It is not made available for public 
inspection. 
 
Definitions by their nature are defined by the context within which they are utilised. 
Therefore neither a scheme nor legal instrument will resolve this problem in its entirety. 
However, it must be noted that a legal instrument will allow for renewed consultations with 
the diamond industry, Participants and other important stakeholders have a greater vested 
interest in according legal authority to future definitions. This process could be especially 
facilitated under the auspices of the UN. 
 
ii. KP: Problem Minimum requirement 2 
 
Country of origin for shipment of parcels of unmixed (ie from the same origin).
728
 
 
The Certification Scheme defines „country of origin‟ as „the country where a shipment of 
rough diamonds has been mined or extracted‟.729 Pursuant to the Certification Scheme „parcel 
means one or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not individualised‟.730 It is 
difficult to ensure that parcels remain unmixed due to human error. Here too, the scheme 
mechanism does not provide an adequate answer.  
 
Whereas a legal instrument may be of a legally binding nature it would result in uniformly 
acceptable standards, taking into account the country specific situations. In particular, the 
situations prevailing in major diamond exporting nations such as Sierra Leone will play a 
major role in the determination of norms and standards. Legal instruments, as have been 
                                                 
728
 The Certification Scheme defines „Country of origin‟ means the country where a shipment of rough 
diamonds has been mined or extracted  
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 Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
730
 Ibid. 
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outlined above also provide for amendments, especially when the concept of „progression‟ is 
borne in mind. 
 
iii. KP: Problem Minimum requirement 9 
 
The Certificate is to contain the ‘identification of exporter and importer’.  
 
Problems arise when the details of the exporter must be noted on the KP Certificate. 
Identification of the exporting and importing states are comparatively easy. However, the 
precise details of acquisition of the diamonds to the exporting authority of a state are 
somewhat difficult to ascertain. The Review noted the presence of artisanal and other 
clandestine diamond dealers.
731
 
 
The Review also noted a lack of import procedures for rough diamond shipments. There are 
no consistent procedures for import in accordance with the Certification Scheme, as the latter 
does not provide for import procedures. This is of concern for the implementation and the 
consequent monitoring of the Certification Scheme‟s workability. Participants reported illegal 
shipments despite the operation of the Certification Scheme‟s contents within their respective 
jurisdictions. Legitimate trade is impeded in this manner.  
 
Problem  
All international rough diamond
732
 shipments
733
 must be traded in tamper-proof boxes and 
accompanied by a forgery-proof Certificate which states that the rough diamonds are conflict 
free.  
 
                                                 
731
 PAC Annual Review (2009) at 3-4. 
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 A „diamond‟ is defined as „a natural mineral consisting essentially of pure crystallized carbon in the 
isometric system, with a hardness on the Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a specific gravity of approximately 3.52 
and a refractive index of 2.42.‟ Section I of the Scheme. A diamond is accorded the minimal criteria necessary 
for trade. The Scheme defines „rough diamonds‟ to mean „diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved 
or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 7102.10, 7102.21 
and 7102.31.‟ Rough diamonds are diamonds which have been mined with a specific value. Section I of the 
Certification Scheme. 
733
 The term „shipment‟ means „one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported.‟ Section 1 of the 
Certification Scheme. 
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Tamper-proof boxes must necessarily be of such a quality that they are rendered incapable of 
manipulation by otherwise unscrupulous parties. The nature and measure of a tamper proof 
box is not defined by the Scheme. The design and construction of such boxes appears to rest 
within the discretion of the Participants.  
 
iv. Section III: Undertakings in respect of the international trade in 
rough diamonds 
 
This Section deals with undertakings of transit Participants. In other words, the undertakings 
of Participants through whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds pass en route to the 
final importing Participant.  
 
Problem 
The importing Participant requires that the original Certificate be readily accessible for a 
period of no less than three years.734 
 
Thus the country of import should have in place mechanisms to ensure storage and 
verification facilities for a period of three years. This may be problematic as not all 
Participants will be in a position to put into place storage and verification facilities. Monetary 
implications present difficulties yet again, as not all Participants are in a financially amicable 
position to install storage and verification facilities. The monetary implications become 
important in making the argument for a treaty making mechanism vis-a-vis the present 
Certification Scheme. In the instance of a treaty making mechanism, there will be no real 
monetary obstacles as the parties to the treaty mechanism would undertake particular legal 
obligations. In contrast, the Participants to the Certification Scheme may be financially 
unable to install such storage and verification facilities. 
 
Storage and verification facilities imply that the country of import puts theses mechanisms 
into place prior to becoming a Participant to the Certification Scheme. It may be that the 
drafters of the Certification Scheme had two possible intentions with this particular aspect. 
                                                 
734
 Section III (b) of the Certification Scheme. The Certification Scheme defines „import‟ to means the physical 
entering/bringing into any part of the geographical territory of a Participant. The Scheme defines and „importing 
authority‟ as the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a Participant into whose territory a shipment of rough 
diamonds is imported to conduct all import formalities and particularly the verification of accompanying 
Kimberley Process Certificates. Section 1 of the Certification Scheme. 
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Firstly, the drafters intended that rough diamonds could be traced. Secondly, the drafters 
intended that the relationship between exporters and importers may be secured.  
 
Further the importing Participant should ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is 
imported from or exported to a non-Participant.735 Section III of the Certification Scheme 
demands that the trade of rough diamonds be confined to Participants of the Certification 
Scheme. Participants may only trade rough diamonds with each other.  
 
All parties and states who have not signed the Certification Scheme are prohibited from 
trading with Participants to the Certification Scheme. To date there are 75 Participants to the 
Certification Scheme, which includes the 49 Member States of the EU.  
 
v. Trading Participants 
 
The Certification Scheme may encounter problems with regard to trading partners as there 
are between 192 to 196 States in the world today.736 Presently 192 States have signed the UN 
Charter.737 With the number of States becoming party to treaties with regard to international 
trade, it is most appropriate to have a treaty mechanism in place. A legal instrument will be 
able to successfully invoke the provisions of international trade law. 
 
To date, there are 75 Participants to the Certification Scheme as aforementioned. The number 
of Participants demonstrates the lack of universal acceptance of the Certification Scheme; and 
consequently its long term sustainability and workability in the diamond industry. At the 
same time, it must be borne in mind that the Participants to the Certification Scheme are 
predominantly the diamond trading and production partners in the world. 
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 Section III(c) of the Certification Scheme. 
736
 www.un.org  
737
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vi. Section III 
 
Problem 
‘Each Participant should when embarking on trading rough diamonds on the international 
level, recognise that Participants through whose territory shipments pass through are not 
required to meet the requirement of producing a duly validated Certificate’.738 
 
According to the Certification Scheme, „transit‟ means the physical passage across the 
territory of a Participant or a non-Participant, with or without transshipment, warehousing or 
change in mode of transport, when such passage is only a portion of a complete journey 
beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-Participant across 
whose territory a shipment passes‟.739 
 
There is very little difficulty foreseen when the shipment passes through the territory of a 
Participant to the Certification Scheme. However, concern arises when the shipment and KP 
Certificate pass through the territory of a non-Participant to the Certification Scheme. This 
definition presents difficulties.  
 
When unpacked, the difficulties may be seen. Firstly, a shipment destined for international 
trade may pass through the country of a non-Participant state or region. Secondly, the 
Certification Scheme‟s definition allows for the shipment to be warehoused or change the 
mode of transport from air to water. Thirdly, the passage of the shipment may be on the 
territory of a non-Participant through any part of its journey en route its final destination.  
 
Whether the shipment is safe and remains intact together with the KP Certificate arises from 
the goodwill or comity of the non-Participant. Further, the transit non-Participant state is not 
required to comply with the minimum requirements for the issuance of the duly validated KP 
Certificate or with the Certification Scheme itself.740 
                                                 
738
 The Certification Scheme defines „transit‟ as the physical passage across the territory of a Participant or a 
non-Participant, with or without transhipment, warehousing or change in mode of transport, when such passage 
is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-
Participant across whose territory a shipment passes.  
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 Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
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 Section II(a) provides as follows: „a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the Certificate) 
accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds on export;‟ and Section II (b) provides as follows: „its processes 
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According to the Certification Scheme, the last two of requirements of a „duly validated 
Certificate and the number of parcels, carat weight, Certificate number and details of 
importer and exporter‟741 are waived, provided that the import and export authorities of the 
Participant through whose territory a shipment passes, ensures that the shipment leaves its 
territory in an identical state as it entered its territory.742 
 
This means that the shipment must not be opened or tampered with.743 This too, is 
problematic as the importing and exporting authorities may not be in a position to evade 
interception. Issues of bribery and corruption are inadequately addressed in light of the 
history of the trade of rough diamonds. The non-Participant country may have or make their 
own customs regulations which may not be consonant with the contents of the Certification 
Scheme. For example, customs rules and regulations may be made with regard to „tamper-
resistant‟ containers utilised for the shipment of diamonds. 
 
As have been noted above, difficulties exist with regard to the definition of „transit‟ and the 
transit of shipments of rough diamonds through territories of non-Participants to the 
Certification Scheme in particular. Difficulties encountered with securing the identity and 
contents of a diamond parcel intended for shipment and receipt by an importer will be in 
significant part be addressed by a legal instrument. A legal instrument will create mutually 
legally binding obligations for all signatories. 
 
vii. Section IV: Internal controls 
 
Problem  
Pursuant to Section IV, Participants should undertake to establish particular internal control 
systems for the export of rough diamonds. Each Participant ‘should establish a system of 
internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of 
rough diamonds imported into and exported from its territory’.744 
                                                                                                                                                        
for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of the Kimberley Process as set out in Section IV …‟ 
respectively. 
741
 Section III(a) and (b) of the Certification Scheme. 
742
 Section III(d) of the Certification Scheme. 
743
 Ibid. 
744
 Section IV (a) of the Certification Scheme. 
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Figure 12: Top diamond producing countries in 2008. 
 
A few components must be in place to establish a „body‟ of a „system of internal controls‟. 
Intrinsic to the system of internal controls is that each Participant should designate an 
„Importing and an Exporting Authority‟.745 In furtherance of establishing a body of internal 
systems of control, Participants should ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported 
in tamper resistant containers.746 Each Participant should as required, amend or enact 
appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme and to 
maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions.747 
 
                                                 
745
 Section IV(b) of the Certification Scheme. 
746
 Section IV(c) of the Certification Scheme. 
747
 Section IV(d) of the Certification Scheme. 
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Firstly, the Review assumes that Participants have implemented the Certification Scheme‟s 
contents into their respective jurisdictions. Secondly, Participant countries are expected to 
ensure that they adhere to the content of the Certification Scheme in their relations with other 
Participants. Thirdly, non-state Participants must ensure that the content of the Certification 
Scheme are included in their regulations and policies. With regards to the Chair, the 
Certification Scheme assumes that the Chair undertakes to fulfil all the duties imposed by the 
Kimberley Process.  
 
Fourthly, the Review stated that the Participation Committee is responsible for assessing 
whether or not a Participant is in compliance with the minimum standards of the Certification 
Scheme. As such, it is the body that decides who can join the Certification Scheme, and who 
should be expelled for non-compliance. Its Terms of Reference detail its importance to the 
Certification Scheme. They were revised at the Gatineau Plenary of 2004, and again at the 
Moscow Plenary of 2005. 
 
The Certification Scheme assumes that laws and practices will be uniform with respect to 
implementation. In reality, Participants differ in the national laws and practices through 
vagaries of interpretation.
748
As the Certification Scheme is a voluntary instrument which is 
not able to make particular demands upon Participants, little redress can be expected in 
respect of unequal application and implementation standards.
749
 
 
The Certification Scheme itself is not a legally binding contract. As such, it is incapable of 
providing for any means of enforcement. A breach of the requirements will not result in 
sanctions. The Certification Scheme does not possess any legally sanctionable clauses. Thus, 
Participants are not held to account for breaches of the contents of the Certification Scheme.  
 
Although the work of the WG and the sub-WG are acknowledged by the Review, much work 
remains outstanding with respect to the internal controls contained in the Certification 
Scheme‟s document. Firstly, it is debatable whether self-regulation may be undertaken in 
isolation of other impacting factors. Participants need support and contact with other 
Participants.
750
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 PAC „Implementing the KP‟ (2005) at 4-6. 
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 Guyana has become a destination of choice for diamond smugglers. See PAC Annual Review (2009) at 23. 
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 PAC Annual Review (2009) at 9 on the DRC; at 8 on Angola. 
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Secondly, implementation and monitoring with respect to trading, cutting and polishing 
centres must be addressed for the purposes of beneficiation and otherwise. Thirdly, concern 
over the internal controls, as contained in the Scheme document, should be addressed as 
Participants lack confidence therein. Belgium, Angola, Guyana and the Côte d‟ Ivoire 
expressed concern over the lack of internal controls.
751
 
 
The lack of uniformity and implementation of internal controls is best addressed in a legally 
binding instrument. Legal instruments provide for the incorporation of its provisions into 
domestic legislation. Further, provision is also made for the progressive implementation of 
treaty provisions within particular time frames. In this manner, legal instruments remove the 
elements of uncertainty and lack of uniformity of practice.
752
 
 
 
Figure 13: Diamond exports 2008 
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 See Third Year Review; see also PAC „Seven case studies‟ (2004) at 6-14. 
752
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viii. Section V 
 
Problem 
Each Participant should collect and maintain relevant official production, import and export 
data, and collate and exchange such data in accordance with the provisions of Section V.753 
 
 
Figure 14: Top diamond importing countries 2008 
 
Data collection entails the presence of technological facilities and information storage 
facilities for data collection and record keeping purposes. This may also prove problematic as 
not all Participants are technologically efficient.  
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 Section IV (e) of the Certification Scheme. 
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Participants, when establishing a system of internal controls, take into account, where 
appropriate, the further options and recommendations for internal controls as elaborated in 
Annex II.754 
 
Pertinent to the four Working Groups, not all Participants are aware of the activities of all 
working Groups. The four main KP WGs are: Working Group on Statistics, Working Group 
of Diamond Experts, Working Group on Monitoring, and the Participation Committee. In 
terms of the Review, it can be difficult for those who are not Working Group members to be 
aware of all the activities of the Working Groups.  
 
Some Participants have failed to timeously submit data to the WG which hampers their work. 
Some members of the various Working Groups have noted that time-zone differences have 
made some teleconferences difficult to plan and execute. 
 
These further problems which the Certification Scheme encounters undermine its efficacy. 
The issues of enactment and amendment of laws to enforce the Certification Scheme‟s 
contents and the issue of data collection relate to legally binding obligations and lack of 
capacity. A scheme mechanism is unable to oblige members or participants to abide by its 
contents. This inability arises from the non-legal nature of the instrument of a scheme. In 
order to demand compliance a legally binding mechanism or instrument must be sought.  
 
ix. Recommendations 
 
In total twenty six recommendations are made to Participants. They are general 
recommendations; recommendations for control over diamond mines; recommendations for 
Participants with small-scale diamond mining; recommendations for rough diamond buyers, 
sellers and exporters; recommendations for export processes; recommendations for import 
processes and recommendations on shipments to and from free trade zones.755 
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 Section IV(f) of the Certification Scheme. 
755
 The Certification Scheme defines as „free trade zone‟ as a part of the territory of a Participant where any 
goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being outside the 
customs territory. Section I of the Certification Scheme. 
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The recommendations given in the Certification Scheme are sound in principle. Attention 
should now be given to the application of these recommendations by Participants. This may 
give rise to different avenues which must be sought to assist especially developing countries 
to overcome the real challenges they face in the day to day implementation of the 
Certification Scheme.
756
 
 
Participants may elect to follow through with recommendations. Recommendations relate to 
the transmission of electronic messages, sharing information to identify areas of rebel 
diamond mining activities.757 
 
Problems 
a. Contravention arising from conviction of legal persons should be disclosed by 
Participants.758 Disclosure should be made to all other Participants through the 
Chair.759 
b. Participants to ensure that all cash purchases of rough diamonds follow the trajectory 
of a legally acceptable purchase and sale transaction.760 
 
The transaction should include all the factors necessary for the conclusion of a legally valid 
sale, including, but not limited to routing through official banking channels.761 All of the 
facets to the transaction should be supported by verifiable documentation.762 
 
Indeed these Recommendations are commendable. However, their application in practical 
terms may become problematic. For example, the collection and storage of data pertaining to 
transactions is onerous on countries afflicted by poverty and lack of access to modern 
communications and data processing technology. Infrastructural constraints, lack of finances 
and other factors should have been considered.
763
 This may be remedied in a treaty-making 
mechanism that would provide for a permanent secretariat and centrally available funding. 
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Problem 
Recommendations for Control over Diamond Mines 
The Certification Scheme also provides for ‘Recommendations for the Control over Diamond 
Mines’ which is an aspect pivotal to tracing the course of a rough diamond.  
 
In so doing, the Certification Scheme encourages Participants to ensure that all diamond 
mines within their control are licensed.
764
 Permission for diamond mining will thus depend 
on the license status of a given mine. If a diamond mine is not licensed, then it will be 
prohibited from mining diamonds.
765
 
 
„Security standards‟ was another issue which concerned the Certification Scheme drafters.766 
Provision is made for prospecting and mining companies to maintain effective security 
standards, but these standards are not actually defined and stipulated. Effective security 
standards are aimed at ensuring that conflict diamonds do enter the legitimate diamond 
production sphere.
767
 
 
Control over diamond mines is intricate and demanding. Unless the Certification Scheme is 
able to provide assistance to diamond producing countries, these Recommendations will in all 
likelihood remain problematic to implement.  
 
Problem  
Provision is made in the Kimberley Process for ‘Participants with small scale diamond 
mining’ within their territories.768 
 
Artisanal and informal diamond miners769 should hold licenses prior to embarking on mining 
initiatives.770 Only those artisanal and informal diamond miners who are license bearers will 
be permitted to engage in diamond mining.771 Therefore artisanal and informal diamond 
miners who do not possess licenses will be prohibited from mining. At minimum the 
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 General Recommendation 9 Annex II of the Certification Scheme. 
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licensing records should contain the name, address, nationality and or residence status and the 
area of authorised for diamond mining purposes.772 
 
Indeed, the role of the artisanal or informal diamond miner is important to the diamond 
industry; most especially in curbing the illegal international trade in rough diamonds. 
However, especially the poorer diamond producing countries experience grave administrative 
shortcomings generally and do not the level of administrative capacity and territorial reach to 
be actually able to locating and identify and administer artisanal miners.
773
 In instances where 
they are located, a lack of trust will prevent co-operation.  
 
x. Section V 
 
Problem  
Participants should co-operate with each other to ensure that shipments of rough diamonds 
are conflict-free. The Scheme attempts to create co-operation between the Participants 
anticipating transparency.  
 
The hope is that effective checks and balances would result in the desired level of 
accountability.
774
 In so doing they must necessarily „comply‟ with the contents of the 
Certification Scheme. Participants should share with each other, through the Chair of the 
Kimberley Process, particular information.775 
 
Of particular importance is the fact that the Certification Scheme makes provision for the 
reporting of other Participants whose domestic legislation is not in keeping with the 
„provisions‟ of the Certification Scheme. The fact that the information pertaining to laws, 
regulations and procedures should be provided in English is detrimental to non-English 
Participants who are burdened with the cost and difficulties of translation. The Chair 
Participant should facilitate co-operation and sharing of information amongst Participants. 
 
                                                 
772
 The Certification Scheme Recommendation 12; see PAC Annual Review (2009) on Angolan artisanal miners 
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xi. Annex III: Statistical data 
 
Problem 
Participants should compile and make available to all other Participants statistical data in 
line with particular principles.776 Annex III deals with the matters of statistics and 
commercially sensitive information.  
 
Reliable and comparable data on the production and the international trade in rough 
diamonds are an essential tool for the effective implementation of any mechanism. 
Nevertheless, nearly half of the 30 million carats of diamonds exported from the Congo in 
2008 remained untraceable.
777
 
 
In particular the data is necessary for identifying any irregularities or anomalies which may 
indicate that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade market.778 Participants should 
inform any other Participant through the Chair if it considers that the laws, regulations, rules, 
procedures or practices of an exporting Participants do not ensure the compliance with the 
Certification Scheme with regard to the rough diamonds intended for export.779 
 
Strengths and mostly weaknesses, or concerns were revealed by the Review. Clearly, the 
WGS has made significant headway into the collection and submission of statistics. However, 
Participants opine that the statistical analysis should focus on situations where there is 
considered a clear risk of conflict diamonds and where there is clear unwillingness or 
inability to comply with minimum standards, including referring the situation to the 
Participation Committee.
780
 
 
Timely reports must be submitted by the WGS to enable complete and full contextual 
discussions. Concern was expressed over the quality and accuracy of data collated. 
Participants were of the view that the data must be made available for verification purposes 
by themselves. 
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 Section V (b) of the Certification Scheme.  
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The Certification Scheme assumes that all Participants have in place structures and personnel 
with specialised expertise and knowledge. It is doubtful that this is the case with most of the 
diamond producing Participants.
781
 A treaty instrument could address this issue specifically 
and ensure the effective and proper collation of statistical data from a permanent secretariat, 
which could then adequately disseminate the statistical data to all signatories.  
 
Problem 
Any applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme should signify its interest by 
notifying the Chair through diplomatic channels.782 
 
The Participation Committee, in accordance with its Terms of Reference, must consider any 
relevant information submitted to it by the Working Group on Monitoring regarding 
compliance by a Participant. It then determines whether, in its view, the Participant in 
question remains able and willing to meet the minimum requirements of the Certification 
Scheme.
783
 
 
The only requirement for participating in the Certification Scheme is that interested parties 
should notify the Chair through diplomatic channels. In the event of a legally binding treaty 
instrument signatures would be a formal process requiring ratification and thus incorporation 
into the domestic legal systems. In the alternative, it may be expedient for the Certification 
Scheme to adopt some substantive admission criteria. 
 
xii. Section VI: Review mechanism 
 
Problem 
Participants intended that the Scheme should be subject to periodic review, to allow 
Participants to conduct a thorough analysis of all elements contained in the scheme.784 
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 Section VI(9) of the Certification Scheme. 
783
 The Certification Scheme‟s minimum standards are defined in Sections II, III, IV, and V, and Annexes I, II, 
and III. 
784
 The Certification Scheme Section VI(20). 
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The Third Year Review was carried out in 2006. Since then, no reviews have been 
undertaken by the Kimberley Process. The Certification Scheme was not discussed in its 
entirety in accordance with the intention of the Participants. The Review was undertaken 
pursuant to a questionnaire formulated by the KP WG and handed to Participants. Indeed, a 
Review based on responses to a questionnaire is of concern. Regarding the impact of the 
Scheme, curbing the production and trade in conflict diamonds, Côte d Ivoire made very 
important submissions.  
 
Submissions reflected the lack of workability of the Certification Scheme. Participants were 
unable to report on internal controls as the KP had not yet undertaken review visits. The 
Working Group did not have sufficient capacity for review visits. 
 
The KP Review WG decided that the Peer Review Monitoring Mechanism should be 
appointed to undertake the Reviews. The PRMM operates under the rubric of the KP. The 
PRMM comprises a group of experts, including the role of observers. The role of observers 
comprises three aspects: the diamond industry self regulation; civil society and links with 
international organisations. All three aspects presented problems in the Review.  
 
Not all Participants were compliant with the contents of the Certification Scheme.
785
 There is 
a need to bolster capacity for implementation. Follow up review visits were made to some 
Participants. In terms of the Review, the review visits were successful. Review Reports are 
not made public. They are made available to other Participants in the restricted part of the 
KP‟s website. This presents some concerns. Only Participants may access the Review 
Reports. Parties outside the KP have no access to the Review Reports, which is problematic 
in light of accountability and transparency. 
 
The Certification Scheme was established at the Ministerial Meeting on the KPCS for Rough 
Diamonds in Interlaken on 5 November 2002.786 Since then a review was commissioned 
annually. Reviews are of crucial importance as they are indicators of the efficacy of the 
Certification Scheme‟s contents and the Participants commitments.  
 
                                                 
785
 The DRC and Venezuela, for example, as explained in the PAC Annual Review (2009) at 10-15. 
786
 Section VI (21) of the Certification Scheme. 
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A scheme or any mechanism of such importance should not only rely upon a self-review. 
Self-reviews may taint the true state of affairs. It is important that impartial outside 
organisations, NGOs and other States can participate in the process of reviews. Again, a legal 
treaty instrument could ensure more uniform and effective standards of accountability and 
transparency. 
 
xiii. Synopsis of problems relating to ‘accountability’ 
 
For accountability to be attained, a legal instrument in its formation is best suited in order to 
demonstrate positive results.  
 
With respect to the problem of definitions, a legal instrument will allow for open discussions 
and renewed consultations with the diamond industry, Participants and other important 
stakeholders. This process is especially possible through the auspices of the UN. 
 
Mixed parcels: whereas a legal instrument may be of a legally binding nature it would result 
in uniformly acceptable standards, taking into account the country specific situations. In 
particular, the situations prevailing in major diamond exporting nations such as Sierra Leone 
will play a major role in the determination of norms and standards. Diamond exports dropped 
significantly from $141 million USD in 2007 to $99 million USD in 2008. PAC Annual 
Review states that the main reason for the decrease in exports is stringent trade control 
measures.
787
 However, diamonds left the country through other means; they reached Antwerp 
through Dubai and Israel.
788
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 PAC Annual Review (2009) at 14-15. 
788
 PAC id at 16. 
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Figure 15: Sierra Leone diamond exports for 2003-2008. 
 
The table shows the steady increase in the rough diamond export from 2003-2007 from Sierra 
Leone. In 2008 the volume of rough diamonds exported decreased. This is attributed to the 
cessation of conflict and the establishment of accountability through the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. 
 
A legal instrument would be better suited for the running of satellite offices in diamond 
producing member states, in order to provide uniform training and capacity building for 
exports of rough diamonds. In turn, this would provide empowerment and human resource 
development opportunities, with minimal supervision. Ideally, such empowerment could 
create a platform for long term sustainability and efficacy. In this manner, the issues of KP 
Certificates and language could also be addressed more effectively. 
 
To become party to the Certification Scheme: the Scheme requires parties for participating in 
the Certification Scheme to notify the Chair through diplomatic channels. Such requirement 
is usually reserved for legally binding and policy agreements. The Certification Scheme, in 
making such a requirement is akin to a legally binding mechanism, as opposed to a voluntary 
measure. However, the requirement effectively bars NGOs and non-state actors from 
becoming participants, which a treaty instrument could permit, with due regard to best 
international practices. 
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xiv. Concluding remarks on difficulties with the Certification Scheme: 
Problem identification and analysis 
 
Both capacity and accountability may be significantly improved through the formation of a 
legal instrument. Firstly, a legal instrument creates certainty. This means that all parties as 
well as industry parties and even the artisanal miners can be made aware of their obligations. 
Secondly, legal instruments can make binding provisions for the progressive realisation of 
their provisions.  
 
In this manner, parties to the instrument would be given better opportunities at acquiring and 
implementing best practices.
789
 Through this learning process, parties to the instruments 
could more rapidly improve their standing in the international community.  
 
e. Infringements of the Scheme 
 
The effectiveness of the Certification Scheme may also be measured in terms of the number 
of reported cases of Certification Scheme infringement or violation in relation to how many 
of these cases are pursued through the judicial channels of respective Participants. This 
provides evidence that the Certification Scheme is being enforced in Participant countries. 
 
With respect to the KP Review Questionnaires, nearly half of all Participants reported that 
they have not had any cases of infringement.
790
 Among the Participants that did report 
instances of infringement on their questionnaires, the number of cases ranged most 
commonly from one to five. For example, since the implementation of national legislation in 
January 2003, Canada recorded five cases of infringement, resulting in convictions and 
forfeitures.
791
 All five cases were investigated in accordance with Canada‟s legislative and 
judicial provisions. 
 
                                                 
789
 Milanovic „Norm conflict‟ (2009) at 307.  
790
 China, India, Israel, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States did not report cases of infringement 
on their KP Review Questionnaires, despite having mentioned such cases in their 2003 and/or 2004 Annual 
Reports. For example, US authorities seized four rough diamond shipments in 2004. Brazil and Venezuela did 
not submit a response to the KP Review Questionnaires. This is according to the Third Year Review at 23. 
791
 Third Year Review at 23. 
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According to the Review, only three Participants reported more than five cases of 
infringement on their questionnaires: Australia recorded eight, Sierra Leone recorded 16, and 
the EC recorded 26.
792
 In each country, the cases were investigated in conjunction with 
customs officials and in accordance with national legislative provisions and judicial means. 
For example, the Australian Customs Service has seized a total of 339.264 carats of rough 
diamonds.
793
 Sierra Leone has seized a total of 340.5 carats worth approximately 
US$19,029.
794
 The EC has seized more than 12,000 carats worth approximately US$1.5 
million.
795
 
 
The response of the Participants to instances of infringement varied from case to case. The 
vast majority of cases led to the seizure of the parcel or shipment of rough diamonds in 
question.
796
 According to the Review, some parcels of rough diamonds were returned to the 
exporting country while others were forwarded to the intended recipient pending receipt of 
proper documentation.
797
 Several cases led to the imposition of fines and the commencement 
of criminal proceedings following a police investigation and other judicial instruments. 
 
The Review made the following recommendations:
798
 
 
 As part of their Annual Reports, Participants should be required to provide more 
detailed information on cases of infringement, which they are able to share within 
the provisions of their national legislation.  
 Where possible, they should include the number of seizures of rough diamond 
shipments along with details on the weight, value, exporter, importer, and country 
of origin of the parcel, as well as other details concerning the prosecution and 
outcome of each case. 
 Participants should be encouraged to share this information with one another on 
an ad hoc basis. 
 
                                                 
792
 Third Year Review at 23-24. 
793
 Two of the seized shipments did not have a declared value; thus, a precise total value cannot be computed. 
794
 Third Year Review at 24. 
795
 In the European Union, EC authorities have pursued additional cases (even when diamond shipments were 
not seized) based on suspect documentation on re-exports from the EU. 
796
 This information is made available to Participants. The information is not made public. 
797
 This information is made available to Participants. The information is not made public. 
798
 This information is made available to Participants. The information is not made public. 
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Although the situations of conflict diamond trade have significantly been reduced through the 
implementation of the Certification Scheme in Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC, it must be 
borne in mind that these reports arise from the Certification Scheme itself. The Review has 
been based on country reports and the Review visits of the KP. This may taint a proper 
scientific determination as other reports by civil society organisations for example, 
demonstrate contestable facts.  
 
Legal instruments provide for a range of mechanisms of accountability due to their legally 
binding nature. As such, legal instruments are a sufficient and a powerful means of achieving 
objectives generally pursued in the international environment. The salient mechanisms of 
accountability pertinent to the study are legal accountability; lobbying; sanctions; capacity 
and technology; peer review, reporting and ostracism; the role of international and civil 
society organisations.  
 
The issues analysed in this study presents concerns as to the long term sustainability and 
efficacy of the Certification Scheme. It must be borne in mind that at the time the 
Certification Scheme was formulated, it was undertaken with full recognition that it was 
appropriate to counter the illegal trade of rough diamonds. However, ten years on, it appears 
prudent and appropriate to consider the efficacy and long term sustainability of the 
Certification Scheme.  
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2. Legal nature of the Scheme with respect to compliance and implementation of the 
Scheme 
 
Participants to the Certification Scheme are expected to fulfil particular „requirements‟ 
pursuant to the Certification Scheme in order for it to have application within their respective 
jurisdictions.799 Furthermore, Participants are also expected to undertake several other 
measures aimed toward the workability of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism with no force of law. However the 
contents of the Certification Scheme in some salient instances, as will be mentioned below, 
are couched in legal terms. This would create implied legal obligations despite the 
Certification Scheme not having the status of a legal document such as a treaty. In many 
instances, the Certification Scheme appears to aspire to features of a treaty mechanism. In the 
main, it may be stated that the Certification Scheme has a quasi legal basis in law.
800
 It is a 
voluntary, self-regulatory initiative whose provisions may be complied with by States and the 
diamond sector. 
The Certification Scheme operates on the basic premise that each shipment of rough 
diamonds must be accompanied by a KP Certificate from the point of origin to the point of 
destination.  
 
The Certification Scheme nevertheless remains a voluntary mechanism. In public 
international law, parties to a mechanism may only be bound by the provisions of the said 
mechanism if they agree to be bound. Moreover parties to mechanisms may be bound when 
the mechanism is of a law-making nature. A treaty is an agreement between parties which is 
recognised in public international law.  
 
Parties may be States or international organisations. They enter into treaties for their mutual 
benefit; however, in certain instances parties may enter into treaties for the benefit of persons 
within their jurisdiction.  
                                                 
799
 Sections II-VII of the Certification Scheme. 
800
 Brownlie (1990) at 605. 
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3. Outcomes from the 2010 Seminar held on Implementation and Enforcement 
 
Recognising the importance of strengthening efforts to address diamond smuggling, the KP 
Chair for 2010 (Boaz Hirsch) identified enforcement as a key priority for the Chairmanship 
of Israel.
801
 To support the Chair‟s efforts to make progress on the issue of diamond 
smuggling, in particular, efforts to keep Ivorian diamonds from entering the black market, the 
United States funded national dialogues on diamond smuggling in four countries, namely, 
Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Technical assistance of Partnership Africa 
Canada was secured.
802
 
 
The purpose of the workshops, which were convened by civil society organisations in each 
country, was to create a space for multi stakeholder dialogue on diamond smuggling and the 
Kimberley Process. A broad and diverse range of organisations, including mine ministries, 
civil society, artisanal miners, union members, diamond dealers, customs and police, attended 
the workshops. Following the workshops, national profiles on diamond smuggling were 
created for each country and presented at the first KPCS Enforcement Seminar, held in Tel 
Aviv at the June 2010 KPCS Intercessional. 
 
Immediately following the Kimberley Process Intercessional in June 2010, a daylong seminar 
was held with representatives of governments, civil society, and the diamond industry to 
explore the complex issues surrounding fraud and diamond smuggling.
803
 Co-sponsored by 
the Governments of Canada and the United States, with the financial support of many 
organisations, the Enforcement Seminar brought together a group of actors, particularly 
customs and police officials.  
 
The Enforcement Seminar created an opportunity for officials to interact with government, 
industry and civil society in order to exchange information and perspectives on ways to 
strengthen the principles and practices of Certification Scheme‟s enforcement measures. 
 
                                                 
801
 „Diamonds without borders: An assessment of the challenges implementing and enforcing of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme‟ Report submitted to the KPCS Plenary by PAC, the governments of Canada and 
the US 1-4 November 2010 Jerusalem at 3. Available electronically at www.kimberleyprocess.com.Last visited 
01 September 2011. 
802
 Ibid. 
803
 West African countries, in particular Sierra Leone, Ghana, Liberia and Côte d‟Ivoire. 
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Two sessions were held. The first session consisted of two sets of panel presentations 
followed by breakout meetings and then a plenary summary. Specialists from the diamond 
industry and customs organisations provided in depth reviews of the nature of diamond 
smuggling and other associated illicit activities. Workshop participants appreciated the 
recounting of the then current diamond smuggling situation and the complexities involved in 
combating fraudulent trading practices. Civil society groups and multilateral organisations 
also provided unique and complementary perspectives on diamond smuggling. 
 
The second session consisted of presentations and small group discussions focused on the 
Certification Scheme‟s enforcement issues in West Africa. This session built upon the 
extensive preparatory efforts of national delegations from West Africa and some participants 
sponsored by the Canadian and US governments. 
 
a. Multilateral:804 way forward and outcomes (first session) 
 
i. Inter-agency co-operation 
 
Inter-regional diamond smuggling requires region-wide responses, especially among 
enforcement agencies. Whatever institutional form it might take, stakeholders agreed on the 
importance of having some type of high level forum that could bring together officials from 
key enforcement agencies in both exporting and importing countries to develop effective 
approaches to combat fraud, smuggling and other illegal activities around diamonds.
805
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
804
 http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/kp_enforcement_en.html. „Diamonds without borders: An 
assessment of the challenges on implementing and enforcing the KPCS‟ Seminar held by PAC and the 
governments of Canada and the USA in Jerusalem November 1-4 2010. Reported to the Plenary of the 
Certification Scheme. Last visited 08 July 2011. 
805
 „Diamonds without borders: An assessment of the challenges implementing and enforcing of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme‟ Report submitted to the KPCS Plenary by PAC, the governments of Canada and 
the US 1-4 November 2010 Jerusalem at 15. Available electronically at www.kimberleyprocess.com. Last 
visited 01 September 2011. 
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ii. Working Group on enforcement 
 
Given the centrality of this issue to the work of the Certification Scheme, many stakeholders 
suggested that the KP either set up a Working Group on Enforcement or ensure that 
enforcement issues were more regularly discussed in existing working groups.
806
 
 
iii. Work Plan on enforcement 
 
Once partners have found a mechanism to come together for cooperation and information 
sharing, the Certification Scheme should coordinate implementation of a comprehensive 
work plan on enforcement encompassing solutions at the local, national, regional and 
international levels.
807
 
 
iv. Information sharing and trust building 
 
One of the first items on an Enforcement Work Plan would be creating mechanisms for 
enforcement agencies to share information and build trust, both within occupational groups 
such as police officials from different countries; and across occupations such as bringing 
customs officials and police together.
808
 Existing multilateral institutions should create 
spaces/networks/institutions to enhance information sharing. 
 
v. Trust fund on enforcement 
 
Several stakeholders noted that although the Certification Scheme has extremely high 
expectations of the types of enforcement actions that African countries should undertake to 
prevent diamonds from being smuggled; resources to finance enforcement activities remain 
scarce.
809
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 Ibid. 
807
 Ibid. 
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 „Diamonds without borders: An assessment of the challenges implementing and enforcing of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme‟ Report submitted to the KPCS Plenary by PAC, the governments of Canada and 
the US 1-4 November 2010 Jerusalem at 16. Available electronically at www.kimberleyprocess.com. Last 
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b. Regional focus: way forward and outcomes 
 
Stakeholders highlighted the importance of focusing limited resources in the initial stages of 
developing Certification Scheme enforcement initiatives. A focus on Côte d‟Ivoire was 
suggested. 
 
c. National: way forward 
 
While multilateral cooperation is essential for dealing with smuggling, a number of national 
level actions were highlighted as well. Three types of solutions were put forward: 
 
i. Development solutions 
 
This should encompass ideas on how to prevent smuggling from occurring by dealing with 
issues of fairness and security from the perspective of artisanal miners. Central to the 
discussions on development solutions were strong recommendations for governments to 
examine closely the prices artisanal miners receive when they participate in the formal 
market, and to develop and promote community reinvestment initiatives to highlight the 
social value of participating in the formal system.
810
 
 
ii. Governance solutions 
 
Governance solutions were also put forward for national governments to improve the 
oversight and accountability systems in the diamond supply chain, that make it more difficult 
for individuals to smuggle without being caught.
811
 A recurring theme was for government 
officials to take a more systemic approach to monitoring the diamond supply chain by 
introducing more random audits and „spot checks‟ into the oversight systems, set up at the 
national level.
812
 Stakeholders also highlighted the importance of collecting meaningful 
                                                                                                                                                        
the US 1-4 November 2010 Jerusalem at 16. Available electronically at www.kimberleyprocess.com. Last 
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production data, and continuing to hold multi-stakeholder dialogues on Certification Scheme 
issues.
813
 
 
iii. Enforcement solutions 
 
Enforcement solutions focussed on improving the effectiveness of institutions designed to 
intercept diamond smugglers and bring them to justice.
814
 Numerous stakeholders 
emphasised the importance of improving collaboration between enforcement agencies at the 
national and regional levels, and providing education, training and logistical support for 
enforcement officials.
815
 An innovative proposal to involve community members in 
monitoring porous borders emerged from the Liberian workshop, as a means to compensate 
for limited state resources to monitor remote border areas. 
 
The Certification Scheme has made significant progress in understanding the issue of 
enforcement, and building up its capacity to address challenges at the multilateral level. 
Initial steps that have been taken include a promising new partnership with the World 
Customs Organisation, which was proposed at the 2010 KPCS Intercessional in Tel Aviv.
816
 
 
Going forward, the KP has an opportunity to build on the momentum created by the Chair to 
institutionalise efforts to improve enforcement cooperation at the international and regional 
levels. Priority actions for the KP could include the following: 
817
 
 
1  Set up a KPCS Working Group on Enforcement to steward the development and 
implementation of a KPCS Work Plan on enforcement. 
2 Support initiatives that lead to increased interagency cooperation, information 
sharing and trust building (the WCO, Interpol, the IMF Anti Money Laundering 
Initiative)  
3 Facilitate the funding of enforcement related cooperation and activity. 
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Certification Scheme participants could: 
818
 
 
1 Closely examine the prices artisanal miners receive, and explore ways to ensure 
they receive fair prices. 
2 Reinvest a portion of diamond related revenues back into mining communities 
and report on the impacts of these investments. 
3 Approach the design and implementation of internal controls from a systemic risk 
management perspective by conducting more random audits and spot checks. 
4 Explore models for collecting meaningful production data. 
5 Improve logistical supports for enforcement agencies. 
6 Involve communities in community based monitoring of diamond producing 
areas. 
7 Continue to involve diverse stakeholders in the design and implementation of the 
Certification Scheme related policies and programs. 
 
It is important to recognise that the KP Intersessional affirmed the concerns on the 
shortcomings and failings of the Certification Scheme. Having done so, the KP organs and 
Participants must endeavour to realise the suggestions in order for the Certification Scheme 
to have a significant impact on important matters, especially smuggling which is still ensuing. 
Further reports by NGO PAC have also demonstrated that Zimbabwean diamonds from the 
Marange region are being smuggled into South Africa. It was further reported that Angolan 
diamonds reach South Africa through Zimbabwe.  
 
Inasmuch as the issue of smuggling has been significantly addressed, the concerns 
surrounding the implementation and monitoring of the Certification Scheme must still be 
addressed. Enforcement of the Certification Scheme is mostly dependent on the will of 
Participants. In the absence of sufficient good will and motivation of Participants, the 
Certification Scheme must still seek a more viable means for enforcement to ensure 
implementation and accountability. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
While the Certification Scheme is uniquely qualified to serve in Africa in certain areas, it 
lacks the capacity to address the full range of development challenges on its own. This is 
evidenced by the outcomes and evidences of the Enforcement Seminar of 2010. Partnerships 
based on comparative advantage and pooling of resources were recognised as being critical to 
maximising impact on African development. The Certification Scheme must progressively 
strengthen its partnership agenda with a wide spectrum of constituencies both regionally and 
internationally.  
 
In order to devise sustainable strategies to address challenges experienced on Certification 
Scheme‟s agenda, it is imperative that symptoms be classified and their causes be 
understood.
819
 This is the first step to successful or sustainable prevention and or alleviation 
of threats to peace and security.
820
 
 
Another concern is the increasing technological gap between Africa and other developing 
regions in the world. This is not only in terms of the acquisition of technology but also in 
terms of the manner of internalising, adapting, optimising and actually operating it. The 
crucial question is not that of transfer of technology. Rather the crucial need is to reverse the 
historical dependency relationship with the developed countries for certain types of 
technologies that are generally inappropriate for African capacities and needs.
821
 
 
Another factor that affects the effectiveness of the Certification Scheme is the 
implementation by Participants both in the areas of international and internal control. It is 
evident that developing countries particularly those in Africa face unique challenges in, for 
example, effectively implementing the recommendations for Control over Diamond Mines or 
recommendations for the import or Export Processes. 
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Issues such as the lack of technology infrastructure, resources and monitoring through to 
effective border controls offer challenges to Participant countries especially those in the 
developing world. The recommendations given in the Certification Scheme are sound in 
principle, however attention should now be given to the application of these 
recommendations by participants and ways must be sought to assist especially developing 
countries to overcome the real challenges they face in the day to day implementation of the 
Certification Scheme.  
In spite of its acclaimed successes to date, the Certification Scheme has serious flaws. Many 
flaws have been highlighted in chapters three and four of the study. In the main, 
technological gaps between Participants predominantly on the African and South American 
continents hinder the Certification Scheme‟s stringent recommendations.  
Recommendations do not carry the force of law. Yet at certain points the Certification 
Scheme invokes principles of international trade law in the trade of rough diamonds. Still, 
such references and stipulations do not attend to the deficits of accountability. Accountability 
is crucial to the tenets of the Certification Scheme. Without accountability, the Certification 
Scheme becomes a white elephant with a few willing Participants.  
One of the major quandaries of the Certification Scheme is the lack of enforcement. The 
voluntary nature of the Certification Scheme does not permit the uniform adoption processes 
to actually eradicate conflict diamonds from the legal diamond market. 
These problems, it is submitted, relate mostly to the nature of the Certification Scheme. If the 
nature was legally defined, then the identified problems would have to be addressed by 
consensus. A document that would legally bind Participants to the Scheme would inevitably 
make accommodation for accountability, thus giving effect to the original purport or intention 
of the Certification Scheme. 
 
For this to occur, cognisance must be taken of the fact that not all matters are resolved 
through the formation and implementation of a legal instrument. The EC passed Council 
Regulation 2368 implementing the Certification Scheme. EC Council Regulation 2368 
codified the contents of the Certification Scheme into statutory law.  
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In the main, the Certification Scheme appears to work well for those Participants whose 
interests and capabilities are well aligned with other objectives.  
 
The next chapter addresses the particular issues that arise from the application of 
Certification Scheme in the Zimbabwean context.  
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CHAPTER 8 : THE CERTIFICATION SCHEME: ITS 
APPLICABILITY IN ZIMBABWE 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is relevant to the second objective of the Certification Scheme, namely to 
eliminate or curb the flow of illegal conflict diamond trading, which results in human rights 
abuses and crises. 
 
Having made the assessment on the legal characterisation of the Certification Scheme, the 
case of Zimbabwe‟s Marange diamond mines will now be examined, as a particularly 
important test case of the effectiveness of the Certification Scheme in an actual situation of 
systematic human rights abuses. Thus a brief situational analysis of the Marange mine region 
will be explored first.  
 
Human rights abuses and conflicts were the primary impetus for the setting up of the 
Kimberley Process International Certification Scheme for the trade of rough diamonds.
822
 
Resolutions, as discussed in chapter four of the study, of the UN GA and the UN SC 
evidenced the international concern over the illegal trade of rough diamonds as it fuelled 
conflicts.
823
 Thus, regulation of the trade of rough diamonds and the curbing of conflict 
diamonds entering the international trade of diamonds was sought.  
Within international law, a state party to a human rights instrument is accountable to three 
different categories of legal entities. First, a state party is accountable to its citizens, and 
second to Member States. Third, a state party is accountable to the UN, in particular to the 
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bodies created by its human rights treaty mechanisms.
824
 Thus the relationship between a 
state party and its citizens in international human rights law is crucial as the state is the 
primary role player. 
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2. Human rights situation in Marange 
 
a. Move for suspension of Zimbabwe from the Certification Scheme 
In their investigation in 2010, Human Rights Watch researchers were able to interview 23 
people directly linked to the Marange diamond fields and to confirm the following abuses, 
which put Zimbabwe in violation of the minimum standards required for membership in the 
Kimberley Process:
825
 
 The Zimbabwean army uses syndicates of local miners to extract diamonds, often 
using forced labour, including children.  
 On September 17, a soldier shot and killed a 19 year old member of one 
syndicate. The soldier stated, in the presence of witnesses, that he had shot the 
man for hiding a raw diamond instead of handing it over to the soldier.  
 Local miners provided information that soldiers have begun to recruit people 
from outside Marange to join army-run diamond mining syndicates.  
 Smuggling of Marange diamonds has intensified. Scores of buyers and 
middlemen openly trade in Marange diamonds in the small Mozambique town of 
Vila de Manica, 20 miles from Mutare.
826
 
This following table demonstrates the events in the Marange (Zimbabwe) diamond fields 
despite Zimbabwe being a Participant in the Certification Scheme. 
                                                 
825
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Figure 16: PAC Occasional Paper 2010 available at www.pacweb.org/zimbabwe 
 
The ownership of the Marange diamond fields is in dispute. The mines minister, the police 
commissioner, and the government owned company, ZMDC, have all failed to comply with a 
High Court order issued by Judge Charles Hungwe on September 28 2010, to restore 
prospecting and diamond mining rights in the diamond fields to the previous owner, ACR.
827
 
The judge also directed ZMDC to cease prospecting and diamond mining activities in the 
area as the Court stated that the mining area belongs to ACR, a private company. Although 
the High Court ordered the police to cease interfering with ACR‟s prospecting and mining 
activities, both the police and the army continue to bar it from access to the diamond fields. 
Zimbabwe's minister of mines has appealed the High Court Order, and ZMDC continues to 
carry out prospecting and mining operations at Marange.
828
 
On October 6 2010, to comply with a demand by Kimberley Process members, President 
Mugabe announced that the government had selected two new private sector investors to take 
over mining in Marange.
829
 However, the process of selection has been shrouded in secrecy 
                                                 
827
 Ibid.  
828
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visited 30 September 2011 
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and the investors‟ identities remain unknown.830 The Kimberley Process‟s Certification 
Scheme‟s rules require Participants to ensure that all diamond mines are licensed and that 
only licensed mines extract diamonds.
831
 
In its June 26 report, Human Rights Watch documented how Zimbabwe‟s army, under the 
control of Zimbabwe‟s dominant political party, ZANU-PF, had committed horrific abuses 
against miners and local residents, including killings, beatings, and torture.
832
 The report also 
revealed the army‟s policy of rotating military units into the diamond fields for roughly two-
month periods.
833
 This policy was designed to maintain the loyalty of senior military and 
other officials to ZANU-PF by giving them illicit access to Zimbabwe‟s mineral wealth at a 
time of national economic and political crisis.
834
 Human Rights Watch found new evidence of 
rotation of army units into Marange.
835
 At the beginning of October, the Harare based special 
mechanised brigade was deployed, replacing the Kwekwe based fifth brigade.
836
 
The Kimberley Process sent a review mission to Marange in late June 2010 to assess 
Zimbabwe‟s compliance with the organisation‟s standards, which require diamonds to be 
lawfully mined, documented, and exported by Participant countries.
837
 On July 4, local and 
international media reported that the review mission found Zimbabwe to be in violation of 
these standards.
838
 The media reports said that the review mission urged the government to 
take corrective action by July 20 or face suspension.
839
The KP did not suspend Zimbabwe 
from the Certification Scheme. The consensus based mechanism within the KP structures on 
decision making, hence a decision on suspending a Participant means that only one 
Participant may dissent which will render a decision to suspend inoperable.  
The government of Zimbabwe ignored calls by the review mission to remove military units 
from Marange, to end human rights violations and smuggling, and hold accountable those 
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responsible for abuses.
840
 In this context, Human Rights Watch again called on the Kimberley 
Process to set up a local monitoring mechanism comprising independent local civil society 
organisations and Marange community leaders, who could freely monitor and verify the 
Zimbabwe government‟s compliance with the Kimberley Process review mission‟s 
recommendations.
841
 
 
b. Key Kimberley Process Members 
The final decision on a possible suspension of Zimbabwe rests with Participants to the 
Certification Scheme, who work on the basis of consensus. When consensus is impossible to 
reach, the Chair is mandated to carry out consultations. To reach consensus, it is essential for 
the following key countries to support fully the suspension of Zimbabwe: 
i. Namibia 
As previous Chair of the Kimberley Process, Namibia presided over all plenary proceedings 
and, in the event that consensus cannot be reached, may be mandated to assist in conducting 
consultations on the way forward. Namibia is also a major regional diamond producer, and its 
ruling party, SWAPO, has long had close links with Zimbabwe‟s ZANU-PF.842 
ii. India 
Some of the world‟s largest rough diamond cutting and polishing centres are found in India. 
India chairs the Kimberley committee on participation, which is responsible for making 
recommendations regarding Zimbabwe‟s future participation. Human Rights Watch 
investigations found that raw Marange diamonds are being channelled to India for 
polishing.
843
 This raises the risk that Marange diamonds could taint the reputation of India‟s 
domestic industry if no action is taken.
844
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iii. South Africa 
Human Rights Watch investigations found that South Africa is one of the main destinations 
of Marange diamonds, and that they are also smuggled there via Mozambique.
845
 Along with 
the region‟s other main diamond producers, Botswana and Namibia, South Africa will find its 
market reputation undermined if it blocks Kimberley Process action on Zimbabwe and 
permits the continued entry of Marange diamonds.
846
 
iv. Belgium 
Home to a huge diamond sorting and polishing industry, Belgium is another notable 
destination for raw Marange diamonds.
847
 Belgium‟s position within the organisation is likely 
to have great influence on the rest of the European Union.
848
 Its reputation could suffer if it 
continues to handle tainted Zimbabwe stones.  
v. Israel 
As the 2010 Chair of the Kimberley Process, Israel encountered scrutiny for its position on 
Zimbabwe‟s suspension at the meeting.849 
Human Rights Watch learned that the Kimberley Process team sent in to review conditions in 
the fields in August 2010 was routinely obstructed by government officials from conducting 
its activities and was unable to gather crucial information about conditions in the majority of 
diamond fields.
850
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3. Human rights violations in Marange diamond fields 
According to Human Rights Watch Reports, corruption is rife, and smuggling of diamonds 
by soldiers in the fields is prolific.
851
 The diamond revenues continue to benefit a few senior 
people in the government and their associates, rather than the people of Zimbabwe.
852
 
Soldiers continue to perpetrate abuses in Marange, including forced labour, beatings, and 
harassment, which Zimbabwe‟s government has failed to investigate or prosecute.853 
State security agents have harassed local civil society organisations that were attempting to 
document smuggling and abuses in the fields. In June 2006, police arrested Farai Maguwu, 
the head of the Centre for Research and Development, after he provided sensitive information 
on the activities of soldiers in the fields to Abbey Chikane, a monitor appointed by the 
Certification Scheme.
854
 Police also beat, arrested, and detained members of Maguwu's 
family. Maguwu was charged with „communicating and publishing falsehoods against the 
State with the intention to cause prejudice to the security or economic interests of the 
country‟ under section 31 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act.855 
a. Principal buyers and smuggling routes 
 
Human Rights Watch was not able to fully pursue the global chain of purchase of diamonds 
from Marange, but Human Rights Watch‟s research suggests that the majority of Marange 
diamonds have been smuggled out of the country via Mozambique, South Africa, and Harare 
international airport, and then shipped to Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, India, Pakistan, 
and Europe, among other destinations.
856
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A significant number of homes in the district have been rented to foreign nationals with 
connections to diamond mining.
857
 As early as September 2006, Zimbabwe authorities 
acknowledged that the smuggling of Marange diamonds had become a serious problem.
858
 
Soon after, the Ministry of Mines directed the MMCZ to „mop up all diamonds in Marange 
and reduce the quantity of diamonds that were illegally leaving the country‟.859 From October 
2006, the MMCZ moved into Marange and began trying to purchase diamonds from illegal, 
unlicensed local miners.
860
 
 
MMCZ officials added to the number of middlemen operating.
861
 They paid out token cash 
sums as incentives to get miners to hand in stones that they had extracted and to stop them 
from trading with foreigners or smuggling the gems.
862
 The MMCZ offered prices that were 
far below market value and much lower than those offered by foreign smugglers, so their 
interventions failed to halt smuggling and illicit trading.
863
 
 
b. Specific human rights abuses, corruption, and extortion by the police 
(November 2006 to October 2008) 
 
On November 21, 2006, five months after the discovery of diamonds in Marange, the 
government launched a nationwide police operation code-named Chikorokoza Chapera (End 
to Illegal Panning), which was aimed at stopping illegal mining across Zimbabwe.
864
 During 
the operation, police deployed approximately 600 police officers, arrested about 22,500 
illegal miners,
865
 and seized rough diamonds and minerals with an estimated value of US$7 
million.
866
 
                                                 
857
 Ibid. 
858
 Ibid. 
859
 Ibid. 
860
 Ibid. 
861
 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/zimbabwe-rampant-abuses-marange-diamond-fields. Last visited 30 
September 2011. 
862
 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/zimbabwe-rampant-abuses-marange-diamond-fields. Last visited 30 
September 2011. 
863
 Ibid. 
864See Peerenboom „Human rights‟ Last visited 30 September 2011; see further Sauders „Crisis‟ (2008) at 74-80. 
865
 Of this figure, approximately 9000 persons were arrested in the Marange region. 
866
 See http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/17/letter-select-major-diamond-retailers; see also http://www.hrw.org 
/news/2009/12/23/stop-zims-abusive-diamond-trade; see http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/22/kimberley-
process-and-zim-last-chance-saloon. Last visited 01 September 2011http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/01/28/how-
292 
 
In June 2009, Human Rights Watch published a report documenting horrific human rights 
abuses in the Marange diamond fields by the Zimbabwean military, including forced labour, 
child labour, the killing of more than 200 people, beatings, smuggling, and corruption.
867
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4. Role of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
 
Human Rights Watch research suggests that the RBZ, which had no legal status to buy 
diamonds until the end of January 2009, has been a major buyer of illegal diamonds from 
Marange since as early as 2006.
868
 In so doing, it violated the Precious Stones Trade Act by 
buying diamonds from unlicensed miners and other illegal sources.
869
 Buying diamonds from 
illegal and undocumented sources also violates Certification Scheme requirements, which 
stipulate that Participants must record all sources of diamonds and export them with 
necessary documentation indicating their origin.
870
 
 
Several middlemen told Human Rights Watch that they had been RBZ agents in Marange 
since October 2006 and that they were given money to buy diamonds from bank officials.
871
 
Local miners told Human Rights Watch that the RBZ and foreign buyers offered market 
prices for the diamonds purchased.
872
 A credible local organisation based in Mutare that 
carried out research in Marange has also named the RBZ as one of the main buyers of the 
area‟s diamonds.873 
 
In its Preamble, the Certification Scheme provides for the curbing of human rights abuses 
resulting from the illicit trade of rough diamonds. The State of Zimbabwe, as has been 
explained above has a duty to respect and ensure human rights. In so doing, the human rights 
abuses in the Marange region must be curbed. It should not be acceptable for a Participant to 
the Certification Scheme to embark upon rough diamond mining and production whilst 
perpetrating human rights abuses.  
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At the Final Communique held in the DRC on 3 November 2011, the Plenary endorsed the 
KP Chair‟s proposal for a decision on Marange (Zimbabwe). The Communique commended 
the DRC, as KP Chair, the EU and Zimbabwe for their relentless efforts at promoting an 
agreement that allows for trade of compliant Marange diamonds under the KPCS and 
maintains the KP integrity and credibility.
874
 The Plenary called on Zimbabwe and the WGM 
to jointly implement the decision with a view to bringing Zimbabwe‟s Certification Scheme‟s 
implementation in the Marange mining area into full compliance with minimum 
requirements.
875
  
 
The KP decided upon an enhanced vigilance approach as aforementioned. No reports were 
made of KP Certificates issued from Zimbabwe, yet it has been reported that the rough 
diamond export continues to increase from the Marange region. The Plenary also called upon 
representatives of the KP civil society coalition, namely Partnership Africa Canada and 
Global Witness to engage actively in the implementation of the decision. There was no 
moratorium placed on the trade of rough diamonds from the Marange region. Therefore, 
rough diamond trading in the Marange region continues. 
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5. Legal standards applicable to Zimbabwe’s diamond industry  
 
Apart from the UN GA Resolutions, especially Resolution 55/56 (2000),
 876
 international 
human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR, Zimbabwe ratified the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights in 1986,877 which, among its many provisions, 
requires states to protect the right to life
878
 and property.
879
 
 
Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights states: 
 
„Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, 
particularly slavery, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited.‟880 
 
Zimbabwe ratified the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). The ICESCR states that state parties to it accept the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including the continuous improvement 
of living conditions and prohibition of forced eviction.
881
 In 1998, Zimbabwe ratified the 
International Labour Organisation Convention, prohibiting forced or compulsory labour. 
Furthermore in 2000, Zimbabwe ratified the ILO‟s Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention.
882
 
  
                                                 
876
 UN GA Resolution 55/56(2000) UN Doc. A/RES/55/56(2000). 
877
 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev 5 21 ILM 58 (1982), entered into force October 21, 1986, ratified by Zimbabwe in 1986, art 5. 
878
 Article 4 of the African Charter. 
879
 Article 14 of the African Charter. 
880
 See the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights Article 5, see also International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
881
 Article 11 of the ICESCR. 
882
 ILO Convention No 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention), adopted June 17, 1999; and ILO 
Convention No 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted June 28, 1930. 
296 
 
6. The Certification Scheme and its role in Marange 
 
The Certification Scheme obliges Participants to exercise effective internal control over their 
diamond industry to prevent trade in conflict diamonds in the global market. Each Participant 
is required to ensure that all rough diamonds that it exports from its domestic industry are 
accompanied by a valid, forgery resistant Kimberley Process certificate attesting to their 
origin. The Certification Scheme has an investigative arm, the Working Group on 
Monitoring, which monitors compliance with Certification Scheme requirements in all 
Participant countries. 
 
The Certification Scheme has, to date, taken a number of steps to address the Marange 
diamonds issue. In June 2007 a Certification Scheme review team led by the Russian 
Federation visited Zimbabwe and came up with recommendations to strengthen Zimbabwe‟s 
certification system.
883
 In 2008 the Certification Scheme plenary meeting noted with great 
concern „the continuing challenges faced by Zimbabwe in meeting its obligations and 
recommended further monitoring of developments and concerted actions in that respect‟.884 
 
In the same month, a delegation, led by the then Kimberley Process Chairperson Esau 
Bernhard of Namibia, visited Zimbabwe and expressed concern to the government of 
Zimbabwe about reports of smuggling and abuses in Marange.
885
 He urged Zimbabwean 
authorities to „put an end to the violence in Marange and bring the area under control‟.886 A 
review mission also ensued in June 2009 which evaluated, among other things, the situation 
in the Marange diamond fields.
887
 
 
The Chairperson publicly questioned, following the March 2009 visit, whether suspending 
Zimbabwe from the Certification Scheme would bring the smuggling of Marange diamonds 
to a halt or end illegal activities in the district.
888
 He said that suspending Zimbabwe „will 
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only help exacerbate the problems in Zimbabwe‟ without stopping Marange diamonds from 
penetrating the legitimate trade.
889
 
 
The KP expressed concern at the illicit trade of diamonds from the Marange area in 
Zimbabwe and decided to step up international efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of 
those diamonds, notably by calling on KP Participants to take appropriate „enhanced 
vigilance measures‟ as per KP Chair notice of 10 February 2009. Pursuant to the KP Chair 
notice of 06/05/2010, the KP decided to upgrade the vigilance measures. This guidance aims 
at assisting KP Participants to implement the „enhanced vigilance measures‟ and handle 
suspicious shipments from the Marange area.
890
 
 
 „Participants should make use of the footprint on Marange diamonds and, when 
confronted with a suspicious Marange shipment, Participants should take the 
following precautionary measures: 
 
 Provisionally detain the shipment; 
 Exercise due diligence, i.e. request the necessary information in view of an 
examination to determine, where possible, the origin of the goods; 
 
 Participants confronted with a suspicious shipment should ensure transparency 
and duly inform the KP Chair and the WGM and issue a suspicious shipment 
report for their consideration, subject to national applicable provisions. The 
suspicious shipment report should contain information pertaining to the 
determination of the origin of the goods, without prejudice to the confidentiality 
of commercial information. Where necessary, the WGM will ensure coordination 
with other KP working bodies such as WGS or WGDE; 
 
 Upon receipt of such a report, the WGM will consider making a recommendation 
to the KP Chair to place the suspicious shipment report on the Participants 
section of KP website. Participants are encouraged to keep their own records of 
suspicious shipments; 
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 When a Participant is confronted with a suspicious shipment requires assistance 
of technical nature for the examination of suspicious shipment and/or evaluation 
of the origin of the goods, the Participant may present a request to the KP Chair 
or the TA coordination mechanism for specific technical assistance in the 
matter‟.891 
 
Considering that the appropriate use of KP certificates is crucial for the credibility of the KP, 
Participants were also encouraged to exercise caution as regards possible fraudulent KP 
Certificates.
892
 
 
For ease of reference, the Certification Scheme defines „conflict diamonds‟ as meaning rough 
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining 
legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may 
be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognised in United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be 
adopted in future.893 
In July 2009, a Kimberley Process investigative mission again found serious human rights 
abuses and rampant smuggling at the Marange diamond fields.
894
 Despite these findings, 
Participants to the Certification Scheme decided not to suspend Zimbabwe from participation, 
nor to ban the export of its diamonds.
895
 The reason advanced was that the mandate of the 
Certification Scheme only addresses „conflict diamonds,‟ if those mined by rebel groups, but 
not by abusive governments.
896
 In this case, the abuses at Marange were committed by 
Zimbabwe's police and army, rather than rebel groups. 
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These abuses are as serious as those that the Kimberley Process was designed to address. 
Reliance on a technicality provides no comfort for the victims of the abuses. Instead of 
ignoring human rights abuses, Certification Scheme Participants, as well as retailers, should 
expand the definition of „conflict diamonds‟ to include the Marange diamonds. 
Zimbabwe is a Participant in the Certification Scheme, which was established in 2003 to 
combat the trade in conflict diamonds. The Certification Scheme defines conflict diamonds as 
rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at 
undermining legitimate governments.
897
 In the strictest sense, due to the absence of armed 
conflict and the involvement of a rebel army or movement in Zimbabwe, the Marange 
diamonds would not fall within Certification Scheme‟s definition of conflict diamonds. 
 
However, such serious human rights abuses by security forces connected with diamond 
mining justify a more expansive interpretation of the Certification Scheme‟s mandate to 
include human rights issues. To formalise this extension of its mandate, the Certification 
Scheme‟s rules should be amended to assert that human rights are a key concern for the 
Certification Scheme. The preamble of the Certification Scheme‟s core document recognises 
„the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, 
safety and security of people in affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights 
violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts‟. 
 
The Certification Scheme‟s core document can be modified by consensus of the Participants 
following a proposal by any participant. Civil society organisations participating in the 
Certification Scheme have already initiated a dialogue among participants with respect to 
conflict diamonds, calling on the Certification Scheme to ensure its minimum standards are 
consistent with international human rights law. 
 
The Certification Scheme ultimately delineated the scope of the diamond problem it was to 
address by regulating „rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance 
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments. ...‟898 This founding document‟s 
preamble reflects a similarly narrow interpretation in „[r]ecognizing that the trade in conflict 
diamonds is a matter of serious international concern, which can directly be linked to the 
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fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of rebel movements aimed at undermining or 
overthrowing legitimate governments, and the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, 
armaments. ...‟899 
 
Yet the Certification Scheme left the larger illicit diamond trade as well as Zimababwe‟s use 
of diamonds to increase and consolidate control and the diamond industry‟s role in other 
human rights abuses unmentioned and unregulated.
900
 According to Wexler, the newly 
emerged Certification Scheme that regulates the diamond trade reflects a very state-centred 
definition of the problem to be addressed.
901
  
 
The Kimberley Process embodies this interest in its unwillingness to distinguish between 
rebels and freedom fighters. Wexler further states that the Kimberley Process simply 
presumes preventing or ending conflict is a sufficient end in itself.
902
 This Certification 
Scheme attempts to cut off rebel access to illegal diamond mining, but does nothing to 
regulate what undemocratic or repressive governments do with such resources.
903
 In so doing, 
it reinforces the state‟s primacy and emphasises the legitimacy of the existing political 
order.
904
 
 
Such an approach is unsurprisingly consistent with much of existing international law.
905
 For 
instance, the Kimberley Process‟s failure to acknowledge the potential legitimacy of non-
state struggles accords well with much of international humanitarian law which usually only 
applies to state actors engaged in armed conflict. Even Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention and Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, which include some limited 
protections for non-state actors engaged in internal armed conflicts, leave purely internal 
disputes to be regulated domestically.
906 
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Wexler argues that rebel forces seeking diamond mining are not freedom fighters seeking 
national liberation, nor do they seem committed to improving the state‟s human rights 
practices, and moreover, these groups clearly engaged in rampant and systemic human rights 
abuses themselves.
907
 Rather, this-sub section means to convey the insight that the Kimberley 
Process‟s initial focus on rebel groups reflects a common, statist strategy that might 
compromise larger human rights goals.
908
 The initial scope of the Kimberley Process along 
with the Certification Scheme as a whole shows non-state actor abuses while ignoring state 
and corporate abuses.
909
 It suggests that the international community acts to deny resources to 
rebel groups regardless of the nature of the underlying conflict. 
 
As the nature of conflicts, repression and human rights abuses changed over the past decade, 
with the virtually total disappearance of post-independence rebel groups in Africa, the 
Certification Scheme risks becoming irrelevant and ineffective if it adheres to a narrow 
interpretation of its original core mandate and limits its human rights focus to human rights 
abuses committed by non-state actors. It can thus be submitted that the Zimbabwean case 
highlights a further serious shortcoming of the Certification Scheme which makes the need to 
revisit its mandate and nature compelling.  
 
The Certification Scheme or an international treaty instrument that may replace it must 
expand its objectives to specifically cover broader human rights concerns and unambiguously 
include them as part of the Certification Scheme. Diamonds originating from situations like 
Marange, where serious human rights abuses have taken place, should be shunned in the 
same manner as traditional „conflict diamonds‟ acquired by rebel groups. The term itself 
should be amended to reflect a broader array of abuses connected to mining. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Like many extractive industries, the diamond trade has proven a highly lucrative business. 
Each year the diamond industry produces over US $62 billion in diamond revenue.
910
 Also 
like many other extractive industries, the majority of diamonds are produced in African 
countries. In total, approximately 65 percent of world diamond production occurs on the 
African continent, amounting to roughly US $8.4 billion. This comprises about one fifth of 
total diamond revenues.
911
 Top producing African countries today include Botswana (26 
percent), South Africa (11.8 percent), Angola (8.1 percent), and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (8.0 percent).
912
 
 
However, these countries‟ markets and others, notably Sierra Leone, Liberia and more 
recently, Zimbabwe, have experienced considerable challenges in recent times. That is, 
throughout the 1990s diamonds fuelled instability in African countries already rife with 
political unrest, corruption and violence. This was the case in Sierra Leone, where diamonds 
were a viable source of funding for many rebel groups willing to exploit human rights in 
order to seize the established government.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, and after an eleven year civil war, 50000 people were killed across 
Sierra Leone and hundreds of thousands were displaced.
913
 The Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) earned roughly US $400 million in conflict diamond revenues in the course of one 
decade, which were used to systematically exploit citizens for arms, labour and other abusive 
means.
914
 
 
UNITA gained power as a Cold War proxy militia for the United States, earning an estimated 
US $3-4 million from the trade in illegal diamonds in 1999 alone. Sierra Leone and Angola 
experienced damaging returns from its diamond market. Over the course of the 1990s, and 
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into the 2000s, approximately 3.7 million people were killed and another 6.5 million people 
were displaced across Africa as a result of conflicts fuelled by diamond profits.
915
 
 
Angola was in fact the first African country to attract the attention of the UN SC, as it 
launched an investigation in 1999 into the activities of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, finding 
that he and his supporters were able to leverage illicit diamond profits for munitions purposes 
and war operations.
916
 Such activities had been carried out despite continued UN arms and 
financial sanctions and in April 2000 the UN SC adopted Resolution 1295, establishing a 
“„Monitoring Mechanism” to collect additional information and investigate any relevant leads 
regarding sanctions violations, with a view to enhancing the implementation of the measures 
imposed on UNITA‟.917 
 
Today, the Certification Scheme is comprised of 75 Member States who account for 
approximately 99.8 percent of rough diamond production.
918
 The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the legal characterisation, implementation, monitoring and evolution of the 
Certification Scheme. 
 
Blood diamonds gave rise to humanitarian crises of untold proportions such as those typified 
in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Angola and Liberia. The Certification Scheme is the most 
significant attempt to comprehensively address the issue of conflict diamonds. The 
international community has long sought an international certification scheme for the 
legitimate trade of rough diamonds. The Certification Scheme signified the international 
community‟s commitment to attain a mechanism which would ensure the legitimate trade of 
rough diamonds; arising from conflict production regions which ultimately resulted in human 
rights abuses and humanitarian crises.  
 
state parties evidenced commitment by embarking upon sanctions against diamond producing 
nations alleged to have traded in conflict rough diamonds. Furthermore, the UN GA in its 
hallmark Resolution 55/56 (2000) provided the impetus to the international community of 
                                                 
915
 www.amnesty.org, „Blood diamonds are still a reality‟. Last visited 30 September 2011. 
916
 www.un.org. Last visited 30 September 2011. 
917
 Ibid. 
918
 www.kimberleyprocess.org. Last visited 30 September 2011. 
304 
 
nations, international organisations and NGOs which was required to respond to the illegal 
trade of rough diamonds.  
 
The Certification Scheme was adopted at a meeting between governments, NGOs and 
diamond industry representatives in May 2000 in Kimberley, South Africa. That was the 
beginning of a three year long negotiating process that led to the establishment of the 
Certification Scheme. The Certification Scheme came into operation in January 2003.  
 
The meetings which culminated in the finalisation of the Kimberley Process did not undergo 
a formal or diplomatic process. Treaty documents were neither signed nor ratified.
919
 
Participants to the Kimberley Process were state parties, NGOs and representatives of the 
diamond industry. Apart from State parties, the latter two are entities without legislative 
authority. 
 
All countries with a vested interest in the international trade of rough diamonds participated 
in the Kimberley Process. Subsequently countries became Participants to the Certification 
Scheme which arose from the Kimberley Process.  
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2. Implementation and monitoring 
 
Out of the fourteen countries that are part of the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), eight are diamond producers: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Tanzania, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. One member, Mauritius, is an important diamond 
cutting centre. Botswana is the world largest producer of rough diamonds by value. 
 
Since its inception the Certification Scheme has not undergone any changes. However the 
effect of the Certification Scheme was fundamentally altered with added impetus when 
Participants began implementing the provisions of the Certification Scheme. 
Lack of mechanisms of accountability within the Certification Scheme, in the main, cause the 
Certification Scheme to lose credibility. Mechanisms are necessary for enforceability of the 
Certification Scheme. In recognition of the development of many State Participants, 
particularly the EU, it may be surmised that consensus for sustaining an economic goal was at 
the forefront of implementation which manifested in the subsequent Council Regulation of 
2002.
920
 
 
Limitation: Certification Scheme’s implementation  
 
The Certification Scheme is a voluntary mechanism, which can only be effective with the 
support and determination of the implementing country. An effective implementation of the 
Certification Scheme is possible in countries where the Participant concerned has minimum 
capacity to enforce regulation and where the political will exists.  
 
It is important to note that the capacity of the Participant State is not determined by peace and 
democracy alone. The implementation of the Certification Scheme requires commitment 
from governments. The political will to enforce the law must be present in order for a 
government to devote sufficient energy and resources to the initiative. 
 
In Southern Africa, it is in countries that have each of these characteristics in which the 
Certification Scheme has been effective. These countries include Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa. In these countries systems of resource management, including the management 
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of diamonds, are well structured and controlled. Governments in these countries can monitor 
both imports and exports of rough diamonds effectively and with the same efficiency and 
rigour as their European counterparts. The Certification Scheme‟s contents are progressively 
realised; thus making implementation in countries that uphold the rule of law and ensure 
good governance possible. Equally, the Certification Scheme is much easier to implement in 
countries where the objectives are in line with those of the country‟s leaders. 
 
However, it has been far more difficult to implement the Certification Scheme in an 
undemocratic environment where the Participant is itself involved in accumulation of 
diamond resources. Again, DRC and Angola stand as stark examples of environments in 
which corruption and the absence of the rule of law have raised questions about the veracity 
of the claims that the Certification Scheme has been implemented in a credible manner. In 
both countries there are serious challenges.  
 
The government of the DRC is known for not being in control of its entire territory.
921
 
Indeed, the Participant state is so weak that it is not even in a position to monitor the mining 
contracts that it has signed with companies.
922
 The state has no capacity to monitor the 
extraction of diamonds.
923
 So weak are the systems that on a daily basis, flights land in 
remote parts of the DRC without government knowledge.
924
 Most importantly, the state is so 
weak that it cannot produce reliable statistics on which to base an accurate conclusion about 
the state of the diamonds trade.
925
 
 
In Angola, another phenomenon exists. There we find a strong state that is in control of its 
resources.
926
 The Angolan government can monitor its diamond trade if it wants to, yet has 
chosen to abdicate that responsibility because powerful networks of political figures control 
the diamond industry. The illicit diamond trade continues in Angola despite the fact the war 
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has ended and in spite of the presence of the Certification Scheme.
927
 It is difficult to find 
statistics on diamonds in Angola. This does not mean there is no legal diamond trade in 
Angola. Instead, the lack of statistics reflects the fact that the figures are likely to be so 
distorted that the government is not prepared to publish production and revenue figures.
928
 As 
a result of this, it is not clear how much revenue government receives from legal diamond 
sales. 
 
Limitation: Certification Scheme’s mandate 
 
The Certification Scheme‟s objective of ending the illicit diamond trade and reducing violent 
conflict only deals with the symptom, which is conflict. It does not deal with the cause. The 
cause of the illicit trade is bad governance in the management of diamond revenues. Conflict 
is simply an all-too-familiar consequence of poor management of resources and their 
revenues. 
 
Just as conflicts will not be solved by limiting the illegal trade of diamonds, the illicit 
diamond trade will not disappear because wars have ended. Both conflict and the illicit 
diamond trade will be solved when countries like the DRC and Angola are able to put in 
place accountable and transparent resource management systems. Perhaps this is where the 
Certification Scheme‟s biggest weaknesses lies. One cannot rely on externally driven 
mechanisms to deal with a problem which is mainly caused by internal structural weaknesses.  
 
The recent case of Zimbabwe shows that when state structures are weak or have collapsed 
people fill in the gap. This sometimes includes moving into the extraction of resources that 
governments can no longer protect and control. Until recently Zimbabwe had an efficient and 
effective resource management system, but as the political crisis has unfolded across the 
country, this system has collapsed.
929
 The formal diamond trade is being replaced by an 
informal diamond trade. Despite the state‟s efforts to curb the informal diamond trade, it is 
continuing and in fact becoming increasingly sophisticated.
930
 As Tim Hughes attests, „recent 
reports of conflict and illicit diamonds seeping into South Africa from the DRC via 
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Zimbabwe are a timely reminder that despite, significant victories, the war on conflict 
diamonds has not yet been won‟.931 
 
Like in Angola and the DRC, the Certification Scheme should play a supportive rather than 
primary role.
932
 The only way Zimbabwe will be able to stabilise the diamond industry again 
is through government ownership and control of a domestic resource management system 
that could be reinforced by the Certification Scheme mechanism.
933
 As in Angola and the 
DRC, the problem of the informal diamond trade in Zimbabwe is exacerbated by the 
existence of a network of powerful political figures in whose interests it is to maintain the 
illicit trade. It is impossible for the Certification Scheme to produce positive results in 
countries where government officials are themselves preying on the mineral wealth of their 
countries.
934
  
 
This situation challenges the ambit of the Certification Scheme system that focuses on the 
diamond trade and not on governance in the different countries. The Certification Scheme can 
only be effective in an organised state where good governance is respected. The main 
purpose of the illegal diamond trade is not necessarily to fuel conflict. The trade exists in this 
informal form in order to maximise profit by evading taxes that would otherwise be due to 
the state. Typically, conflicts are symptoms of deep-seated divisions in societies.
935
 
 
To assume that only illicit diamonds fuel conflict is also simplistic. The possibility also exists 
for legal diamonds to fuel conflict. This happens when diamond revenues are not equitably 
shared among the population, and instead are used to strengthen and enrich a few who are 
close to the regime. The Marange diamond rush in Zimbabwe has benefited senior ZANUPF 
officials and those close to them. In Angola, there are rumours that in an attempt to buy the 
opposition, the government (MPLA) has given the opposition (UNITA) a concession to mine 
diamonds.
936
 This is a strange situation in African politics where a ruling party gives 
economic boost to an opposition party.
937
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Yet it is a clear manifestation of political co-option or a move to weaken the opposition‟s 
oversight role. The MPLA‟s co-option of UNITA through the offer of an economic carrot to 
allow it to have some continued, if circumscribed, control over mineral wealth, is a sign that 
all is not well in Angola.
938
 Equally, a question could be posed about the extent to which 
UNITA would respect the Certification Scheme‟s requirements. 
 
The high risk of violent conflict that has been attributed to resource abundance in Angola and 
the DRC is mediated by critical governance failures.
939
 Systematic corruption and economic 
mismanagement and patrimonial rule, often associated with resource abundance, may fuel 
political and economic grievances by undermining the state‟s legitimacy and by weakening 
its capacity to perform core functions.
940
 States‟ failures to put in place natural resource 
management systems strongly influence the opportunities for and feasibility of rebellion.
941
 
This is why governance of natural resources needs to be made a central element of the 
Certification Scheme if it is to remain relevant. 
 
The main objective of the Certification Scheme finds defiance in Marange and smacks in the 
face of a different political and social reality. Whereas the Certification Scheme is optimally 
effective in the EC, who are the biggest importers of rough diamonds and the biggest 
exporters throughout the world, African countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa are amongst the biggest rough diamond producers with little regard for the 
Certification Scheme.
942
 Unfortunately the Certification Scheme does not meet its objective 
in serving those very countries it committed to serve at inception.  
 
The Certification Scheme must evolve beyond conflict prevention and include issues of 
governance and revenue transparency. For example, the process could constitute a database 
where it records the quantities of diamonds being traded and the possible revenues from these 
diamonds and follow through and see how a) the extent to which these revenues have been 
collected and b) how these revenues have been utilised. 
943
This could help track a 
government‟s use of revenues from diamonds, especially in countries like Angola, the DRC 
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and Lesotho, where resource spoliation is known to be significantly high.
944
 For example, 
despite the fact that the official diamond revenues increased dramatically from US$331 
million in 1995 to US$895-million in 2005, the Congolese state cannot explain how the 
money was used.
945
 
 
Limitation: Structure of diamond production 
 
In Southern Africa, the Certification Scheme has a serious challenge in countries where there 
are wide and entrenched artisanal mining operations. As much as 90 percent of the 
production in countries like the DRC, Angola and Lesotho is produced by artisanal labourers 
using simple tools and equipment, and living in conditions of insecurity and poverty.
946
  
 
The problem with artisanal mining is not that it is illegal, but rather that it is badly regulated 
and organised.
947
 The absence of any form of organised structure for these miners poses a 
multiple challenges to the Certification Scheme. Artisanal miners are mostly unregistered, 
and they operate in conditions that make them vulnerable to buyers.
948
 They tend to have few 
livelihood options, which means, that they will often sell their stones to whoever comes first. 
In addition, the distribution channels of diamonds from this sector are not always clear, 
making it difficult to monitor diamond transactions.  
 
The weakness of the Certification Scheme has been that it focuses more on the trade and 
export end of the industry and far less on the production of diamonds. The fact that 
governments in DRC and Angola are not capable of producing reliable statistics is in part a 
consequence of the high number of under regulated artisanal miners who are involved in the 
industry.
949
 Because these governments do not control production at the mining stage, they 
are also not in a position to control trade.
950
 It is possible to assume that plenty of diamonds 
from the artisanal mining sector go unrecorded through an informal network. The tracking 
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process can only be effective if it begins at the sites of mining activities, including those 
where artisanal mining is happening.
951
 
 
Another challenge to the Certification Scheme relates to the capacity of even those 
institutions that have been mandated to maintain peace and regulate the diamond trade.
952
 
Recent reports have suggested that United Nations personnel in the DRC have been involved 
in the illegal diamond trade, and in Zimbabwe the press has noted that a person involved in 
the United Nations Development Programme are being accused of aiding in the smuggling of 
diamonds out of Zimbabwe, in violation of the Certification Scheme.
953
 
 
Limitation: Weak monitoring capabilities 
 
Confiscation of rough diamond parcels from Zimbabwe has been reported to have occurred in 
India and Dubai.
954
 It has been reported that Angolan rough diamonds have entered 
Zimbabwe, which end up in South Africa for export. In both the DRC and Angola, there are 
signs of rampant smuggling, criminality and illegal exploitation of diamonds.
955
 Trustworthy 
contacts in these countries confirm that significant quantities of diamonds continue to be 
illegally traded. Yet the KP Secretariat refrained from suspending Zimbabwe from the 
Certification Scheme in 2009. 
 
Even if the DRC and Angola do submit their statistical records on time in line with the 
Certification Scheme, it does not mean those statistics are accurate. The design of a system of 
control is one thing, its implementation is another. Even at the 6 May 2011 Plenary, the KP 
noted the inability of the DRC to comply with the statistical submissions.  
 
The Certification Scheme is a non-binding instrument which relies upon good faith and 
political commitment for its success. To date, this is precisely what made the commitment of 
Participants stand. However, such a notion has its failings in the face of a lack of mechanisms 
of accountability. This has been demonstrated through so called violations of the Certification 
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Scheme by Venezuela, the DRC, Guinea, Liberia and other Participant countries.
956
 Perhaps 
the Certification Scheme was overzealous in its infancy. This, does not, however detract from 
much needed improvements to the Certification Scheme to bolster its efficacy. 
 
A well structured „Certificate of Origin‟ regime can be an effective way of ensuring that only 
legally mined diamonds, that is, those from government controlled areas reach the 
international diamond market. Additional controls by State Participants and the diamond 
industry are needed to ensure that such a regime is effective. These measures might include 
the standardisation of the certificate among diamond exporting countries, transparency, 
auditing and monitoring of the regime and new legislation against those who fail to comply. 
Despite the standardisation sought by the Certification Scheme, Participant Countries such as 
Zimbabwe has violated the Certification Scheme.
957
 
 
However, even if the Participants‟ initial aspiration was to constitute a political agreement, 
the Certification Scheme impetus has developed the kind of legitimate status that „typical‟ 
international treaties enjoy.
958
 Most Participants feel compelled to cooperate with the 
Certification Scheme. Participants want to be a part of the Certification Scheme. Equally, 
Participants fear the consequences of non compliance, even if no proper legal basis for 
sanctioning exists.  
 
The fact that the Certification Scheme‟s impetus has received such a broad following, gives it 
somewhat of a legal authority, making it difficult for diamond trading countries not to join 
the voluntary scheme. On the one hand, in successfully establishing a Community system the 
EU had to ensure an effective control of its external borders. On the other hand the EU had to 
preserve its structure of internal free trade. Earlier implementation of UN Resolutions that 
sanctioned the trade in conflict diamonds provided the EU Member States with ideas on 
alternative diamond trade regulation in the EU.
959
 Unfortunately, UN sanctions were not 
sufficient to overcome loopholes in the global trading system and not every country had 
implemented effective and harmonised control mechanisms. 
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Of pivotal importance is the application of the Certification Scheme. The Certification 
Scheme addresses situations of rebel movements exploiting rough diamonds to overthrow 
legitimate governments. The Certification Scheme is not sufficiently broad in ambit to 
include Participants or State Parties that embark upon human rights abuses whilst engaged in 
the mining and production of rough diamonds, such as the situation typified in Zimbabwe‟s 
Marange region.  
 
The Certification Scheme should be strengthened by broadening its ambit to include pariah 
nations such as Zimbabwe which will be consonant with ethos, purport and objectives of the 
Certification Scheme. 
 
Diamonds are a fungible commodity, which means that they are a particularly attractive 
means of moving value across borders, in other words, money laundering.
960
 Presently, the 
Certification Scheme defines „conflict diamonds‟ as rough diamonds used by rebel 
movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments. It 
is suggested that the following modification be considered: 
 
„Conflict diamonds‟ means „rough diamonds used by rebel movements or its allies, or a state 
or its agents or its allies, to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments; or 
where a state or its allies or agents use rough diamonds to perpetrate human rights abuses, or 
engage in acts contrary to international human rights and international humanitarian law‟. 
 
It is anticipated that the aforementioned working definition will provide the impetus for 
reconsideration of the intention of the Certification Scheme. After all, the Certification 
Scheme has a two fold mandate: firstly, to curb the illicit trade in rough diamonds; and 
secondly to prevent human rights violations.  
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3. Legal characterisation and the evolution of the Certification Scheme 
 
Amongst the aims of this study is to characterise the legal nature of the Certification Scheme. 
With the legal characterisation of the Certification Scheme, it becomes possible to determine 
its efficacy, its meaning in international law and long term sustainability.  
 
Regarding the process of its implementation, the Certification Scheme has logically striven 
toward minimalising legislative and logistical steps for its Participants. A pivotal diamond 
trading Participant, the EU by presenting itself as a single Participant, effectively succeeded 
in making the Certification Scheme a part of its Member States‟ national systems, through 
legislative measures under the EC Regulation (Common Foreign and Security Policy).  
 
The rules of international trade, upheld by the WTO, could have been a hindrance for a new 
system that tried to alter the way in which diamonds are traded internationally, even if it were 
to serve a „noble‟ cause. It should be noted, however, that the Certification Scheme as such 
does not constitute a trade restriction in WTO terms, but rather the execution of its provisions 
by the Certification Scheme Participants that are also members of the WTO. The WTO 
Council instead decided to issue a waiver. This waiver expressly gave its member states 
permission to proceed with their trade restricting measures against non-Participants to the 
Certification Scheme.  
 
Still, with its waiver decision the WTO indirectly recognised that the Certification Scheme 
stands as a significant, autonomous agreement in which almost all diamond trading WTO 
members have decided to adhere to alternative rules governing the trade in a potentially 
pernicious product. The WTO supports the existence of the Certification Scheme. 
 
The Kimberley Process approach to the quandary of conflict diamonds provides an 
interesting example of political, economic and social developments in the international 
sphere. Indeed the Certification Scheme is a noteworthy multilateral endeavour seeking an 
economic-political solution to sever the relationship between the trade in diamonds and 
human rights violations and humanitarian disasters.  
 
315 
 
Despite the lack of legal authority of the Certification Scheme, Participants have indicated 
that their intentions to be „bound‟ by the contents of the Certification Scheme are indeed 
serious.
961
 Manifestation of this intent is evidenced by the passage of domestic legislation 
arising from the Certification Scheme commitment. The WTO, the UN and the EU have 
given recognition to the Certification Scheme.
962
 
 
The role which international organisations have played in the Certification Scheme must not 
be ignored for they provide crucial indicators as to the perception and acceptance of the 
Certification Scheme. The UN GA, the UN SC, the WTO and of note, the EU have given 
recognition to the Certification Scheme through indirect requests made by Participants. Such 
a drive has caused the Certification Scheme to gather sufficient momentum that by far 
counterbalances most international instruments‟ impact in recent decades. 
 
The response by international organisations must be tempered with social, political, legal, 
economic and other objectives. Inasmuch as the Certification Scheme was intended to curb 
the illicit trade of rough diamonds, which gives rise to human rights abuses, Participants also 
had other pressing concerns that bolstered the momentum for the formation and acceptance of 
the Certification Scheme. Out of volition, Participants accepted the contents of the 
Certification Scheme into their respective domestic legislation. The international diamond 
trade was in dire need of a legitimate diamond trading environment.  
 
The character of the Certification Scheme is in keeping with Dupuy‟s view, which have 
followed suit with many other international instruments in the past three decades or so.
963
 The 
Certification Scheme is not prescriptive. Evidence of the Certification Scheme‟s non 
prescriptive nature arises from its request for annual reports from Participants in order to 
monitor the progress of implementation by Participants. According to Dupuy‟s analysis, this 
constitutes evidentiary proof of the intention not to be bound in the strict sense.
964
 Juxtaposed 
against Brierly‟s argument with regard to the legal fiction pertinent to the „consent to be 
bound‟ by a state, Dupuy has gained support.965 
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From a theoretical standpoint, the prerequisite of an ultimate authority for legitimacy of 
international law remains. In practice though, this notion has deference to the pervasive legal 
and social realities. The core issue lies not entirely in an attempt to identify the ultimate 
source of law in order to determine the validity of a norm. Rather, cognisance must be taken 
of the fact that fundamental principles have opened new avenues for cogency of 
argumentation in order to determine the sources of law for the purposes of ascertaining the 
veracity of a norm. 
 
Inasmuch as Article 38 of the International Court of Justice purports to contain the sources of 
international law, it by no means purports to be exhaustive in its listings. The pertinent 
elements for the creation and development of new rules of customary international law lie in 
satisfying two legal elements. 
 
In the first instance, competent state authorities must demonstrate a „consistency and 
generality of similar acts‟. In the second instance, there must be an expression of the notion 
that such acts are performed in response to a legal obligation, namely opinio juris.
966
 It is 
difficult to prove the existence of opinio juris or the so called mental element. With regard to 
opinio juris, Brownlie states that the general practice raises a presumption of opinio juris and 
it is for the opponent to prove that this is not the case.
967
 Otherwise put, the party contesting 
the existence of a general practice must prove that the general practice in fact does not exist. 
Here, a civil onus must be discharged. 
 
The courts rely on the actual existence of a general practice. This means that the court will 
not be satisfied with the existence of a general practice until the contrary is successfully 
demonstrated through the assessment of facts. In general, courts are not satisfied with the 
mere presence of a presumption in favour of the existence of a general practice because 
courts are less concerned with the analysis of a mental state. The court is concerned more 
with an outward manifestation of intent with respect to the existence of a general practice. 
 
With the passage of time, norms or standards of conduct have the propensity to develop into 
legal rules. Unless couched in a law making treaty that arises from the entrenched 
international culture, norms and standards of conduct do not automatically qualify as legal 
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rules. At the point of inception, norms possess the potential to assume the character of legal 
rules in international law and the international community. Therefore, norms and standards 
that are legally binding on the international plane must arise from a law making treaty or the 
trajectory of development through factual practice, must be demonstrated. 
 
However, the contemporary international community demonstrates an understanding of 
acceptance to the emergence of new rules and normative conduct.
968
 New rules and 
normative conduct do not necessarily undergo the process of transition into an emergence of 
new rules or new norms arising from normative conduct by states and international 
organisations, as Weil has stated. Instead, they demonstrate a rapid transition that realises the 
short term growth of rules into new rules and norms.  
 
The EU‟s regulations have laid the foundations for the contents of the Certification Scheme 
which have been transported into hard law.
969
 In the main, almost all the contents of the 
Certification Scheme have been transformed into hard law. With 49 Member States 
implementing the contents of the Certification Scheme, it is difficult not to state that the 
Certification Scheme has acquired the force of law, at least on the municipal level.  
 
Whether the EU regulation would become the subject of dispute remains to be seen. In this 
instance, one must ponder over the relevant bodies of adjudication. It is not possible to 
speculate on the adjudication of possible disputes, at this stage, because the Certification 
Scheme, to date, has utilised expulsion from participation in the instance of a so called 
„breach‟. 
 
The reasoning for the Certification Scheme‟s legal categorisation is dependent on various 
institutions and legal factors. 
 
The UN used to be regarded as the primary organisation for establishing internationally 
accepted standards of conduct. Despite the resistance of some scholars to recognise that 
Resolutions of the UN are generally not regarded as sources of law, UN GA Resolution 55/56 
(2000) paved the way for the formation of the Certification Scheme. As such, the 
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international community recognises that Resolutions of the UN GA and the UN SC have 
limited legal effects. Resolutions impact upon the conduct of States and international 
organisations thereby giving rise to the formation of new rules and standards of conduct. 
 
Even though Resolutions lack the authority of legal force, there is recognition by States and 
international organisations to observe the Resolutions in a particular light. At the very least, 
the observance not to oppose the Resolutions is considered to be compliance. The opposition 
of a Resolution calls into question the so called breaching party conduct into question by the 
rest of the international community. Zimbabwe‟s non-recognition of recent UN Resolutions 
and statements by NGOs has been called into question by the international community.
970
  
 
Consequently, Zimbabwe‟s non-recognition of UN Resolutions has resulted in public 
shaming and scorning by the international community at large. Therefore, it must be seen that 
at a most fundamental level, the notion of good faith in consideration and observance must be 
present even though the Resolution is non-binding in character. The UN is the principle 
organisation that establishes international norms and standards.  
 
It is necessary to distinguish between the authority of a Resolution and the legal 
consequences that arise from it. Because an agreement is not legally binding does not mean 
that agreement has no standing in the international community or in international law. The 
agreement, despite its non-legally binding nature must at least be observed. However, there 
can be no real demand for compliance with the contents of the agreement from the point of 
view of enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The EU‟s involvement in the battle against conflict diamonds began with the implementation 
of UN sanctions as enshrined in Security Council Resolutions 1173 (1998), 1176 (1998), 
1295 (2000), 1306 (2000) and 1343 (2001) which are legally binding on all Member States to 
the UN.
971
 These Resolutions prohibited the import of rough diamonds coming directly or 
indirectly from Sierra Leone or Angola, unless accompanied by certificates of origin, and all 
direct and indirect import of rough diamonds from Liberia.  
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After EC Council Regulation 1745/2000 had been extended by Regulation 303/2002,
972
 it 
was felt that the existing measures would have to be enhanced by effective controls of the 
international trade in rough diamonds. Therefore, a new Regulation was passed in 2006.The 
UN GA and the UN SC have both passed Resolutions recognising the role of conflict 
diamonds. The UN GA recognised the need for a certification scheme for the trade in rough 
diamonds. Brownlie advances the argument that such recognition indeed opens the doors to 
the creation of new norms. 
 
Cognisance must therefore be taken of the fact that States indeed are swayed by the 
Resolutions of the UN. Inasmuch as UN GA Resolutions may not be regarded as legally 
binding, the fact remains that UN GA Resolution 55/56 has become synonymous with the 
Certification Scheme. Passage of said Resolution permitted the community of nations 
together with other stakeholders to embark upon a process of establishing the Certification 
Scheme. 
 
The form and language of the Certification Scheme appears consistent with a „declaration of 
principle‟ and not of a legal obligation to comply. Usage of terminology appears to have been 
carefully selected by Participants. The language employed by the document of the 
Certification Scheme seemingly reflects a compromise between the various Participants. 
 
The language used in formal documents is often indicative of their legal status. Terminology 
typically used to indicate an intention to enter into a formal treaty are words like „shall‟, 
„agree‟, „undertake‟, „rights‟, „obligations‟ and „enter into force‟.973 The Certification Scheme 
text, however, makes use of less imperative phrasing such as „Participants recommend‟, „are 
encouraged‟, „should ensure‟, and „should be established‟.974 
 
The language, together with the lack of formal, treaty-like final clauses, or a registration 
requirement, is strongly indicative that the document is a political agreement or 
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„Memorandum of Understanding‟ (MoU)975 and not a proper treaty according to Schram.976 
Although the language employed in the Certification Scheme may also be viewed as a 
document of another kind.  
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 Aust (2000) at 26. 
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4. How the Certification Scheme attained juridical force 
 
In order to attain juridical force, an agreement must ordinarily be reduced to a treaty 
form.Treaties are international instruments that determine legal relations between parties.
977
 
The Certification Scheme, being a so-called „living agreement,‟978 has since its adoption 
gradually acquired a quasi-legal status, rendering much of the debate arising from the legal 
paraphernalia on the international level void of meaning.
979
 What matters at this point is that 
the Participants have implemented the Certification Scheme in their domestic law and have 
thereby demonstrated consent to be bound.  
 
Still no international obligation was established and this is why the Certification Scheme 
should be expanded into a formal international treaty. If an agreement is a law making 
agreement, then legal recourse may be had in the instance of a breach, pursuant to the 
provisions of the agreement. In the absence of a legally binding agreement, compliance per se 
is sought in other ways, namely ostracising, peer pressure and lobbying by civil society.
980
 
Inasmuch as compliance may not be secured through legal avenues, acts which flow from the 
agreement are deemed valid amongst the community of nations.
981
 As such, they may not be 
retracted despite the voluntary, non-legally binding nature of the agreement. 
 
Like Resolutions, the value of international agreements, are context dependent for their 
respective veracities.
982
 Thus, the value of a Resolution or an international agreement 
depends upon the context which gave rise to the formation of the international agreement, the 
degree of consensus attained for the formation of the international agreement, the institutions 
which the international agreement create, the issues of implementation and monitoring of the 
international agreement, the practice of the provisions of the international agreement. It may 
then be considered that the legal authority of the international agreement per se is less 
important than the actual impact of the said agreement. 
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In contemporary international law, certain normative phenomena occur which influence and 
control the behaviour of States and international organisations that do not have their basis in 
hard law in the strictest sense. All the same, the legal effects of the normative phenomena are 
experienced by the international community. The sphere of normative phenomena of „soft 
law‟ has remained the subject of academic controversy. 
 
Soft law exists independently of a legally binding agreement. The name accorded to an 
instrument of international law is insufficient for its characterisation or classification in 
international law.
983
 In the first instance, „soft law‟ attempts to influence international law 
unilaterally.
984
 In other words, new international norms are created for states and by states. 
States generally observe new international norms, especially when the applicability of new 
international norms has a direct impact on a particular state‟s behaviour.  
 
In the second instance, not all international agreements are able to secure full consensus from 
the international community, or a consensus that is sufficiently meaningful for new norm 
creation.
985
 Generally speaking, „soft law‟ lacks the character of hard law. „Soft law‟ 
instruments or agreements exist outside the normal parameters of legal agreements give 
credibility to the seriousness of commitment of the parties‟ intention to create new standards 
of conduct for the international community. In this way, a new paradigm for international 
cooperation is created. 
 
In the third instance, new norms may be couched in the form of organised international 
cooperation.
986
 These new norms arise from legitimate expectations that are embedded in the 
socio political compact agreed to by the states concerned. These new norms form the basis of 
realistic expectations that arise from the international agreement. As such, states and 
international organisations elect to abide by the new norms created, in the absence of the 
imposition of hard law nuances. 
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In order to determine which of the above three instances of „soft law‟ an international 
agreement most conforms to, an empirical exercise is necessary.
987
 Consequently, the impact 
of the international agreement, and the manner in which the international community has 
received it, must be examined. 
 
Participant States most affected by the contents of the Certification Scheme are those directly 
engaged in the production, import and export of rough diamonds. The World Diamond 
Council, the WTO and the UN are also impacted upon due to the various roles they play in 
the diamond trade industry. 
 
Of international organisations, specifically civil society organisations, Partnership Africa 
Canada and Global Witness have meticulously followed the Certification Scheme from 
before inception. They have been the foremost critics of the Certification Scheme in 
poignantly pointing to its so-called loopholes or deficiencies in achieving its two-fold 
mandate, as enunciated by the UN GA Resolution 55/56.
988
 
 
However, Participant countries in the EU, Africa, and the Americas have reacted positively to 
the introduction of the Certification Scheme. Some Participant countries have pointed to the 
shortfalls of the Certification Scheme, as illustrated in the Third Year Review. However, in 
the main, Participant countries, most notably the EU have passed domestic legislation, or are 
in the throes of passing domestic legislation, to give effect to the contents of the Certification 
Scheme. Inasmuch as Third World nations such as Côte d‟ Ivoire has voiced its many 
concerns with implementation and monitoring of the Certification Scheme, it has not resisted 
the norms created by the Certification Scheme.
989
 
 
The reactions of the EU, Africa and the Americas have been so despite the lack of juridical or 
legal force of the Certification Scheme. Demonstrably, there is a defined and clear 
commitment by Participant States to adhere to the contents of the Certification Scheme. The 
Certification Scheme was introduced to the international community at a time when the illicit 
trade in rough diamonds contributed significantly to gross human rights violations.
990
 In some 
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instances, the significant contribution of the illicit diamond trade contributed to humanitarian 
crises in Liberia, Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone.  
 
Countries such as the US and the EU member states, reacted through the passage of sanctions 
against diamond producing countries.
991
 The UN GA passed several Resolutions in an 
attempt to curb the illicit diamond trade and to remove pariah diamond trading nations from 
the international trade sphere.
992
 There was also reaction by the UN SC seeking a certificate 
of origin scheme from Angola for legitimate diamond trade in the international arena. This 
paved the path for an international certification of origin of rough diamonds scheme. 
 
Despite the difficulties encountered, Participants express their seriousness of intention toward 
the Certification Scheme through their vociferous complaints and moves for assistance with 
implementation of the Certification Scheme.
993
 They seek assistance with technological 
capacities, language barriers, cooperation and the like.
994
 This is a specific issue that the 
future Certification Scheme or treaty mechanism can address. 
 
Societies respond to the needs communicated to the law makers in given circumstances. They 
attempt to articulate compromises of a political, economic, social and moral nature. 
Contemporary societies attempt to compromise in a more modern fashion, creating pacts and 
relying upon good faith. The demands of modern international law are not as severe as 
traditional international law.  
 
Modern international law, especially in the recent three decades has demonstrated a 
willingness to allow „newcomers‟ onto the international playing field.995 This has been 
especially in light of the delicacy of situations and commodities that have been the subject of 
regulation. International instruments, like the Certification Scheme, which lacks the force of 
law, have come to acquire the force of law. The movement from precepts of norms of „soft 
law‟ gave way to hard law. 
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Common alignment of interests between nation states and international organisations appear 
more prominently in the international arena.
996
 Therefore, they have acquired more 
importance than the semantics of legal jargon. In meeting this new challenge, often non-
legally binding instruments have become the popular choice. The choice creates avenues for 
political compromise and international cooperation.
997
 Hard law would be unable to 
accomplish the same objectives. 
 
It may be stated that on the national level, the Certification Scheme is legally recognised.
998
 
On the international level, the document has wielded strong political influence, granting the 
Certification Scheme a special status, thus making it more binding than most conventional 
treaties. 
 
The reason that the Participants are eager to adhere to the agreement probably lies with the 
discrete nature of the diamond trade. Diamonds are at the heart of a multinational, 
multibillion dollar industry that has prospered on tradition, elitism and secrecy for hundreds 
of years. 
999
 
 
The fact that 70 to 80 percent of global annual production passes through the EU, implies that 
the EU regulation can have a huge impact on the trade in conflict diamonds.
1000
 Apart from 
humanitarian motives, the EU‟s participation in the Certification Scheme was deemed 
necessary and desirable for foreign and security policy reasons and economic considerations. 
Europe is an essential hub for diamonds, with London and Antwerp being two of the world‟s 
largest diamond trading centres.
1001
 Naturally, these centres are sensitive to the effects 
conflict diamonds can have on the legitimate trade. The Certification Scheme merely outlines 
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a framework and, assuming good faith, relies upon Participants to implement effective 
legislation.  
 
Exclusion from the diamond trading system, or obtaining a blemish on its reputation due to 
trade in illicit diamonds the Certification Scheme, would be untenable for any diamond-
producing country or diamond trader.
1002
 As Feldman states, „in industry circles, such 
exclusion is often compared to excommunication by the church‟.1003 
 
Concretely, the association of a country and its diamond industry with the trade in conflict 
diamonds could be interpreted as inability or unwillingness to comply with the Certification 
Scheme‟s minimum requirements.1004 These instances may lead to expulsion or suspension 
from the Certification Scheme as a Participant or a denial of application for membership.
1005
 
 
Since the Certification Scheme prohibits trade in diamonds between Participants and non-
Participants, the latter become pariahs in the world diamond trade. Therefore, the 
considerable negative consequences of non-compliance seem to make up for the Certification 
Scheme‟s lack of legal enforcement, giving it more credence of „soft law‟ characteristics. 
 
The Certification Scheme has proven itself to be a constituent of „soft law‟ insofar as it 
confirms the nature of „soft law‟ instruments. Soft law instruments, by definition, reflect 
informal cooperation, recognition and acceptance amongst Participants. Soft law reflects a 
common stance toward the quandary of conflict diamonds. All this constitutes sufficient 
evidence to prove that the Certification Scheme is „soft law‟ in nature since inception. 
Further, it may be said that the Certification Scheme may be considered to be an instrument 
of international law. 
 
The Certification Scheme is an extraordinary example of how a document with no formal 
legal force has successfully attained a sound juridical force in its eight years since inception. 
The case of the Certification Scheme corroborates the view of several authors that law does 
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not only develop out of the formal sources of its authority, but also to a great extent out of the 
activity that sustains it.
1006
 
 
This indeed is true for the Kimberley initiative, which has successfully mustered diamond 
trading countries‟ indispensable political willingness to institutionalise non-legal rules into 
sustained practice. Consequently, it may also be stated that the moral force of practice has 
culminated in a defined sense of legal obligations among Participants, which in turn has 
crystallised in the actual implementation of the Certification Scheme in national legislation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
PARTICIPANTS, 
 
RECOGNISING that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious international 
concern, which can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of rebel 
movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate governments, and the illicit 
traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms and light weapons; 
 
FURTHER RECOGNISING the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in 
conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the 
systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts; 
 
NOTING the negative impact of such conflicts on regional stability and the obligations 
placed upon states by the United Nations Charter regarding the maintenance of international 
peace and security; 
 
BEARING IN MIND that urgent international action is imperative to prevent the problem of 
conflict diamonds from negatively affecting the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a 
critical contribution to the economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and 
importing states, especially developing states; 
 
RECALLING all of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, including the relevant provisions of Resolutions 
1173 (1998), 1295 (2000), 1306 (2000), and 1343 (2001), and determined to contribute to and 
support the implementation of the measures provided for in these resolutions; 
 
HIGHLIGHTING the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (2000) on the role 
of the trade in conflict diamonds in fuelling armed conflict, which called on the international 
community to give urgent and careful consideration to devising effective and pragmatic 
measures to address this problem; 
 
FURTHER HIGHLIGHTING the recommendation in United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 55/56 that the international community develop detailed proposals for a simple 
and workable international certification scheme for rough diamonds based primarily on 
national certification schemes and on agreed minimum standards; 
 
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process, which was established to find a solution to the 
international problem of conflict diamonds, was inclusive of concerned stake holders, namely 
producing, exporting and importing states, the diamond industry and civil society; 
 
CONVINCED that the opportunity for conflict diamonds to play a role in fuelling armed 
conflict can be seriously reduced by introducing a certification scheme for rough diamonds 
designed to exclude conflict diamonds from the legitimate trade; 
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RECALLING that the Kimberley Process considered that an international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds, based on national laws and practices and meeting internationally 
agreed minimum standards, will be the most effective system by which the problem of 
conflict diamonds could be addressed; 
 
ACKNOWLEDGING the important initiatives already taken to address this problem, in 
particular by the governments of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and 
Sierra Leone and by other key producing, exporting and importing countries, as well as by 
the diamond industry, in particular by the World Diamond Council, and by civil society; 
 
WELCOMING voluntary self-regulation initiatives announced by the diamond industry and 
recognising that a system of such voluntary self-regulation contributes to ensuring an 
effective internal control system of rough diamonds based upon the international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds; 
 
RECOGNISING that an international certification scheme for rough diamonds will only be 
credible if all Participants have established internal systems of control designed to eliminate 
the presence of conflict diamonds in the chain of producing, exporting and importing rough 
diamonds within their own territories, while taking into account that differences in production 
methods and trading practices as well as differences in institutional controls thereof may 
require different approaches to meet minimum standards; 
 
FURTHER RECOGNISING that the international certification scheme for rough diamonds 
must be consistent with international law governing international trade; 
 
ACKNOWLEDGING that state sovereignty should be fully respected and the principles of 
equality, mutual benefits and consensus should be adhered to; 
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RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS: 
 
SECTION I 
 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of the international certification scheme for rough diamonds (hereinafter 
referred to as „the Certification Scheme‟) the following definitions apply: 
 
CONFLICT DIAMONDS means rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to 
finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in 
other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and 
recognised in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other 
similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future; 
 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN means the country where a shipment of rough diamonds has been 
mined or extracted; 
 
COUNTRY OF PROVENANCE means the last Participant from where a shipment of rough 
diamonds was exported, as recorded on import documentation; 
 
DIAMOND means a natural mineral consisting essentially of pure crystallised carbon in the 
isometric system, with a hardness on the Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a specific gravity of 
approximately 3.52 and a refractive index of 2.42; 
 
EXPORT means the physical leaving/taking out of any part of the geographical territory of a 
Participant; 
 
EXPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a 
Participant from whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving, and which are 
authorised to validate the Kimberley Process Certificate; 
 
FREE TRADE ZONE means a part of the territory of a Participant where any goods 
introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being 
outside the customs territory; 
 
IMPORT means the physical entering/bringing into any part of the geographical territory of a 
Participant; 
 
IMPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) designated by a 
Participant into whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is imported to conduct all 
import formalities and particularly the verification of accompanying Kimberley Process 
Certificates; 
 
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE means a forgery resistant document with a 
particular format which identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in compliance with 
the requirements of the Certification Scheme; 
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OBSERVER means a representative of civil society, the diamond industry, international 
organisations and non-participating governments invited to take part in Plenary meetings; 
(Further consultations to be undertaken by the Chair.) 
 
PARCEL means one or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not 
individualised; 
 
PARCEL OF MIXED ORIGIN means a parcel that contains rough diamonds from two or 
more countries of origin, mixed together; 
 
PARTICIPANT means a state or a regional economic integration organisation for which the 
Certification Scheme is effective; (Further consultations to be undertakenby the Chair.) 
 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ORGANISATION means an organisation 
comprised of sovereign states that have transferred competence to that organisation in respect 
of matters governed by the Certification Scheme; 
 
ROUGH DIAMONDS means diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted 
and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 
7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31; 
 
SHIPMENT means one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported; 
 
TRANSIT means the physical passage across the territory of a Participant or a non- 
Participant, with or without transhipment, warehousing or change in mode of transport, when 
such passage is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the 
frontier of the Participant or non-Participant across whose territory a shipment passes; 
 
 
SECTION II 
The Kimberley Process Certificate 
 
Each Participant should ensure that: 
(a)  a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the Certificate) accompanies 
each shipment of rough diamonds on export; 
(b)  its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of the Kimberley 
Process as set out in Section IV; 
(c)  Certificates meet the minimum requirements set out in Annex I. As long as these 
requirements are met, Participants may at their discretion establish additional 
characteristics for their own Certificates, for example their form, additional data or 
security elements; 
(d)  it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the features of its Certificate as 
specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation. 
 
SECTION III 
Undertakings in respect of the international trade in rough diamonds 
 
Each Participant should: 
(a)  with regard to shipments of rough diamonds exported to a Participant, require that each 
such shipment is accompanied by a duly validated Certificate; 
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(b)  with regard to shipments of rough diamonds imported from a Participant: 
•  require a duly validated Certificate; 
•  ensure that confirmation of receipt is sent expeditiously to the relevant Exporting 
Authority. The confirmation should as a minimum refer to the Certificate number, 
the number of parcels, the carat weight and the details of the importer and 
exporter; 
•  require that the original of the Certificate be readily accessible for a period of no 
less than three years; 
(c)  ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non- 
Participant; 
(d)  recognise that Participants through whose territory shipments transit are not required to 
meet the requirement of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, and of Section II (a) provided 
that the designated authorities of the Participant through whose territory a shipment 
passes, ensure that the shipment leaves its territory in an identical state as it entered its 
territory (ie unopened and not tampered with). 
 
SECTION IV 
Internal Controls 
 
Undertakings by Participants 
 
Each Participant should: 
(a)  establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict 
diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported from its 
territory; 
(b)  designate an Importing and an Exporting Authority(ies); 
(c)  ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper resistant containers; 
(d)  as required, amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce 
the Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for 
transgressions; 
(e)  collect and maintain relevant official production, import and export data, and collate 
and exchange such data in accordance with the provisions of Section V. 
(f)  when establishing a system of internal controls, take into account, where appropriate, 
the further options and recommendations for internal controls as elaborated in Annex 
II. 
 
Principles of Industry Self-Regulation 
 
Participants understand that a voluntary system of industry self-regulation, as referred to in 
the Preamble of this Document, will provide for a system of warranties underpinned through 
verification by independent auditors of individual companies and supported by internal 
penalties set by industry, which will help to facilitate the full traceability of rough diamond 
transactions by government authorities. 
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Section V 
Co-operation and Transparency 
 
Participants should: 
(a)  provide to each other through the Chair information identifying their designated 
authorities or bodies responsible for implementing the provisions of this Certification 
Scheme. Each Participant should provide to other Participants through the Chair 
information, preferably in electronic format, on its relevant laws, regulations, rules, 
procedures and practices, and update that information as required. This should include a 
synopsis in English of the essential content of this information; 
(b)  compile and make available to all other Participants through the Chair statistical data in 
line with the principles set out in Annex III; 
(c)  exchange on a regular basis experiences and other relevant information, including on 
self-assessment, in order to arrive at the best practice in given circumstances; 
(d)  consider favourably requests from other Participants for assistance to improve the 
functioning of the Certification Scheme within their territories; 
(e)  inform another Participant through the Chair if it considers that the laws, regulations, 
rules, procedures or practices of that other Participant do not ensure the absence of 
conflict diamonds in the exports of that other Participant; 
(f)  cooperate with other Participants to attempt to resolve problems which may arise from 
unintentional circumstances and which could lead to non-fulfilment of the minimum 
requirements for the issuance or acceptance of the Certificates, and inform all other 
Participants of the essence of the problems encountered and of solutions found; 
(g)  encourage, through their relevant authorities, closer co-operation between law 
enforcement agencies and between customs agencies of Participants. 
 
Section VI 
Administrative Matters 
 
MEETINGS 
1.  Participants and Observers are to meet in Plenary annually, and on other occasions as 
Participants may deem necessary, in order to discuss the effectiveness of the 
Certification Scheme. 
2.  Participants should adopt Rules of Procedure for such meetings at the first Plenary 
meeting. 
3.  Meetings are to be held in the country where the Chair is located, unless a Participant or 
an international organisation offers to host a meeting and this offer has been accepted. 
The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings. 
4.  At the end of each Plenary meeting, a Chair would be elected to preside over all 
Plenary meetings, ad hoc working groups and other subsidiary bodies, which might be 
formed until the conclusion of the next annual Plenary meeting. 
5.  Participants are to reach decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus proves to 
be impossible, the Chair is to conduct consultations. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT 
6.  For the effective administration of the Certification Scheme, administrative support will 
be necessary. The modalities and functions of that support should be discussed at the 
first Plenary meeting, following endorsement by the UN General Assembly. 
7.  Administrative support could include the following functions: 
(a)  to serve as a channel of communication, information sharing and consultation between 
the Participants with regard to matters provided for in this Document; 
(b)  to maintain and make available for the use of all Participants a collection of those laws, 
regulations, rules, procedures, practices and statistics notified pursuant to Section V; 
(c)  to prepare documents and provide administrative support for Plenary and working 
group meetings; 
(d)  to undertake such additional responsibilities as the Plenary meetings, or any working 
group delegated by Plenary meetings, may instruct. 
 
PARTICIPATION 
8.  Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis 
to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the requirements of that Scheme. 
9.  Any applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme should signify its 
interest by notifying the Chair through diplomatic channels. This notification should 
include the information set forth in paragraph (a) of Section V and be circulated to all 
Participants within one month. 
10.  Participants intend to invite representatives of civil society, the diamond industry, non-
participating governments and international organisations to participate in Plenary 
meetings as Observers. 
 
PARTICIPANT MEASURES 
11.  Participants are to prepare, and make available to other Participants, in advance of 
annual Plenary meetings of the Kimberley Process, information as stipulated in 
paragraph (a) of Section V outlining how the requirements of the Certification Scheme 
are being implemented within their respective jurisdictions. 
12.  The agenda of annual Plenary meetings is to include an item where information as 
stipulated in paragraph (a) of Section V is reviewed and Participants can provide further 
details of their respective systems at the request of the Plenary. 
13. Where further clarification is needed, Participants at Plenary meetings, upon 
recommendation by the Chair, can identify and decide on additional verification 
measures to be undertaken. Such measures are to be implemented in accordance with 
applicable national and international law. These could include, but need not be limited 
to measures such as; 
a.  requesting additional information and clarification from Participants; 
b.  review missions by other Participants or their representatives where there are 
credible indications of significant non-compliance with the Certification Scheme. 
14.  Review missions are to be conducted in an analytical, expert and impartial manner with 
the consent of the Participant concerned. The size, composition, terms of reference and 
time-frame of these missions should be based on the circumstances and be established 
by the Chair with the consent of the Participant concerned and in consultation with all 
Participants. 
15.  A report on the results of compliance verification measures is to be forwarded to the 
Chair and to the Participant concerned within three weeks of completion of the mission. 
Any comments from that Participant as well as the report, are to be posted on the 
restricted access section of an official Certification Scheme website no later than three 
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weeks after the submission of the report to the Participant concerned. Participants and 
Observers should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issue 
and the discussions relating to any compliance matter. 
 
COMPLIANCE AND DISPUTE PREVENTION 
16.  In the event that an issue regarding compliance by a Participant or any other issue 
regarding the implementation of the Certification Scheme arises, any concerned 
Participant may so inform the Chair, who is to inform all Participants without delay 
about the said concern and enter into dialogue on how to address it. Participants and 
Observers should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issue 
and the discussions relating to any compliance matter. 
 
MODIFICATIONS 
17.  This document may be modified by consensus of the Participants. 
18.  Modifications may be proposed by any Participant. Such proposals should be sent in 
writing to the Chair, at least ninety days before the next Plenary meeting, unless 
otherwise agreed. 
19.  The Chair is to circulate any proposed modification expeditiously to all Participants and 
Observers and place it on the agenda of the next annual Plenary meeting. 
 
REVIEW MECHANISM 
20.  Participants intend that the Certification Scheme should be subject to periodic review, 
to allow Participants to conduct a thorough analysis of all elements contained in the 
scheme. The review should also include consideration of the continuing requirement for 
such a scheme, in view of the perception of the Participants, and of international 
organisations, in particular the United Nations, of the continued threat posed at that 
time by conflict diamonds. The first such review should take place no later than three 
years after the effective starting date of the Certification Scheme. The review meeting 
should normally coincide with the annual Plenary meeting, unless otherwise agreed. 
 
 
THE START OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHEME 
21.  The Certification Scheme should be established at the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds in Interlaken on 5 
November 2002. 
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Annex I 
Certificates 
 
A.  Minimum requirements for Certificates 
 
A  Certificate is to meet the following minimum requirements: 
•  Each Certificate should bear the title „Kimberley Process Certificate‟ and the 
following statement: „The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
for rough diamonds‟ 
•  Country of origin for shipment of parcels of unmixed (ie from the same) origin 
•  Certificates may be issued in any language, provided that an English translation is 
incorporated 
•  Unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO 3166-1 
•  Tamper and forgery resistant 
•  Date of issuance 
•  Date of expiry 
•  Issuing authority 
•  Identification of exporter and importer 
•  Carat weight/mass 
•  Value in US$ 
•  Number of parcels in shipment 
•  Relevant Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
•  Validation of Certificate by the Exporting Authority 
 
B.  Optional Certificate Elements 
A  Certificate may include the following optional features: 
•  Characteristics of a Certificate (for example as to form, additional data or security 
elements) 
•  Quality characteristics of the rough diamonds in the shipment 
•  A recommended import confirmation part should have the following elements: 
Country of destination 
Identification of importer 
Carat/weight and value in US$ 
Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 
Date of receipt by Importing Authority 
Authentication by Importing Authority 
 
C.  Optional Procedures 
Rough diamonds may be shipped in transparent security bags. 
The unique Certificate number may be replicated on the container. 
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Annex II 
Recommendations as provided for in Section IV, paragraph (f) 
 
General Recommendations 
1.  Participants may appoint an official coordinator(s) to deal with the implementation of 
the Certification Scheme. 
2.  Participants may consider the utility of complementing and/or enhancing the collection 
and publication of the statistics identified in Annex III based on the contents of 
Kimberley Process Certificates. 
3.  Participants are encouraged to maintain the information and data required by Section V 
on a computerised database. 
4.  Participants are encouraged to transmit and receive electronic messages in order to 
support the Certification Scheme. 
5.  Participants that produce diamonds and that have rebel groups suspected of mining 
diamonds within their territories are encouraged to identify the areas of rebel diamond 
mining activity and provide this information to all other Participants. This information 
should be updated on a regular basis. 
6.  Participants are encouraged to make known the names of individuals or companies 
convicted of activities relevant to the purposes of the Certification Scheme to all other 
Participants through the Chair. 
7.  Participants are encouraged to ensure that all cash purchases of rough diamonds are 
routed through official banking channels, supported by verifiable documentation. 
8.  Participants that produce diamonds should analyse their diamond production under the 
following headings: 
•  Characteristics of diamonds produced 
•  Actual production 
 
Recommendations for Control over Diamond Mines 
9.  Participants are encouraged to ensure that all diamond mines are licensed and to allow 
only those mines so licensed to mine diamonds. 
10.  Participants are encouraged to ensure that prospecting and mining companies maintain 
effective security standards to ensure that conflict diamonds do not contaminate 
legitimate production. 
 
Recommendations for Participants with Small-scale Diamond Mining 
11.  All artisinal and informal diamond miners should be licensed and only those persons so 
licensed should be allowed to mine diamonds. 
12.  Licensing records should contain the following minimum information: name, address, 
nationality and/or residence status and the area of authorised diamond mining activity. 
 
Recommendations for Rough Diamond Buyers, Sellers and Exporters 
13.  All diamond buyers, sellers, exporters, agents and courier companies involved in 
carrying rough diamonds should be registered and licensed by each Participant‟s 
relevant authorities. 
14.  Licensing records should contain the following minimum information: name, address 
and nationality and/or residence status. 
15.  All rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters should be required by law to keep for a 
period of five years daily buying, selling or exporting records listing the names of 
buying or selling clients, their license number and the amount and value of diamonds 
sold, exported or purchased. 
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16.  The information in paragraph 14 above should be entered into a computerised database, 
to facilitate the presentation of detailed information relating to the activities of 
individual rough diamond buyers and sellers. 
 
Recommendations for Export Processes 
17.  A exporter should submit a rough diamond shipment to the relevant Exporting 
Authority. 
18.  The Exporting Authority is encouraged, prior to validating a Certificate, to require an 
exporter to provide a declaration that the rough diamonds being exported are not 
conflict diamonds. 
19.  Rough diamonds should be sealed in a tamper proof container together with the 
Certificate or a duly authenticated copy. The Exporting Authority should then transmit 
a detailed e-mail message to the relevant Importing Authority containing information 
on the carat weight, value, country of origin or provenance, importer and the serial 
number of the Certificate. 
20.  The Exporting Authority should record all details of rough diamond shipments on a 
computerised database. 
 
Recommendations for Import Processes 
21.  The Importing Authority should receive an e-mail message either before or upon arrival 
of a rough diamond shipment. The message should contain details such as the carat 
weight, value, country of origin or provenance, exporter and the serial number of the 
Certificate. 
22.  The Importing Authority should inspect the shipment of rough diamonds to verify that 
the seals and the container have not been tampered with and that the export was 
performed in accordance with the Certification Scheme. 
23.  The Importing Authority should open and inspect the contents of the shipment to verify 
the details declared on the Certificate. 
24.  Where applicable and when requested, the Importing Authority should send the return 
slip or import confirmation coupon to the relevant Exporting Authority. 
25.  The Importing Authority should record all details of rough diamond shipments on a 
computerised database. 
 
Recommendations on Shipments to and from Free Trade Zones 
26.  Shipments of rough diamonds to and from free trade zones should be processed by the 
designated authorities. 
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Annex III 
Statistics 
Recognising that reliable and comparable data on the production and the international trade in 
rough diamonds are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the Certification 
Scheme, and particularly for identifying any irregularities or anomalies which could indicate 
that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade, Participants strongly support the 
following principles, taking into account the need toprotect commercially sensitive 
information: 
(a)  to keep and publish within two months of the reference period and in a standardised 
format, quarterly aggregate statistics on rough diamond exports and imports, as well as 
the numbers of certificates validated for export, and of imported shipments 
accompanied by Certificates; 
(b)  to keep and publish statistics on exports and imports, by origin and provenance 
wherever possible; by carat weight and value; and under the relevant Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) classifications 7102.10; 7102.21; 
7102.31; 
(c)  to keep and publish on a semi-annual basis and within two months of the reference 
period statistics on rough diamond production by carat weight and by value. In the 
event that a Participant is unable to publish these statistics it should notify the Chair 
immediately; 
(d)  to collect and publish these statistics by relying in the first instance on existing national 
processes and methodologies; 
(e)  to make these statistics available to an intergovernmental body or to another 
appropriate mechanism identified by the Participants for (1) compilation and 
publication on a quarterly basis in respect of exports and imports, and (2) on a 
semiannual basis in respect of production. These statistics are to be made available for 
analysis by interested parties and by the Participants, individually or collectively, 
according to such terms of reference as may be established by the Participants; 
(f)  to consider statistical information pertaining to the international trade in and production 
of rough diamonds at annual Plenary meetings, with a view to addressing related issues, 
and to supporting effective implementation of the Certification Scheme. 
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